‘Who is My Friend, Who is My Enemy’? Youth and Statebuilding in Timor-Leste
2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 16; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13533310903036426
ISSN1743-906X
Autores Tópico(s)Political Conflict and Governance
ResumoAbstract Timor-Leste was shaken by a violent national crisis from April 2006 to April 2008. This article examines the role that youths played in the crisis by providing an empirical mapping of the groups involved and the dynamics provoking youth participation in violence. Martial arts groups, ritual arts groups and bairo youth groups were dominant in the street violence that left Timor-Leste in turmoil, notably in Dili. The presence and agitation of their members helped to escalate and perpetuate the crisis. This was facilitated by the sheer scale of the groups' memberships, a fluid socio-cultural situation caused by political unrest, and widespread discontent among a young generation detached from the solidarity of Timor-Leste's resistance era. Notes Angela Robson, 'A Society Beset by Fear and Mistrust: East Timor's Past Threatens its Present', Le Monde Diplomatique, Feb. 2008 (at: http://mondediplo.com/2008/02/09timor). For analysis of the UN's activities 1999–2004 see, 'East Timor', in James Dobbins et al., The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005, pp.151–80. For a comprehensive review of Timor-Leste's development since 2002 see, Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach (eds), East Timor: Beyond Independence, Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2007. Joseph Nevins, 'Timor-Leste in 2006: The End of the Post-Independence Honeymoon', Asian Survey, Vol.47, No.1, 2007, p.163. For a detailed description of these events, see UN, 'Report of the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste', Geneva, 2 Oct. 2006 (at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/COITimorLeste.pdf). The most detailed description of the attack can be found in a leaked UN report investigating its own response (at: http://wikileaks.org.uk/leak/unmit-ramos-horta-shooting-2008.pdf). World Bank, 'Timor-Leste's Youth in Crisis: Situational Analysis and Policy Options', Washington DC, 5 Sept. 2007, p.7 (at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTIMORLESTE/Resources/youngincrisienglish.pdf). See also, James Scambary, 'A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste', Australia's Agency for International Development, Canberra, 15 Sept. 2006, p.1 (at: www.etan.org/etanpdf/2006/Report_Youth_Gangs_in_Dili.pdf). United Nations (n.4 above), p.24. International Crisis Group, 'Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis', Asia report no. 120, Brussels, 10 Oct. 2006, p.9. United Nations (n.4 above), p.42. Simon Philpott, 'East Timor's Double Life: Smells Like Westphalian Spirit', Third World Quarterly, Vol.27, No.1, 2006, p.151. International Crisis Group, 'Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform', Asia report no.143, Brussels, 17 Jan. 2008, p.2. Interview with foreign adviser to Ministry of Social Solidarity, Dili, 10 Apr. 2008. Other 'large disaffected groups with youth involvement are the Sagrada Familia and Colimau 2000. They were involved in violence, especially in April 2006, through their links to veteran's movements, hostility to governing parties and/or politicians, and their strong presence in violence-prone neighbourhoods. Scambary (n.6 above), p.5. Ibid., p.2. KS is 'Kera Sakti' ['Powerful Monkey'], PSHT is 'Persaudaraan Setia Hati Terate' ['Brotherhood of the Sacred Heart Water Lily'], and Korka is 'Kmanek Oan Rai Klaren' ['Sacred Children of the Land']. Ibid., pp.14–15. Interview with PSHT leaders, Dili, 11 Apr. 2008. Scambary (n.6 above), p.6. Some ritual art groups, such as 12/12 do physical training, as well as spiritual activities. 7/7 has also gradually infused martial arts training into its programming. Interview with 12/12 members, Dili, 15 Apr. 2008. Secretariat of State for Youth and Sport, National Youth Policy of Timor-Leste, Dili, 14 Nov. 2007, p.6. Interview with international observer, Dili, 11 Apr. 2008. Scambary (n.6 above), p.4. This was a sentiment shared by many Timor-Leste observers, in contrast to sensational press accounts that drew dubious correlations between entire groups and specific criminal incidents. Interview with international observer, Dili, 12 Apr. 2008. PLAN Timor-Leste, 'Like Stepping Stones in the River: Youth Perspectives on the Crisis in Timor-Leste', Dili, May 2007, p.ii (at: www.plan-international.org/wherewework/asia/easttimor/stones/). Ludovic Hood, 'Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999–2004', International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.1, Mar. 2006, pp.68–70. Interview with Alison Cooper, UNMIT spokeswoman, Dili, 15 Apr. 2008. International Crisis Group (n.11 above), p.14. Secretariat of State for Youth and Sport (n.19 above). Interview with Jose Neves, Adviser to Minister of Youth, Dili, 11 Apr. 2008. Ibid. Interview with PSHT leaders (n.16 above). Interview with international legal adviser to Provedor Office, Dili, 14 Apr.2008. Interview with Father Cyrus, Catholic Church of Timor-Leste, 11 Apr. 2008. Ibid. Ibid. Interview with Juan Carlos Arevulo, Deputy Commissioner of UNPOL, Dili, 17 Apr. 2008. This was a sentiment expressed by both Timorese involved in youth issues and general observers of the Timorese political and economic situation. Interview with Timorese adviser on youth issues, Dili, 9 Apr. 2008. UN efforts in Timor-Leste have been described as a statebuilding 'project' in that they were intended to first allow for the emergence of an independent state and, since 2002 to build institutional capacity and encourage an enduring 'liberal peace'. Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, 'Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor-Leste: The Emperor's New Clothes', International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.2, Apr. 2008, p.185. James Cotton, for instance, argued that 'the system of government in Timor-Leste … effectively disintegrated'. 'Timor-Leste and the Discourse of State Failure', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.61, No.4, Dec. 2007, p.455. Lora Horta, 'East Timor Riots Expose a Political Divide', Asia Times (online), 18 May 2006 (at: www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HE18Ae01.html). Interviews with 7/7 leader and Father Cyrus, Catholic Church of Timor-Leste, Dili, 11 Apr. 2008. Robson (n.1 above). Interview with 5/5 members, Dili, 12 Apr. 2008. Christopher Coker terms this outcome as 'Neo-Feudal Security Regimes' whereby individuals look to membership in gangs, clans or other similar groupings for personal security. Humane Warfare, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 115. Interview with Timorese adviser on youth issues (n.37 above). Interview with Josh Trindade, Timorese social scientist/researcher, Dili, 12 Apr. 2008. Interview with PLAN NGO staff, Dili, 21 Apr. 2008. Interview with bairo youth leader, Dili, 16 Apr. 2008. PLAN Timor-Leste (n.23 above), p.iii. Interview with foreign adviser to Secretary of State for Security, Dili, 17 Apr. 2008. World Bank (n.6 above), pp.15–16. Furthermore, a survey of Timorese youth revealed that many young people had 'common knowledge' rather than personal experience of youth violence. PLAN Timor-Leste (n.23 above), p.9. The World Bank reported that youths arrested for street violence had been found with identical sums in US$20 bills after instigating violence, indicating that they could have been bought off. World Bank (n.6 above), pp.15–16. Scambary (n.6 above), p.2. Interview with UNMIT official, Dili, 22 Apr. 2008. There were even reports that the militias which had been used by the Indonesian army in 1999 were being used by political actors to traffic in methamphetamines in order to encourage street violence. Rumour had it that some martial arts groups were involved in distribution through their contacts with the '99 militias now residing in West Timor. Interview with UNMIT official, Dili, 12 Apr. 2008. International Crisis Group (n.8 above), p.i. Paulo Gorjao, 'The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor', Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.24, No.2, Aug. 2002, p.326. Cotton (n.39 above), p.461. World Bank (n.6 above), pp.15–16 and United Nations (n.4 above). Interview with bairo youth leader, Dili, 15 Apr. 2008. Jeffrey Kingston, 'Balancing Justice and Reconciliation in East Timor', Critical Asian Studies, Vol.38, No.3, 2006, p.273. Ian Martin and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, 'The United Nations and East Timor: From Self-Determination to State-Building', International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.1, 2005, p.114. International Crisis Group, Timor-Leste's Displacement Crisis, Asia report no. 148, Brussels, 31 Mar. 2008, p.1. United Nations (n.4 above), see pp.45 ff. Lobato briefly served time in prison but escaped to Malaysia while there for medical treatment. He was eventually pardoned by Ramos-Horta for his actions in the April–May 2006 violence. Interviews with 12/12 member, and Ba Futura [For the Future] NGO staff, Dili, 14–15 Apr. 2008. Simon Chesterman, 'East Timor', in Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (eds), United Nations Interventionism: 1991–2004, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.207. Interview with Juan Carlos Arevulo (n.35 above). Interview with foreign adviser to a government ministry involved in youth issues, Dili, 10 Apr. 2008. Interview with Father Rolando, Catholic Church of Timor-Leste, Dili, 10 Apr. 2008. Interview with Afonso de Jesus, Commander of PNTL, Dili, 12 Apr. 2008. Interview with Nelson Bello, Timorese political activist, Dili, 12 Apr. 2008. Notably, the FALINTIL rebel group relied on a network of 'clandestinos' in towns and villages to supply food, shelter, and intelligence. Jonathon Steele, 'Nation Building in East Timor', World Policy Journal, summer 2002, p.84. This sentiment arose consistently in the author's interviews with youth and has also been routinely highlighted in surveys of youth perceptions of development. PLAN Timor-Leste (n.23 above), p.iv. Interview with 5/5 members, Dili, 12 Apr. 2008. Timorese national identity is formulated on the 'valorization of resistance', namely the struggle against 500 years of Portuguese and Indonesian occupation. Michael Leach, 'History on the Line: East Timorese History after Independence', History Workshop Journal, No.61, 2006, pp.225, 230. Interview with PSHT leaders, Dili, 11 Apr. 2008. The International Crisis Group also commented that Timor-Leste faced 'a culture of political violence, the high incidence of criminality, [and] the gang violence which terrorizes Dili every night'. International Crisis Group (n.11 above), p.i. Lucy Williamson, 'The Tears of East Timor's Youth', BBC News, 21 Feb. 2008 (at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7397472.stm). Also see PLAN Timor-Leste (n.23 above), p.ii. Interview with Joaquim Fonseca, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, Dili, 15 Apr. 2008. Interview with Eduardo Soares, Timorese social scientist/researcher, Dili, 7 Apr. 2008. World Bank (n.6 above), p.7. Ibid., p.2. Ibid., p.10. United Nations, 'United Nations System in Timor-Leste Briefing Kit', Dili, Sept. 2007, p.16. Interview with international observer, Dili, 11 Apr. 2008. Interview with foreign adviser to Secretary of State for Security, Dili, 17 Apr. 2008. Interviews with 'Suco Xefe' (village leader) and a bairo youth leader, Dili, 15 Apr. 2008. Interview with a bairo youth leader, Dili, 16 Apr. 2008. Martial arts leaders for their parts felt that joint training with other groups and 'friendship meetings' were valuable for reconciliation. Interview with PSHT leaders, Dili, 11 Apr. 2008.
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