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Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 30; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10576100601148449

1521-0731

Svante Cornell,

Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

Abstract The link between armed conflict and the production and trafficking of illicit drugs has been much noted in the popular literature, and recent research tentatively indicates a link between lootable resources, including narcotics, and conflict duration. Yet the specific dynamics of the linkage between narcotics and conflict remain poorly understood. Evolving theory on the link between organized crime and terrorism enhances and supplements the debate on economic incentives in civil war, proposing mechanisms whereby insurgent groups interact with narcotics production—a crime–rebellion nexus. Studies of nine major narcotics-producing areas indicates strong support for this nexus. Rather than generating or being generated by drug cultivation, armed conflict qualitatively and quantitatively transforms existing drug cultivation. Importantly, armed conflict is itself deeply affected by the narcotics industry, which tends to strengthen the capacity of insurgent movements while weakening that of the state. A momentous aspect of the crime–rebellion nexus is the effect that the drug industry tends to have on the motivational structures of insurgent groups: criminal involvement in some instances creates an economic function of war and vested interests in the continuation of armed conflict. This has substantial implications for strategies to resolve armed conflict involving the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Acknowledgments Research for this article was made possible by support from the Office of the Swedish National Drug Policy Coordinator and the Swedish Emergency Management Agency. Notes 1. Michael L. Ross, "Oil, Drugs and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil Wars," in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp. 47–70; Ross, "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War," Journal of Peace Research 41(3), pp. 337–356; Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases," International Organization 58 (Winter 2004), pp. 35–67; James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?," Journal of Peace Research 41(3) (2004), pp. 275–301. 2. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources …", p. 43; D. Scott Bennett and Alan C. Stam, "The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816–1985," American Political Science Review, 90 (2) (1996), pp. 239–257. 3. Ted R. Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and Accommodation at the End of the 20th Century (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2000); Michael E. Brown, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, 18(4) (1994), 5–39; David A. Lake and Donal Rotschild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21(2) (1996), pp. 41–75. 4. David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars (London: Adelphi Paper no. 320, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," (Washington, DC: World Bank, October 2001); Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, "Introduction," in Berdal and Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000) pp. 1–18.; Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 5. H. I. Grossman, "Kleptocracy and Revolutions," Oxford Economic Papers 51 (1999), pp. 267–283; Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." 6. Collier and Hoeffler, fn 4, p. 2. 7. David Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence," in Mats Berdal and David D. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 19–42. 8. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars," Washington, DC: World Bank, WPS 2000–18, p. 1. 9. Collier and Hoeffler, fn 4, p. 16. 10. Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict, International Peace Academy Policy Report, October 2003, p. 1. 11. Ross, "What Do We Know," fn 1, pp. 337–338. 12. Ibid., p. 338. 13. Philippe Le Billon, "The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts," Political Georgraphy 20(5) (2001), pp. 561–584. 14. Ross, "Oil, Drugs and Diamonds," pp. 47–70. 15. Macartan Humpreys, "Natural Resource, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution," Santa Fe Institute/Javeriana University Workshop on "Obstacles to Robust Negotiated Settlements," Bogotá, 29–31 May 2003. 16. James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?," Journal of Peace Research 41(3) (2004), pp. 283–284. 17. Ross, "What Do We Know," fn 1, pp. 344–345. 18. I. William Zartman, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments," The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1(1) (2001), pp. 8–18. 19. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narcoterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Chris Dishman, "Terrorism, Crime and Transformation," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24(1), pp. 43–58; Glenn E. Schweitzer, A Faceless Enemy: The Origins of Modern Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2002), pp. 287–289; Tamara Makarenko, "Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade," Harvard Asia Quarterly, (Spring 2002). Also Ekaterina Stepanova, Rol' narkobiznesa v politekonomii konfliktov i terrorizma [The Role of Drugs in the Political Economy of Conflict and Terrorism] (Moscow: Ves Mir, 2005), with English summary, pp. 302–310; Pablo Dreyfus, "Sendero Luminoso: Un caso de Narcoterrorismo?," Boletín Saap, Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político, No. 8, (1999); Luis Alberto Villamarin, Narcoterrorismo: La Guerra del Nuevo Siglo (Madrid: Nowtilus, 2005). 20. The analytical construction of the crime–terror nexus was originally conceptualized specifically for terrorism. However, it captures the dynamic of all politically motivated non-state violent actors, including separatist and insurgent groups whether or not they use terrorist tactics. As such, this article does not differentiate among groups based on whether or not they use terrorist tactics. 21. Tamara Makarenko, "A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relationships," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 August 2003. 22. Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security," Survival 36(1) (1994), p. 96. 23. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 43. 24. Williams, fn 22, p. 96. 25. Kimberley Thachuk, "Transnational Threats: Falling Through the Cracks?" Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 10(1) (2001), p. 51. 26. Alain Labrousse, Géopolitique des Drogues (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004), p. 72. 27. Tamara Makarenko, "Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: Tracing the Crime-Terror Nexus in Southeast Asia," in Paul Smith, ed., Terrorism and Transnational Violence in Southeast Asia: Challenges to States and Regional Stability (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). 28. Thomas M. Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines," SAIS Review 24(1) (Winter–Spring 2004), pp. 49–61. 29. Barbara Harriss-White, "Globalization, Insecurities and Responses: An Introductory Essay," in Harriss-White, ed., Globalisation and Insecurity: Political, Economic and Physical Challenges (New York: Palgrave, 2002); H. Richard Fridman and Peter Andreas, eds., The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 1–43. 30. Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Networks," in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), pp. 61–97. Melvin Levitzky, "Transnational Criminal Networks and International Security," Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 30 (2003), pp. 227–240; Svante E. Cornell, "Crime Without Borders," Axess Magazine No. 6 (2004), pp. 18–21. 31. Makarenko, fn 21; Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Crime and Terrorism," Global Crime 6(1) (Spring 2004), pp. 129–145. 32. Adapted from Tamara Makarenko's concept of the Crime–Terror Nexus. See Makarenko, "A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relationships," fn 21. 33. Dishman, fn 19. 34. Makarenko, "Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade," fn 19. 35. Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum," fn 31; Schweitzer, fn 19, pp. 287–289. 36. Karen Ballentine, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict," in Ballentine and Sherma, fn 1, p. 262. 37. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Les Territoires de l'Opium: Conflits et Trafics du Triangle d'Or et du Croissant d'Or (Geneva: Editions Olizane, 2002), pp. 43–67. 38. This includes eight conflicts in Myanmar, and one each in Laos, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Colombia, Peru and Mexico. Mikael Eriksson and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict, 1989–2003," Journal of Peace Research, 41(5) (2004), pp. 625–636. 39. Chouvy, fn 37, p. 113. 40. Edmundo Morales, "Coca and Cocaine Economy and Social Change in Peru," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35(1) (October 1986), pp. 143–161; Chouvy, fn 37. 41. Alain Labrousse, "Colombie: Le role de la drogue dans l'extension territoriale des FARC-EP (1978–2002)," Géopolitique des Drogues Illicites, Hérodote No. 112 (Paris: La Découverte, 2004). 42. Michael Farrell and John Marsden, "Methamphetamine: Drug Use and Psychoses Becomes a Major Public Health Issue in the Asia Pacific Region, Addiction 97(7) pp. 771–772. 43. International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board (New York: United Nations Publications, 2000–2003); UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends (2000–2003). 44. Peter Reuter and David Ronfeldt, "Quest for Integrity: The Mexican-US Drug Issue in the 1980s, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 34(3) (1992), pp. 89–153; Luis Astorga, "The Limits of Anti-Drug Policy in Mexico," International Social Science Journal 56(169) (2001), pp. 427–434. 45. Ikramul Haq, "Pak-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspective," Asian Survey 36(10) (October 1996), pp. 945–963. 46. Exact production figures are unfortunately not available for all states. UNODC only provides cultivation data for the past few decades, whereas information from the time of conflict onset in Colombia and Burma, especially, is absent. 47. Laos, Mexico, Pakistan, and Thailand experienced either no conflict (Thailand), minor armed conflict (Laos), or unrelated armed conflict (Pakistan, Mexico). In the latter two cases, a theoretically possible linkage would be that drug corruption decreases government legitimacy and increases grievances—but this proposition lies outside the scope of this study. 48. Nancy McGuire, Combating Coca in Bolivia and Colombia: A New Perspective on the Forces that Drive Peasant Coca Farming (Washington, DC: Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, December 2002). 49. Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). 50. See UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004 (Vienna: United Nations, November 2004). 51. Bolivia, Thailand, and Pakistan are left out in this section, given the absence of conflict. 52. Dishman, fn 19, p. 47. The EZLN received significant licit external funding, and may have anticipated that involvement in the drug trade would jeopardize its significant international goodwill and lead to increased American counterinsurgency assistance to the Mexican government. 53. Farhat Haq, "Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization," Asian Survey 35(11) (November 1995), pp. 990–1004; Moonis Ahmar, "Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: The Karachi Crisis," Asian Survey 36(10) (October 1996), pp. 1031–1048. 54. Stephen T. Johnson, "Laos in 1992: Succession and Consolidation," Asian Survey 33(1) (January 1993), pp. 75–82. 55. Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991). 56. By contrast, 225 tons were estimated for 1987 and 255 for 1988; with 265 for 1991, 230 for 1992, and 85 for 1994. However, a renewed increase in production after 1995 did not see a visible increase in the insurgency. United States of America, Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997 (Washington, DC: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, 1998). 57. Personal communication, UNODC representative, February 2005. 58. Officially, the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan. 59. Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London: Pluto, 2001). 60. McCoy, fn 54; John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 61. James Rupert and Steve Coll, "U.S. Declines to Probe Afghan Drug Trade," The Washington Post, 13 May 1990, p. A1. 62. Haq, fn 45; Ishtiaq Ahmad, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: An Afghan Trail from Jihad to Terrorism (Islamabad: STEP, 2004). 63. Hamida Ghafour, "Spicy Solution to the Afghan Poppy Problem," Los Angeles Times, 5 April 2004, p. A3; Ghafour, "Poverty and Terrorism Fuel Booming Drug Trade in Afghanistan," Telegraph, 24 August 2004; Integrated Regional Information Network, "Afghanistan: Donor-Supported Approaches to Eradication," 24 August 2004. 64. UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003. 65. Jonathan Goodhand, "From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North Eastern Afghanistan," Central Asian Survey 19(2) (2000), pp. 265–280. 66. U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001 (Washington, DC: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, 2002). 67. Svante E. Cornell, "Taliban Afghanistan: A True Ideological State?" in Brenda Shaffer, ed., The Limits of Culture: Foreign Policy, Islam, and the Caspian (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). 68. Makarenko, "Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade," fn 19; Christopher M. Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL32686, 7 December 2004. 69. Drug Enforcement Administration, "Burma: Country Brief," Drug Intelligence Brief (May 2002); Lintner, fn 49. 70. Chouvy, fn 37, pp. 78–84. 71. Lintner, fn 49; Alan Dupont, "Transnational Crime, Drugs and Security in East Asia," Asian Survey 39(3) (1999), pp. 433–455. 72. DEA, fn 67, p. 2. 73. Dupont, fn 69, p. 442. 74. Chouvy, fn 37, p. 118; Dupont, fn. 69, p. 442. 75. Aside from Burma's KKY and Colombia's AUC, paramilitary village guard formations in southeastern Turkey and the pro-Russian Chechen administration are two other examples of the same phenomenon. 76. DEA, fn 67, p. 5. 77. Chouvy, fn 37, p. 120. 78. Peter Chalk and Angel Rabasa, The Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 23–24. 79. Richard B. Craig, "Colombian Narcotics and United States-Colombian Relations," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 23(3) (August 1981), p. 244. 80. Labrousse, fn 41, p. 32. 81. Ana María Díaz and Fabio Sánchez, Geography of Illicit Crops (Coca Leaf) and Armed Conflict in Colombia, Working Paper, Crisis State Program, London School of Economics, 2004, p. 53. 82. Labrousse, fn 41, pp. 38–39; Chalk and Rabasa, fn 76; Rensselaer Lee III, "Dimensions of the South American Cocaine Industry," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30(2/3) (1988), p. 99. 83. Chalk and Rabasa, fn 77, p. 33. 84. "The Andean Coca Wars: The Crop that Refuses to Die," The Economist, 4 March 2000. 85. James Ron, "Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso's Tactical Escalation," Journal of Peace Research 38(5) (2001), pp. 569–592. 86. Bruce H. Kay, "Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of 'King Coca' and Shining Path," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 41 (3) (Autumn 1999), p. 102; Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano and John Reuter, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism (New York: Praeger and CSIS, Washington Papers Series, 1990). 87. David Scott Palmer, "Peru, the Drug Business and Shining Path: Between Scylla and Charybdis?" Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 34(3) (1992), p. 70. 88. Kay, fn 84, 104. 89. Dìaz and Sanchez, fn 80. 90. This situation is present in numerous conflict zones, even where narcotics are not grown. The criminalization of both sides in the war in Chechnya, for example, is a case in point. See Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., Mafia in Uniform: The Criminalization of the Russian Armed Forces (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1995); Mark Phythian, "The Illicit Arms Trade: Cold War and Post-Cold War," Crime, Law and Social Change 33(1) pp. 1–52. 91. Lee, fn 80, pp. 171–174. 92. Peter Andreas, "Profits, Poverty and Illegality: The Logic of Drug Corruption," NACLA 27(3) (1993), pp. 22–28. 93. David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirt Politics and Democracies (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999). 94. Dupont, fn 69; Richard M. Gibson and John B. Haseman, "Prospects for Controlling Narcotics Production and Trafficking in Myanmar," Contemporary Southeast Asia 25(1) (April 2003), pp. 1–19; Chouvy, fn 37; Altsean-Burma, A Failing Grade: Burma's Narcotics Eradication Efforts (Bangkok: Altsean, 2004).