Engagement without Recognition: A New Strategy toward Abkhazia and Eurasia's Unrecognized States
2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 33; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/0163660x.2010.516183
ISSN1530-9177
AutoresAlexander Cooley, Lincoln A. Mitchell,
Tópico(s)European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge the support of the Smith Richardson Foundation for this research Notes 1. For an analysis of the background causes and a timeline of the lead-up to the conflict, see “The Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia,” September 2009, http://www.ceiig.ch/. For further analyses of Russia's intentions and the causes of the conflict, see Charles King, “The Five-Way War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 6 (November/December 2008): 2–11. ; Svante Cornell and Frederick Starr, eds. The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2009); Ronald Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 2. On how the U.S.–Georgian relationship evolved before the war, see Alexander Cooley and Lincoln A. Mitchell, “No Way to Treat Our Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.–Georgian Relations,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 1 (January 2009): 27–41. 3. See “Putin Urges Consensus on Kosovo,” BBC News, January 17, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7193225.stm. 4. For an exceptional study that advanced proposals for various alternative sovereign arrangements, see Bruno Coppieters, David Darchiashvili, and Natella Akaba, eds., Federal Practice: Exploring Alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia (Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000). 5. On the particularities of South Ossetia, see International Crisis Group (ICG), “Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly,” Europe Report, no. 183 (June 7, 2007), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/183_georgia_s_south_ossetia_conflict_make_haste_slowly.ashx. 6. In 2010 alone, 42 percent of ethnic Armenians, 58 percent of ethnic Russians, 78 percent of ethnic Abkhaz, and even 47 percent of ethnic Georgians view independent statehood as the best political outcome for Abkhazia. See John O'Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gerard Toal, “Contemporary Attitudes and Beliefs in Transdnestria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: A Preliminary Analysis of Survey Data,” presentation at the Kennan Institute, Washington, D.C., April 26, 2010, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/Toal_OLoughlin_Kolossov1.pdf. 7. See Freedom House's 2009 assessment of Abkhazia's political institutions, which it characterizes as “partly free.” See Freedom House, “Freedom in the World—Abkhazia (2009),” http://freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2009&country=7744&pf. 8. See ICG, “Abkhazia: Ways Forward,” Europe Report, no. 179 (January 18, 2007), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/179_abkhazia___ways_forward.ashx. 9. Reactions from Abkhaz officials on the status of internally displaced persons (IDPs) range from defensive, noting that Abkahzia did accept the return of 30,000 residents of Gali, to simply admitting that the return of IDPs is an impossibility as it would threaten the demography and Abkhazia's aspirations to statehood. Interviews by authors, Sukhumi, Georgia, April 15–16, 2010. 10. Belarus sent fact-finding delegations to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and undisputed Georgia to investigate the issue and make recommendations to President Alexander Lukashenko. Some have suggested that Lukashenko accepted an emergency economic aid package from Moscow in 2009 on the condition that he recognizes the breakaway territories, but such a decision has not been forthcoming. See, for instance, “Belarus Seeks $3b Loan from Moscow,” Associated Press, December 22, 2008, http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/12/22/belarus-russia.html. 11. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili at Camera Spray Before Their Meeting,” New York, September 21, 2009, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/09/129442.htm. 12. “EU, U.S. Reject Abkhaz Elections,” Civil.Ge, December 15, 2009, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21782. 13. See Cooley and Mitchell, “Recasting Recent U.S.–Georgian Relations.” 14. On Georgia's strategic use of historical narratives to gain U.S. support, see Lincoln A. Mitchell, “Georgia's Story: Competing Narratives Since the War,” Survival 51, no. 4 (August-September 2009): 87–100. 15. For important distinctions among different elements of sovereignty, see Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 16. See ICG, “Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence,” Europe Report, no. 202, February 26, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/202_abkhazia___deepening_dependence.ashx. 17. Authors’ interviews with Abkhazian media representatives confirmed that this internal debate about growing dependence on Russia is now the primary foreign policy concern in Abkhazia. Interviews by authors, Sukhumi, Georgia, April 14, 2010. 18. See “Bozbuzhdayoushaya Druzhba” [Excitatory Friendship], Kommersant, June 6, 2009, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?fromsearch=4b6cfe8f-0847-4245-808a-54b658638948&docsid=1173036 (in Russian). 19. Abkhaz parliamentarian, interview by authors, Sukhumi, April 15, 2010. 20. “Moscow Signs Agreement to Station Military Bases in Abkhazia,” MosNews.com, March 10, 2010, http://www.mosnews.com/military/2009/03/06/abbases/. 21. See Samantha Shields, “Russian Presence Grows in Abkhazia,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2009. 22. “Inguri Hydroelectric Plant: Compromise Reached?” Georgia Times, January 12, 2009, http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/articles/5887.html. 23. “Georgia: Abkhazia Hands Airport, Railway Over to Russian Management,” Eurasianet.org, May 17, 2009, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/news/articles/eav051809b.shtml. 24. “Russia's Ministry of Transport Prepares a Whole Range of Intergovernmental Russian-Abkhaz Agreements Covering the Entire Cooperation Spectrum,” Official Website President of the Republic of Abkhazia, July 10, 2009, http://www.abkhaziagov.org/en/news/detail.php?ID=23701. 25. Abkhazian officials, interviews by authors, Sukhumi, April 15–16, 2010 26. These are estimates quoted to the authors by multiple Russian journalists in April 2010 who had covered the breakaway territories in October 2009. Abkhaz officials themselves estimate that the customs venues they collect from the Russian border constitute about 40 percent of their budget. Thus, Russia remains Abkahzia's almost exclusive economic partner, be it for investment, commerce, or as a source of customs duties. 27. Senior Abkhaz official, interview by authors, Sukhumi, April 16, 2010. 28. See Butba's comments in “Abkhazia: Russia's Headache,” Northern Caucasus, no. 23, June 2009, http://en.sknews.ru/main/print:page,1,1795-abkhazia-russias-headache.html. 29. Quoted in Inal Khashig, “Abkhaz Opposition Fear Growing Russian Influence,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, August 7, 2009, http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/abkhaz-opposition-fear-growing-russian-influence. 30. Both Abkhazian de facto President Sergei Bagapsh and de facto Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba have consistently affirmed their commitment to pursue a “multivector” foreign policy. See “Abkhazia: Optimism and Tension,” Intenational Relations and Security Network, August 27, 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=105219. 31. Charles Recknagel, “Smuggling Dispute Between Sukhumi, Tbilisi Enters Uncharted Waters, Legally,” Radio Free Europe, September 4, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Smuggling_Dispute_Between_Sukhumi_Tbilisi_Is_In_Uncharted_Waters_Legally/1814822.html. 32. Georgian officials have affirmed that they are committed to finding a mutually beneficial procedure through which Turkish vessels could visit Abkhazia, but subject to a customs inspection stop by Georgian officials beforehand. 33. See “Ukraine Refuses to Recognize,” RIA Novosti, May 14, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/20100514/159015981.html. Additional informationNotes on contributorsAlexander Cooley Alexander Cooley is an associate professor of political science at Barnard College and Columbia University's Harriman Institute Lincoln A. Mitchell Lincoln Mitchell is an associate of the Harriman Institute
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