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Hellions of the Deep: The Development of American Torpedoes in World War II (review)

1998; Johns Hopkins University Press; Volume: 39; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1353/tech.1998.0072

1097-3729

G. Pascal Zachary,

History and Developments in Astronomy

Reviewed by: Hellions of the Deep: The Development of American Torpedoes in WWII * G. Pascal Zachary (bio) Hellions of the Deep: The Development of American Torpedoes in WWII. By Robert Gannon. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996. Pp. xiv+241; illustrations, tables, notes, bibliography, index. $28.50. Robert Gannon, an associate professor of English at Pennsylvania State University, has produced a valuable case study of the fruitful and often frustrating [End Page 809] marriage between civilian research and military imperatives during World War II. Gannon’s specific example is the development of torpedoes, the chief offensive weapon of the submarine. While by necessity narrow and highly technical, the subject of torpedoes is an excellent choice of study because, unlike better-known weapons areas such as radar or atomic weapons, American failures in this area proved costly. The history of torpedoes, in other words, underscores the fact that the jerry-rigged, emergency effort to put science in the service of the military often broke down under the weight of military tradition and the confusing realities of battle. In chronicling torpedo development from the 1920s through the end of World War II, Gannon relies on official records and a plethora of interviews with scientists and soldiers. His grasp of technical issues is stunning, and his writing clear and lively. The prewar story, he finds, reflects the overall condition of U.S. military technology: on the eve of Pearl Harbor, American torpedoes were far inferior to those of other countries, most notably Germany’s. The reasons for the United States’ torpedo deficit were typical: a lack of research funding (totaling just thirty thousand dollars annually during the 1920s), a hidebound navy, and the failure to involve private companies in the design and manufacture of this crucial weapon. As late as 1937, the navy’s sole torpedo supplier, its Torpedo Station in Newport, Rhode Island, could produce just one or two torpedoes a day. The result of allowing a naval monopoly in torpedoes, Gannon writes, “was a tiny dribble of beautifully crafted torpedoes, barely less erratic and dangerous than their World War I forefathers (famous as much for blowing up their own submarines as the enemy’s), produced by an organization corpulent, sluggish, and not so much consciously resistant to change as physically and emotionally unable to” (p. 33). This dysfunctional situation carried a price. In 1942, 60 percent of the navy’s torpedoes were duds. Air-launched torpedoes were so sensitive that pilots had to fly within fifty feet of the sea and thus became an inviting target for the enemy. At the Battle of Midway in June 1942, for instance, forty-one U.S. torpedo planes joined in the battle. As Gannon notes, “all but four were lost—and not one scored a hit” (p. 175). It was not until the middle of 1943 that the navy, now supplementing its own efforts with those of civilian researchers and private manufacturers, began delivering torpedoes that actually met the needs of its submarine commanders. Gannon deftly describes the technical evolution of these successful weapons and the bureaucratic machinations within the navy that often slowed their adoption. In one telling example, he shows how the workhorse Mark-14 torpedo was being squandered on mysterious misses until submarine commanders in the Pacific took it upon themselves to test the weapon properly, something the navy had failed to do. Their studies determined that the torpedo ran eleven feet deeper than it should have, thus explaining the failure to hit enemy craft. [End Page 810] Even when the U.S. submarines began receiving more effective torpedoes, problems arose over the failure to coordinate weapon design with actual combat conditions. Much effort went into developing an electric-powered torpedo, which promised quieter operations than conventional steam-powered torpedoes but at the cost of speed. Although submarine commanders welcomed the quieter, more dependable electric torpedoes, the newer weapon performed worse than the one it had replaced. By the end of the war, it turned out that the older steam torpedo was more lethal, hitting its target, Gannon writes, “nearly twice as often—probably because of its faster speed” (p. 199). As a microcosm for the evolution of military...