UN Security Council Resolutions as Factors of International Socialization: The Case of Hezbollah
2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 21; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13533312.2014.937639
ISSN1743-906X
Autores Tópico(s)Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies
ResumoAbstractThis paper shows how UN Security Council resolutions can facilitate the international socialization of an Islamist political actor. The study undertakes a process-tracing analysis of the negotiations and attempts to implement UNSC Resolutions 1559 and 1701 and then assesses their impact on Hezbollah's agency and political identity. The author argues that UNSC resolutions can inform processes of social influence that directly affect the activity of non-state actors and then cause international socialization. According to the analysis proposed international socialization has produced three main effects on Hezbollah that are: increased accountability; a shift in its legitimacy paradigm; and a mutation of Hezbollah's relation with the Lebanese state. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe author is grateful for comments on previous drafts to Katerina Dalacoura, Fawaz Gerges, Mervyn Frost and the two anonymous reviewers. The author is also grateful to those who could find the time for the interviews used in this research as well as to the Beirut-based Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentations. The author has tried to report the interviewees' views and opinions as faithfully as possible; any approximation or misquotation remains the author's responsibility. Toby Dodge, Guido Dotti and the journal editors have been very helpful at various stages of the research. The LSE Middle East Centre has been an essential resource which made this research possible. The content and opinions expressed in this article represent exclusively the author's view.ABOUT THE AUTHORFilippo Dionigi is a fellow at the London School of Economics; his research focus is on the impact of international norms on Islamist politics. He carried out extensive research on Hezbollah and Islamist political theories.Notes1 UN Security Council, 'Resolution 1559 (2004)', UN doc., S/RES/1559 and UN Security Council, 'Resolution 1701 (2006)', UN doc., S/res/1701.2 With regard to Hezbollah's concept of jihād, see Hilal Khashan and Ibrahim Mousawi, 'Hezbollah's Concept of Jihad', Journal of Religion and Society, Vol.9, 2007, pp.1–19. More generally on Hezbollah's political identity see Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion, London: Pluto Press, 2002 (at: http://moses.creighton.edu/JRS/toc/2007.html).3 For relevant discussion of this concept as understood in this study see Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, esp. ch.2 and ch.7; and Fred Halliday, 'International Society as Homogeneity: Burke, Marx, Fukuyama', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.21, No.3, 1992, pp.441–2.4 Saad-Ghorayeb (see n.2 above), pp.88–111.5 Within the framework of a broader research project the author has carried out about 25 interviews with UN officers, politicians, locally based scholars and journalists. Only some of these are directly relevant for this specific enquiry and are referenced in the footnotes.6 See Kai Alderson, 'Making Sense of State Socialization', Review of International Studies, Vol.27, No. 3, 2001, pp.415–33 and the reply to Alderson in C.G. Thies, 'Sense and Sensibility in the Study of State Socialisation: A Reply to Kai Alderson', Review of International Studies, Vol.29, No. 4, 2003, pp.543–50. See also the discussion in Iain Johnston, 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environment', International Studies Quarterly, Vol.45, No.4, 2001, pp.488–94.7 See, for example, K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp.127–8.8 H. Bull and A. Watson, The Expansion of International Society, Oxford: Clarendon, 1984.9 Charles Kupchan and John Ikenberry, 'Socialisation and Hegemonic Power', International Organization, Vol.44, No.3, pp.290–1.10 For example see Thomas Risse and Kathrin Sikkink, 'The Socialisation of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction', in Risse and Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp.1–38.11 Frank Schimmelfennig, 'International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment', European Journal of International Relations, Vol.6, No.1, 2000, p.116.12 Johnston (see n.6 above), p.495.13 Ibid., p.500.14 Ibid., p.495. See also Thies (n.6 above).15 Kupchan and Ikenberry (see n.9 above).16 Ibid., p.290.17 For a translation of Hezbollah's Open Letter to the Downtrodden, see Joseph Elie Alagha, Hizbullah's Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto, Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2011, pp.39–55.18 Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, London: Pluto, 2007, pp.240–6.19 Mona Harb and Reinoud Leender, 'Know thy Enemy: Hezbollah "Terrorism" and the Politics of Perception', Third World Quarterly, Vol.26, No.1, 2005, pp.183–6.20 For a thorough discussion of the April Understanding and its procedures with regard to international law see Adri Waldman, Arbitrating Armed Conflict: Decisions of the Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group, Huntington, NY: Juris, 2003.21 International Crisis Group, 'Hizbollah: Rebel without a Cause?', in Middle East Briefing, Amman: International Crisis Group, 2003. Aurélie Daher, 'Le Hezbollah libanais et la résistance islamique au Liban: des stratégies complémentaires', Confluences Méditerranée, Vol.76, No.1, 2011, pp.101–11.22 For analysis of 1559 and 1701 with reference to the context of the 'war on terror' see Karim Makdisi, 'Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the War on Terror', International Peacekeeping, Vol.18, No.1, 2011, pp.4–20.23 Marwan G. Rowayheb, 'Lebanese Militias: A New Perspective', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.42, No.2, 2006, pp.303–18.24 On the relationship between the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon and Hezbollah see, for example, Daher (n.21 above).25 See M.H.F. Clarke, T. Glynn and A.P.V. Rogers, 'Combatant and Prisoner of War Status', in M.A. Meyer and G.F.A. Best (eds) Armed Conflict and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 1981 Weapons Convention, London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1989, pp.107–35, esp. pp.118–19 and Karma Nabulsi, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.26 International Crisis Group (see n.21 above).27 UN Security Council (see n.1 above).28 Including the Sunni-based Future Movement, the Christian-based Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement (led by Michel 'Aoun who subsequently changed side). Also the Druze-based party led by Walīd Junblāṭ (Progressive Socialist Party) was then part of the March 14 coalition although he later repositioned himself.29 UN Security Council, 'First Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Implementation of Resolution 1559 (2004)', Chapter III, A/17, UN doc. S/2005/272.30 Although the Hezbollah sympathizer Ṭrād Ḥamāda was part of Najīb Miqātī's cabinet in 2005.31 For a recent account of these events see A.J. Knudsen and M. Kerr, Lebanon: After the Cedar Revolution, London: Hurst, 2012.32 UN Security Council, 'Letter Dated 13 December 2005 from the Chargé D'affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General', UN doc., S/2005/783.33 Nicholas Blanford, 'Murder Polarizes Lebanon', 14 Dec. 2005 (at: www.csmonitor.com/2005/1214/p06s02-wome.html).34 This political strategy is known as the 'blocking third', a veto mechanism based on Art. 69(1b) and Art. 95 of the Lebanese Constitution.35 'Lebanese Press Highlights 19 Dec 05′, BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2005, London, UK.36 Government of the Republic of Lebanon, 'Policy Statement of the Government Led by Fuʾād al-Sinyūra', 19 Jul. 2005 (at: www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=3635).37 UN Security Council, para. 3 of 1559 (see n.1 above).38 Republic of Lebanon, Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb 2006 [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives 2006], Beirut: Governement of Lebanon, 2006, p.258.39 In a conversation between the US Ambassador in Beirut and PM al-Sinyūra, the latter described the solution to the political stalemate as the result of a concerted effort between Amal's leader Nabih Birri and 14 March forces. As reported in 'Us Diplomatic Cable 06beirut324' (at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06BEIRUT324.html).40 A month later another resolution was adopted by the Security Council (UNSC Res. 1680, 2005) referring to Hezbollah as a 'militia' and consequently lacking effectiveness.41 For a discussion on how 1559 was ineffective in obtaining their objectives in Lebanon see Reinood Leenders, 'How UN Pressure on Hizballah Impedes Lebanese Reform', Middle East Report Online, 23 May 2006 (at: www.merip.org/mero/mero052306).42 Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel 12 July 2006' (at: mideastwire.com).43 H. Sayed and Z. Tzannatos, 'The Economic and Human Costs of the War', in Nubar Hovsepian (ed.), The War on Lebanon: A Reader, Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2008, pp.316–42.44 Paul Salem, 'The Future of Lebanon', Foreign Affairs, Vol.85, No.6, 2006, pp.13–22.45 UN Security Council (see n.1 above).46 'Text of the Draft Security Council Resolution', New York Times [New York], 5 Aug. 2006 (at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/05/world/05cnd-counciltext.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&).47 For example MP Boutros Ḥarb, was quoted in a US diplomatic cable saying: 'if we are convinced that Israel can finish the job, then we can allow a few more weeks', 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2544' (at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2544.html).48 In another US cable there are reports of a conversation with MPs of the 14 March coalition. The US ambassador reports as follows: 'They fear a ceasefire coming too early, with an admittedly weak central Lebanese government then forced prematurely to deal with a resurgent Hizballah. Claiming to reflect PM Siniora's private thoughts, several of the assembled leaders urged that Hizballah be given a "real pounding" by the Israelis to the point that the group would be "soft enough to listen to reason"', 'US Cable 2544' (see n.47 above). Another cable reports that Birri said that the operation should not have lasted for more than four to five days at that point, 'Us Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2407' (at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06BEIRUT2407.html).49 In a speech in 2011, Naṣrallah claimed that the international community and the Arab delegation at the UN were delaying the ending of the conflict. Miṭrī, strongly denies this accusation. Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel, 3 August 2011' (at: Mideastwire.com). Interview by author with Ṭāreq Miṭrī, Delegate for the Republic of Lebanon to the Security Council During the 2006 War and Member of Cabinet, Beirut, 27 Sept. 2011.50 'B3. Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, Seven-Point Plan for Ending the War in Lebanon, Beirut, 7 August 2006', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.36, No.1, 2006, pp.177–8.51 Interview by author with Miṭrī (see n.49 above).52 Miṭrī (see n.49 above).53 New York Times, 'Text of the Draft Security Council Resolution', New York Times [New York], 5 Aug. 2006 (at: www.nytimes.com/2006/08/05/world/05cnd-counciltext.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&).54 Miṭrī (see n.49 above).55 Interview by author with Michael Williams, Member of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom. Former UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon from 2008 to 2011, London, 23 Jul. 2012.56 The reasons to oppose a multinational force were many; the main risk was that the multinational force would have been NATO, which would have been unacceptable for Hezbollah and its allies.57 Miṭrī (see n.49 above).58 In a cable, US Ambassador Feltman comments that: 'It will be hard enough to convince Siniora – a Sunni worried about problems with the Shia – to put an official acceptance stamp on Israeli troops in south Lebanon. Speaker Berri will be an even greater problem', 'Us Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2542' (at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2542.html).59 'C2. Winograd Commission, Press Conference on Inquiry into 2006 Lebanon War, 30 January 2008 (Excerpts)', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.37, No.3, 2008, pp.208–11.60 Hezbollah's Secretary General Nasrallah referred to the 2006 conflict as a 'divine victory' for example in an interview on al-Manar on 16 September 2006 and in a speech broadcasted by al-Manar on 22 September 2006. See also Michael Slackman 'Lebanon Throng Hails Hezbollah Chief, Who Calls Militia Stronger', New York Times [New York], 23 Sep. 2006 (at: www.nytimes.com/2006/09/23/world/middleeast/23lebanon.html?pagewanted=all).61 A point of dispute was whether 1701 called only for the cessations of hostilities or for a ceasefire. UN Security Council, Resolution 1701 (see n.1 above).62 'Us Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2542' (see n.58 above).63 In many of the leaked US diplomatic cables it appears the request of the Lebanese government to use 'Ṭāʾif language' in the resolution as regards disarmament of Hezbollah and 'April Understanding language' as regards the regulation of conflict as opposed to '1559 Language'. See, for example, 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2600' (at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2600.html); 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2441' (at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06BEIRUT2441.html).64 UN Security Council, point 8 of 1701 (see n.1 above).65 Makdisi (see n.22 above), p.16.66 Williams (see n.55 above).67 ʻ'Alī Fayyāḍ, The Resolution 1701 and the Conflicting Strategies, Beirut: The Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation, 2008.68 Makdisi (see n.22 above), pp.16–17.69 Johnston (see n.6 above), p.499.70 Kupchan and Ikenberry (see n.9 above), p.290.71 Miṭrī confirmed how al-Sinyūra has always been adamant on the need to find a unanimous consensus in the cabinet over the negotiation of a ceasefire thus inevitably taking into account Hezbollah's conditions of the ceasefire. Miṭrī (see n.49 above). The same is also confirmed in various US diplomatic cables see, for example, 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2542' (n.58 above).72 See the following section for examples of Hezbollah's reference to jihād as inspiring principle for bellicose activity.73 Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel, 12 August 2006' (at: Mideastwire.com). Futhermore, Hezbollah's commitment to 1701 has been reiterated on several other occasions. See, for example, Nabil Haitham, 'Interview with Naim Qassem', As-Safir, 2 Jul. 2010 (at: http://assafir.com/#!/ArticleWindow.aspx?ArticleID=204672); 'Hezbollah's Naim Qasim Talks to Asharq Al-Awsat', As-Sharq al-Awsat, 20 Apr. 2010 (at: www.aawsat.net/2010/04/article55251034).74 Naṣrallah (see n.73 above).75 Fayyāḍ (see n.67 above), p.2. Although Hezbollah would not admit it, the 2006 war and 1701 overall did mark a significant strategic shift, not only establishing a new balance of relation between Hezbollah and the state as well as Hezbollah and its enemy.76 M. Ranstorp, Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, London: Macmillan Press, 1997, p.107 and p.145.77 Peter Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', in Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p.23.78 From the 1985 'Open Letter to the Downtrodden', in D. Avon, A.-T. Khatchadourian and J.M. Todd, Hezbollah: A History of the 'Party of God', Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012, p.121. As regards Hezbollah's conception of military jihād, see also the discussion of this principle as the second pillar of Hezbollah's identity in the book written by Hezbollah's deputy Secretary General Naem Qassem. N. Qassem and D. Khalil, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, London: Saqi, 2005, pp.39–49.79 An analysis of some of the key declarations of Hezbollah's Secretary General Naṣrallah as well as other leading members shows how Hezbollah's discourse refers in various occasions to certain aspects of international law. See, for example, the speeches of Naṣrallah held on 6 Jan. 2009, 14 Aug. 2009, 11 Nov. 2009, in which Naṣrallah refers to international law as being violated by Israel or manipulated by global hegemonic powers as opposed to the supposedly lawful resistance activity of Hezbollah (at: http://mideastwire.com/).80 'B4. Hizballah Leader Hasan Nasrallah, Interview with Al-Jazeera, 20 July 2006 (Excerpts)', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.36, No.1, 2006, p.180.81 Ibid. Edmond Naim was a prominent figure in the Lebanese academia with expertise in international law.82 It has been widely reported that Hezbollah also attacked civilians deliberately in the 2006 war even though the number of reported casualties (43) is lower if compared to the 1,200 Lebanese civilian casualties. Human Rights Watch, 'Civilians under Assault: Hezbollah's Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War', August 2007 (at: www.hrw.org/reports/2007/08/28/civilians-under-assault).83 Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel 9 August 2006' (at: mideastwire.com).84 Ibid.85 As regards the challenges to UNIFIL capacity to operate fully in south Lebanon see any of the UN Secretary General's reports over the implementation of 1701, which often report of (generally minor) incidents with UNIFIL troops. The question of whether Hezbollah is presently acquiring weapons and to what extent is difficult to determine as sources are often dubious although there are uncountable reports in this respect. See, for an example, Adam Entous et al., 'Hezbollah Upgrades Missile Threat to Israel.' The Wall Street Journal [New York], 2 Jan. 2014 (at: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304361604579290613920542386).86 Several reports on the implementation of 1701 confirm the generally stable situation in the UNIFIL area. For example, UN Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)', UN doc., S/2013/381.87 A. George and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005, pp.120–3.
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