Seniority and maturity of debt contracts
1993; Elsevier BV; Volume: 33; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1016/0304-405x(93)90011-y
ISSN1879-2774
Autores Tópico(s)Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
ResumoThis paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt. Increased short-term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often. It also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information, although better-than-average borrowers desire information sensitivity. The model implies that short-term debt will be senior to long-term debt, and that long-term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt. The model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults.
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