Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

A New Interpretation of Contraband Trade

2001; Duke University Press; Volume: 81; Issue: 3-4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1215/00182168-81-3-4-733

1527-1900

Ernst Pijning,

Brazilian History and Foreign Policy

Under the pressure of a Napoleonic invasion in 1807, the Portuguese court took the unprecedented step of moving from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro. With this transfer, a European country was ruled from its overseas colony for the first time. Upon arrival in 1808, one of the first measures of the Prince Regent was to open all Brazilian ports to direct trade from Europe, without first having to pass through the now occupied port of Lisbon. As a result, the political and economic heart of the Portuguese empire moved to Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon lost its monopolistic position as an intermediary in the Brazil trade.In the November 2000 issue of the HAHR, Portuguese historian Jorge M. Pedreira and Brazilian historian José Jobson de Andrade Arruda debated anew their differences concerning the meaning of this transfer.1 Both relied heavily on the balances of trade between Brazil and Portugal to gather data, but they arrived at opposite conclusions: Pedreira argues that there was a continuity in Luso-Brazilian trading relations, but Arruda stresses a breach. Part of their debate disputes the existence of illegal trade in Brazilian waters, and both authors have found inspiration in my dissertation for their lines of argument.2Both Arruda and Pedreira rely heavily on quantitative material, that is, statistical data. My dissertation, however, demonstrates the significance of a qualitative approach to illegal trade, especially through the analysis of local reports.3 My research not only showed “how much” illegal trade took place but also “how” contrabandists traded. Thus, in my opinion, the debate should focus more on the nature of authority over commercial transactions, not on the quantity of contraband goods. The authority of colonial administrators to regulate illegal trade is a vital indicator of the motherland’s grip on its colony.To comprehend the concept of authority over illegal commerce, it is essential to understand the meaning of the term “contraband trade” and the circumstances under which it took place. “Contraband” literally means against the law (contra = against; bando = law).4 Contraband trade thus encompassed all illegal commercial activities, including trading with foreigners, trade in forbidden goods, or underpayment of taxes on goods. Yet some forms of contraband trade were more illegal than others. Because illegal trade was inevitable in some commodities, it was less likely to be condemned by the colonial administrators. It is therefore not enough to measure illegal trade; we need to understand who had control over these transactions. Thus we need to examine the local circumstances in Rio de Janeiro and its environs more closely.Rio de Janeiro had become the major Brazilian port of transit by the end of the eighteenth century. Carioca merchants conducted trade with Africa, Asia, Europe, Rio de la Plata, and gold mining districts in the Brazilian interior. Trading connections between Portugal and Brazil were frequent and uninterrupted. Unlike Spanish fleets to the Americas, Portuguese fleets were annual and they arrived and departed from Rio de Janeiro within a predictable framework.5 Trade adequately met the demand for foreign goods, so insufficiency of European products was not a reason for contraband trade. Illegal trade took place because it was lucrative. Given these local circumstances, it was unlikely that the amount of illegal trade ever surpassed legal commercial transactions in colonial Rio de Janeiro.For most of the eighteenth century both legal and illegal trade was regulated or condoned by the king’s servants. Contraband trade in foreign goods took place in various spheres of control, depending on the degree of authority administrators had over commercial transactions. However, once illegal trade took place outside of the realm of an official’s jurisdiction, it was proscribed and the contrabandists could be arrested. One such example was the gold trade. In the most severe cases, foreign vessels anchored in a small port outside the confines of Rio de Janeiro’s jurisdiction and exchanged untaxed gold dust for European products. In such cases, neither did Carioca administrators have any say in the captain and crew’s transactions nor did anyone pay the requisite taxes on the gold. If caught, officials immediately arrested such smugglers and put the criminals through the legal system. In the most regulated way, a passenger could smuggle minted gold on board one of the fleet vessels, make full disclosure to the captain, and pay a one percent fee for protection. In other words, Brazilian authorities gave their consent to the smuggling of gold.The nature of illegal trade in Rio de Janeiro changed during the eighteenth century. Until the 1730s, Brazilian authorities confiscated foreign vessels for conducting illegal trade outside the jurisdiction of Rio de Janeiro, and arrested contrabandists for crimes related to the counterfeiting of gold bars. In the 1760s, gangs engaged in contraband trade smuggled gold and diamonds on board official fleet vessels. These practices took place with the consent of the captain and other officials and thus fell within the confines of legal trading networks. However, after the 1790s, it took a turn for the worse. Brazilian officials frequently mentioned that illegal trade had increased dramatically; moreover, these officials indicated that foreign, Portuguese, and Brazilian merchants conducted this outlawed commerce both within and outside the legal frameworks.6 As legal trade grew, so too did the opportunity to engage in contraband trade. Because so many foreign vessels visited the port of Rio de Janeiro and surrounding ports, officials wrote alarming letters saying that curbing contraband trade had becoming a major problem.7 Two snapshots illustrate this change between the 1760s and the 1800s. In 1768 the viceroy virtually expelled Captain James Cook from the Rio harbor for failing to comply with his orders to buy provisions from a designated intermediary. In 1801 Donald Campbell, a British admiral in Portuguese service, complained that his own countrymen did not recognize any Portuguese jurisdiction over Brazilian ports.8Authority over ports was related to the opportunity for local administrators to act as intermediaries in commercial transactions. In the case of Buenos Aires in the seventeenth century, Zacharias Moutoukias has demonstrated the importance of administrators in legal and illegal commercial activities.9 In fact, the distinction between merchant and administrators was difficult to make. This did not mean that officials refused to enforce the law. However, their ability or will to do so depended on their control over commercial activities, hence my distinction between “condoned” and “proscribed” illegal trade. When contraband trade took place within the jurisdiction of an official, it was condoned; whenever it was outside these boundaries, it was proscribed. Officials arrested illegal traders who transgressed this boundary. The number of prosecutions of contrabandists was therefore an indication of the extent to which illegal trade took place outside the realm of official control.I agree wholeheartedly with Pedreira’s assumption that stricter enforcement of royal legislation was related to the number of prosecutions.10 Indeed, the boundaries between proscribed and condoned illegal trade shifted throughout the century. Zealous and more honest viceroys, such as the marquis of Lavradio (1769–79), were able to raise the bar on what was considered proscribed illegal trade.11 Regimes of “more involved” and less attentive viceroys, such as the count of Resende (1790–1801), achieved the opposite. In his article, Pedreira pointed out the seeming contradiction in my dissertation that during the 1760s more arrests occurred than in the 1790s.12 The reason was that in the 1760s contraband trade was more controlled than it was during the 1790s. Prosecutions in the 1760s had a different meaning than arrests in the 1790s. This is exactly why I have placed the number of prosecutions in the context of these shifting boundaries. In the 1760s officials cracked down on illegal trade that was organized by smuggler rings who operated within the framework of the official trading system; in the 1790s officials prosecuted contrabandists who operated outside the realm of official control.According to Pedreira, in the 1810s Portuguese merchants regained some of the Brazil trade. The Portuguese historian argues that this demonstrated that British illegal trade before 1808 could not have been as pervasive. He finds further evidence in British and North American reports to show the Brazilian market was small, and the marketplace was difficult to penetrate.13While I tend to agree with Pedreira’s contentions for the period after 1808, I am not convinced that these findings can be used as evidence for British smuggling before the legalization of direct British commerce. Neither am I convinced that Brazilian traders lacked goods to exchange for British contraband goods. My data lead me to arrive at very different conclusions, as the following three examples demonstrate.14 We are very fortunate to have one published account of Thomas Lindsey, a contrabandist off the coast of the state of Bahia. Lindsey smuggled brazilwood and intervened in the coastal trade.15 Another British vessel, Duke of Clarence, was caught with a cargo of tobacco, gold, and slaves near Santos, which suggests intervention in Brazilian South Atlantic trade.16 Other reports, such as that of the French woman Joanna d’Entremeuse, demonstrate that smuggling along the Brazilian coast to Rio de la Plata and Cayenne was both common and lucrative.17 British and other foreign suppliers had established themselves well in a country trade along the South Atlantic coastline and traded directly with Brazilian merchants.In 1808 a new set of regulations changed the parameters for commercial transactions, the boundaries between condoned or proscribed illegal trade, and the jurisdiction, authority, and hence control of colonial administrators in the port of Rio de Janeiro. In sheer numbers, it is unlikely that contraband trade ever surpassed legal transactions before 1808. However, increased contraband trade in the decade before the opening of the Brazilian ports undermined the authority of royal administrators as intermediaries in commercial transactions between British and Brazilian merchants. This situation changed after the opening of the ports, when British and other foreign merchants were allowed to establish themselves legally in Brazil. Setting up strong, exclusively foreign trading networks proved to be a difficult process that changed the nature of transnational commerce. The marketplace was, and remained, controlled. Once British merchants tried to penetrate the Brazilian market with their own networks, they competed with long-established relations both across the Atlantic Ocean and inside Brazil. Before the opening of the ports, the British served as suppliers of foreign goods, using the fleet system and Portuguese vessels and Brazilian merchants to supply goods to Brazil. This official commerce was controlled by local administrators and regulated by legislation. Nevertheless, in the 1790s, Luso-Brazilian administrators had already started to lose their authority in the ports, and this threatened their position as intermediary in the supply of foreign goods. After the opening of the ports in 1808, British merchants were allowed to supply goods freely to Brazil in British vessels. However, foreign merchants were confronted with fierce opposition from Luso-Brazilian merchants, who allied with local administrators when foreigners tried to use the new liberties to participate in the internal trade of Brazil. Thus, the opening of the ports in 1808 changed the rules for a restricted Carioca market place, and this inaugurated a new era of competition in Anglo-Luso-Brazilian commercial relationships.Reports on contraband trade open a window on the mentalities and the social and economic practices that defined the Portuguese Atlantic World. Beyond the statistics of balances of trade lie the values and norms of merchants, peddlers, and officials who transgressed legal codes of behavior. In this unofficial world Brazilian administrators negotiated their authority over legal and illegal commerce, just as foreign and Brazilian merchants negotiated their legal and illegal access to the Carioca market place. Before the 1790s all commercial transactions took place through the proper channels. At the close of the century, the rules of trade in the Portuguese Atlantic changed so too did the social norms and corresponding illegal and legal approaches employed by Atlantic merchants.I would like to thank Bethany Andreasen, Joseph Jastrzembski, Wim Klooster, Daniel Ringrose, A. J. R. Russell-Wood, and ShaunAnne Taugney for their comments and suggestions.