Going Underground: the political economy of the ‘left turn’ in South America
2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 34; Issue: 8 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/01436597.2013.831538
ISSN1360-2241
Autores Tópico(s)Politics and Society in Latin America
ResumoAbstract This article argues that South America’s ‘revolutionary’ left turn can be best explained by its assertion of state property over natural resource extraction. The recent history of the leftist movements in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador relates to the failures of the neoliberal reforms applied in the region decades before, hence the dismantling of core orthodox policies has been critical for them once in power. This has been possible through the expansion of state action in the economy, but mainly through the governance of hydrocarbon extraction and the control of subsoil rents. Resource extraction has been central to the political economy of Andean left-wing revolutionaries, responsible for many of their successes but also their impending challenges. This rearticulation of underground governance is linked to global transformations that give prominence to emerging economies and reinforces these countries’ position in the world economy as providers of primary commodities. Notes 1 I would like to thank Eric Helleiner, and the Third World Quarterly editor and reviewers for their insightful comments.See MA Cameron, ‘Latin America’s left turns: beyond good and bad’, Third World Quarterly, 30(2), 2009, pp 331–348; S Ellner, ‘The distinguishing features of Latin America’s new left in power: the Chávez, Morales, and Correa governments’, Latin American Perspectives, 39(1), 2012, pp 96–114; and A Escobar, ‘Latin America at a crossroads’, Cultural Studies, 24(1), 2010, pp 1–65. 2 See Cameron, ‘Latin America’s left turns’; and Ellner, ‘The distinguishing features of Latin America’s new left in power’. 3 J Corrales, ‘A set back for Chávez’, Journal of Democracy, 22(1), 2011, pp 122–136. 4 Escobar, ‘Latin America at a crossroads’. 5 Ibid. 6 F Coronil, ‘Venezuela’s wounded bodies: nation and imagination during the 2002 coup’, nacla Report, January–February 2011, p 33. 7 B Stallings & W Peres, ‘Is economic reform dead in Latin America? Rhetoric and reality since 2000’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 43, 2011 pp 755–786. 8 Ibid, p 769. 9 Cameron, ‘Latin America’s left turns’; and Ellner, ‘The distinguishing features of Latin America’s new left in power’. 10 F Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997. 11 B Kohl & L Farthing, ‘Material constraints to popular imaginaries: the extractive economy and resource nationalism in Bolivia’, Political Geography, 31(4), 2012, pp 225–235. 12 T Perreault & G Valdivia, ‘Hydrocarbons, popular protest and national imaginaries: Ecuador and Bolivia in comparative context’, Geoforum, 41(5), 2010, p 696, emphasis in the original. 13 G Valdivia, ‘Governing relations between people and things: citizenship, territory, and the political economy of petroleum in Ecuador’, Political Geography, 27(4), 2008, pp 456–477. 14 See Escobar, ‘Latin America at a crossroads’; J Moore & T Velázquez, ‘Sovereignty negotiated: anti-mining movements, the state and multinational mining companies under Correa’s “21st century socialism”’, in A Bebbington (ed), Social Conflict, Economic Development and Extractive Industry: Evidence from South America, London: Routledge, 2012; and L Rival, ‘Planning development futures in the Ecuadorian Amazon: the expanding oil frontier and the Yasuní–itt initiative’, in Bebbington, Social Conflict, Economic Development and Extractive Industry. 15 Corrales, ‘A set back for Chávez’. 16 Ellner, ‘The distinguishing features of Latin America’s new left in power’. 17 P Palma, ‘Riesgos y consecuencias de las economías rentistas: el caso de Venezuela’, Problemas del Desarrollo: Revista Latinoamericana de Economía, 42(165), 2011, pp 35–59; and Corrales, ‘A set back for Chávez’. 18 M Weisbrot, R Ray & L Sandoval, ‘The Chávez administration at 10 years: the economy and social indicators’, 2009, at http://www.cepr.net/. 19 Coronil, ‘Venezuela’s wounded bodies’. According to Corrales and Penfold, the number is as high as 18 000 employees. J Corrales & M Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela, Washington, DC: Latin America Initiative, Brookings Institution, 2011. 20 Since 2003 the ceo of pdvsa is also the Minister of Oil and Mines. 21 Corrales & Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics. 22 Palma, ‘Riesgos y consecuencias de las economías rentistas’. 23 M Weisbrot & J Johnston, ‘Venezuela’s economic recovery: is it sustainable?’, Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2012, at http://www.cepr.net/, accessed 12 February 2013. 24 According to ibid, poverty rates have shown a 37.6% decline in 13 years. If the count is from 2004, when political stability had been somewhat achieved after four years of instability, the decline is as much as 49.7%. The Gini coefficient shows inequality improvements from 0.49 in 1999 to 0.39 in 2011. 25 In 2012 non-oil exports plummeted to low levels of $3 billion. Corrales & Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics. This is not uncommon in contemporary Venezuelan economic history. For more on this, see Palma, ‘Riesgos y consecuencias de las economías rentistas’. 26 Weisbrot & Johnston, ‘Venezuela’s economic recovery’, pp 21–22. Although Mark Weisbrot is perhaps the most vocal economic sympathiser of the left turn in South America, he has been critical of Venezuela’s currency policy. In a recent newspaper column he stated: ‘The current exchange rate regime is difficult to manage, it is prone to inefficiencies and corruption, and my own view is that Venezuela would be better off under a different exchange rate regime’. M Weisbrot, ‘Disinformation still clouds the US debate on Chávez’s legacy in Venezuela’, Guardian, 9 January 2013, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jan/09/us-debate-chavez-venezuela-legacy, accessed 7 February 2013. 27 According to Venezuela’s Central Bank, inflation has reached over 20% annually for the past five years. In the first quarter of 2013 it had already reached 7.9%. Shortage levels are as high as 20%. See http://www.bcv.org.ve/c2/indicadores.asp, accessed 7 April 2013. 28 On 13 February 2013 a 46.5% devaluation took place and the new parity was set at 6.3 bolívares per dollar. Nevertheless, the alternative legal system of bond swaps (sitme) was eliminated and no replacement was set in its place until weeks later, when a parallel system of foreign currency auctions was held through the Central Bank (sicad). Although there is no official exchange rate for these auctions, analysts argue it has been set at least at double as much as the official exchange rate. See ‘Gobierno anuncia devaluación a bs 6,3 por dólar’, El Mundo, 8 February 2013, at http://www.elmundo.com.ve/noticias/economia/politicas-publicas/gobierno-anuncia-devaluacion-a-bs--6,30-por-dolar-.aspx, accessed 15 March 2013. 29 B Mander, ‘Power crisis threatens Venezuelan recovery’, Financial Times, 11 January 2009, at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c3088c34-feda-11de-a677-00144feab49a.html#axzz2QwQOqw1Q, accessed 25 February 2013; and ‘Navarro reconoce fallas en el sistema eléctrico’, El Universal (Caracas), 14 April 2013, at http://www.eluniversal.com/caracas/130414/navarro-reconoce-fallas-en-el-sistema-electrico, accessed 17 April 2013. 30 From Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, at www.cne.gov.ve, accessed 17 April 2013. Opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radosnki requested the extension of the normal citizenry audit from 54% of the ballots to the full 100% on the grounds of numerical inconsistencies, which may render a different result. The electoral council accepted the request and conducted an audit but on different grounds than the one requested by the opposition alliance. 31 By 2006 Venezuela had paid off all its debts to the IMF and World Bank, and continued to issue sovereign bonds to the international and local markets. See Weisbrot et al, ‘The Chávez administration at 10 years’. 32 Weisbrot & Johnston, ‘Venezuela’s economic recovery’. 33 Ibid. 34 R Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009. 35 Escobar, ‘Latin America at a crossroads’, p 27. 36 A recent indication of this is the decision of various European states to refuse Morales’ presidential aircraft to enter their airspace on the grounds that it may have had cia whistle-blower Edward Snowden on board. Bolivia and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) strongly rejected the move and labelled it a ‘neo-colonial practice’ that flagrantly violated treaties of international law. See ‘Declaración de la unasur frente al agravio sufrido por el Presidente Evo Morales’, at http://www.unasursg.org/inicio/centro-de-noticias/archivo-de-noticias/declaraci%C3%B3n-de-la-unasur-frente-al-agravio-sufrido-por-el-presidente-evo-morales, accessed 7 July 2013. 37 Kohl & Farthing, ‘Material constraints to popular imaginaries’, p 230. 38 A Bebbington, ‘Extractive industries, socio-environmental conflicts and political economic transformations in Andean America’, in Bebbington, Social Conflict, Economic Development and Extractive Industry, p 13. 39 D Humphreys Bebbington, ‘State–indigenous tensions over hydrocarbon expansion in the Bolivian Chaco’, in Bebbington, Social Conflict, Economic Development and Extractive Industry. 40 Bebbington, ‘Extractive industries, socio-environmental conflicts and political economic transformations in Andean America’; and M Weisbrot, R Ray & J Johnston, ‘Bolivia: the economy during the Morales administration’, 2009, at http://www.cepr.net/, accessed 2 March 2013. 41 Weisbrot et al, ‘Bolivia’. 42 Humphreys Bebbington, ‘State–indigenous tensions over hydrocarbon expansion in the Bolivian Chaco’. 43 Kohl & Farthing, ‘Material constraints to popular imaginaries’. 44 Bolivia was part of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (hipc) initiative and during the Morales administration was successful at reducing the debt burden in the economy. 45 Kohl & Farthing, ‘Material constraints to popular imaginaries’. 46 Weisbrot et al, ‘Bolivia’, p 3. 47 Rival, ‘Planning development futures in the Ecuadorian Amazon’. 48 Moore & Velázquez, ‘Sovereignty negotiated’. 49 Rival, ‘Planning development futures in the Ecuadorian Amazon’. 50 A Bebbington & D Humphreys Bebbington, ‘An Andean avatar: post-neoliberal and neoliberal strategies for securing the unobtainable’, New Political Economy, 16(1), 2011, p 136. 51 A. Araujo, ‘Arranca explotación petrolera del Yasuní ITT’, El Comercio, 16 August 2013, at http://www.elcomercio.com/negocios/Yasuni_ITT-explotacion-petroleo-ambiente-Ecuador_0_974902709.html, accessed 16 August 2013. 52 Emphasis added. 53 R Correa, ‘Ecuador’s path’, New Left Review, 77, 2012, p 95. 54 A Acosta, ‘Extractivismo y neoextractivismo: dos caras de la misma maldición’, in M Lang & D Mokrami (eds), Mas allá del Desarrollo, Quito: Fundación Rosa Luxemburgo/Abya Yala, 2011. 55 In the February 2013 presidential elections, Correa was re-elected with over 57% of the votes. Acosta received slightly over 3% and his ‘pluri-national left alliance’ got five National Assembly members elected. See Ecuador’s National Electoral Council, at http://resultados.cne.gob.ec/Results.html?RaceID=1&UnitID=1&IsPS=0&LangID=0, accessed 9 July 2013. 56 Moore & Velázquez, ‘Sovereignty negotiated’. 57 Ibid. 58 An interesting note by Moore and Velázquez points to the overlapping tensions between mining companies and indigenous peoples in both Ecuador and Canada. Correa has publicly asked the Canadian Ambassador to ‘send a pro-mining indigenous emissary from Canada to prove wrong those “radical indigenous leaders” in Ecuador […] In the debate over mining, persistent tensions between Canadian companies and their first nations peoples over oil and mining deposits were disregarded.’ Moore & Velázquez, ‘Sovereignty negotiated’, p 127. 59 M Weisbrot, J Johnston & S Lefebvre, ‘Ecuador’s new deal: reforming and regulating the financial sector’, 2013, at http://www.cepr.net/, accessed 1 March 2013. 60 Ibid, p 14. 61 TL Karl, Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997; and F Coronil, The Magical State. 62 Perreault & Valdivia, ‘Hydrocarbons, popular protest and national imaginaries’, p 691. 63 Bebbington, ‘Extractive industries, socio-environmental conflicts and political economic transformations in Andean America’, p 5. 64 Ibid, p 13. 65 Coronil, The Magical State. 66 Bebbington, ‘Extractive industries, socio-environmental conflicts and political economic transformations in Andean America’; and Perreault & Valdivia, ‘Hydrocarbons, popular protest and national imaginaries’. 67 Coronil, The Magical State. 68 R Gonzalez-Vicente, ‘China’s engagement in South America’s and Africa’s extractive sectors: new perspectives for resource curse theories’, Pacific Review, 24(1), 2011, pp 65–87. 69 Ellner, ‘The distinguishing features of Latin America’s new left in power’, p 111. 70 Rival, ‘Planning development futures in the Ecuadorian Amazon’. 71 Some prominent dependency theorists were highly optimistic about the role of a potentially ‘revolutionary state’ taking over natural resource extraction for the benefit of the larger collective. For instance, Furtado in 1974 wrote in response to the Club or Rome’s Limits to Growth: ‘From the moment in which the sources of non-renewable resources—even those which are used for agricultural production—are controlled nationally by states and put in the service of a different development rationale, there will be ostensible consequences on the international prices of basic commodities. Under these conditions the relative prices of non-renewable resources will tend to increase […] This price change will make important cash transfers to the Third World, which will promote their development and slow the accumulation of richer nations. As the Third World countries will use these resources more reasonably, the final effect of this income transfer on the use of the resources will be positive.’ C Furtado, ‘El mito del desarollo y el futuro del tercer mundo’, El Trimestre Económico, 9(162), 1974, pp 407–416, emphasis added. 72 E Gudynas, ‘Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extractivismo’, in EGudynas, Extractivismo, Política y Sociedad, 2009, Quito, Ecuador: caap y claes, 2009. 73 Ibid.
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