The Politico-Military Alliance of Russia and Belarus: Re-Examining the Role of NATO and the EU in Light of the Intra-Alliance Security Dilemma
2014; Routledge; Volume: 66; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09668136.2014.899769
ISSN1465-3427
Autores Tópico(s)European Politics and Security
ResumoAbstractThis article examines Belarusian strategies in the bilateral politico-military alliance with Russia, focusing on the issue of recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in addition to the evolution of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. It argues that the approaches interpreting the alliance as a response to decisions of external actors cannot fully account for the disagreements between the parties. The analysis of Belarusian strategies demonstrates how the decisions of external actors, such as the European Union and to a certain extent the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, function as bargaining chips for the Belarusian leadership. Due to the intra-alliance security dilemma, external actors have at times even weakened the alliance rather than automatically inducing its cohesion. Notes 1 While the pattern of intra-alliance bargaining can be identified in Russia–Belarus cooperation over the Customs Union and the parties' way towards the Eurasian Union, these two cases are not the subject of the analysis of this contribution. 2 A non-paper is an unsigned and undated informal document traditionally used in negotiations to clarify the contents of other documents, and to sum up the expectations and the position of the respective negotiator. The EU's decision to make the non-paper public reflects the stalled progress in EU–Belarusian relations and the EU's aspiration to address the Belarusian people directly and independently from the negotiations with the official Belarusian envoys and representatives. 3 Post-election protests were violently suppressed by the authorities, while seven out of ten presidential candidates, as well as hundreds of protesters were beaten up and arrested. Three presidential candidates were sentenced to prison terms of between five and six years. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had described the elections as 'flawed' and condemned heavy-handed police tactics. 4Zayavlenie Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del Respubliki Belarus, 30 September 2012, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.by/press/news_mfa/b9843f846435be1c.html, accessed 9 April 2012. 5Dogovor o Druzhbe, Dobrososedstve i Sotrudnichestve, 1995, available at: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/md_bel.nsf/1beba7ba95cdfb88c3256f6a00417b59/dbbca5487c35483dc3257694004249f3!OpenDocument, accessed 7 April 2012. The Treaty provided for consultation 'in the event of an armed attack on one of the parties, or the threat of such an attack' (Article 5). The treaty also stipulated that the parties would refrain from: 'participation in or support for any actions whatsoever directed against the other party'; the creation of treaties directed against the other party; and using their territories 'to the detriment of the security of the other (party)'. 6Ustav k Dogovoru o Soyuze Belarusi i Rossii ot 2 Aprelya 1997, available at: http://belrus.ru/law/act/dokumentyi_opredelyayuchie_osnov/ustav_k_dogovoru_o_soyuze_belarusi_i_rossii_o.html, accessed 9 April 2012. Paragraph 2, Article 11 of the Charter of the Union defines taking 'joint measures to counter threats to the sovereignty and independence of each State member of the Union' as its main goal. The Charter also establishes, in Article 16, the necessity of coordinated decisions regarding 'the maintenance of collective security' and 'cooperation in ensuring the territorial integrity' of the parties as well as 'the protection of the borders of the Union'. 7 The two installations in question are the radio-technical centre near Baranovichi, part of the Russian early warning missile attack system; and the Russian Navy communication point in Vileika used for submarine tracking. 8 See Programma Ukreplenie pogranichnoi bezopasnosti Soyuznogo Gosudarsva na period 2012–2016 godov, available at: http://www.soyuz.by/projects/soyuz-projects/programm/453.html, accessed 2 February 2014. This has superseded a previous programme on the equipment of the external border of the Union State for 2007–2011, which is no longer available via the web. 9 See also Article 18 of Programma Deistvii Respubliki Belarus' i Rossiiskoi Federatsii po realizatsii poloshenii Dogovora o sozdanii Soyuznogo Gosudarstva', 2 December 1999, available at: http://www.levonevski.net/pravo/norm2009/num36/d36483.html, accessed 2 February 2014.10 For instance, Paragraph 2, Article 8 of the 1997 Charter of the Union defines taking 'joint measures to formulate common positions on international issues of mutual interest' as its main goal: Ustav k Dogovoru o Soyuze Belarusi e Rossii ot 2 aprelya 1997 goda, available at: http://www.soyuz.by/about/docs/dogovor4/, accessed 2 February 2014.11Voennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federazii, 2010, Article 21, available at: http://kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461, accessed 9 April 2012.12Soglashenie o Sozdanii Soyuza Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv, 1991, available at: http://cis.minsk.by/reestr/ru/index.html#reestr/view/text?doc = 1, accessed 7 April 2012. Dogovor o Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti, 1992, available at: http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/, accessed 9 April 2012. The CIS Treaty stipulates refraining 'from the use of force or the threat of force against the political independence of a member state' (Article 3), the 'employment of the mechanism of mutual consultations', as well as 'peace-making actions and the use of the Armed Forces as the realization of the right for individual and collective self-protection' in case of a threat (Article 12). The CST(O) Treaty in its turn stipulates the obligation to abstain from the use or threat of force in interstate relations (Article 1). It establishes that 'aggression by any state or a group of states' against one party will be considered 'an aggression against all the parties' (Article 4). Finally, it provides for 'joint consultations' in the case of 'any threat to security, territorial integrity and sovereignty' against one or several parties, or to 'international peace and security' (Article 2).13 The CSTO Secretariat reported on 20 October 2009 that it had received all documents, including the 'Soglashenie o Kollektivnykh Silakh Operativnogo Reagirovaniya Organizatsii Dogovora o Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti', Interfax, 20 October 2009, available at: http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/ 162330/, accessed 7 January 2010.14 'President Belarusi ne schitaet nuzhnym speshit's priznaniem nezavisimosti Yuzhnoi Ossetii i Abkhazii', Interfax, 24 September 2008, available at: http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/46153, accessed 2 February 2014.15Konzeptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 15 July 2008, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/785, accessed 2 February 2014; Konzeptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 12 February 2013, available at: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/e2f289bea62097f9c325787a0034c255/c32577ca0017434944257b160051bf7f, accessed 2 February 2014.16Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Arktike na period do 2020 goda I dal'neishuyu perspektivu, 27 March 2009, available at: http://www.rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html, accessed 2 February 2014.17Strategiya natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda, 2009, available at: http://www.rg.ru/2009/05/19/strategia-dok.html, accessed 14 February 2014.18Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2010, available at: http://www.rg.ru/2010/02/10/doktrina-dok.html, accessed 14 February 2014.19Voennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2010, available at: http://kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461, accessed 9 April 2012.20Voennaya Doktrina Respubliki Belarus, 2002, available at: http://www.mod.mil.by/doktrina.html, accessed 7 April 2012.21Kontseptsiya Natsional'noi Bezopasnosti Respubliki Belarus, 2010, available at: http://mod.mil.by/koncep.html, accessed 14 October 2010.22 Russia's main concern was its exclusion from the dominant (indeed, to a great extent, the only) security organisation in Europe, a feeling which was supposed to be overcome by the creation of the NATO–Russia Council in the context of the second wave of NATO enlargement in March 2004. The Belarusian leadership did not share this anxiety.23Soglashenie mezhdy Respublikoi Belarus' i Rossiiskoi Federatsiei o sovmestnom obspechenii regional'noi bezopasnosti v voennoi sfere, 19 December 1997, available at: http://www.levonevski.net/pravo/norm2009/num39/d39490.html, accessed 14 April 2012.24North Atlantic Council Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm, accessed 14 April 2012.25 The price for 2002 was estimated at $22 per 1,000 m3. During that year, the parties signed an agreement which settled the special price for natural gas exported from Russia to Belarus, while also stipulating the creation of a joint venture between Russia's Gazprom and Belarusian state-owned gas transmission company Beltransgaz. The agreement provided for the acquisition of a 50% stake in the Belarusian company by July 2003, which did not, however, take place due to a dispute over the value of Beltransgaz. While Belarus demanded $2.5bn for a 50% stake, Gazprom was not willing to pay more than $290m. Since Gazprom did not receive any benefit from the agreement, it did not feel bound by it and therefore started to raise the gas price: to $30 per 1,000 m3 in 2003 and $46.68 per 1,000 m3 in 2004. Negotiations proved especially difficult in 2004, leading to cuts in gas supplies to Belarus during winter. These in turn were vociferously denounced by the Belarusian president, who threatened to abandon the integration process with Russia. The gas crisis damaged the reputation of Gazprom in many European countries. Eventually Gazprom settled on a price of $46.68 for 2005, while gas transit fees through Beltransgaz were raised by about a third.26 The agreement reached after protracted negotiations on 31 December 2006 stipulated a further gradual increase of the gas price up to European levels. Belarus was to pay $100 per 1,000 m3 from the end of 2006, about 40% of the average price paid by European customers. The price would be raised to 67% in 2008, 80% in 2009 and 100% in 2011. The agreement also provided for an increase in gas transit fees through Beltransgaz (to $1.45 1,000 m3/100 km), as well as specifying the conditions for the creation of the Gazprom–Beltransgaz joint venture, i.e. the purchase of 50% of Beltransgaz at the price of $2.5bn. Even after the implementation of the agreement, Gazprom threatened to cut off gas supplies unless Belarus paid all the remaining debt ($456m) by 3 August 2007. In December 2011, Gazprom acquired another 50% of Beltransgaz for the same price of $2.5bn. The deal fixed the price of $164 per 1,000 m3 for 2012, in contrast to $244 per 1,000 m3 paid in 2011 (still about half the price paid by European customers). The parties also came to an agreement regarding the $10bn credit to Belarus for the construction of the nuclear power plant.27 The amount of $500m was the last part of the second tranche of the $2bn credit agreed on 14 November 2008. After the Belarusian party rejected payment in Russian rubles, the Russian Ministry of Finance declared that the granting of the last credit tranche depended on the policy of the Belarusian leadership, which it accused of failing to take measures to guarantee the stability of Belarus' economy; 'Rossiya predlagala Belarusi vzyat' credit na $500 mln v ros. Rublyakh, no Belarus' otkazalas'', Interfax, 28 May 2009, available at: http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/55764, accessed 2 February 2014.28 Belarus received an IMF stabilisation loan of $2.5bn, of which the first tranche ($788m) was transferred to Belarus on 15 January 2009. In June, the conditions were revisited and the overall sum was increased to $3.46bn.29 Russian sanctions were lifted, but a re-certification of Belarusian production was required. Also, Belarus ultimately had to consent to the imposition of quotas on some types of dairy exports to Russia (e.g. powdered milk).30 'Lukashenko: otnosheniya Belarusi s ODKB ne svyazany s ekonomicheskimi problemami s Rossiei', Naviny.by, 2 October 2009, available at: http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2009/10/02/ic_news_112_318683/, accessed 7 January 2010.31 'Vostochnoe partnerstvo mozhet nesti ushcherb interesam Rossii—Lavrov', RiaNovostiUkraina, 13 May 2010, available at: http://rian.com.ua/politics/20100513/78391127.html, accessed 2 February 2014.32 'Ot soyuznikov po ODKB trebuetsya pomoshch'', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 13 February 2009, available at: http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2009-02-13/1_odkb.html, accessed 7 January 2010.33 'Prezident Belarusi: tol'ko idiot mozhet skazat', shto Lukashenko povernul na Zapad i kinul Rossiyu', Naviny.by, 2 October 2009, available at: http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2009/10/02/ic_news_112_318686/, accessed 2 February 2014.34 'Former Czech Foreign Minister Talks About Missile Defense, Belarus, and Russia', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 25 September 2009, available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Former_Czech_Foreign_Minister_Talks_About_Missile_Defense_Belarus_And_Russia/1836572.html, accessed 2 February 2014.35 'NATO Official on Prospects for Relations with Belarus', Belapan, 12 December 2008, available at: http://en.belapan.by/archive/2008/12/12/en_natol_v/, accessed 9 April 2012.36 'Rossiya okazalas' ne sposobna podderzhat' Belarus' v reshchenii problem, kotorye mogli vozniknut' posle priznaniya nezavisimosti Abkhazii i Yuzhnoi Ossetii-Lukashenko', Belta, 13 August 2010, available at: http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/president/Rossija-okazalas-ne-sposobna-podderzhat-Belarus-v-reshenii-problem-kotorye-mogli-vozniknut-posle-priznanija-nezavisimosti-Abxazii-i-Juzhnoj-Osetii–-Lukashenko_i_521286.html, accessed 14 October 2010.37 'Rossiya okazalas' ne sposobna podderzhat' Belarus' v rechshenii problem, kotorye mogli vozniknut' posle priznaniya nezavisimosti Abkhazii i Yuzhnoi Ossetii-Lukashenko', Belta, 13 August 2010, available at: http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/president/Rossija-okazalas-ne-sposobna-podderzhat-Belarus-v-reshenii-problem-kotorye-mogli-vozniknut-posle-priznanija-nezavisimosti-Abxazii-i-Juzhnoj-Osetii–-Lukashenko_i_521286.html, accessed 14 October 2010.The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Post-Doctoral Scholarship of the Fundação Ciência e Tecnologia, financed by Programa Operacional Potencial Humano within the Quadro de Referência Estratégica Nacional (project reference SFRH/BPD/63834/2009), with the support of the European Social Fund. While this article mostly draws on an analysis of relations between Russia and Belarus in 2009–2010, the pattern of the intra-alliance security dilemma (and the respective role which NATO and the EU play in it) is easily identifiable in more recent events related to this bilateral relationship. For instance, in April 2013, Russia announced that it was establishing an air base in Belarus in 2015, as agreed with the Belarusian leadership during a meeting in Minsk on 24 April 2013. Only a couple of days after this declaration, Aleksandr Lukashenko presented a watered down version of the agreement which mainly concerned delivery of military aircraft to Belarus (Su-27P). The Belarusian position has been determined by the twofold aspiration not to antagonise NATO while reminding Moscow of the political implications/costs of creating an air base in Belarus (Safronov aCitation2013).
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