The Fujimori Effect
2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 10; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/14754835.2011.596062
ISSN1475-4843
Autores Tópico(s)Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics
ResumoAbstract This article examines how efforts to hold Alberto Fujimori, president of Peru from 1990 to 2000, accountable for human rights violations and to build safeguards against a recurrence of those violations have set important precedents for international human rights law and practice. Among the key developments his crimes have provoked are new protections for democracy as a human right via the Inter-American Democratic Charter; international legal precedents banning the use of amnesties for human rights crimes and the use of military courts to try alleged terrorists; and the extradition of a democratically elected former head of state for human rights violations and his conviction for those crimes by the courts of his own country. Acknowledgments Rebecca K. Root teaches political science and international studies in the School of American and International Studies at Ramapo College of New Jersey. She has a 2007 PhD in Political Science from the University of Massachusetts–Amherst. Her previous article appeared in Human Rights Quarterly in 2009, and she is now working on a book on transitional justice in Peru. She would like to thank Sonia Cardenas, Robert Lacey, Joshua Root, Jeremy Teigen, Roark Atkinson, Michael Riff, Paul Elovitz, and Stephen Rice for providing feedback on an earlier draft of this article, and Marie Murray for her excellent research assistance. Notes 1. I cite here the final report of Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which conducted its work between 2001 and 2003. Priscilla Hayner, a leading scholar on truth commissions, identifies the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission as one of the five strongest truth commissions in the world to date (2011: 35–39). 2. De la Jara Basombrío (2003) notes that Peruvian diplomats felt this effort was necessary to repay Peru's debt to the OAS for its contribution to responding to Fujimori's abuses of democracy and human rights. 3. Peru took other steps to commit itself to international mechanisms for human rights accountability in this period, including signing and ratifying the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court (ICC). While the ICC would be unable to prosecute Alberto Fujimori or his accomplices, given that their crimes were committed before the Rome Statute came into force, the Peruvian government supported the ICC as a tool to prevent other human rights abusers from enjoying the impunity Fujimori gained by fleeing his country. 4. The charter was also invoked during the 2002 coup against Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, but the coup was reversed before the OAS could take action. The strong OAS stance toward Honduras persisted despite US attempts to persuade its Latin American neighbors to accept the Honduran elections as sufficient grounds for an end to the country's suspension. 5. See The Economist (2011). 6. The Inter-American Court had found Peru's attempt to withdraw from its jurisdiction illegitimate anyhow (Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru; Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 1999b). However, the vote to return to the court signified Peru's willingness to recognize the court's decisions. 7. Because of the removal of these judges, the Constitutional Court had been deprived of the number of judges necessary to reach decisions, thereby rendering it defunct. 8. As late as 2010, this issue remained highly controversial. Minister of Defense Rafael Rey claimed that the Paniagua and Toledo administrations had allowed thousands of terrorists out of prison as a result of the Inter-American Court's decision. Diego García Sayán's response to these accusations is especially helpful: See Balbi (2010). 9. There is some uncertainty about the exact number of new trials granted. I use here the number offered by Laplante, who has served as a legal consultant for liberated prisoners. 10. A forthcoming article (Reiter and Kyle in press) responds to this very problem. 11. For example, in the ground-breaking book Transitional Justice in Balance (2010), Olsen, Payne, and Reiter systematize and test many of the hypotheses and insights of transitional justice scholarship but do not mention this issue. 12. Among those convicted are Vladimiro Montesinos, chief of intelligence Julio Salazar, and head of Grupo Colina Santiago Martín Rivas. 13. The "self-defense committees" (or rondas campesinas) were civilian patrols that engaged in much of the fighting during this conflict but without directly being incorporated into any official bodies. They occasionally received arms from the government as the conflict heated up. 14. The most recent attempt came in September 2010 with President García's legislative decree 1079, which stated that human rights cases against members of the security forces would be closed if, 36 months after legal investigations began, no decisions had been reached. Given the slowness of the courts to date, this would have amounted to a de facto amnesty. Within days, the Peruvian Congress voted 90-1 to nullify the law. "Por amplia mayoría, el pleno del Congreso aprobó derogar el polémico DL 1097" El Comercio September 14, 2010. 15. Carlos Rivera Paz, a lawyer with the Instituto de Defensa Legal, has been especially vocal on this point, which he made forcefully at a conference entitled "Los Retos de la Justicia en la 'Democracia': Perspectivos de la judicialización de las violaciones de derechos humanos, a 18 años del Caso Cantuta" at Universidad San Marcos in Lima, Peru on July 15, 2010. 16. Only two Latin American presidents had been extradited before this. In 1996, Bolivia's military dictator Luis Garcia Meza was extradited from Brazil to serve a prison sentence from a 1993 conviction for human rights violations. In 2008, Guatemalan president Alfonso Portillo was extradited by Mexico for corruption charges, but no further legal action has been taken against him. Meanwhile, the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and others refuse to grant extradition of ex-presidents of the region who reside on their territory. See Lutz and Reiger (2009: appendix). 17. The poll was conducted by the Instituto de Opinión Publica and the Pontifica Universidad Católica del Perú in April 2009. 18. The others were Luis Echeverría of Mexico, Jorge Videla and Maria Isabel Martínez de Perón of Argentina, Efraín Ríos Montt and Óscar Humberto Mejía Victores of Guatemala, and Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of Bolivia, and Juan Bordaberry of Uruguay (Roht-Arriaza 2009: 46). In 2010, two former dictators of Uruguay, Juan Bordaberry and Gregorio Alvarez, were convicted of violating the constitution and human rights and sentenced to 25 and 30 years in prison, respectively. 19. Olsen, Payne, and Reiter find mixed evidence regarding the justice cascade but write that "the accountability norm, where it does exist, is regionally concentrated in Europe and Latin America" (2010: 108). 20. While the individual crimes for which Fujimori was convicted are common crimes under the Peruvian criminal code (aggravated assault, homicide, and kidnapping), the Supreme Court stated that these crimes constituted crimes against humanity. Corte Suprema de Justicia. Sentencia Alberto Fujimori Fujimori (R.N. N° 03-01-2010). This decision ratified the earlier ruling (R.N. N° 19-01-2009-A.V).
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