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Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation

2004; Elsevier BV; Volume: 40; Issue: 8 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.001

1873-1538

José Alcalde, Pablo Revilla,

Game Theory and Applications

This paper explores the existence of stable research teams, when the preferences of each agent depend on the set of researchers who are collaborating. We introduce a property over researchers' preferences, called top responsiveness, guaranteeing the existence of stable research teams configurations. We also provide a stable mechanism, induced by the so-called top covering algorithm, which is strategy-proof when researchers preferences satisfy top responsiveness. Furthermore, we find that, in this framework, the top covering mechanism is the only strategy-proof mechanism that always selects stable allocations.