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The governance of national cultural organisations: comparative study of performance contracts with the main cultural organisations in England, France and Catalonia (Spain)

2011; Routledge; Volume: 19; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10286632.2011.638981

1477-2833

Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins, Arturo Rubio Arostegui,

Cultural Industries and Urban Development

Abstract In some European countries, performance contracts have become an instrument for the governance and control of major cultural organisations by the public administration. The negotiation and signing of a performance contract are mainly aimed at developing the goals of cultural policies by means of large organisations in order to achieve the traditional objectives of cultural democratisation and other instrumental objectives (economic development, urban regeneration or social inclusion). Nevertheless, the development level of performance contracts varies when we compare England, France and Catalonia (Spain). Each particular level of development is conditioned by the overall administrative and institutional context and the development level of results-based management and an accountability culture. The level of public funding and the degree of autonomy of management within each organisation can also explain why in some cases governance has been contractualised whereas in other cases either progress is more rhetorical than real. Keywords: performance contractscultural organisationscultural policycultural governanceaccountability Acknowledgements We want to acknowledge Oriol Picas (Department of Culture of the Catalan Government) for his advice and information provided, and Luis Jiménez for his help in correcting this article. Notes 1. The existing relationship with the cultural facility within the organisation chart of the public administration as a whole would be a direct one. The established relationship between a private or non-profit cultural facility and a public organisation through an agreement, a registered grant or any other kind of relationship would be an indirect one. 2. We have chosen England and France as they are at first sight opposite cases with regard to cultural policy models (Zimmer and Toepler Citation1996, Citation1998). We are aware that other cases exist like Flanders or the Netherlands where performance contracting formulae have been developed (Bouckaert et al. Citation2002). However, the goal of this article is to show a typology of the performance contracting processes in the relationships between public administrations and the major cultural organisations rather than draw a complete picture of that process at European level. We are also aware that in Great Britain there exist different contexts with regard to public policy management within its constituent territories – such as the case of Scotland or Wales – so we have decided to focus on England. In the case of Spain, au contraire, the decision has been to highlight the differences between Madrid and Catalonia in reference to how those relationships are carried out. 3. One of the factors having an influence on the legal status of the major cultural organisations is the administrative and legal context of each cultural policy. In France, those are established as public organisations, mainly as Établissements Publics Administratifs and Établissements Publics à Caractère Industriel et Commercial (Coppinger et al. Citation2007, p. 8) whereas in Madrid – and more specifically in Barcelona – public organisations (i.e. autonomous bodies or publicly owned companies) coexist with non-profit organisations (foundations). In both cases – despite some ambiguities – their nature is public, following the European accounting rules SEC-95, which define as a public body one that receives more than 50% of its funding from public resources. In England, legal nature of the major artistic institutions is that of non-profit distributing so they are not legally categorised within the public sector nor within the non-profit private sector. However most of their funding comes from public sources (ACE Citation2010) so comparison with the French and Spanish cases is relevant. In any case, as examined by Schuster (Citation1998), we are facing – from the 1990s in the case of museums – a trend towards hybridisation, that is, a combination of elements from the public and third sector so distinction between both sectors is becoming blurred. Thus we need to combine various criteria (legal status, self-financing rate, pattern of relationships between public administration and the organisation manager, etc.) in order to accurately describe the degree of compliance with each sector. This kind of task cannot be systematically dealt with in this article but will undoubtedly help in throwing light on the last aspect of this typology – the pattern of relationships, which as we will see later on, is currently undergoing a change through the performance contracting process. 4. The meaning of national cultural organisation is clear in England or France but more problematic in Spain: In Barcelona when we speak about national cultural organisations we are making reference to those belonging to Catalonia as a country whereas in Madrid the same term makes reference to the Spanish State. Therefore there exist different criteria for describing this term. 5. This article will not cover medium or small-sized cultural organisations, locally based, not providing activities for the public (regulating or fund-managing agencies) or belonging to the lucrative private sector. In the French case, those previously defined major organisations are named opérateurs or établissements culturels whereas in Spain they are termed equipamientos or instituciones culturales. 6. We are aware that the social impact of culture is a problematic concept at both theoretical and methodological levels (Merli Citation2002). Its results, difficult to measure, are many times overestimated through a rhetoric trying to justify in this way public subsidies to culture (Belfiore Citation2002, Citation2004). Nevertheless we mention social impact as a means to show a paradigm as well as an emerging practice having an important effect on the management of major cultural organisations in the examined countries. 7. The total amount of DCMS financing includes the grant aid – operating (£33.4 m) and the grant aid – capital and works of art (£22.6 m). 8. The link between the performance contract and the PSA can be seen in Tate's case, where the memorandum establishing the content and the negotiation methodology for the FA states: The Agreement will reflect the Tate's statutory duties and, within those duties, the priorities agreed with the Secretary of State from time to time. In particular the Agreement will reflect Tate's contribution where relevant to the achievement of the Department's PSA objectives and targets (Tate Citation2008). 9. A complete list (fully downloadable) of the cultural organisations with FA can be found here: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.culture.gov.uk/reference_library/publications/4704.aspx 10. For our purposes, self-financing rate is takings plus renting of halls plus sponsorship and/or patronage. That is, all the income except that from public administrations or bodies under its authority – including income from the national lottery. In any case, financing rates of the major cultural institutions are abnormal because of their large dimension as well as the fact that these are usually located in main cities. Consequently, one cannot deduce that the self-finance rates of the major cultural institutions should happen in the case of smaller ones or of those located in medium and small-sized cities. 11. The establishment of three-year FAs made possible to go beyond the up to then usual one-year term in the public sector, also providing the major cultural organisations with the ability to develop a more dynamic and accountable three-year action plan. One of the most important novelties of this reform was that it made possible to keep and use the surplus amount and savings from the current budget term for the next years (unlike the previous situation where the budget had to be spent or given back) thus promoting a most efficient and proactive resource management. 12. As per the Organic Law on Financial Acts of 2001 (LOLF), the organisations under the authority of the State (in legal French terminology, opérateurs) are described as 'public bodies endowed with moral status, under the authority of the State either directly or because they are mostly publicly funded'. 13. If we focus on the first 11 cultural organisations according to funds awarded, we find that they represent 75% of the total funding amount and 27% of the MCC budget in 2002 (KPMG Citation2002, p. 26). Full list of these major organisations is: Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Opéra National de Paris, CNAC Georges Pompidou, Cité des Sciences et de l'Industrie, Musée du Louvre, Écoles d'Architecture, Cité de la Musique, Comédie Française, Grande Halle de la Villette, Musée du Quay Branly and Centre National de la Cinématographie. 14. According to a study from Deloitte (Citation2006) Consulting on 10 performance contracts, commissioned by the MCC, six of these scored 0 points on a 0–5 scale in some of these three aspects: level of compliance with the PAP of the MCC in the annual budget; level of commitment and monitoring of contractual obligations; operational level of the performance goals. 15. The lower self-financing rate in France can be explained in terms of rigidity in budget management and lack of mechanisms – unlike those existing in England – in order to allow the major artistic organisations to keep the surplus amount for the subsequent budget periods. This situation discourages innovative management, as defined by Moore (Citation1998). 16. In the wake of Franco's rule, the Spanish State was only present in cultural institutions within Catalonia through the Archaeological Museum of Tarragona (Rubio Arostegui Citation2003). 17. Due to their rather complex nature, a study on the negotiation and signing of performance contracts demands a further detailed analysis, something which is beyond the scope of this article. It is worth noting though that, for example, in the negotiation process of the performance contract with the Teatre Lliure of Barcelona every administration lobbied in order to get their priorities put on paper: the Spanish Ministry of Culture insisted on the coordination between cultural institutions of Barcelona and Madrid, whereas the Generalitat of Catalunya laid the stress on promoting Catalan artists as well as – along with the Barcelona Provincial Council – on disseminating the institution's programming throughout the areas of Barcelona and Catalonia. As for the Barcelona City Council, emphasis was placed on the contemporary, creative nature of the institution and its affiliation with the major similar theatres at international level. But most of the difficulties encountered in that negotiation process were of administrative nature (such as the very bureaucratic procedures) or of economic nature (the burden each administration had to take in its annual funding) rather than being caused by the intrinsic content of the contract.