Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Memory and the everyday landscape of violence in post-genocide Cambodia

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 13; Issue: 8 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14649365.2012.734847

1470-1197

James A. Tyner, Gabriela Brindis Alvarez, Alex R. Colucci,

Vietnamese History and Culture Studies

Abstract This paper addresses the politics of memory in post-genocide Cambodia. Since 1979 genocide has been selectively memorialized in the country, with two sites receiving official commemoration: the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide Crimes and the killing fields at Choeung Ek. However, the Cambodian genocide was not limited to these two sites. Through a case study of two unmarked sites—the Sre Lieu mass grave at Koh Sla Dam and the Kampong Chhnang Airfield—we highlight the salience, and significance, of taking seriously those sites of violence that have not received official commemoration. We argue that the history of Cambodia's genocide, as well as attempts to promote transitional justice, must remain cognizant of how memories and memorials become political resources. In particular, we contend that a focus on the unremarked sites of past violence provides critical insight into our contemporary understandings of the politics of remembering and of forgetting. Cet article aborde la politique de la mémoire au Cambodge après le génocide. Au pays le génocide fut commémoré de manière sélective depuis 1979, avec deux sites qui reçoivent une commémoration officielle: le Musée des Crimes Génocidaires de Tuol Sleng et les terrains d'exécution à Choeung Ek. Le génocide n'a pas pourtant été limité à ces deux sites. A partir d'une étude de cas de deux sites non marqués – la fosse commune Sre Lieu à Koh Sla Dam et l'aérodrome Kampong Chhanang – nous soulignons l'importance primaire de prendre au sérieux les sites de violence qui n'ont pas encore reçu une commémoration officielle. Nous affirmons que l'histoire du génocide du Cambodge, ainsi que les tentatives de promouvoir la justice transitionnelle, devraient rester conscientes du processus par lequel les mémoires et les mémoriels se transforment en ressources politiques. Nous proposons en particulière que les sites non marqués de la violence du passé puissent fournir un aperçu critique sur nos compréhensions contemporaines de la politique du souvenir et de l'oubli. Este artículo se trata a la política de memoria en Camboya después del genocidio. Desde 1979 genocidio ha sido conmemorado selectivamente en el país, con dos sitios recibiendo conmemoración oficial: el Museo Tuol Sleng de Crimenes de Genocidio y los campos de matanza de Choeung Ek. Sin embargo, el genocidio de Camboya no fue limitado a estos dos sitios. A través un caso práctico de dos sitios sin nombre – la fosa común de Sre Lieu en Koh Sla Dam y el Aeródromo de Kampong Chhnang – destacamos la prominencia, y significativo, de tomar en cuenta estos sitios de violencia que no han recibido conmemoración oficial. Discutimos que la historia del genocidio en Camboya, también como intentos promover justicia transnacional, deben pertenezcan conscientes de cómo las memorias y conmemorativos llegan a ser recursos políticos. Particularmente, sostenemos que un enfoque en los sitios sin nombre de violencia del pasado proveen una perspicacia critica a nuestros entendimientos contemporáneos de la política de recordar y olvidar. Keywords: landscapememorymemorializationviolenceCambodiaKeywords: paysagemémoirecommémorationviolenceCambodgeKeywords: paisajememoriaconmemoraciónviolenciaCamboya Notes 1. As one anonymous reviewer correctly notes, Cambodia was not entirely erased, as it persisted in the imaginations of many Khmer throughout the genocide. Conceptually, however, it was imperative for the Khmer Rouge—from their perspective—to destroy rather than transform previous institutions and infrastructures. The reviewer explains, furthermore, that this was 'the image they [the Khmer Rouge] attempted to make of themselves, and we do well not to repeat it.' We agree in part. While we, in our writings, should endeavor to not represent the individual experiences of Cambodians throughout the genocide (and beyond) as monolithic, we must also tease apart the particularities of the Khmer Rouge to understand why certain policies and practices were pursued. Too often scholars of genocide and mass violence forward overly simplistic accounts (i.e., Pol Pot was evil) that render the Khmer Rouge regime itself as a monolithic entity. 2. When first opened in 1962, the school was called Chao Ponhea Yat High School. In 1970, it was renamed Tuol Svay Prey (meaning 'hillock of the wild mango'). It was located next to an adjoining primary school, Tuol Sleng ('hillock of the sleng tree'). This name was used to designate the entire compound when it was converted to the Museum of Genocide Crimes, perhaps, as Chandler (Citation1999: 4) suggests, because the sleng tree bears poisonous fruit. 3. Security centers in Democratic Kampuchea were spatially organized into five levels: subdistrict, district, regional, zone, and central. It is unknown exactly how many security centers were in operation; most scholars estimate the existence of approximately 200 districts, regional and zonal centers were established. Tuol Sleng is the only known 'central' or highest-level facility. 4. Most accounts continue to claim that 14,000 prisoners were killed at S-21, with only seven survivors. Some estimates continue to place the death toll at over 20,000. However, as the meticulous research of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DCCAM) has detailed, these numbers are in error. The figure of 12,273 is derived from documentation presented at the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC; better known as the 'Cambodian tribunal'). Likewise, the purported seven survivors have been shown to be wrong; archivists at DCCAM have documented the existence of at least 179 survivors. Interestingly, there is speculation that the number of seven survivors was promoted by the Vietnamese to parallel the 7th day of January—the 'day of victory' (see Documentation Center of Cambodia Citation2011). 5. As of this writing, Hun Sen remains prime minister—a position he has held since 1985. 6. For a detailed overview of the tribunal (see Ciorciari and Heindel Citation2009). 7. His initial sentence of thirty-five years was reduced to just nineteen years because of time served. In other words, his sentence was less than one-half a day for each of the 12,000 deaths associated with Tuol Sleng. 8. Quoted in Rasy (Citation2007); at 18. 9. Interview with lead author, 9 October 2011. 10. Angkar (literally, 'organization') refers to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), the ruling body of the Khmer Rouge. 11. Quoted in Prum (Citation2006); at 45. 12. Cited in Office of the Co-Investigating Judges (Citation2007), p. 101. 13. Khieu Samphan studied politics and economics at the University of Sorbonne. He earned his doctoral in 1959. 14. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this important connection to our attention. It is well-worth pursuing how the unremarking of past atrocities—the hidden landscapes of violence of which we write—parallel the unremarking of contemporary landscapes of violence. Indeed, as the reviewer suggests it may be that the selective remembrance of the Cambodia genocide as an apex of violence serves to render mundane current violent practices. In other words, how 'bad' can the present levels of violence be when compared to the genocidal violence of the previous years?