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A key recovery attack on the 802.11b wired equivalent privacy protocol (WEP)

2004; Association for Computing Machinery; Volume: 7; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1145/996943.996948

1557-7406

Adam Stubblefield, John P. A. Ioannidis, Aviel D. Rubin,

IPv6, Mobility, Handover, Networks, Security

In this paper, we present a practical key recovery attack on WEP, the link-layer security protocol for 802.11b wireless networks. The attack is based on a partial key exposure vulnerability in the RC4 stream cipher discovered by Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir. This paper describes how to apply this flaw to breaking WEP, our implementation of the attack, and optimizations that can be used to reduce the number of packets required for the attack. We conclude that the 802.11b WEP standard is completely insecure, and we provide recommendations on how this vulnerability could be mitigated and repaired.