Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Radicalising liberal feminism by playing the games that men play*

2004; Routledge; Volume: 19; Issue: 44 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/0816464042000226465

1465-3303

Michael Burke,

Gender Roles and Identity Studies

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of an earlier draft of this article for their helpful comments. Cited in Frank Deford, ‘A League of Their Own’, Newsweek, vol. 130, no. 9, 9 January 1997, p. 63. Women's basketball in Australia still suffers from a relative lack of coverage when compared with the men's game. There are other aspects in certain competitions that maintain the gender hierarchy, such as girls playing midweek and boys playing at the weekend. This clause is contained at s. 66(1) of the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act (1995). This exception is reproduced in federal legislation (Sex Discrimination Act 1984 [Commonwealth] s. 42) and the legislation of all other States of Australia (e.g. Equal Opportunity Act 1984 [South Australia] s. 48; Anti‐Discrimination Act 1991 [Queensland] s. 111; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 [Western Australia] s. 35). I will ignore the alignment of sexiness with male heterosexuality in this argument. 1986, cited in Nancy Theberge, ‘ “Same Sport, Different Gender”: a Consideration of Binary Gender Logic and the Sport Continuum in the Case of Ice‐Hockey’, Journal of Sport and Social Issues, vol. 22, no. 2, May 1998, pp. 183‐198 (accessed from EBSCO host online display, pp. 1–11). Marion Tapper, ‘Can a Feminist be a Liberal?’, Australian Journal of Philosophy, Supplement to vol. 64, June 1986, pp. 37–47. Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard University Press) Cambridge, MA, 1987. Margaret Thornton, ‘The Seductive Allure of EEO’ in Norma Grieve and Ailsa Burns (eds), Australian Women: Contemporary Feminist Thought (Oxford University Press) Melbourne, 1994, pp. 215–24. This is demonstrated in the sporting world through Jim McKay's study of the gendered environment of sporting organisations in Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Jim McKay, Managing Gender: Affirmative Action and Organizational Power in Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand Sport (State University of New York Press) Albany, 1997. Australian Law Reform Commission (1994), Strengthening the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, ALRC 69 Part III, paragraph 3.1. [Online. Internet.] Available at ⟨www.austlii.edu.au/cgi‐bin…html⟩, accessed 21 January 2003. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, p. 77. Michael A. Messner and Donald F. Sabo, ‘Toward a Critical Feminist Reappraisal of Sport, Men, and the Gender Order’ in Michael A. Messner and Donald F. Sabo (eds), Sport, Men, and the Gender Order (Human Kinetics Publishers) Champaign, IL, 1990, pp. 1–15. Mary Jo Kane, ‘Resistance/Transformation of the Oppositional Binary: Exposing Sport as a Continuum’, Journal of Sport and Social Issues, vol. 19, no. 2, 1995, p. 197. Australian Law Reform Commission, Strengthening the Sex Discrimination Act, paragraphs 3.88–9. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, p. 35. David McArdle, ‘Can Legislation Stop me from Playing? The Distinction between Sport Competitors and Sport Workers under the United Kingdom's Sex Discrimination Laws’, Culture, Sport, Society, vol. 2, no. 2, Summer 1999, p. 44. Robertson v. Australian Ice Hockey Federation and Victorian Ice Hockey Association, 207, [1997], VADT, 363, pp. 9–11. I am aware that a similar rule exists in Australian Rules football. Girls may play in mixed competitions until the age of 12. Then they are required to play in separate competitions. But as the women's football league will not accept girls below the age of 15, for legal reasons of their own, it would seem difficult for a girl between the ages of 12 and 15 to maintain her playing interest in football. At a later hearing on this matter that included another female complainant, Kira Kirvan, the president of the Tribunal stated: ‘Before December 1996 [where the Australian Ice Hockey Federation made the decision to ban girls from contact ice hockey] a number of girls had played with males in contact ice hockey’ (Kirvan and Robertson v. Victorian Ice Hockey Assoc. [1998] VADT 207. [Online. Internet.] Available at ⟨www.home.vicnet.net.au/∼bats/Adtdecision376.html⟩, accessed 7 January 2003). Robertson v. Australian Ice Hockey Federation and Victorian Ice Hockey Association, p. 9. Natalie Sikora, ‘Girl Goalie Frozen Out of Sport’, Herald Sun (Melbourne), 26 February 1998, p. 13. A case put to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (Australia) in July 1999, involving the rights of a junior female steer rider, Ayshea Clement, to participate in steer riding events resulted in a similar argument put by the organisation that had banned Ayshea, the National Rodeo Association, that all women should be banned from the sport on the basis that the average women would be more susceptible to serious injury (Amanda Watt, ‘Steering Rodeo to Equity’, Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia) 31 July 1999a, p. 4; Amanda Watt, ‘Ban Spurs Young Steer Rider’, Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia) 30 August 1999b, p. 7). The National Rodeo Association reinforced this argument by suggesting that ‘insurance may not cover her in the event of injury’ (Watt, 1999b, p. 7). The secretary, Stephen Drive, of a competitor organisation Rodeo Oz Style, argued (outside of the Commission) that his organisation, which allowed females to compete, used the same insurance company as the National Rodeo Association, and ‘there was no clause discriminating on the basis of sex’ (Watt, 1999b, p. 7). The general manager of the Australian Professional Rodeo Association, Stephen Hilton, said that he knew of no other rodeo group that banned females from participation (Watt, 1999a, p. 4). Yet the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission ruled that, because the National Rodeo Association is a voluntary organisation, it was exempted under the 1984 Sex Discrimination Act, and any rule that prevented female participation would not constitute ‘unlawful discrimination’ (Watt, 1999b, p. 7). This case evokes many of the ideas put by feminists about both equal opportunities legislation and the protection provided to male power by the private/public dichotomy. Robertson v. Australian Ice Hockey Federation and Victorian Ice Hockey Association, p. 10. This also ignores the cultural oppressions that overlay and reinforce the structural oppressions women face in sport. When Justine Blainey, the Canadian ice hockey player, fought the Ontario Hockey Association for the right to play the sport, she faced death threats, ostracism from the hockey community and pornography about her in the change rooms. Even those females who successfully challenge structural oppression may have their freedom reined in by harassment and annihilation (Laura Robinson, ‘All‐Male Sports Fit All Too Well into Our Culture of Violence’ in Peter Donnelly (ed.), Taking Sports Seriously: Social Issues in Canadian Sport (Thompson Educational Publishing) Toronto, 1997, pp. 133–5). Maximal VO2 is a standard physiological measure of aerobic capacity. The biological certainty of gender categories, and their unchangeability, is made manifest in the 1996 New South Wales laws that enact anti‐discrimination against transgendered individuals. These laws purportedly give the post‐operative transgendered individual the right to be recognised legally as having altered their sex. Yet s. 38P of the act provides an exception such that nothing in the legislation ‘renders unlawful the exclusion of a transgender person from participating in any sporting activity for members of the sex with which the transgendered person identifies’ (cited in Andrew Sharpe, ‘Naturalising Sex Differences through Sport: an Examination of the New South Wales Transgender Legislation’, Alternative Law Journal, vol. 22, no. 1, February 1997, pp. 40, 41). As Sharpe goes on to suggest, sport is a site for ‘correct [and correcting] readings’ of sex, in a world where sex has become ambiguous (p. 40; my addition). The sporting world allows for the production of non‐ambiguous, authentic, biological sex assignments, which transgress any therapeutically driven legal recognition of transgendering. Further, and in light of the later sections of this article, both members of parliament and society who supported this exception, and those who argued against it, still created a dichotomous view of sex differences that was hierarchical. Women were seen as members of the weaker and inferior sex. Individuals and groups who supported the Bill suggested that women could not compete with post‐operative transgendered females, because of ‘pre‐existing superior anatomical and physiological characteristics’ in the post‐pubertal transgendered person (Women in Sport Foundation, cited by Sharpe, 1997, p. 40). Those who opposed the legislative exception suggested that the example of Renee Richards indicates that postoperative transgendered females are weak enough to fit into the female sporting world. But both groups agree that women are located by inferiority in sport. South v. RVBA ac al 131200. [2001] VCAT 207. [Online. Internet.] Available at ⟨www.austlii.edu.au/cgi‐bin…2001/207.html⟩, accessed 7 January 2003, paragraphs 1–5. South v. RVBA, paragraph 6. South v, RVBA, paragraphs 15, 40–59. South v. RVBA, paragraph 44. South v. RVBA, paragraphs 45–52, 57–9. South v. RVBA, 207, paragraph 51. South v. RVBA, paragraphs 60–8. As one of the reviewers of this article pointed out, the cultural acceptance of the link between masculinity and aggression (and femininity and passivity) limits the extent to which even a radical form of legislation will effect changes in the actual practice of sport. The forms of hegemonic control extend beyond the biological imperatives in the legislation. Unfortunately, a fuller discussion of this issue, whilst worthy, is not possible in this article. However, I thank the reviewer for this insight, as it has directed part of my future research agenda. South v. RVBA, paragraphs 69–87. Lisa Jernakoff v. WA Softball Association (Inc) [1998], Equal Opportunity Tribunal of Western Australia, 1, pp. 8–10. In this summary of the case, I will not deal with the expert anatomical and physiological evidence presented in support of the exclusion of Jernakoff, as this repeats much of the evidence given in the ice hockey case. That is, whilst it is acknowledged that certain individual females can match ‘the average male’ in terms of strength, stamina and physique, it is argued that ‘the average female’ suffers a competitive disadvantage when compared with the average male on these characteristics. Play by the Rules: Court and Tribunal Decisions (2001), [Online. Internet.] Available at ⟨www.playbytherules. net.au/court.html⟩, accessed 9 October 2001. Lisa Jernakoff v. WA Softball Association (Inc). Lisa Jernakoff v. WA Softball Association (Inc). In her evidence, Lisa explained the situation in the following way: ‘… in this day and age everyone is told that you should never let anyone tell you that you are not good enough just because you’re a girl' (p. 13). Lisa Jernakoff v. WA Softball Association (Inc), p. 15; my emphasis. Lisa Jernakoff v. WA Softball Association (Inc), p. 16. Lisa Jernakoff v. WA Softball Association (Inc), p. 16. Lisa Jernakoff v. WA Softball Association (Inc), p. 16. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales [2001], FCA 1740 (10 December 2001). [Online. Internet.] Available at ⟨www.austlii.edu.au/cgi‐bin…html⟩, accessed 7 January 2003, paragraph 4. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraph 3. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraphs 7–10. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraph 11. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraphs 12–15. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraph 50; my insertion. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraph 15. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraphs 96–9. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraph 6. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraph 99. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraphs 89–90. I am aware of the feminist and pro‐feminist arguments concerning the value of women engaging in the same sorts of violent sports as men (including Messner and Sabo, Sport, Men and the Gender Order; McKay, Managing Gender; Martha McCaughey, ‘The Fighting Spirit: Women's Self‐defense Training and the Discourse of Sexed Embodiment’, Gender & Society, vol. 12, no. 3, June 1998, pp. 277–300 (accessed from EBSCO host online display, pp. 1–17); Helen Jefferson Lenskyj, ‘McCaughey, Martha: Real Knockouts: the Physical Feminism of Women's Self‐defense’, Book Review, International Review for the Sociology of Sport, vol. 34, no. 4, December 1999. This article is using the boxing example to demonstrate the arbitrariness of the anatomical exception clause in equal opportunity legislation, and is not making a comment on the worthiness of the former argument. Martin Tolich, ‘Negotiated Turf: the Feminisation of the New Zealand Jockey Profession’, ANZJS, vol. 32, no. 2, 1996, pp. 50–60. Tolich, ‘Negotiated Turf’, p. 53. Theberge, ‘ “Different Sport” ’, pp. 2–3. According to Barovick, the boxing market may also be changing because of the inclusion of women boxers. Women's boxing has apparently struck a chord with both jaded fans and exasperated boxing promoters who are disillusioned with men's boxing, such that women's boxing gets better ratings on ESPN than men's boxing. But additionally, Barovick reports that women boxers suggest that boxing has helped them to fight off other oppressions in their life. So regardless of whether the market embraces it or not, women's boxing remains an important site of empowerment (Harriett Barovick, ‘Diamonds in the Ring’, Time, vol. 155, no. 18, 1 May 2000. Accessed from EBSCO host online display: pp. 1–3). Theberge (‘ “Different Sport” ’, p. 4) also remarks that the binary is reasserted in the idea that the aggressive physicality of the men's game, a social construction, is due to men's superior strength, a biological reason. So differences from the male standard are justified by biological, and not social, differences, and hence the binary is reasserted as a biological and fixed one. Helen Lenskyj, ‘Sexuality and Femininity in Sport Contexts: Issues and Alternatives’, Journal of Sport and Social Issues, vol. 18, no. 4, 1994, pp. 356–76. This is the equivalent clause to the exception of s. 66.1 of the Victorian Act. Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraph 75. Senate Debates, 20 October 1983, p. 1893, as cited in Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraphs 76–8. Senate Debates, 21 October 1983, pp. 1929–30, as cited in Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraph 77. Senator Haines, in a speech during the Committee stage of framing the legislation stated: If we are at any stage to overcome the myth that girls' hips stop them from running fast, that their elbow joints stop them from throwing properly, or whatever the various arguments are for excluding women from competing against and with men, we will have to do it when it is quite clearly shown that there is considerable equality between the sexes …I believe that if we can scotch that at pre‐puberty by actively stating within this Bill that sporting activities for children under the age of 12 should include children of both sexes, we will go a long way to effecting the general principle and spirit of this legislation. (Senate Debates, 16 December 1983, pp. 3993–4, as cited in Ferneley v. The Boxing Authority of New South Wales, paragraph 78) However, the amended legislation could never be allowed to go far enough in this respect. As one of the reviewers of this article pointed out, the apparently arbitrary selection of the age of 12 as the cut‐off point for mixed‐sex competitions may have something to do with historical ideas, in medical, religious and educational discourses, of the need for paternalistic care by male professionals of the emerging reproductive organs of the adolescent women. The social control of women's sport has often treaded the fine line between concerns for reproduction and concerns about the fitness of women for the demands of childbirth and motherhood. This is one of the examples in Australian law where, at both ends of the process, lawmaking and judgment, what is reflected are the values, interests and concerns of the (mostly) men who make the laws and the (mostly) men who judge the cases. Australian Law Reform Commission, 1994. The Gender of Law, ALRC 69 Part II, [Online. Internet.] Available at ⟨www.austlii.edu.au/cgi‐bin…html⟩, accessed 27 September 2001, paragraphs 2.4–6). And we could add the (mostly) men who act as expert witnesses in these cases. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, p. 35. My insertion. Kane, ‘Resistance/Transformation’, pp. 202, 204. There are also sports that women play better than men, although this has rarely been given the legitimacy of pseudo‐biology. Perhaps the closest example is the idea that women's greater buoyancy gives them an advantage in long‐distance swimming. However, it is important to emphasise the historical contingencies that led to the disparity in sports that favour the average male, and to allow for this adaptation to be applied to newly developed sports that favour the average female, by reversing the hierarchy. It seems inconsistent that many sports organisations will use the ‘safety’ argument of protecting smaller females from competition with bigger, stronger males to prevent women from participating in men's competitions, yet at the same time see no problem in allowing males or females from a certain age group, playing against members of their own sex in a higher age group. Yet the same argument could be applied across age groups; on average, athletes from a higher age group will be bigger, stronger and fitter than athletes from a lower age group, and this difference will produce a performance advantage. Yet in terms of athletes who cross age barriers but not sex barriers, organisations allow, and even encourage, individual eccentricity.