Lost in transition: the South African military and counterinsurgency
2008; Routledge; Volume: 19; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09592310802462315
ISSN1743-9558
Autores Tópico(s)Peacebuilding and International Security
ResumoAbstract Not all militaries are able to learn counterinsurgency (COIN). Whether a military has the capacity to do so is determined by specific factors: a favourable political environment; and pragmatism within the respective military. During the 1970s and 1980s, the South African military exhibited both and learned COIN to devastating effect. Post 1990, however, the political environment has proven unfavourable for the continuing of COIN by the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and the military no longer practises COIN to any significant extent. Problematically, new commitments in peace support operations, in otherwise insurgent conflicts, are giving rise to a need for many of the COIN skills and tactics discarded during the transition. The strict anti-COIN position currently adhered to by the military is hamstringing its own ability to fulfil its new designated tasks and strategic objectives. Keywords: counterinsurgencypeace support operationspeace enforcement operationscivil-military relations Notes 1. Graeme Hosken, ‘SA Readies to Battle a New Kind of Enemy’, Pretoria News, 2 November 2006, 2. 2. A note on sources and methodology. Case evidence was collected through both secondary and primary resources. Primary resources included legal and military policy documents, media sources, informal conversations and formal interviews conducted with military personnel and civilian analysts. These interviews were carried out through a fairly loosely structured, in-depth approach centred around open-ended and key questions. Some interviews were conducted face-to-face, however, several were telephonic interviews. Also, written and email correspondence was used with the Dept. of Defence and selected civilian analysts. Importantly, the nature of the subject is one that is largely classified. As such, the paper has relied predominantly on unclassified materials and information provided by military and civilian sources. However, on occasion sources were left anonymous due to requests based on a need for confidentiality as a result of the sensitive nature of the topic. Moreover, the paper will consider only the SA Army. 3. CitationSeegers, ‘If Only…The Ongoing Search for Method in Counter-Insurgency’, 209–14. 4. CitationKruys, ‘Twentieth Century Classical Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terror’, in ‘Contemporary Terrorism and Insurgency: Selected Case Studies and Responses’, eds. Hough, Kruys and du Plessis, 19. 5. CitationKier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine. France Between the Wars’, 69–70; CitationCassidy, ‘Winning the War of the Flea. Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare’, 41. 6. CitationLevitt and March, ‘Organizational Learning’, 319 and 328. 7. CitationLevitt and March, ‘Organizational Learning’, 327; CitationNagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, 6–8. 8. CitationMajor David Strawbridge (British Peace Support Training Team), in discussion with the author, August 2005; Henri Boshoff (Africa Security Analysis Programme, Insitute for Security Studies), in discussion with the author, 30 August 2005; United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Joint Warfare Publication Citation3–50, The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations, 2nd ed., (A11) – (A17). 9. CitationWilliams, ‘How Primary is the Primary Function? Configuring the SANDF for Africana Realities’, http://www.issafrica.org; CitationNeethling, ‘Military Forces and Non-Traditional Military Roles: Assessing Post-Cold War Developments and Considering Some Implications for the SANDF’, 1. 10. CitationJoes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, 5. 11. Strawbridge, discussion; Boshoff, discussion, 30 August 2005; see , General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, chapter 1. 12. Importantly, PSO training is neither a substitute for COIN training. While COIN knowledge may be transferable and able to be applied in different contexts, PSO training, however close to COIN but without a COIN background, is COIN out of context. It fails to foster and entrench the same institutional features, and consequently is not transferable to a direct encounter with insurgency. Instead, like any art, one must first master the basics before applying what you have learned in new ways. As such, despite basic COIN-type skills being able to be learned under the guise of PSO training, it remains important to train in COIN in its own right. 13. CitationHayes, Occasional Paper: Establishing the Credibility of a Regional Peacekeeping Capability, 11. 14. CitationMinter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique, 116; CitationBrown, ‘Diplomacy by Other Means: SWAPO's Liberation War’, in Namibia's Liberation Struggle. The Two-Edged Sword, eds. Leys and Saul, 21. 15. CitationEllis and Sechaba, Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in, 89; Brown, ‘Diplomacy by Other Means’, 26–7. 16. CitationWilliams, ‘The Other Armies: Writing the History of MK’, in The Long March. The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa, eds. Liebenberg et al., 25; CitationTruth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa Report, ‘National Overview’, Vol. 2, 35. 17. Williams, ‘The Other Armies’, 26; CitationToase, ‘The South African Army: The Campaign in South West Africa/Namibia Since 1966’, in Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency, eds. Beckett and Pimlott, 196. 18. TRC of South Africa Report, ‘National Overview’, (79). 19. CitationO'Brien, ‘A Blunted Spear: The Failure of the African National Congress/South African Communist Party Revolutionary War Strategy 1961–1990’, 30–2. 20. Minter, Apartheid's Contras, 116. 21. TRC of South Africa Report, ‘National Overview’, (84), (112)–(113). 22. O'Brien, ‘A Blunted Spear’, 40; Williams, ‘The Other Armies: Writing the History of MK’, 29–30; Minter, Apartheid's Contras, 116. 23. See CitationCawthra, Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine, 217–18. 24. Ellis and Sechaba, 173–4; TRC of South Africa Report, ‘National Overview’, (164). 25. O'Brien, ‘A Blunted Spear’, 54–5. 26. CitationCawthra, Securing South Africa's Democracy, 43. 27. CitationSeegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, 186–7, 249 and 313. 28. Specific COIN forces were organized under the Area Defence system, in which Citizen Force and conscript units provided a reaction force in each territorial command. Area Defence amounted to rural COIN. It came about as a result of the intensification of the insurgency, and the need to counter border infiltrations and eliminate any internal insurgent bases. The commandos or local militias (divided into rural, urban and industrial commandos) were central in Area Defence, and supported the SAP in defending a designated territorial area. The 32 or Buffalo Battalion operated in the Namibian/Angolan arena, and was employed solely as a COIN unit, and later in a semi-conventional capacity. It was considered that SWAPO was too numerous and well equipped to be taken head on, and instead guerrilla warfare was the only way to regain the initiative. As such, the 32 were designed to out-guerrilla SWAPO. Cawthra, Brutal Force: Apartheid War Machine, 24, 146 and 228; Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, 213; CitationO'Brien, ‘Special Forces for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Case’, 80 and 96; CitationBreytenbach, The Buffalo Soldiers: The Story of South Africa's 32-Battalion; CitationNortje, 32 Battalion: The Inside Story of South Africa's Elite Fighting Unit. 29. COIN theory can be divided into three approaches: winning hearts and minds; the cost-benefit approach; and the imperial approach. While the latter is less obvious in COIN theory, it is the approach used by those most successful with COIN. From the Romans to the later colonial powers, it involves the COIN force creating enemies for its enemies, using opponents of the insurgents to fight the insurgents, creating insurgency to counter insurgency. Historically used on the borders of empires, this approach allows for the divide and rule of enemies. Opponents include both local auxiliary armies and already existing forces (often enemies of the insurgents). Importantly, this approach is used opportunistically as candidate forces present themselves, and out of necessity to meet force requirements. CitationKeegan, A History of Warfare, 184–5, 275 and 280; CitationHeather, Fall of the Roman Empire, 191–250. 30. Williams, ‘The Other Armies: Writing the History of MK’, 30; CitationShaw, ‘Biting the Bullet. Negotiating Democracy's Defence’, in The Small Miracle. South Africa's Negotiated Settlement, eds. Friedman and Atkinson, 231. 31. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, 277; Shaw, ‘Biting the Bullet. Negotiating Democracy's Defence’, 232. 32. Such statements were important as a professional force unconcerned with political affairs was unlikely to mount a coup. Ibid., 291–4; Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, 271–2. 33. 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DOD, Annual Report 2004/2005, 6, http://www.dod.mil.za/documents/annualreports/AnnualReport2005.pdf; DOD, South African National Defence Force Military Strategy, 4–5; CitationDepartment of Defence, Strategic Business Plan FY2005/06 to FY 2007/08, 10, http://www.mil.za/Articles&Papers/StrategicPlan/DODstratplan05to08.pdf. 59. DOD, Strategic Business Plan FY2005/06 to FY 2007/08, 10–11. 60. DOD, ‘Defence Update 2005’, as presented to the Defence Portfolio Committee, South Africa, 17 August 2005, chapter 1, (1), (8)–(9), http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2005/050817update.doc. 61. DOD, (1). 62. CitationFrankel, Soldiers in a Storm, 159–60; for example, an average of 3,000 soldiers were deployed in border control and rural protection operations continuously in 2004 alone. Le Roux, ‘The Post-Apartheid South African Military: Transforming with the Nation’, 263. 63. DOD, Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa 1996, chapter 5, (12)–(18). 64. CitationShelton, ‘The South African National Defence Force and President Mbeki's Peace and Security Agenda: New Roles and Mission’, 39–40; CitationSouthall, ‘SADC's Intervention into Lesotho: an Illegal Defence of Democracy?’ in African Interventionist States, eds. Furley and May, 158, 164–6; CitationStott, ‘From the SADF to the SANDF: Safeguarding South Africa for a better life for all?’, http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papvtp7.htm; CitationKent and Malan, ‘Decisions, Decisions: South Africa's Foray into Regional Peace Operations’, 4. 65. CitationDepartment of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, 6–7, 12 and 19, http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1999/peacemissions.pdf. 66. Citationde Waal, telephone conversation, 9 December 2005. 67. Shaw, ‘Biting the Bullet. Negotiating Democracy's Defence’, 233. 68. Esterhuyse, discussion. 69. 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George Kruys, in telephonic discussion with the author, 16 February 2006. 76. Institute for Security Studies, Submission on the South African Defence Review to the Portfolio Committee on Defence of the South African National Assembly, 11 and 13. 77. Steinberg, ‘After the Commandos’, 15; DOD, Annual Report 2004/2005, 73. 78. DOD, South African National Defence Force Military Strategy, 10. 79. CitationCrawford, ‘South Africa's New Foreign and Military Policy: Opportunities and Constraints’. 80. The former is the descendent of 4 Recce, and the latter of 5 Recce. Notably, 1 Special Forces Regiment was retired in 1997, and its members transferred to 4 and 5 Regiments. DOD, The South African Special Forces, http://www.mil.za/CSANDF/CJOps/specialforcesbrigade.htm. 81. DOD, Annual Report 2004/2005, 68 and 72; DOD, The South African Special Forces, http://www.mil.za/CSANDF/CJOps/specialforcesbrigade.htm. 82. CitationGuy Lamb, ‘From Military to Civilian Life. 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CitationMaj. Gen. Jan Lusse, in telephonic discussion with the author, 12 September 2005. 87. Boshoff, discussion, 30 August 2005. 88. Boshoff, discussion, 30 August 2005 89. CitationBrig. Gen. A.C. Smit, written correspondence to author from Defence Intelligence, 3 February 2006. 90. These tasks include: urban and rural foot and vehicle patrols; escorts; manning observation posts, checkpoints and roadblocks; protecting humanitarian operations; support for electoral processes; maintaining and restoring law and order; conflict containment; and the enforcement of sanctions. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Handbook for Junior Ranks, chapter 5; idem, General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, chapter 4; NATO, Draft NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, chapter 5 and chapter 9 (87); Institute for Security Studies, Peace Support Operations: A Working Draft Manual for African Military Practitioners, chapter 5. 91. 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Peacekeeping includes monitoring and assisting in the implementation of agreements, with the consent of the belligerent parties, without the use of force, as per Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Peace enforcement includes activities outlined by Chapter VII, involves the use of force to maintain or restore peace where peace is threatened, a breach of peace or act of aggression takes place. DOD, South African National Defence Force Military Strategy, 6; As per MONUC and ONUB, UN Security Council, Resolution 1635 S/RES/1635 (2005), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/577/42/PDF/N0557742.pdf?OpenElement; UN Security Council, Resolution 1650 S/RES/1650 (2005) (UN, 21 December 2005), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/658/48/PDF/N0565848.pdf?OpenElement. The SANDF has approximately 3000 soldiers deployed at present, including in UN and AU operations in Eritrea/Ethiopia, Liberia, Uganda, Sudan and Côte D'Ivoire. 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Jean CitationCoulloumme-Labarthe, lecture presented at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 24 November 2004, http://www.issafrica.org/Seminars/2004/2411french.pdf. 123. Heinecken, ‘Regional Involvement: Attitudes of SANDF Officers Towards Future Military Missions’, InfoTrac OneFile electronic database; CitationNeethling, ‘Conducting Operations in the Realm of Peace and Security: Key Issues and Challenges in the African Context’, 95 and 107. 124. Malan, ‘Intelligence in African Peace Operations: Addressing the Deficit’, 3. 125. CitationMark Malan, email correspondence with the author, 16 August 2005. 126. Heinecken, Gueli and Neethling, ‘Defence, Democracy and South Africa's Civil-Military Gap’, 134–7. 127. CitationNagl, ‘Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning During the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War’, 195 and 197. 128. CitationNagl, ‘Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning During the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War’, 196. 129. Williams, ‘How Primary is the Primary Function? Configuring the SANDF for Africana Realities’, http://www.iss.org.za/Pubs/ASR/8No6/HowPrimary.html. 130. See Ndaba, ‘Evaluating Our Defensive Tactics’, 19. 131. See Maj. Gen. L. N. Le Roux, ‘A Determination of the South African Defence Requirements: A Vision for 2015 and Beyond’, paper presented at the Africa Defence 2000 Summit, Gallagher Estate, Midrand, South Africa, 14 August 2000, http://www.mil.za/Articles&Papers/Papers/a_determination_of_south_african.htm; CitationWilliams, ‘Defence in a Democracy: The South African Defence Review and the Redefinition of the Parameters of the National Defence Debate’, in Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa, (eds.) Williams, Cawthra, and Abrahams, 219. 132. 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