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Sectarian Violence and Social Group Identity in Pakistan

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 37; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1057610x.2014.903374

1521-0731

Isaac Kfir,

Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East

AbstractIndividual basic security is limited in Pakistan as the state is institutionally weak. One way to attain basic security is by joining groups who provide security and services. Consequently, groups not part of the political mainstream, to attract a following, must therefore show that they are sufficiently powerful to obtain concessions from established actors. Thus, by engaging in violence primarily of a sectarian nature, the Pakistani Taliban sustains itself as a unified force while also highlighting that it is a powerful group, which in turn it hopes would enable it to curve a political space and win concessions from the established elite. Using social group identity theory, club goods, and the economics of extremism, the article highlights why the Pakistani Taliban has increasingly attacked minorities and why more must be done to address sectarian violence. NotesJ. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," International Organization 48(1) (1994), pp. 107–130.Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" World Politics 22(1) (1972), pp. 319–355.Stuart Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein, "Rebuilding Weak States," Foreign Affairs 81(1) (2005), pp. 134–146; Charles Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492–1992," Theory and Society 23(1) (1994), pp. 131–146.Islamists in this context refer to those that wish to infuse Islam and politics and advocate for a theocracy or something close to it. See, for example, Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi, First Principles of the Islamic State (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960); Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).On the influence and importance of each actor see, for example, Husain Haqqani, Pakistan between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005); Ayesha Siqqiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007); Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift to Extremism: Allah, Army and America's War on Terror (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005); Ashutosh Misra and Michael E. Clarke, eds., Pakistan's Stability Paradox: Domestic, Regional and International Dimensions (New York: Routledge, 2012).Hassan Nawaz Gardezi, and Jamil Rashid, Pakistan, the Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State (London: Zed Press, 1983); Asaf Hussain, "Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan," Asian Survey 16(10) (1976), pp. 918–930.Declan Walsh, for example, points out that in Pakistan, politicians are "big bosses who can deliver protection: influencing the police and dealing with aggressive, corrupt land officials, or working to route jobs or multimillion-dollar projects to their districts." Declan Walsh, "Political Handouts Thrive in Pakistan," New York Times, 8 May 2013. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/09/world/asia/patronages-roots-run-deep-as-pakistan-faces-vote.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Markus Daechsel, writing about the Islamization of the military in Pakistan, emphasized that a core element of the military is that its members embrace a specific ethos, which in the case of Zia-ul-Haq and his colleagues was a sense of Muslim nationalism. Markus Daechels, "Military Islamisation in Pakistan and the Spectre of Colonial Perceptions," Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 6(2) (1997), pp. 141–160.Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy (London: Pluto, 2007). Fair and Nawaz's important study on the changing nature of the Pakistani Army Officer Corps concludes that one reason why the army is attracting recruits from areas that traditionally have not supported military recruitment is because these individuals know that they and their near and extended families benefit from the opportunities that the army offers. C. Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps," Journal of Strategic Studies 34(1) (2011), pp. 63–94.Both Islamists and jihadists adhere to Political Islam, referring to a desire to place Islamic law at the epicenter of a Muslim-majority state, as it would make the state a true Islamic State. The distinction is over means, in that the latter promotes the use external jihad (violent struggle) to facilitate change, whereas Islamists may compete in elections, civil disobedience, and other nonviolent means. Graham E. Fuller, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan: Its Character and Prospects (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991); Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Lawrence Ziring, "From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan," Asian Survey 24(9) (1984), pp. 931–946.Allegedly, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan provided the training for a 2012 terrorist attack by Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (AWSJ), formally the Sipha-e-Sahbab that led to the death of 11 people in Gilgit. Shabbir Mir and Farman Ali, "Sectarian Tensions: Alleged Mastermind, Five Other Arrested for GB Unrest," Express Tribune, 17 April 2012. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/365827/sectarian-tensions-alleged-mastermind-five-others-arrested-for-gb-unrest/. It is also claimed that Al Qaeda and members of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan cooperated in the 2008 Marriott hotel bombing. Bill Roggio, "Al Qaeda-Linked Suspects Emerge in Islamabad Marriott Attacks," The Long War Journal, 25 September 2008. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/al_qaeda-linked_suspects_emerge_in_islamabad_marriott_attacks.php. Alix Philippon, "Sunnis against Sunnis: The Politicization of Doctrinal Fractures in Pakistan," The Muslim World 191(2) (2011), pp. 347–368.In 1989, there were 67 sectarian incidents, which left 18 people dead and injured 102. In 2013, there were 106 incidents, in which 753 people died and over 467 injured. "Sectarian Violence in Pakistan," South Asian Terrorism Portal. Available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm (accessed 15 November 2013). A fact sheet by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom held that in an 18-month period there were 203 incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan resulted in 1,800 casualties, including 717 deaths, of which 635 were Shi'a. "203 Incidents of Sectarian Violence in 18 Months," Daily Times, 19 July 2013. Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\07\19\story_19-7-2013_pg12_1Nosheen Ali notes that in the Gilgit region in Northern Pakistan, sectarian tensions are appearing, despite decades of Shi'a–Sunni communities living in harmony. Nosheen Ali, "Sectarian Imaginaries: The Micropolitics of Sectarianism and State-making in Northern Pakistan," Current Sociology 58(5) (2010), pp. 738–754.Eamon Murphy, The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism (London: Routledge, 2013).A good historical example of this was the way Zulfikar Ali Bhutto increasingly brought in the religious polity into the political system, as he needed support because his policies were alienating his own supporters. William L. Richter, "The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," Asian Survey 19(6) (1979), pp. 547–557. Musharraf did the same thing with Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA). Ashutosh Misra, "MMA-Democracy Interface in Pakistan: From Natural Confrontation to Co-habitation?" Strategic Analysis 30(2) (2006), pp. 377–388.Syed Hussain Hussaini, a Pakistani Shi'a, captured this notion by pointing out following a suicide bomber attacks a Shi'a mosque in Peshawar, "You have seen all over Pakistan, in Karachi, Quetta, and Peshawar, there are bomb blasts, targeted killings and suicide attacks. Governments have always failed right from the first day until today. People are on their own." Richard Galpin, "Pakistan Grapples with Rising Tide of Extremist Violence," BBC News, 15 July 2013. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23319254In January 2011, one of the bodyguards of Salmaan Taseer, the governor of the Punjab, assassinated him because he called for a revision to Pakistan's blasphemy laws. Declan Walsh, "Pakistan Attack Kills Punjab Governor," Guardian, 4 January 2011. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/04/pakistan-attack-kills-punjab-governor?INTCMP=SRCH; Mohammed Hanif, "How Pakistan Responded to Salmaan Taseer's Assassination," Guardian, 5 January 2011. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/06/pakistan-salman-taseer-assassinationThe rising level of sectarian violence in Iraq is a good example of how destructive sectarian violence can become. Ashish Kumar Sen, "Al Qaeda Drives Iraq toward Chaos: U.S. Withdrawal left Door Open to Sectarian Battle for Power," Washington Post, 8 August 2013. Available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/8/al-qaeda-drives-iraq-toward-chaos/?page=allMark Duffield, "Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-adjustment States and Private Protection," Civil Wars 1(1) (1998), pp. 65–102; Paul Jackson, "Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance," Small Wars & Insurgencies 14(2) (2003), pp. 131–150; Gordon Peake, "From Warlords to Peacelords?" Journal of International Affairs 56(2) (2003), pp. 181–191; Charles Tilly, "Citizenship, Identity and Social History," International Review of Social History 40(3) (1995), pp. 1–17; Gordon H. McCormick and Lindsay Fritz, "The Logic of Warlord Politics," Third World Quarterly 30(1) (2009), pp. 81–112.Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, "Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory," Social Psychology Quarterly 63(3) (2000), p. 225; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); Asef Bayat, "Islamism and Social Movement Theory," Third World Quarterly 26(6) (2005), pp. 891–908.Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, "Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists," The American Political Science Review 105(2) (2011), pp. 275–297.During the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, for example, Jama'at-e-Islami, which ran the largest relief operation in the province, concentrated its relief operations in areas where its supporters were located as it is a natural inclination of any group is to first provide to its own members. Kalim Bahadur, "Politics of the Earthquake in Pakistan," Himalayan and Central Asian Studies 9(4) (2005), p. 25.The term jihadi groups refer to those groups that embrace Deobandi, Wahabbi, or any other form of militant Islam that calls for the use of violence to attain political goals. The Pakistani jihadi movement is not uniform and it often engages in internecine violence. See, for example, the tensions between Baitullah Mehsud when he was head of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, head of the Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (Local Taliban Movement). Sadia Sulaiman and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, "Hafiz Gul Bahdur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban," Terrorism Monitor 7(9) (2009), pp. 4–6.There is a plethora of studies on Pakistani terrorist groups but not so much on sectarian groups. See, for example, C. Christine Fair, "Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants," Journal of Strategic Studies (Forthcoming 2014); C. Christine Fair, "Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State," Survival 53(4) (2011), pp. 1–23; Stephen Tankle, Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics 13(4) (1981), pp. 379–399; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).Religion, as defined by Max Weber, is a political institution, carrying a normative order, whereas a sect is predominately voluntary, bringing together those who accept an interpretation promoted by a charismatic leader. Peter L. Berger, "The Sociological Study of Sectarianism," Social Research 21(4) (1954), pp. 467–485.Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, "Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the Deadly," Public Choice 128(1/2) (2006), pp. 109–129.Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities," Modern Asian Studies 32(3) (1998), pp. 689–716.Mumtaz Ahmad, "Shi'i Political Activism in Pakistan," Studies in Contemporary Islam 5(2) (2003), pp. 57–71.Vali R. Nasr, "International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979–1998," Comparative Politics 32(2) (2000), p. 171.Ayesha Siddiqa, "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies," The Washington Quarterly 34(1) (2011), p. 158.Fareena Alam, "Vision of a New Islam," The Observer, 4 April 2004. Available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,1185265,00.htmlIannaccone highlights that that once a market for martyrdom emerges it becomes exceedingly hard to close them down because one need only a few willing members to create a state of terror. The situation is made even worse by the fact that there is very little to dissuade the committed martyr. Laurence R. Iannaccone, "The Market for Martyrs," Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 2 (2006), pp. 1–29.Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, "Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the Deadly," Public Choice 128(1/2) (2006), pp. 109–129; Victor Asal, C. Christine Fair, and Stephen Shellman, "Consenting to a Child's Decision to Join a Jihad: Insights from a Survey of Militant Families in Pakistan," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(11) (2008), pp. 973–994; Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan," International Security 34(3) (2010), pp. 79–118.Many of the minorities in Pakistan are very poor, which mean that, "in addition to facing all the problems which flow from being poor and powerless in Pakistan, religious minorities face additional difficulties and insecurities which arise specifically from their minority status and religious differences." Shaun Gregory, "Under the Shadow of Islam: The Plight of the Christian Minority in Pakistan," Contemporary South Asia, 20(2) (2012), p. 197.Charles Lindholm noted that the Jama'at-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) grew from a minor group on local Swat politics because the landlords were so disgusted and opposed to the land programs of the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) that they formed an alliance with the JUI. Lindholm asserts that growing religiosity became especially visible among the landlord class, who equated Islam with traditional interests and consulted the imams and "In return, the Islam preached by JUI mullahs and imams repeatedly stressed the sanctity of private property and the need for strict punishment of the impious." Charles Lindholm, "Contemporary Politics in a Tribal Society: Swat District, NWFP, Pakistan," Asian Survey, 19(5) (1979), p. 500; Mahvish Ahmad, "Who is Behind Sectarian Attacks in Pakistam," Pakistan Observer, 3 July 2013. Available at http://pakobserver.net/201307/03/detailnews.asp?id=211529Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, "Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the Deadly," Public Choice 128(1/2) (2006), pp. 125–126.Ashok K. Behuria, "The Rise of Pakistani Taliban and the Response of the State," Strategic Analysis 31(5) (2007), p. 700.Shehzad H. Qazi attributes two key events to the development of the Pakistani Taliban. First, the mobilization of thousands of Pakistani Pashtun from the tribal belt to fight U.S. forces in Afghanistan following the toppling of the Taliban regime in 2001. Second, the arrival of senior Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders including many Arab and foreign militants, which help forge new alliances and rekindle a "culture of militancy." Shehzad H. Qazi, "Of the Pakistani Taliban," Policy, Policy Brief #44 (August 2011); Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, "A Profile of Baitullah Mehsud," The Long War Journal, September 2008. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Baitullah-profile-Manzar-LWJ-09302008.pdfFair and Jones note "… domestic politics have influenced army decision-making. Public-opinion polls indicate that many Pakistanis have been wary of army operations against fellow citizens, and some have accused the government of conducting them at Washington's behest." C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, "Pakistan's War Within," Survival 51(6) (2009), p. 162.Hassan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," CTC Sentinel 1(2) (2008), pp. 1–2; Ryan Clarke, Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia: States, Security and Non-state Actors (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 140–141.Laurence Iannaccone highlights the importance of a religious market as he asserts that religious competition ensures an efficient production of ideas and goods, doctrinal innovation, and a weakening of extremist views. Laurence R. Iannaccone, "Extremism and the Economics of Religion," The Economic Record 88 (2012), pp. 110–115.Hassan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," CTC Sentinel 1(2) (2008), p. 2; Ayesha Siddiqa, "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies," The Washington Quarterly 34(1) (2011), p. 154.Hassan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," CTC Sentinel 1(2) (2008), p. 1.On the crisis in education and how the state fails the people see for example, Hasan Aamir, "The Need for Public Education Reform," The Express Tribune, 20 January 2014. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/660716/the-need-for-public-education-reforms/Bill Roggio, "Taliban, IMU form Ansar al Aseer to Free Jihadist Prisoners," Small Wars Journal, 5 February 2013. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/taliban_imu_form_ans.phpIn a letter sent to the Sharif government following its decision to lift the moratorium on executing individuals convicted of terrorism offenses, the TTP warned the government that it would suffer the fate that the ANP endured during the election. Kalbe Ali, "Govt. Ignores TTP Threat, to Execute three Militants," Dawn, 14 August 2013. Available at http://dawn.com/news/1035732/govt-ignores-ttp-threat-to-execute-three-militantsJon Boone, "Taliban Warns Pakistan Government against Execution of Militants in Jail," Guardian, 13 August 2013. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/13/taliban-pakistan-execution-militants"Stop Drone Attacks," Daily Tribune, 3 October 2013; Mahsud Ihtiaq, "Anti-Drones Protest Blocked in Tribal Region,"Charleston Gazzette, 8 October 2013, p. B8."PTI charge—Zardari, Nawaz USA Puppets," Pakistan Observer, 22 October 2011; Arshad Muhammad, "Puppets on US Strings," Pakistan Observer, 17 August 2011.In 2009, for example Baitullah Meshud claimed that the attack on a policy academy in Lahore was "in retaliation for the continued drone strikes by the US in collaboration with Pakistan on our people." Lahore "was Pakistan Taleban op," BBC News, 31 March 2009. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7973540.stm; "Pakistan Taliban Warns of Disastrous Days Ahead," Indian Express, 17 November 2013. Available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/pakistan-taliban-warns-of-disastrous-days-ahead/1196051/Ryan Clarke, Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia: States, Security and Non-state Actors (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 140–146; Shehzad H. Qazi, '"Rebels of the Frontier: Origins, Organization, and Recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban," Small Wars & Insurgencies 22(4) (2011), pp. 574–602; Mona Kanwal Sheikh, "Sacred Pillars of Violence: Findings from a Study of the Pakistani Taliban," Politics, Religion, & Ideology 13(4) (2012), pp. 439–454.For information about the election, winners and loser and the key parties see, "Pakistan's Domestic Political Setting," Congressional Research Service, 2 July 2013. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakdom.pdfAsif Shahzad, "Nawaz Sharif Return to Power: What does it mean for Pakistan?" Niti Central, 13 May 2013. Available at http://www.niticentral.com/2013/05/13/nawaz-sharifs-return-to-power-what-does-it-mean-for-pakistan-77072.htmlMohammed Hanif, "Pakistan Elections: How Nawaz Sharif beat Imran Khan and What Happens Next," Guardian, 13 May 2013. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/13/pakistan-elections-nawaz-sharif-imran-khan"Election 2013: Violence against Political Parties, Candidates and Voters," Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, May 2013.The clearest example of the Pakistani Taliban trying to affect the election was their decision to kidnap Ali Haider Gilani, the son of Yusuf Raza Gilani, Pakistan's former prime minister and an important leader within the Pakistan Peoples' Party. Following the kidnap, Musa Gilani, Ali Hadier's brother declared that he would prevent the election from taking place unless his brother was freed. Michael Geogry, "Ex-Pakistan PM's Son Abducted as Taliban Threaten Election," Reuters, 9 May 2013. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/09/us-pakistan-election-idUSBRE94807320130509In 2008, the turnout was around 48 percent. "Pakistan Wins," Economic & Political Weekly, 25 May 2013.Pankaj Mishra, "I Must Be Doing Something Right," New York Times Magazine, 19 August 2012, p. 32.Salman Masood, "Prime Minister of Pakistan Open to Talks with Taliban," New York Times, 20 August 2013, p. A9."Election 2013: Violence against Political Parties, Candidates and Voters," Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, May 2013."PIPS report: Awami National Party Bore the Brunt of Pre-Election Violence," The Express Tribune, 25 May 2013. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/554140/pips-report-awami-national-party-bore-the-brunt-of-pre-election-violence/Jan stated "There is absolutely no security and the TTP is killing ANP workers from Karachi to Mardan. You can imagine how difficult it is for us to actually hold public meetings." Whereas Hasan declared, "Our firm stance against the Taliban and their affiliates makes us a direct target, … And it gives undue advantage to the parties that are soft on them." Ali K. Chishti, "Terror Threat Looms in Karachi," The Friday Times 25 (9), 12–18 April 2013. Available at http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20130412&page=5Ali Ousat, "Keep it Down-Low or Go all the Way?: TTP Dictates the Terms for Election Campaigns," The Express Tribune, 10 April 2013. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/533337/keep-it-down-low-or-go-all-the-way-ttp-dictates-the-terms-for-election-campaigns/Emmanuel Duparcq, "Taliban Flex Muscle in Karachi Ahead of Pakistan Vote," 10 May 2013. Available at http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/international/taliban-flex-muscle-in-karachi-ahead-of-pakistan-vote/Ahmed Khan, "The Confused Pashtun," Economic & Politically Weekly, 3 August 2013.Allegedly, the PTI recently decided to reverse the curriculum reforms that the ANP had introduced specifically in relation to the teaching of jihad, which under the proposed curriculum would be taught again, which is something that the Islamist parties, mainly but not exclusively the Jama'at-e-Islami, have been campaigning to restore the teaching of jihad. Rehman, "KP Schools will Teach Jihad Again."C. Christine Fair, "The Militant Challenge in Pakistan," Asia Policy, no. 11 (2011), p. 123.A classic example of this was the letter sent by the Taliban commander Adnan Rasheed to Malala Yousafzai expressing regret that he had not forewarned her about the impending attack on her. Saba Imitaz, "Taliban's Letter to Malala Yousafzai: This is Why We Tried to Kill You," Guardian, 17 July 2013. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/17/taliban-letter-malala-yousafzaiDeclan Walsh, "Leadership Rift Emerges in Pakistani Taliban," New York Times, 5 March 2012. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/asia/pakistani-taliban-face-a-leadership-rift.html?ref=hakimullahmehsud&_r=0; Hafiz Gul Bahadar, a local Taliban commander in North Waziristan banned polio vacation in his area as a way to stop US drone attacks. Bill Roggio, "'Good' Taliban Commander Halts Polio Vaccinations over Drone Strikes," The Long War Journal, 16 June 2012. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/06/good_taliban_command.phpTariq Saeed, "17 Killed in TTP Attack on Rival Group," Pakistan Observer, 4 October 2013. Available at http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=220089Shehzad Malik, "Taliban 'openly raising funds' in Pakistani Punjab," BBC News online, 23 June 2010. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10387670Nalia Inayat, "After Pakistan Attack, Some Question Talks with Taliban," USA Today, 24 September 2013, p. A4."Ex-Navy Man, KDA Director Shot Dead," The Nation, 28 September 2013. Available at http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/karachi/28-Sep-2013/ex-navy-man-kda-director-shot-dead; "Rangers Arrest 44 'Criminals' in Raids," The Express Tribune, 18 October 2013. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/619110/rangers-police-arrest-44-suspects-in-karachi-operation/"Awami National Party Shuts Down Offices Across Karachi Following Attack," The Express Tribune, 23 July 2013. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/580512/awami-national-party-shuts-down-offices-across-karachi-following-attack/Faiz Muhammad, "May 11 Poll Defeat: ANP Dissolves Countrywide Organizations," Dawn.com, 1 September 2013. Available at http://dawn.com/news/1039740/may-11-poll-defeat-anp-dissolves-countrywide-organisationsThe 104-page PML-N manifesto barely mentions terrorism, extremism or militancy. "Take on Terrorism," The Friday Times [Malaysia], 13 April 2013.Daud Khattak, "Reviewing Pakistan's Peace Deals with the Taliban," CTC Sentinel, 26 September 2012. Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/reviewing-pakistans-peace-deals-with-the-talibanOn the importance of demobilization with cantonment and of disarmament see, Mark Knight and Alpaslan Ozerdem, "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace," Journal of Peace Research 41(4) (2004), pp. 419–516.Writing about the Hazara Division of the former North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) Tayyab Shah points out that first, conservative groups that have an affinity for the Taliban and its agenda have historically done well in the province, whereas the PPP and the ANP have made little impact. More importantly, Shah also notes that the Taliban recognize the strategic importance of the area, which is why they have sought to expand their influence in the region. Notably, the 2008 Swat Peace Agreement covered the area. A core demand of Fazullah was the implementation of sharia in the Swat Valley. Tayyab Ali Shah, "The Hazara Division of Pakistan–Growing Talibanization amidst Political Instability and Ethnic Tensions," Terrorism Monitor 8(17) (2010), pp. 6–8.Salis bin Perwaiz, "Taliban in City Gaining Strength in Numbers," The News International, 3 November 2012. Available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-4-140693-Taliban-in-city-gaining-strength-in-numbersAnti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 2013, § 8, The Gazette Of Pakistan Extraordinary (19 March 2013). Available at http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1364482779_599.pdfThe Anti-Terrorism Act 2013, amended the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act stating that the "the threat of terrorism" covers "intimidating and terrorizing the public, social sectors, business community, security forces, Government installations, officials and law enforcement agencies." Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 2013, § 2, The Gazette Of Pakistan Extraordinary (19 March 2013). Available at http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1364482779_599.pdfThe new definition replaced "proscribed organisations" with "an organisation concerned which is listed in the First Schedule under section 11B" The Gazette Of Pakistan Extraordinary (19 March 2013). Available at http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1364482779_599.pdfAsad Kharal, "Policy Revision: Fresh Plan Proposed to Fight Terrorism," The Express Tribune, 22 July 2013. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/580128/policy-revision-fresh-plan-proposed-to-fight-terrorism/#.UezCGI5LQuc.twitterElizabeth Rubin, "In the Land of the Taliban," New York Times, 26 October 2006. Available at http://www.mayin.org/ajayshah/A/rubin1.pdf. See also Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Impact of the Afghan War on Pakistan," Pakistan Horizon 41(1) (1988), pp. 23–45; Walter A. Morgan, "Experience of a Clinic for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan," Medicine in Perspective 149(2) (1988), pp. 234–238.National Counter Terrorism Authority Act, 2013, § 4. The Authority is structured to have a Board of Governors that includes Chief Ministers of all the provinces along with Gilgit-Baltistan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan-held Kashmir. From the cabinet, two ministers are included: the Minister for Law and Justice and the Secretary Ministry of Interior. Parliament will elect a senator and a member from the National Assembly to serve on the Board. Finally, from the defense and law enforcement establishment, the DG Inter-Services Intelligence, the DG Intelligence Bureau, the DG Military Intelligence, the National Coordinator, the DG Federal Investigation Agency and the Inspector Generals of Police of all provinces are also included. Naveed Butt, "National Assembly Passes 'National Counter Terrorism Authority,'" Business Recorder, 9 March 2013.National Counter Terrorism Authority Act, 2013. Available at http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1363071845_127.pdfSaeed Shah, "Pakistan Struggles With Terror Strategy," Wall Street Journal, 13 August 2013. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324085304579010992875828738.htmlThe Act states that a key function of the Authority is "to receive and collect data/information/intelligence, and disseminate and coordinate between all the relevant stakeholders to formulate threat assessments with periodical reviews to be presented to the Federal Government for making adequate and timely efforts to counter terrorism and extremism." National Counter Terrorism Authority Act, 2013, § 4(a).Charles Kennedy distinguishes between Islamic Activists and Islamic Modernists, arguing that the former seek to expansion of Islamic law and practices across Pakistani national life, whereas the latter argue in favor of a limited application of Islam in relation to the State. Charles H. Kennedy, "Repugnancy to Islam: Who Decides? Islam and Legal Reform in Pakistan," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 41(4) (1992), p. 769.Farooq Hassan, "Religious Liberty in Pakistan: Law, Reality, and Perception (A Brief Synopsis)," Brigham Young University Law Review, 2002, No. 2 (2002), pp. 283–286.The 2012 U.S. State Department report on religious freedom not only recognizes increased attacks against minorities, but also the need for minorities to engage in "self-censorship due to the climate of intolerance and fear." Moreover, the report also notes that Muslims that advocate tolerance and pluralism have also been targeted. "International Religious Freedom Report for 2012," Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapperJon Boone, "Pakistan Military Intelligence under Fire for Failing to Prevent Quetta Bombing," Guardian, 18 February 2013. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/18/pakistan-inteliigence-isi-quetta-bombingsAFP, "New US Study Finds Diverse Beliefs in Muslim World," The Express Tribune, 9 August 2012. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/419776/new-us-study-finds-diverse-beliefs-in-muslim-world/Since becoming prime minister Nawaz Sharif has spoken about the need to address sectarianism, but there has been no measures or attempts to curtail the violence, which allows one to take the view that he is engaging in rhetoric as he appreciate and recognize the cost of challenging sectarian groups."Pakistan's Shias: After the Persecution?' Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst 13(3) (2013). See also, "Speaking for the Shia?" The Sunday Times, 23 April 2013.