Promoting Security in Common Domains
2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 33; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/0163660x.2010.492725
ISSN1530-9177
Autores Tópico(s)Military and Defense Studies
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. See National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” November 2008, http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf and U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Joint Operating Environment 201,” February 2010, http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf. 2. See Department of Defense (DOD), “Quadrennial Defense Review,” February 2010, pp. 8–9, http://www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf and Robert M. Gates, speech, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, April 17, 2009, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1346. 3. Such dynamics are clearly at play in contemporary conflicts, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the 2006 Lebanon war. High resolution satellite imagery (less than 1 meter resolution) is commercially available. 4. For example, in July 2009, India became the sixth nation to field a nuclear-powered submarine. See Lydia Polgreen, “India Launches Nuclear Submarine,” New York Times, July 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/world/asia/27india.html. DOD has assessed that while China's emerging military capabilities have allowed it to contribute cooperatively in areas such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counterpiracy, some of these capabilities, as well as other, more disruptive ones, could allow it to project power to ensure access to resources or enforce claims to disputed territories. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China,” 2009, p. 1. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf. 5. See Joseph Nye, “Recovering American Leadership,” Survival 50, no. 1 (February–March 2008): 55–68. 6. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom” (speech, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm (hereinafter Clinton's remarks on Internet freedom) and Gates views on the importance of security in the global commons can be found in both the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 8 and the DOD, “National Defense Strategy,” June 2008, pp. 6, 16, http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf. 7. Ernest May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (New York: St. Martins, 1993), p. 41. 8. Some of the difference can likely be attributed to much better space surveillance capabilities that exist today relative to 1980. Objects in orbit today include over 1,100 active satellites, 10,000 pieces of space debris, 3,700 dead satellites and rocket pieces, and 5,700 unknown objects. There are many more thousands of objects less than ten cm in diameter that can pose threats to spacecraft. See prepared testimony of Lt. Gen. Larry James before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2010, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03%20March/James%2003-10-10.pdf. 9. See Marc Kaufman, “U.S. Finds It's Getting Crowded Out There,” Washington Post, July 9, 2008, p. A1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/08/AR2008070803185.html. 10. See Joseph Kahn, “China Confirms Test of Anti-Satellite Weapon,” New York Times, January 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/23/world/asia/23cnd-china.html. 11. When completed, the Galileo constellation will offer an alternative to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation that broadcasts signals allowing for precision positioning, timing, and navigation. 12. See Nazila Fathi and William Broad, “Iran Launches Satellite as U.S. Takes Wary Note,” New York Times, February 3, 2009, p. A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/world/middleeast/04iran.html and Blaine Harden, “N. Korea Puts Launch in Innocuous Terms,” Washington Post, February 25, 2009, p. A11, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/24/AR2009022400324.html. 13. See Eric Sterner, “Beyond the Stalemate in the Space Commons” in Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World, February 2010, pp. 105–136, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Contested%20Commons_1.pdf. 14. The Interim Space Posture Review, co-authored by the DOD and the Office of Director National Intelligence and provided to Congress, is not publicly releasable. Key themes, however, can be found in the testimony of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James N. Miller to the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces on March 16, 2010, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/StratForces031610/Miller_Testimony031610.pdf. 15. See Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn, remarks, National Space Symposium, Colorado Springs, Colorado, April 14, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1448. Lynn was paraphrasing comments made by Gen. Robert Kehler, Commander, U.S. Air Force Space Command, at the same symposium on April 13, 2010. 16. See Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber and Space Policy Robert Butler, testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategy Forces, April 21, 2010, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/SF042110/Butler_Testimony042110.pdf. 17. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Securing Our Nation's Cyber Infrastructure,” Washington, D.C., May 29, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Securing-Our-Nations-Cyber-Infrastructure/. 18. Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 37, http://www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. 19. See William Lynn, “Protecting the Domain: Cybersecurity as a Defense Priority” (speech, CSIS, Washington, D.C., June 15, 2009), http://csis.org/files/attachments/090615_sf_lynn.pdf. 20. See William Lynn, “Protecting the Domain: Cybersecurity as a Defense Priority” (speech, CSIS, Washington, D.C., June 15, 2009), http://csis.org/files/attachments/090615_sf_lynn.pdf. 21. USCYBERCOM will be a sub-unified command to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). See the confirmation testimony of Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander (confirmed as the first Commander, U.S. Cyber Command) to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 15, 2010, http://armed-services.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?wit_id=9315&id=4505. 22. Clinton's remarks on Internet freedom. 23. See Miguel Heft and David Barbosa, “Google Shuts China Site in Dispute Over Censorship,” New York Times, March 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/technology/23google.html. 24. See Robert Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2 (April/May 2009): pp. 16–32; “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010): 22–41; James Holmes, Andrew Winner, and Toshi Hoshihara, eds., Indian Naval Strategy in the 21 st Century (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 82. 25. See Scott Borgerson, “The Great Game Moves North,” Foreign Affairs Postcripts, March 25, 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64905/scott-g-borgerson/the-great-game-moves-north. 26. See Frank Hoffman, “The Maritime Commons in the Neo-Mahanian Era,” in Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World, February 2010, p. 53, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Contested%20Commons_1.pdf. 27. See Commander U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Robert Willard, testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, March 24, 2010, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03%20March/Willard%2003-26-10.pdf; Edward Wong, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend its Naval Power,” New York Times, April 24, 2010, p. 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html; Robert Ross, “China's Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 46–81; Ronald O'Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, RL33153, December 23, 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf. 28. See Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 32. 29. See Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 32. 30. For a detailed examination of this issue see Peter Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21 st Century (New York: Penguin Press, 2009). 31. See Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 32. 32. For an excellent overview of this issue, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Why AirSea Battle?” 2010, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100219.Why_AirSea_Battle/R.20100219.Why_AirSea_Battle.pdf and Jan van Tol et al., “Airsea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept,” 2010, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100518.Air_Sea_Battle_A_/R.20100518.Air_Sea_Battle_A_.pdf. 33. See CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, “Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency,” December 2008, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_securingcyberspace_44.pdf and Damon Coletta and Frances Pilch, eds., Space and Defense Policy (New York: Routledge, 2009). Additional informationNotes on contributorsShawn BrimleyShawn Brimley is a strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The views expressed here are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government
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