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The roots of coercion and insurgency: exploiting the counterfactual case of Honduras

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 11; Issue: 02 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14678802.2011.572454

1478-1174

Sarah Zukerman Daly,

Political and Social Dynamics in Chile and Latin America

Abstract Anecdotal evidence points to a significant relationship between repression and rebellion and yet the quantitative civil war literature ignores state strategies, deeming them endogenous or perfectly correlated with polity type. This article seeks to bring the state back in again and examine the causes of states' strategies and the effects of these strategies on non-violent mobilisation. It finds that, under certain circumstances, a state's response to a peaceful opposition movement depends not on its institutions or capacity; rather, it is a function of the state's control of the national security apparatus, autonomy from its constituents, and resources fungible for reform. Additionally, the article concludes that state policy can play a more significant role in explaining the onset of civil conflict than do structural variables such as per capita income, terrain and population size. Historical analysis of coercion and insurgency in the counterfactual case of Honduras illustrates the plausibility of this argument. Acknowledgements The author is particularly grateful to James Fearon, Stephen Stedman and Benjamin Valentino for their valuable guidance and feedback on this project. For additional helpful comments, the author wishes to thank Fitini Christia, Stephen Haber, Terry Karl, Janet Lewis, Alexander Montgomery-Amo, Abbey Steele, Stanford CISAC seminar participants, and several anonymous reviewers. All errors remain my own. Notes 1. See Fearon Fearon, James D. 1991. Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. World Politics, 43(2): 169–195. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing' on counterfactuals, the comparative method, and hypothesis testing. 2. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence. 3. This study builds on the excellent scholarship of Tilly Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. [Google Scholar], From Mobilization to Revolution; McAdam McAdam, Doug, Tarrow, Sidney and Tilly, Charles. 2001. Dynamics of Contention, New York: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar] et al., Dynamics of Contention. This literature looks at the relationship between repression (threat) and mobilisation, but not at why states repress. 4. To solve this problem, scholars often conflate repression and regime type with the latter proxying for the former (Collier and Hoeffler Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4): 563–595. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Greed and Grievance'; Fearon and Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency'). This generates measurement bias; dictatorship is an imperfect measure of indiscriminate state repression. Additionally, despite being lagged, democracy and political instability variables suffer endogeneity as a country is coded as having a civil war only after its level of violence has crossed a certain threshold (and therefore likely already affected the regime type). The quantitative studies that do examine the effect of repression on rebellion are also plagued by endogeneity of a more extreme type where it is impossible to tease out causality (Poe et al. Poe, Steven C., Tate, C. Neal and Camp Keith, Linda. 1999. Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993. International Studies Quarterly, 43(2): 291–313. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Repression of the Human Right'; Gurr and Moore Gurr, Ted Robert and Moore, Will H. 1997. Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s. American Journal of Political Science, 41(4): 1079–1103. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Ethnopolitical Rebellion'). And while some scholars engage in sub-national research designs with detailed data on repression, they examine the role of indiscriminate violence only after the wars have begun and thus offer little insight into the role of repression on insurgency onset (Kalyvas, Logic of Violence; Lyall Lyall, Jason. 2009. Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(3): 331–362. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Indiscriminate Violence'). 5. See Sambanis Sambanis, Nicholas. 2002. A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil Wars. Defence and Peace Economics, 13(3): 215–243. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'A Review of Recent Advances'; Hegre and Sambanis Hegre, Håvard and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2006. Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results of Civil War Onset. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(4): 508–535. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Sensitivity Analysis'; and Blattman and Miguel Blattman, Christopher and Edward Miguel, 2009. 'Civil War', NBER Working Paper 14801 [Google Scholar], 'Civil War', for reviews of these studies. 6. Qualitative studies indicate the importance of state policy, but often do so anecdotally. The works of Theda Skocpol and Timothy Wickham-Crowley are exceptions. Unfortunately, since Skocpol brought the 'state back in' in the 1980s, state policies have been forgotten as causes of violence; geography and economics have come to dominate the literature (Buhaug and Gates Buhaug, Halvard and Gates, Scott. 2002. The Geography of Civil War. Journal of Peace Research, 39(4): 417–433. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Geography of Civil War'; Le Billon Le Billon, Philippe. 2000. The Political Economy of War: An Annotated Bibliography, London: Overseas Development Institute. [Google Scholar], Political Economy of War; Ross Ross, Michael. 2006. A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. Annual Review of Political Science, 9: 265–300. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Closer Look at Oil'). This article builds on Skocpol's work to bring the state back in again. 7. Anocracies are regimes that mix democratic with autocratic features. They include regimes that score between − 5 and 5 on the difference between Policy IV's democracy and autocracy measures (the difference ranges from − 10 to10). See Fearon and Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency'. Huntington Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. [Google Scholar], Political Order, calls autocracies 'praetorian regimes'. 8. Honduras and El Salvador share a common colonial history, similar levels of economic development, human development, democratisation, inequality, population size and rough terrain, but exhibited strong and consistent variation on the outcome of state strategy towards popular mobilisation. These cases follow the guidelines for case selection of Lijphart Lijphart, Arend. 1975. The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research. Comparative Political Studies, 8(2): 158–177. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'The Comparable-Cases Strategy'. Other scholars have engaged in comparisons of the two cases: Booth Booth, John A. 1991. Socioeconomic and Political Roots of National Revolts in Central America. Latin American Research Review, 26(1): 33–73. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Socioeconomic and Political Roots'; Brockett Brockett, Charles D. 1998. Land, Power, and Poverty: Agrarian Transformation and Political Conflict in Central America, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO: Westview Press. [Google Scholar], Land, Power, and Poverty, 2nd ed.; Goodwin Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], No Other Way Out. Goodwin demonstrates the link between repression and civil war. He does not, however, delineate the causal process by which coercion versus reform influences opposition organisations. He also does not provide evidence that repression, as it was applied, did not occur prior to civil war onset. Moreover, in the case that repression did antedate the insurgency, Goodwin fails to provide insight into why, in the absence of armed opposition, a regime would choose a violent (and ostensibly doomed) policy. Booth emphasises variation in income inequality grievances and repression to explain variation in outcomes. However, as Goodwin, he shows correlations, but does not specify causal mechanisms. He also does not account for the marked variation in state strategies of the Central American countries. Brockett documents and explains variation in agrarian reform across Central America. His approach falls into the traditional grievance approach and cannot account for the fact that grievances are nearly universal, but insurgency is not. 9. See Hegre and Sambanis, 'Sensitivity Analysis', for a discussion of the 88 variables found to correlate with civil war onset. 10. See Trimberger Trimberger, Ellen Kay. 1978. Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. [Google Scholar], Revolution from Above; Stepan Stepan, Alfred. 1978. The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar], State and Society, for a discussion of autonomy. 11. Fearon and Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency'. 12. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence. 13. The data for this section comes from Brockett Brockett, Charles D. 1988. Land, Power, and Poverty: Agrarian Transformation and Political Conflict in Central America, 1st. ed., Boston: Allen & Unwin. [Google Scholar], Land, Power, and Poverty; Williams Williams, Robert G. 1986. Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], Export Agriculture; Browning Browning, David. 1971. El Salvador: Landscape and Society, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Google Scholar], Landscape and Society; Dunkerley Dunkerley, James. 1982. The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in El Salvador, London: Junction Books. [Google Scholar], The Long War. The population similarly increased 91 per cent in El Salvador during this period. 14. The percentage of landless rural families swelled from 31.4 per cent in 1970 to 36 per cent in 1974 (Ruhl Ruhl, J. Mark. 1984. Agrarian Structure and Political Stability in Honduras. Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 26(1): 33–68. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 'Agrarian Structure', 48; Brockett Land, Power, and Poverty, 74). 15. Muller and Seligson Muller, Edward N. and Seligson, Mitchell A. 1987. Inequality and Insurgency. American Political Science Review, 81(2): 445–446. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 'Inequality and Insurgency', 445–446. The gini coefficient reached 0.82 in El Salvador. See Brockett, 'Measuring Political Violence', for alternative measures of land inequality including minifundización (the reduction in average plot size of land) and landless scores. 16. The Polity Project. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. From 1949 to 1954, the case could be made that Honduras was a semi-democracy, but not thereafter (See Bowman et al. Bowman, Kirk, Lehoucq, Fabrice and Mahoney, James. 2005. Measuring Political Democracy: Case Expertise, Data Adequacy, and Central America. Comparative Political Studies, 38(8): 939–970. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Measuring Political Democracy'). The Polity score averaged − 0.5 in El Salvador during this period. The polity score for Honduras rose to 6 in 1982 and dropped to − 6 for El Salvador in 1977 after the states had chosen divergent policies towards their popular mobilisation. 17. El Salvador experienced four coups during these years. 18. Ruhl, 'Agrarian Structure'; Rudolph James D., Rudolph, ed. 1984. Honduras: Country Study, Washington DC: Prepared Government Printing Office. by Foreign Area Studies, American University, Under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program [Google Scholar], Honduras: Country Study, 44. 19. Lapper and Painter Lapper, Richard and Painter, James. 1985. Honduras: State for Sale, London: Latin American Bureau. [Google Scholar], Honduras: State for Sale. 20. Rudolph, Honduras: Country Study, 47. 21. El Tiempo, 2 May 1972, quoted in Morris Morris, James A. 1984. Honduras: Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers, 189–226. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. [Google Scholar], Honduras: Caudillo Politics. 22. In addition to members of the conservative National Party to which President López was allied. 23. Euraque Euraque, Dario A. 1996. Reinterpreting the Banana Republic: Region and State in Honduras, 1870–1972, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. [Google Scholar], Reinterpreting the Banana Republic. 24. The United States influence over Honduran policy grew after 1980. During the 1980s, the US stationed many troops on Honduran soil and supplemented Honduras' military expenditures with 53–99 million US dollars per year (See Acker Acker, Alison. 1988. Honduras: The Making of a Banana Republic, Boston: South End Press. [Google Scholar], Honduras, 117; Ruhl, 'Agrarian Structure', 39–44; Morris Morris, James A. 1984. "Honduras: The Burden of Survival in Central America". In Central America: Crisis and Adaptation, Edited by: Ropp, Steve C. and Morris, James A. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. [Google Scholar], 'Honduras: The Burden', 211). Moreover, the US strategy with respect to imminent guerrilla movements changed in 1979 and it began to promote 'development and democratisation' over 'coercion and militarisation'. Accordingly, its military and economic aid became conditional on the presence of democracy and reduction in human rights violations. Thus, the Honduran two-pronged strategy of reform and selective coercion was continued, but came to be dictated by a foreign actor. Many studies have focused on the external-dependence of Honduras as an explanatory variable of its relative stability (Coatsworth Coatsworth, John. 1994. The United States and Central America: The Clients and the Colossus, New York: Twayne. [Google Scholar], United States; Weeks Weeks, John. 1986. An Interpretation of the Central American Crisis. Latin American Research Review, 21(3): 31–53. [Google Scholar], 'Interpretation'). However, Nicaragua and Honduras demonstrated the greatest external dependence and experienced divergent outcomes (Goodwin, No Other Way Out, 153). 25. Stanley Stanley, William D. 1996. The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. [Google Scholar], Protection Racket State,1–2. As has been well documented in the literature, in the 1970s, the Salvadoran state engaged in indiscriminate repression of the popular mobilisation and refused reform on nearly all fronts. 'Guilt' was determined not on an individual basis, but on a collective one: guilt by association (Kalyvas, Logic of Violence). The UN Truth Commission of 1993 concluded that violence in the countryside was 'indiscriminate in the extreme' in the first years of the 1970s (UN UN. 1993. De la locura a la esperanza: La guerra de 12 años en El Salvador: Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador, New York: United Nations. [Google Scholar], De la locura, 65). Security forces raided villages chosen almost arbitrarily because of the large presence of FECCAS unions. The scale of these massacres increased from those of 1974–78–La Cayetana (19 dead), Aguilares (50 dead)–to those of 1980 — Sumpul River (600 dead), El Mozote (1000 dead) (See Danner Danner, Mark. 1994. The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War, 1st ed, New York: Vintage Books. [Google Scholar], Massacre at El Mozote; Alas Alas, Higinio, 1982. El Salvador, por qué la insurrección? Secretariado Permanente de la Comisión para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos en Centroamérica, San José [Google Scholar], El Salvador). Moreover, the peaceful vehicles for change were mostly halted; elections in 1974 and 1977 proved fraudulent (Webre Webre, Stephen Andrew. 1979. José Napoleón Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party in San Salvadoran Politics, 1960–72, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. [Google Scholar], José Napoleón Duarte). 26. Honduras: The Facts Speak. 27. Schulz and Schulz Schulz, Donald E. and Schulz, Deborah S. 1994. The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. [Google Scholar], The United States, 159. 28. Benjamin Benjamin, Medea, ed. 1987. Don't Be Afraid, Gringo: A Honduran Woman Speaks from the Heart: The Story of Elvia Alvarado, San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy. [Google Scholar], Don't Be Afraid, xvi. 29. These families controlled the agrarian sector and 51 per cent of capital in commerce, 49.9 per cent in construction, 43.7 per cent in services and a majority of the top industrial corporations and private-sector associations with powerful lobbying capabilities. See Dunkerley, The Long War; Colindres Colindres, Eduardo. 1977. Fundamentos económicos de la burguesía salvadoreña, 1st ed, San Salvador: UCA Editores. [Google Scholar], Fundamentos económicos. Also, in contrast to Honduras, most of the 50 foreign companies, which invested in El Salvador in the 1960s, entered into joint ventures with the dominant Salvadoran capitalists (the agrarian elite). 30. Honduras has no one traditional domestic crop like El Salvador (coffee). 31. Ruhl Ruhl, J. Mark. 2000. "Honduras: Militarism and Democratization in Troubled Waters". In Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America, Latin American Silhouettes, Edited by: Walker, Thomas W., Armony, Ariel C. and Latin American Studies Association. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources. [Google Scholar], 'Honduras: Militarism and Democratization', 38. 32. Euraque, Reinterpreting the Banana Republic, 38. 33. The domestic agricultural elite effectively retained control over the economy, and the bourgeois groups consequently 'lacked significant autonomy from the "oligarchic" families' (Stanley, Protection Racket, 97) The Salvadoran society thus generally lacked economic leaders willing to promote reform contrary to oligarch interests (Paige Paige, Jeffery M. 1975. Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World, New York: Free Press. [Google Scholar], Agrarian Revolution). 34. For parsimony, this article refers to the 'Honduran military regime' or state as a singular entity between 1963 and 1982, despite the existence of several regimes during this period. In comparison to El Salvador, however, the regimes' values on the key variables of interest are similar enough to warrant the regimes being pooled together. 35. See Article 272 of the 1982 Honduran Constitution. This external orientation was so strong that during the 1954 banana strike crisis, the military 'appeared more disposed to respond to a potential Guatemalan threat to the country's national security than to quell the north coast strikes'. Soldiers were even dispatched to patrol Guatemalan border posts (MacCameron MacCameron, Robert. 1983. Bananas, Labor, and Politics in Honduras, 1954–1963, Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. [Google Scholar], Bananas, Labor, and Politics, 26). The military's organisational structure reflected this external focus. The air force, a force charged with defence against a conventional external enemy, accounted for 32 per cent of Honduras' armed forces. In El Salvador, the air force comprised only two per cent of the military. (See Euraque, Reinterpreting the Banana Republic; Rudolph, Honduras: Country Study). It may be argued that the Honduran military's 1963 overthrow of Villeda was executed on behalf of the elite. I propose instead that the military used coups to prevent too far a swing to the right (1971) or left (1963) and thereby maintain national order, not 'order' as defined by any one group (See Acker, Honduras). 36. The Salvadoran military's principal raison d'être, namely the defence of national sovereignty in the face of an invading army, constituted 'the least of its worries'. Instead the military, as an institution, was oriented and designed not to fight a conventional war against a foreign enemy, but 'to defeat, instead, internal enemies of the state' (Williams and Walter Williams, Philip J. and Walter, Knut. 1997. Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador's Transition to Democracy, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. [Google Scholar], Militarization and Demilitarization, 51). The structure and ideology of its forces reflects this internal security orientation. The National Guard, which was founded to facilitate agricultural commercialisation in the late nineteenth century. through large-scale evictions of peasants and repression of the landless, enjoyed the greatest prestige and authority within the military structure. The military, especially the Guard, continued through the twentieth century to preserve order on private estates, arrest people for vagrancy, and serve the interests of the landed elite. See Americas Watch Committee and The American Civil Liberties Union Americas Watch Committee and American Civil Liberties Union. 1982. Report on Human Rights in El Salvador, New York: Random House. [Google Scholar], Report on Human Rights, xx–xxi. See also Stanley, Protection Racket. 37. Ruhl, 'Honduras: Militarism and Democratization'. 38. Euraque, Reinterpreting the Banana Republic. 39. Quoted in Euraque, Reinterpreting the Banana Republic. 40. Towards the end of the civil war, even the Salvadoran military acquired autonomy from the oligarchy. 41. The regime founded ORDEN in the early 1960s as a rural police force charged with informing on and taking action against any subversive activities. By 1970, ORDEN had a vast network in every village, numbering 10,000 combatants and 100,000 collaborators (Jung Jung, Harald. 1980. "Class Struggle and Civil War in El Salvador". In El Salvador: Central America in the New Cold War, Edited by: Gettleman, Marvin E., Lacefield, Patrick, Menashe, Louis and Mermelstein, David. New York: Grove Press. [Google Scholar], 'Class Struggle', 74). ORDEN's command structure enabled social elites to gain control of its units (Stanley, Protection Racket). 42. ANSENAL served as 'an employment agency for landlords and industrialists looking for so-called supernumerarios: security personnel who would perform security tasks for companies and farms' (McClintock McClintock, Michael. 1985. The American Connection, London: Zed Books. [Google Scholar], American Connection, 220). Additionally, the elites themselves (with aid from military hard–liners) created armed groups: death squads. These answered directly to civilian elite. They included ARENA (National Republican Alliance), the UGB (White Warriors' Union), and FALANGE (Anti-Communist Armed Forces of Liberation by Wars of Elimination) to name a few. 43. Mao Zedong Mao, Zedong. 2000. On Guerrilla Warfare, Champaign: University of Illinois Press. Trans. Samuel B. Griffith [Google Scholar] describes the guerrilla–civilian relationship: 'Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathizers and cooperation […]. The former [the people] may be likened to water and the latter [the guerrillas] to the fish who inhabit it' (Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 44, 92–93). Thus if the civilian populace constitutes the 'sea' in which the combatant 'fish' swim, counter-guerrilla warfare is a strategy that seeks to catch the fish by draining the sea (Valentino et al. Valentino, Benjamin, Huth, Paul and Balch-Lindsay, Dylan. 2004. Draining the Sea: Mass Killing, Guerrilla Warfare. International Organization, 58(2): 375–407. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Draining the Sea', 384). 44. Guardian, 23 October 1978, quoted in Dunkerley, Long War, 117. 45. Ropp Ropp, Steve C. 1974. The Honduran Army in the Sociopolitical Evolution of the Honduran State. The Americas, 30(4): 504–528. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 'The Honduran Army', 505–506. 46. Sagan and Waltz Sagan, Scott D and Waltz, Kenneth N. 1995. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, New York: W.W. Norton. [Google Scholar], Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 53 47. The strongly institutionalised Salvadoran military, in contrast, had a myopic vision and organisational structure, which rendered inflexibility and state repression more likely for three reasons: one, the soldiers had extensive training in the use of repression; repression was institutionalised. Two, past experience had demonstrated repression's efficacy. One colonel expressed to Stanford Professor Terry Karl: 'In 1932 we killed 30,000 peasants, and they were quiet for 50 years. All we are asking for is another 50 years' (Karl Karl, Terry, 2002. 'Expert Testimony of Terry Karl in Plaintiffs vs. Jose Guillermo Garcia and Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova', US District Court, Southern District of Florida, Northern Division (8–9 July). Transcript. http://www.cja.org [Google Scholar], 'Expert Testimony', 71). Three, the military's organisational structure (brief presidential term and the Defence Minister's exclusive control of officer assignments) enabled hardliners to marginalise reformists (Stanley, Protection Racket). See also the 'Woerner Report', a secret Pentagon document produced in 1981 by Brig. Gen. Fred F. Woerner. 48. Fearon and Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency', 6. See also Olson Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [Google Scholar], Logic of Collective Action; Gurr Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar], Why Men Rebel; and Poe and Tate Poe, Steven C. and Tate, C. Neal. 1994. Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. American Political Science Review, 88(4): 853–872. 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Of this arable land, in the 1960s, less than 25 per cent was incorporated into farms in Honduras, while in El Salvador, 75 per cent was. 54. Durham Durham, William H. 1979. Scarcity and Survival in Central America: Ecological Origins of the Soccer War, Stanford: Stanford University Press. [Google Scholar], Scarcity and Survival, 102; Seligson Seligson, Mitchell A. 1995. Thirty Years of Transformation in the Agrarian Structure of El Salvador, 1961–1991. Latin American Research Review, 30(3): 43–74. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 'Thirty Years of Transformation'. 55. Lapper and Painter, Honduras. 56. The banana companies suffered exorbitant losses in the September 1954 hurricane and consequently donated 62, 291 acres of land to the government for colonisation projects. The same occurred following 1974 Hurricane Fiji (MacCameron, Bananas, Labor, and Politics). See also Anderson Anderson, Thomas P. 1982. Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, New York: Praeger Publishers. [Google Scholar], Politics in Central America. 57. United Brands paid a $1.25 million bribe to the Honduran economic minister. It transferred land as reparation (Volk Volk, Stephen. 1981. "Honduras: On the Border of War". In Revolution in Central America, Edited by: Stanford Central America Action Network. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. [Google Scholar], 'Honduras'). 58. Prior to the outbreak of war, Salvadoran migrants occupied 293,000 of the best manzanas in Honduran territory and constituted 20 per cent of the Honduran agriculturally active population (Durham, Scarcity and Survival, 125). See also Torres-Rivas Torres-Rivas, Edelberto. 1971. Interpretación del desarrollo social centroamericano; procesos y estructuras de una sociedad dependiente, San José: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana. 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