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Richard Swinburne's argument to the simplicity of God via the infinite

2009; Cambridge University Press; Volume: 45; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1017/s0034412509990217

1469-901X

Jeremy Gwiazda,

Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs

Abstract In The Coherence of Theism Richard Swinburne writes that a person cannot be omniscient and perfectly free. In The Existence of God Swinburne writes that God is a person who is omniscient and perfectly free. There is a straightforward reason why the two passages are not in tension, but recognition of this reason raises a problem for Swinburne's argument in The Existence of God (the conclusion of which is that God likely exists). In this paper I present the problem for Swinburne's argument. I then consider two potential responses and suggest that neither succeeds.