Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Security, profit or shadow of the past? Explaining the security strategies of microstates

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 23; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09557571.2010.484047

1474-449X

Anders Wivel, Kajsa Ji Noe Oest,

International Development and Aid

Abstract Which factors determine the security strategies of microstates? Many microstates are either secluded island states or have very close political, economic and cultural ties to a larger neighbouring 'protector state'. They have had, therefore, little use for more traditional alliance arrangements. However, the patterns of security cooperation between states have shifted as the significance of flexible ad-hoc coalition-building as a means to coordinate international interventions has increased. Consequently, the strategic security challenges and opportunities for microstates have been transformed. Focusing on the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition, this article explores some of these challenges and opportunities. Three hypotheses regarding the decisions made by the respective microstates to join international ad-hoc coalitions are studied: (1) participation provides increased security, (2) participation provides economic gains, and (3) participation reflects the lessons of past security challenges. The explanatory powers of each hypothesis are examined using a comparative case study of 11 Pacific microstates. Notes 1 The exact number of coalition members has been disputed, as this depends highly on how 'coalition contribution' is defined. The contributions on this list range from direct military contributions to the front line to material, political or diplomatic support. See < http://www.whitehouse.gov>, accessed March 2003. 2 In 1983, Fiji joined a US-led coalition, the Suez International Force (Tago Citation2007, 190). Other 'coalitions of the willing' formed to conduct military interventions in the post-Cold-War era include the Gulf War in 1991, Somalia 1993, Haiti 1994, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999 and Afghanistan 2001. Microstates only participated in the Haiti intervention (see Tago Citation2007, 190). 3 We understand coalitions as a subcategory of alliances and therefore argue that coalition participation can be seen as an alliance strategy. For a discussion, see Oest (Citation2007, 19–21). 4 Thus, we exclude the territories in the region governed by other states, for example New Caledonia and French Polynesia (governed by France), and Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (governed by the US). 5 Important theoretical contributions to the study of international coalitions include Tago (Citation2007), Lake (Citation2009), Finnemore (Citation2004) and Hagan et al (Citation2003). Weitsman (Citation2003), Morrow (Citation1986), Snyder (Citation1997) and Jervis (Citation2007) all provide relevant discussions of the subject. For examples of empirical studies of coalitions, see Pierre (Citation2002), Mauer (Citation1994) and Dibb (Citation2002). On the use and frequency of coalitions versus alliances in the post-Cold-War era, see Menon (Citation2003), Campbell (Citation2004), Norris (Citation2003), Kagan (Citation2008), Tertrais (Citation2004) and Sandler (Citation1993). 6 Some definitions of microstates include assumptions about the (questionable) sovereignty of these states (see Neumann and Gstöhl Citation2006, 6). The states discussed in this article all fulfil the criteria for sovereign statehood established in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: a permanent population, defined territorial boundaries, a government and the ability to enter into agreements with other states. 7 Very little research has focused on the microstate concept. Fortunately, however, the challenge of defining this type of state is closely coupled to the study of power in international relations in general, and the discussions of great powers and small states in particular. Thus, our argument will draw on this literature. 8 An alternative criterion for defining microstates may be the perception of foreign policymakers of the role of their state in international affairs as diminutive. Thus, Keohane defines a small state as 'a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system' (Keohane Citation1969, 296; see also Knudsen Citation1996, 5; Gärtner, Citation1993, 303). However, this definition collapses the distinction between microstates, small states and middle powers, thereby leaving us unable to identify the particular choices, challenges and opportunities related to the alliance strategies of microstates. Occasionally, definitions based upon subjective factors (the perception of power) such as Keohane's are combined with objective factors (the material, quantifiable aspects of power). See, for example, Archer and Nugent (Citation2002, 2–3) and Warrington (Citation1998, 102). 9 Alternatively, we may use relative criteria for defining microstates, that is the distribution of capabilities (see Waltz Citation1979, 192). Thus, what matters is not the size of the population, GDP or military expenditures in absolute terms, but, rather, how it compares with the population, GDP or military spending of other states. Whereas relative criteria are often used to define great powers and occasionally used to define small states, they are only rarely used in definitions of microstates. Moreover, just like definitions based on absolute criteria, definitions based on relative criteria suffer from arbitrariness (see Mouritzen and Wivel Citation2005a, 3). 10 As noted by Warrington, the implications are not always purely negative: 'it is both a bleak reality and a useful device for gaining leverage with external partners' (Warrington Citation1998, 102). 11 Our argument about the effect of the probability of conflict on microstate strategy builds on the general discussion in Brooks (Citation1997). The argument that state foreign and security policy varies with external threats is widespread in the international relations literature. See for example Arnold Wolfers, who argues that an important reason 'why nations must be expected not to act uniformly is that they are not all or constantly faced with the same degree of danger' (Wolfers Citation1962, 152). 12 Other non-Pacific microstates include San Marino, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Andorra and many Caribbean Islands. 13 David argues that external alliances are not necessarily formed in response to an increasing threat from other states or an increase in their relative capabilities but often as a response to domestic groups' increase in power and challenge to the elite (David Citation1991, 233). David's study is based on alignment and realignment in the Third World (David Citation1991, 238, note 17). 14 Tonga had the Tonga Defence Service (TDS). This was a 450-person force with headquarters, platoon and a light infantry and coastal naval unit. Their mission was to assist in the maintenance of public order, to patrol coastal waters and fishing zones and to engage in civic action and national development projects. Fiji had a force that has contributed to UN peacekeeping with about 600 soldiers and police overseas in the Middle East, East Timor and Iraq. 15 < http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/index.php>, < http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/02-03/dar/02_06_05defcoop.htm>. 16 < http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/brief/info04_7.html>, accessed 21 August 2008. 17 The other three are situated in the US, Fiji and Japan. 18 In 1998, there was fighting between two rival militias; in 2000 an attempted coup in which the Prime Minister was taken hostage and forced to resign; in 2000 a broad peace agreement treaty brokered by Australia, and unarmed peacekeepers from Australia and New Zealand were deployed; in 2001 the Marau peace agreement was signed; in 2001 a prominent rebel leader was murdered; in 2002 economic and social problems worsened, some peace monitors withdrew, lawlessness rose and a government minister was shot dead. A multinational force, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), headed by Australia, has been in the Solomon Islands at the invitation of the government since 2003 in order to help restore order and stability. 19 Since 2006, the country has been in a state of emergency following political demonstrations and riots. 20 In 1997, Nauru had four different presidents in as many months. 21 This is consistent with the findings in Tago (Citation2007). 22 On the successful marketing of Fiji water relating the brand to its place of origin, see Connell (Citation2006). 23 Due to their limited resources, most microstates choose to brand few issues. However, Qatar has followed a more encompassing branding strategy, including diplomatic, economic and cultural factors. See Peterson (Citation2006). 24 For instance, the US administration prolonged the Congressional approval of the bilateral negotiations with Chile on North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) inclusion from 2002 to 2003. Chile was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and had not confirmed its position on the invasion of Iraq. Moreover, the US lifted the economic sanctions on Pakistan—invoked after Pakistani nuclear testing in 1998 and the 1999 military coup—after Pakistan supported the US offensive against Taliban after 9/11 and received more than US$1 billion in US assistance. 25 For example, the American initiative the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), starting in 2000, grants preferential access to US markets to sub-Saharan states that meet a list of criteria. One of these is a demand that the state is 'not engaged in activities that undermine United States national security or foreign policy interests' ( < http://www.agoa.gov>, accessed 11 November 2009). 26 < http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101439.pdf>, accessed 12 August 2008. 27 CIA World Fact Book, < https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> and < https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tn.html>, accessed 6 August 2008. 28 < http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1840.htm>, accessed 11 August 2008. 29 < http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26551.htm>, accessed 11 August 2008. 30 < http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm>, accessed 11 August 2008. 31 < https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tn.html>, accessed 11 August 2008. 32 < http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/16092.htm>, accessed 11 August 2008. 33 < http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101439.pdf>, accessed 12 August 2008. 34 On aid, see < http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101439.pdf>, on trade < http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2799.htm>, accessed 11 August 2008. 35 On the development of Australian aid to the Pacific microstates, see AUSAID Annual Report 2006–2007, Appendix C ( < http://www.ausaid.gov.au/anrep/rep07/pdf/anrep06_07.pdf>). 36 < http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/asia-oceania/vanuatu>, accessed 22 August 2008. 37 CIA World Fact Book, < https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>, accessed 6 August 2008. 38 A related point is made by Tago (Citation2007), who points to the importance of 'shared language', a proxy for historically shared culture. However, our definition of the presence of the past and historical ties with the US is quite different from Tago's 'shared language'.