Conceptualism and the Myth of the Given
2008; Wiley; Volume: 17; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00288.x
ISSN1468-0378
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophy and History of Science
ResumoEuropean Journal of PhilosophyVolume 17, Issue 3 p. 363-385 Conceptualism and the Myth of the Given Walter Hopp, Walter Hopp Department of Philosophy, Boston University 745 Commonwealth Avenue, Room 539, Boston, MA 02215, USA[email protected]Search for more papers by this author Walter Hopp, Walter Hopp Department of Philosophy, Boston University 745 Commonwealth Avenue, Room 539, Boston, MA 02215, USA[email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 24 August 2009 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00288.xCitations: 4Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. 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