A value for multichoice games
2000; Elsevier BV; Volume: 40; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00054-2
ISSN1879-3118
AutoresEmilio Calvo, Juan Carlos Santos,
Tópico(s)Game Theory and Applications
ResumoA multichoice game is a generalization of a cooperative TU game in which each player has several activity levels. We study the solution for these games proposed by Van Den Nouweland et al. (1995) [Van Den Nouweland, A., Potters, J., Tijs, S., Zarzuelo, J.M., 1995. Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games. ZOR-Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 41, 289–311]. We show that this solution applied to the discrete cost sharing model coincides with the Aumann-Shapley method proposed by Moulin (1995) [Moulin, H., 1995. On additive methods to share joint costs. The Japanese Economic Review 46, 303–332]. Also, we show that the Aumann-Shapley value for continuum games can be obtained as the limit of multichoice values for admissible convergence sequences of multichoice games. Finally, we characterize this solution by using the axioms of balanced contributions and efficiency.
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