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From“Parliamentarized”to“Pure” Presidentialism: Bolivia after October 2003

2008; Wiley; Volume: 52; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1557-203x.2008.00024.x

1557-203X

Miguel Centellas,

Southeast Asian Sociopolitical Studies

The Latin AmericanistVolume 52, Issue 3 p. 5-30 Free Access From"Parliamentarized"to"Pure" Presidentialism: Bolivia after October 2003 Miguel Centellas, Miguel CentellasSearch for more papers by this author Miguel Centellas, Miguel CentellasSearch for more papers by this author First published: 11 November 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1557-203X.2008.00024.xCitations: 3AboutSectionsPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat From October 2003, when Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada resigned the presidency, to January 2006, when Evo Morales was sworn into the office, an important shift in the organization of presidential power occurred in Bolivia. The events of the past few years can be viewed through different perspectives: as a rejection of neoliberalism and globalization, as a signal of Latin America"s "shift to the left," as a return to the country's tradition of political instability, as a sign of a new Bolivian "social revolution," as evidence of the new rising power of indigenous millenarian movements, among others. This paper focuses on one significant detail often overlooked in recent analyses of Bolivian politics: the transition from "parliamentarized" presidentialism in place from 1985-2002 to "pure" presidentialism. Even before Evo Morales assumed office, Bolivia's presidential system had shifted away from a multi-party coalition-based executive system. This shift—which brings Bolivia's political system closer into alignment with typical Latin American presidential democratic systems—hides some of the unique (and still relevant) features of Bolivia's constitutional system. Though nominally a presidential system, Bolivia's constitutional design is (still) marked by unique factors that resemble conventional parliamentary systems: A combination of proportional representation electoral system (which is common in other presidential systems) and selection of the chief executive by the legislature (which is not). Since October 2003, Bolivia's presidential system has more closely aligned itself with the conventional model of presidential democracy common throughout Latin America: A chief executive whose source of legitimacy is independent from the legislature. As such, Bolivia's chief executives recently faced the same dilemmas, pressures, and temptations as more typical Latin American presidents. This paper focuses on two of Bolivia's most recent presidents: Carlos Mesa (2003-2005) and Evo Morales (2006-present). After assuming the office of president upon Sánchez de Lozada's resignation, Mesa sought to govern as an independent and was frequently thwarted by a hostile legislature. In contrast, Morales—who was popularly elected in the December 2005 elections and whose party (MAS, Movement Towards Socialism) holds a majority in the lower house (though not in the Senate)—has been comparably more forceful in pursuing his own policy agenda. Despite their several differences, the strategies pursued by both Mesa and Morales fit the literature on presidentialism (particularly the literatures on "delegative democracy" and "populism") in ways that differ from their predecessors. Both have frequently tried to sideline the legislature and even at times their own party (in Morales's case), appealing directly to a popular mandate. This paper concludes with some comments on the future of Bolivia's presidential system. A new draft constitution (if approved by popular referendum) will significantly alter the nature of Bolivia's constitutional design.1 These include proposals to eliminate the provisions in Article 90 of the current constitution, which provides for the selection of the executive by the legislature in cases where no candidate wins a majority of the popular vote, with a more conventional majority runoff system and the possibility of indefinite reelection.2 While such a proposal is understandable in the recent Bolivian context—especially as long-ignored subaltern popular sectors seek to establish a more "majoritarian" vision of democracy—it would steer the Bolivian system further towards "pure" presidentialism. Despite the appeal of a directly elected president, this paper argues that parliamentarized presidentialism is still a viable model and that it may be more appealing to move closer to parliamentarism, than away from it. It is, of course, important to emphasize that between 2003 and 2008, the institutional framework of parliamentarized presidentialism has not yet changed. Both Mesa and Morales operated under the same constitutional constraints as their predecessors. But formal, legal provisions only tell half the story. While Mesa and Morales acted as chief executives under a constitution that allowed for legislative election of the executive, neither of the two was elected in this way. Mesa, because he succeeded a deposed and unpopular president; Morales, because he was directly elected by a popular majority. Although for different reasons, both staked their political legitimacy on sources outside the "parliamentarized presidentialism" framework. It is also important to remember that in the early 1980s Bolivian politics was highly unstable and polarized. The institutional framework that allowed parties to come together in coalitional "pacts" may have saved Bolivian democracy from crib death in 1985. Parliamentarized presidentialism may not guarantee "more democratic" form of governance or social life (no institutional design can). But the experience of stable multi-party politics from 1985 through 2002 should not be lightly discarded. The present "Bolivian crisis" (as it is commonly called) demonstrates that polarized winner-take-all politics is a real danger in deeply divided societies. Bolivians, like most Latin Americans, are not likely to adopt a parliamentary system. But, as the earlier Bolivian experience shows, it is perhaps possible to "engineer" presidentialism in ways that bring it closer to the parliamentary model. The "Perils" of Presidentialism Revisited The consequences of presidential democracy have been widely debated and I will only briefly summarize that ongoing debate here. In the inaugural issue of the Journal of Democracy, Juan Linz initiated a basic critique of the "perils" of presidential democracy (Linz 1990; Linz and Valenzuela 1994). The basic argument is simple: Presidential systems are less likely to lead to the democratic consolidation of third wave democracies because of two key institutional features. The first is "dual legitimacy." Because legislatures are separately elected, it is difficult to determine which of the two branches of government is the more "legitimate" representative of the popular will. The second is "temporal rigidity." Because the chief executive is elected for a specific term, an unpopular, ineffective, or even incompetent executive is not easily removed from office. The track record of "interrupted" presidencies (Valenzuela 2004) suggests that the critical view of presidential democracy is not easily dismissed.3 In contrast to the poor track record of presidentialism in Latin America (and elsewhere), many have advocated parliamentary democracy. The debate over the merits of presidentialism has been extensive. Many have criticized the Linzian view for oversimplifying the dichotomy between presidentialism and parliamentarism, and for exaggerating the dangers of presidentialism while too readily dismissing the potential drawbacks of parliamentarism (Horowitz 1990; Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Colomer and Negretto 2005; Cheibub 2007). Others pointed out that there are significant variations between different presidential systems and that other factors—particularly electoral systems—have dramatic consequences for how presidential systems function (Jones 1995; Nohlen and Fernández 1998). By the late 1990s, several scholars had focused on the "style" of presidential politics emerging in the region and began discussing "delegative democracy" (O'Donnell 1994), the rise of "competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky and Way 2002), or a resurgence of "populism" (Weyland 1995). Overall, the evidence does suggest that presidential democracy is prone to serious problems—particularly in Latin America. In many cases, the unfortunate combination of list proportional electoral systems for the legislature coupled with a second round runoff system for the president has led to a high frequency of minoritarian presidents. Faced with such situations, many Latin American presidents have abused their powers, often radically eroding the quality of their respective democracies. In other cases, presidents have been weak and ineffective, which precipitated political crises that again eroded the country's democracy. Hugo Chávez (in Venezuela), Alberto Fujimori (in Peru), and Carlos Menem (in Argentina) are examples of the first extreme; Abdala Bucaram and Jamil Mahuad (in Ecuador), Sánchez de Lozada (in Bolivia), and Jorge Serrano (in Guatemala) are examples of the latter extreme. Regardless of whether parliamentarism is a desirable or even viable solution to the region's problems—whether in terms of governance and stability—it is clear that presidential democracy does not have a good track record in Latin America. It is unlikely that Latin America's republics will abandon presidentialism for parliamentarism any time soon. The cultural and historical legacies that encourage presidentialism are, perhaps, too strong. Yet the literature on presidentialism suggests that some variations of presidential democracy are more likely to endure than others. Thus, it is possible that presidential systems could be "engineered" in ways that bring elements of parliamentarism into the political system. The Bolivian case, from 1985 through 2002, offers such a model. Presidentialism, Populism, and Delegative Democrats An important focus on the comparative democratization literature on Latin America (and beyond) has been on the tendency of some presidents to revert to (semi-) authoritarian practices. The resurgence of a new generation of populist leaders and a new type of populism has subsequently become an important area of research—and one that is compatible with the criticisms of presidential democracy. Though in many ways conceptually different, Guillermo O'Donnell's (1994) description of "delegative democracy" and Kurt Weyland's (2001) conceptualization of "populism" focus on the tendencies of popularly elected, presidential executives. While O'Donnell's "delegative democracy" describes the kind of democracy in which executives are able to govern without significant horizontal accountability, such executives can also be classified as "populists."4 Not all populist executives use openly "authoritarian" tactics, of course. What they share in common, however, is that they rely primarily on their personal charisma, seeking to establish a close personal link with "the people" at the cost of de-emphasizing more institutional means of representation. This paper uses the terms "populist" and "delegative democrat" interchangeably. Here, it focuses on the concept's political, rather than economic (or "policy") dimensions. This includes a wide range of tools populist presidents use—including "elections, plebiscites, mass demonstrations, and most recently opinion polls" (Weyland 2001, 12)—to overpower their opponents by demonstrating their popular (and personal) legitimacy. In such instances, presidents rely on charismatic foundations of legitimacy and seek to reduce or altogether cut their dependence on more institutional means of authority: the courts, the legislature, even their own political party. In short, political authority becomes increasingly personalized and centralized around a president who claims—and seeks to demonstrate—a close, personal connection with "the people" and their interests. Like many Latin American countries, Bolivia has a legacy of populism (Mitchell 1977; Brienen 2007). The National Revolutionary Movement (MNR)—which carried out the 1952 "National Revolution"—was modeled on Peru's American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and once in power sought to emulate Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Unlike class-based populist movements (such as Peronism), Bolivian populism tends towards integrationist, multi-class, corporatist movements (perhaps better described as "national" populism). After the attempt to establish an MNR single-party state failed, Bolivia was governed by a series of populist military dictatorships from 1964 through 1978. One of the common features of the civilian MNR regime (1952-1964) and the military regimes that followed (1964-1982) was a dismal view of "partisan" politics, which was criticized for its divisiveness. None of the military regimes attempted to build an institutionalized party base while in power. Bolivia's democratic transition was hindered by the lack of institutionalized political parties. Instead, the political landscape of the early 1980s was marked by a large number of poorly institutionalized and ideologically vague electoral vehicles dominated by individual personalities. Many of these were the same figures from the "national revolutionary" period: Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Hernán Siles Zuazo, Hugo Banzer, and a number of lesser figures.5 Political campaigns of this period can be categorized as "politics as war" and early efforts at democratization were doomed by the unwillingness of political leaders to cede power to others as the populist mode of politics fostered highly divisive zero-sum political struggles. Multiparty accommodations or power sharing were not yet considered. Al this changed with the introduction of "pacted" governments in the late 1980s. Thus, the focus of this paper is not on populism per se, but rather on the apparent tendency of "pure" presidential executives to move in that direction. It is significant that Bolivian executives have historically fit the pattern of populist leaders. Both prior to 1985 and after 2003, political power was heavily concentrated in chief executives who did not rely on political parties and legislatures as popular intermediaries. Like all democratic leaders, Bolivia's presidents from 1985 through 2003 also exhibited "populist" traits.6 But these were tempered by their reliance on the "pacted" multiparty coalitions that were a cornerstone of "parliamentarized" presidentialism. "Parliamentarized" Presidentialism, 1985–2002 In the 1990s, Bolivia ceased to be a Latin American basket case and instead became a potential model. During this time, Bolivia was governed by alternating governments, which were themselves comprised of multiparty coalitions. Under the first Sánchez de Lozada administration (1993-1997), the country embarked on an ambitious series of reforms aimed at increasing citizen participation, representation, and government accountability. The 1994 decentralization reforms, known as Participación Popular, became a model for the region (MDH-SNPP 1997). The country even seemed inoculated (if not immune) to the rise of new populist movements across the region. While neopopulist movements such as Conscience of the Fatherland (CONDEPA) and Civic Solidarity Union (UCS) were present in Bolivia, they were accomodated into the political party system, which itself tended towards a moderate multipartism. How do we explain this transformation? How did Bolivia, one of the most unstable countries in the region, enjoy more than a decade of political stability?7 The answer lies partly with its unique presidential system. From 1985 through 2002, Bolivian political elites employed a system described by René Antonio Mayorga (1997; 2005) as "parliamentarized presidentialism."8 It is important to understand how Bolivia's remarkable political stability of the 1990s (which coincides with this institutional period) was, in large part, shaped by this unique institutional model. It is equally important, of course, to carefully assess the limitations on this system in order to understand how it failed to defuse the social and political crisis that led to the country's first "interrupted" presidency since 1985. We turn to the latter question later. First, let us briefly describe Bolivia's parliamentarized presidentialism. Parliamentarized presidentialism is characterized by a combination of formal institutions and informal rules whose key features are: 1) A fused-ballot list proportional representation (list-PR) electoral system, in which the president heads a list of party candidates. 2) Congressional election of the president (if no candidate-list wins a popular majority of valid votes). 3) Informal semi-consociational norms that encourage multiparty post-electoral coalition building (or "pacts"). The constitution and the Electoral Code formally proscribe the first two features. The provision for congressional selection of the president is outlined in Article 90 of the current constitution. Article 90 stipulates that, in the event that no presidential candidate (and his or her list) wins a majority of the popular vote, the newly elected legislature must select a new president from among the frontrunners.9 In 1994, the constitution was modified to limit the congressional election of the president to the two frontrunners (a reduction from the previous option to vote for three frontrunners). In addition, the fused-ballot electoral system binds the legislature and the president closely together. The composition of both the Senate and the House of Deputies reflect the votes cast for the single party lists headed by the presidential candidate (a vote for president is an automatic vote for a party list). Thus, unlike in "pure" presidentialism, the executive and legislature share the same source of electoral legitimacy. Despite the change to a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system before the 1997 election, the legislature still largely reflects the results of this "plurinominal" portion of the ballot. Bolivian voters cast two ballots: one for their local ("uninominal") representative and the other for president. The presidential votes are used to determine seat distribution in the 27-member Senate and to award the remainder (nearly half) of the seats in the 130-member House of Deputies in compensatory (rather than "parallel") fashion. In the five elections between 1985 and 2002, no presidential candidate was able to win a majority of the popular vote (see Table 1). Yet each of the five presidents that emerged from the post-electoral legislative selection process built a majority governing coalition. Already by 1989, these multiparty pacts had become a critical component of Bolivian politics. The post-electoral coalitions did more than merely produce majority legislative support for incoming presidents—they established multi-party portfolio coalitions. The weeks following general elections became a period of intense inter-party negotiations, as presidential hopefuls lobbied incoming legislators and their parties. In exchange for legislative support, new presidents signed agreements with rival parties. Spelled out in the various coalitional pacts, incoming presidents agreed to share executive power by awarding ministerial and other high government posts to coalition member parties. Table 1. Bolivian Presidential Frontrunners and Governments, 1985–2002 Election Party Presidential candidate (winner in italics) Percent of valid vote Seats in Congress By party By coalition 1985 ADN Hugo Banzer 32.8 51 MNR Víctor Paz Estenssoro 30.4 59 110 MIR Jaime Paz Zamora 10.2 16 1989 MNR Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 25.7 49 ADN Hugo Banzer 25.2 46 MIR Jaime Paz Zamora 21.8 41 87 1993 MNR Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 35.6 69 97 APa Hugo Banzer 21.1 43 CONDEPA Carlos Palenque 14.3 14 1997 ADN Hugo Banzer 22.8 43 96b MNR Juan Carlos Durán 18.6 30 2002 MNR Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 22.5 47 88 MAS Evo Morales 20.9 35 Data from Bolivia's Corte Nacional Electoral Figures only represent those candidates who were eligible for second-round selection by the legislature; candidates who went to be selected president are in bold. Total number of seats in legislature is 157 (130 in the House of Deputies and 27 in the Senate). aAP (Patriotic Accord) was a coalition between ADN and MIR. bFigure does not include CONDEPA's 22 seats; CONDEPA was dismissed from the coalition on August 6, 1998. The coalition pacts did more than merely select new presidents: they substantially altered parties' behavior. Two significant examples include the 1989 MIR-ADN alliance and the 1993 MNR-led "Plan de Todos" coalition. After an electoral impasse left the two center-right candidates (Paz Estenssoro and Banzer) in a virtual tie in 1989, Jaime Paz Zamora, the center-left Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) presidential candidate crafted an alliance with Banzer's Democratic Nationalist Action (ADN). The move was controversial because MIR had originally been founded in 1971 to resist the Banzer military dictatorship. In exchange for the presidency, Paz Zamora agreed to form a joint cabinet with ADN, naming the ADN vice presidential candidate as vice president (rather than the MIR candidate), forming a joint Committee of the Patriotic Accord (headed by Banzer) with extensive input into policy decisions, and an agreement for MIR to officially support a Banzer presidential bid in 1993. The Patriotic Accord government was thus much more than a legislative coalition: It was an explicit co-government between two previously rival parties. By 1993, post-electoral pacts were expected. That year, Sánchez de Lozada secured his presidential election by including two new parties into his governing coalition. The first was the populist UCS; the other was the center-left Free Bolivia Movement (MBL), a former MIR splinter. Despite placing first by a wide margin over the second runner up (and a significant legislative plurality),10 the MNR formed a coalition that gave significant cabinet (and sub-cabinet) representation to UCS and MBL. The 1997 and 2002 elections followed this pattern, with parties and candidates maneuvering for post-electoral coalitions even before votes were cast. As such, coalitions were avenues for either consensus building or cooption (or both) around a neoliberal political and economic project. What is significant is that after the 1989 Patriotic Accord government, governments increasingly operated within the constraints of their multiparty pact agreements. Though these agreements could be reevaluated (as when CONDEPA was dismissed from the ADN-led coalition in 1998), much of the policy making process was now conducted at inter-party conferences (often including key opposition parties). Because of this post-electoral dynamic, the presidents that governed Bolivia between 1985 and 2002 resembled the kind of multi-party coalitions typical of parliamentary democracies. As in parliamentary democracies, the selection of the chief executive involved substantial inter-party negotiations. Yet these "parliamentarized" executives were still "presidential" executives. Presidents were expected to serve their full terms, there was no expectation that the legislature could call for a vote of confidence or that the president could dissolve the legislature, and the constitutional line of succession was acknowledged. Certainly, none of the six presidents that governed Bolivia between 1985 and 2002 thought of themselves as a prime minister. This system, of course, came under increasing pressure after 2000. In part, this was due to some unexpected consequences of institutional reforms. While Participación Popular and the adoption of an MMP electoral system helped improve vertical accountability and opened up new spaces for political participation at the local level, it also introduced new "centrifugal" tendencies into the political process. Both reforms introduced new incentives for regional, local, and sectoral elites to seek political power outside the traditional party system (Centellas 2005). In particular, it provided new institutional spaces for "anti-systemic" political forces that opposed the existing neoliberal consensus among the traditional (or "systemic" parties). This contributed to an erosion of support for traditional parties, which in turn contributed to a broader crisis of legitimacy. Both Participación Popular and the new MMP electoral system—under which approximately half of the legislature was elected by plurality in single-member "uninominal" districts—made it possible for political "outsiders" to bypass the traditional parties and gain power directly. In 2003, Bolivia's parliamentarized presidentialism broke down in the face of an intense social and political crisis (though this should not be confused with a complete breakdown of democracy). Thus, the second Sánchez de Lozada presidency (2002–2003) illustrates the Achilles heel of parliamentarized presidentialism. On the one hand, the weakness of the regime had much to do with poor choices made by political elites. Despite growing unrest, much of their time was spent squabbling over the distribution of cabinet seats and other government patronage. Locked into the logic of coalition building, Bolivia's political class fiddled while La Paz burned. But on the other hand, the regime also suffered from a critical institutional weakness: it lacked a safety valve. Without a constitutional exit strategy, political elites found themselves unable to swiftly defuse or resolve any crisis. We will return to my preferred institutional solution—a constructive vote of confidence—later. But it is clear that, since October 2003, Bolivia has not experienced "parliamentarized" presidentialism, but rather "pure" presidentialism. Carlos Mesa and Evo Morales in Comparative Perspective This paper focuses on the presidencies of Carlos Mesa and Evo Morales and considers them as two examples of "pure" presidential executives. Unlike previous "parliamentarized" chief executives, neither was elected by a multiparty legislative coalition. Although the relevant constitutional provision (Article 90) for the selection of the president by congressional election remained in place in 2005, it was not exercised in the case of Morales. Similarly, while Mesa was technically "elected" (as Sánchez de Lozada's vice presidential running mate), he had by early October 2003 distanced himself from the governing legislative coalition and deliberately declared himself an "independent," stressing that he had never been a member of any political party.11 Thus, this paper argues that both Mesa and Morales operated within (and also partly shaped) a different political institutional context than did previous chief executives.12 Mesa's presidency does not fit the model of "parliamentarized" presidentialism. Unlike previous presidents—including Jorge Quiroga, who assumed the presidency in 2001 after Banzer resigned (for health reasons)—Mesa governed without a legislative coalition. Because of his insistence throughout 2003–2005 to govern independently from political parties—particularly by naming a cabinet of "independent" figures—Mesa deliberately and consistently distanced himself both from political parties and the legislature. In contrast, Quiroga inherited both the presidency and the multiparty coalition (one he himself had been instrumental in creating) that sustained it. Additionally, unlike Mesa, Quiroga made few references to his personal popularity, did not seek to mobilize popular support on his behalf, and instead staked his presidency primarily on traditional representative institutions. Thus, Mesa, unlike Quiroga, did not represent a continuation of his predecessor's coalition government; rather, he signals a break. The case of Carlos Mesa is an interesting juxtaposition to that of Quiroga. Although Mesa, like Quiroga, was a sitting vice president, the two were in many ways dissimilar. While Quiroga had been active in party politics since the late 1980s, Mesa had no such trajectory. Despite being a well-known public figure in his own right (as a television news anchor and political commentator, as well as for his academic credentials as a historian), Mesa was an "apolitical" figure. This, of course, was part of what made him an attractive running mate for Sánchez de Lozada: Mesa could bring middle class voters who were also disaffected by traditional politicians and projected a sense of honesty, intellectualism, and independence to the campaign. As a president, however, this meant that Mesa lacked long-established ties to any political party or organization.13 Quiroga often clashed with members of his own party (ADN, Democratic National Action), antagonized several of his government's coalition partners, and sought extra-institutional sources of legitimacy (such as the "National Dialogue" initiative). But these similarities should be put into proper context. While Quiroga clashed with other ADN leaders—after all, he represented a different, "technocratic" generational movement within the party—his membership in the party was never suspect.14 The tensions between members of the ADN-led coalition (which eventually led to the coalition's breakup) can also be understood in the context of electoral politics: Historically, multiparty coalitional pac