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‘A mustard seed grew into a bushy tree’: The Finnish CSCE initiative of 5 May 1969

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 9; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14682740802170982

1743-7962

Thomas Fischer,

German History and Society

Abstract On 5 May 1969 Finland launched its famous initiative, which led to the opening of multilateral negotiations for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) three years later. To date there is widespread reasoning that the Finnish initiative was mainly an idea inspired by the Soviets. Based on new archival materials and interviews with contemporary witnesses, this article shows, however, that the Finns had their own good reasons to launch their appeal. The initiative was primarily designed to ease Soviet pressure on Finnish neutrality and to deal with the pending question of recognition of the two German states. The conference itself was for a long time not the main ambition of Finnish foreign policy. Offering Helsinki as a host to the talks and thereby making neutrality an indispensable condition for convening the security conference became the crown jewel in Finland's strategy towards the Soviet Union in the years 1969 to 1972. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank CitationSuvi Kansikas for her help in locating and photographing/copying the documents in the Finnish archives and Juhani Karppinen for translating the Finnish and Swedish language materials. Kristina Spohr-Readman gave useful comments on a first draft of this article and Niamh Scally edited the language. The author would also like to extend his gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers for their comments. Research for this article has been made possible by a project on the historical role of the neutral and non-aligned states in the CSCE funded by the Jubiläumsfonds der Österreichischen Nationalbank (project no. 11435). Notes Thomas Fischer, born 1971 in Switzerland, studied History, Public and International Law in Zurich and Bruxelles. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Sciences from the University of Zurich. Since 2004 he has been an affiliated researcher with the Austrian Institute for International Affairs in Vienna, and from 2005 a lecturer in International History at the University of Vienna. He is currently working on a manuscript on ‘The Neutral and Non-aligned States in the CSCE, 1969–1975’. [1] Dipoli is the name for the student union house of the Helsinki University of Technology (up to 1907 the Polytechnic School) in the Helsinki suburban area of Otaniemi, Espoo. Its scenic location on a slight elevation in a small wood gives it a particularly quiet feel. Construction work on the cavern-like building in a modern architecture style of stone and wood was almost finished when the Finnish government started to look for a suitable site to host the multilateral preparatory talks of the CSCE in 1972. [2] CitationHentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten. See also CitationHentilä's English article ‘Maintaining Neutrality between the Two German States’. For an earlier study dealing with the issue see CitationPutensen, Im Konfliktfeld zwischen Ost und West. [3] CitationJakobson, År av fruktan och hopp, 478–85; Hyvärinen, Virkamiehiä, viekkautta ja vakoilijoita, 99; CitationKeisalo, Hätäpotkusta voittomaali, 21f. [4] At the Roots of the European Security System: Thirty Years Since the Helsinki Final Act, Conference, 8–10 September 2005, Zurich/Switzerland. Available from http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/conferences/previous/Zurich_2005.cfm?nav1 = 2&nav2 = 1. [5] Rentola, ‘Der Vorschlag einer europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz’, 177–202. This article is an offspring of Rentola's latest book, Vallankumouksen aave. [6] Neither Rentola nor Hentilä made use of the 12 boxes of CSCE material in the Finnish Foreign Ministry Archives. See: Ulkoasiainministeriön Arkisto [Finnish Foreign Ministry Archive, Helsinki, hereafter: UMA], 7 B Euroopan turvallisuuskonferenssi [European security conference], Kansio 1-12 [Box 1-12]. Urho Kekkonen's biographer CitationJuhani Suomi, who had exclusive access to the president's material when writing his work of several volumes, has referred to a number of these documents or their copies in the Kekkonen archives in Orimattila, Finland. [7] For the beginnings and the concepts of French détente and German Ostpolitik see CitationGarthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 124–7. [8] For a brief overview on the pre-history of the CSCE see Citationvan Oudenaren, Détente in Europe, 319f. [9] CitationMastny, Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 43f. For the text of the Bucharest Declaration see: Erklärung der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrags vom 6. Juli 1966 in Bukarest zur europäischen Sicherheit, in CitationSchramm et al., Sicherheitskonferenz für Europa, 425–35. [10] Erklärung der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrags vom 6. Juli 1966 in Bukarest zur europäischen Sicherheit, in Schramm et al., Sicherheitskonferenz für Europa, 425–35. [11] Erklärung der auf der Konferenz in Karlsbad vertretenen kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien Europas, 26. April 1967, in Schramm et al., Sicherheitskonferenz in Europa, 440–44. [12] Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Archiv der Republik [Austrian National Archive, Vienna, hereafter: ÖStA/AdR], BMfaA, II-Pol/Pol. Berichte: Moskau, 1335, Bericht Wodak an Toncic-Sorinj: Die Karlsbader Konferenz der europäischen Kommunisten und die Neutralen, Auszug aus der Karlsbader Rede von Breznev, Moskau, 10. Mai 1967. [13] Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Archiv der Republik [Austrian National Archive, Vienna, hereafter: ÖStA/AdR], BMfaA, II-Pol/Pol. Berichte: Moskau, 1335, Bericht Wodak an Toncic-Sorinj: Die Karlsbader Konferenz der europäischen Kommunisten und die Neutralen, Auszug aus der Karlsbader Rede von Breznev, Moskau, 10. Mai 1967 [14] Cf. CitationFischer, ‘Die Sowjetunion, Österreich und die finnische KSZE-Initiative’, 313–40, especially 324–30. [15] CitationHaymerle, ‘Die Beziehungen zur Grossmacht im Osten’, 143–94, especially 173–80. [16] CitationFischer, ‘Die Sowjetunion, Österreich und die finnische KSZE-Initiative’, 329f. [17] The FCMA treaty was extended twice in 1955 and in 1970 without any changes to the original. On both occasions the Soviets pressed for extension well in advance of expiration. In 1955 the renewal of the treaty happened against the backdrop of the FRG becoming a member of NATO, while in 1970 the Soviet Union wanted to extend the FCMA treaty on its existing basis before it signed a non-aggression treaty with the FRG, then on the table. [18] Article 1 of the FCMA treaty cited in CitationEngman, ‘Schicksalsgemeinschaft?’, 378f. [19] Article 1 of the FCMA treaty cited in CitationEngman, ‘Schicksalsgemeinschaft?’, 390–96; CitationHäikiö, ‘Finland's Neutrality’, 199–217, at 204–6. [20] For reasons, which are not entirely clear the Soviet Union in autumn 1961 sent a diplomatic note to Finland proposing military consultations according to Article 2 of the FCMA treaty referring to an imminent threat by the Federal Republic of Germany. Helsinki rejected consultations based on its understanding that military cooperation with the Soviet Union should begin only after Finland had failed to defend itself alone. The resolution of the ‘note crisis’ came in a personal meeting in Novosibirsk, Siberia, of Kekkonen with Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev, with the Finnish president promising to observe carefully the security situation in Northern Europe. Häikiö, ‘Finland's Neutrality’, 210f; Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 46–50. [21] Rentola, ‘Der Vorschlag einer europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz’, 180f. [22] The Hallstein doctrine, named after the State Secretary of the West German Foreign Ministry Walter Hallstein, stated in 1955 that the Federal Republic of Germany would consider the recognition of the ‘so-called GDR’ by any other state as an unfriendly act and would cease diplomatic relations with the respective state immediately. The Hallstein doctrine was anchored in Bonn's claim to exclusive representation of Germany after the partition of the country in 1949. [23] Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 50. [24] This was the first time since regular Finnish–Soviet talks were held that the Soviet side explicitly asked for the mentioning of East German recognition in a final communiqué of bilateral talks. ÖStA/AdR, BMfaA, II-Pol/USSR 1, 1074, Aktennotiz über Kossygin-Besuch in Finnland: Schwierigkeiten bei der Abfassung des Schlusskommuniqués am 18. Juni 1966, Vienna, 2 September 1966. [25] ÖStA/AdR, BMfaA, II-Pol/Pol. Berichte: Moskau, 1132, Anhang zum Bericht von Botschafter Wodak an Aussenminister Toncic-Sorinj: Soviet–Finnish Communique, 20 June 1966, 23 June 1966. This story was confirmed by an oral report of Max Jakobson given to a French diplomat in New York some weeks after the event: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères/Archives Diplomatiques, Paris [hereafter: MAE], Europe, Finlande 1961–1970, vol. 79: Télégramme Roger Seydoux adressé à Diplomatie Paris, Entretien avec le représentant de la Finlande (Max Jakobson), New York, le 2 août 1966. [26] Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, quotation 13, regarding the Soviet campaign for recognition of the GDR, 72–4, 92. [27] Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, quotation 13, regarding the Soviet campaign for recognition of the GDR, 90. [28] In April 1968 the Finnish Social Democratic party endorsed a resolution calling for the recognition of both German states since it had become a historical fact. See the resolution in Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 109f. [29] Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 73. [30] Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 75f. [31] Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 76. The subject of the security conference had first been touched upon in the Finnish-Soviet bilateral talks in 1966 but no follow-up action had been taken until 1968 by the Soviet side. See: ÖStA/AdR, BMfaA, II-Pol/Pol. Berichte: Moskau, 1132, Anhang zum Bericht von Botschafter Wodak an Aussenminister Toncic-Sorinj: Soviet–Finnish Communique, 20 June 1966. [32] ÖStA/AdR, BMfaA, II-Pol/USSR 2, 1404, Besuch Kossygins bei Kekkonen Anfang Oktober: Communiqué on the unofficial visit to Finland by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of USSR A.N. Kosygin, Helsinki, 9 October 1968. As President Kekkonen explained in a TV interview: ‘No special means were discussed in this connection [with the strengthening of European security], perhaps because Finland's role in finding and applying such means is not very great when such general issues are in question.’ ÖStA/AdR, BMfaA, II-Pol/USSR 2, 1404, Besuch Kossygins bei Kekkonen Anfang Oktober: TV interview of the President of the Republic on 10 October 1968 (unofficial translation, Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Pressbureau). The meeting between Kekkonen and Kosygin on a Finnish coastguard vessel in the Hittinen archipelago west of Hanko was surrounded by much secrecy as it came on the verge of the Czechoslovakian crisis. It seems that Kosygin had originally been invited for a ‘fishing trip’ to the Turku archipelago in summer when Kekkonen last was in Moscow in June. However, these arrangements were soon toppled by international events. The Finnish president later in September had reiterated the invitation for October, apparently ‘to talk things out with the Soviets’. Moscow at the same time was eager to overcome international criticism and resume détente with the West. ÖStA/AdR, BMfaA, II-Pol/USSR 2, 1404, Treffen Präsident Kekkonen und Ministerpräsident Kossygin, Bericht Bot. Palla (Stockholm), 11 October 1968. See also Rentola, ‘Der Vorschlag einer europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz’, 182, n. 22. [33] Appell der Budapester Konferenz der Staaten des Warschauer Vertrags an alle europäischen Staaten, 17. März 1969, in Schramm et al., Sicherheitskonferenz in Europa, 451–3. [34] Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta, 202f; See also the note of 8 April 1969 in the edited diaries of Urho Kekkonen: Suomi, Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat, Vol. III. [35] According to Hentilä, Finnish Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto, Foreign Minister Karjalainen, and President Kekkonen between November 1968 and early 1969 all received this call in individual high-level talks with their Soviet counterparts. Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, S. 95; Cf. Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta, 199f. [36] Interview with Leif Blomqvist, Helsinki, 17 May 2006. Leif Blomqvist has been a junior member of the Finnish CSCE delegation from 1973 onwards in the Geneva negotiations, responsible as number two to Paavo Rantanen for the economic brief. From 1969 to 1972 he was stationed in Israel. [37] Max Jakobson, born 1923 in Vyborg, Carelia (today Russia), served in the Finnish Foreign Ministry from 1953 to 1974. He was the head of the political department from 1962 to 1965, and although being stationed in New York as Finland's ambassador to the UN from 1965 to 1972 remained in very close contact with the president and the leading staff of the Foreign Ministry. [38] Jakobson, År av fruktan och hopp, 480; Cf. Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta, 205f; Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 123. Kekkonen's diary entry of that day reads: ‘29.4. Jakobson visiting me for breakfast. Elaborating the positive Finnish answer to the Moscow proposal of holding a Security Conference and a preparatory meeting and the proposal to other countries. It will be good. ‘When the press in Western countries starts to write that Finland has acted on the orders of the Soviet Union, you can as a historian tell how the idea started and developed here’, I told Jakobson.’ Entry of 29 April 1969 in Suomi, Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat, Vol. III, 44. [39] Hentilä mistakenly picks up on the ‘Tamminiemi legend’, possibly because the Finnish press at the time conveyed Kekkonen's May 22 version: Suomen Kuvalehti, no. 25–26, 22 May 1969; Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 123. [40] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Press Section, Unofficial translation: Interview with President Urho Kekkonen on TV, 22 May 1969 (emphasis added). The Finnish Foreign Ministry obviously made sure that the transcript of this interview was widely dispersed. The author of this article has found copies of the transcript in French and Austrian Archives: MAE, Europe, Finlande 1961–1970, vol. 79, Finlande/URSS: Visite de M. Kekkonen à Leningrad, 19/21 Mai 1969; ÖStA/AdR, BMfaA, II-Pol/Finland, 1505, Äusserungen des finnischen Staatspräsidenten Kekkonen zur Frage der europ. Sicherheit, Helsinki, 24 Mai 1969. [41] Jakobson, År av fruktan och hopp, 480; Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta, 205. [42] Urho Kekkonen Archive, Orimattila, Finland [hereafter: UKA], Yearbook 1969, letter Kekkonen to Jakobson, 27 May 1969: ‘I have had to publish our breakfast meeting in a slightly embellished way. Let's hope it served its purpose so that one doesn't any more imagine that our initiative was launched from outside’ (emphasis added). In his yearbooks President Kekkonen would assemble the most important documents that passed his table and annotate his comments. The yearbooks contain practically anything from small pieces of paper to official memoranda, newspaper clippings, letters, secret police briefings, and alike. [43] Risto Hyvärinen was the Foreign Ministry's Political Director from 1967 to 1972. Coming from an officer's family (his father being born in Smolensk), he did his studies at the Ecole d'Etat Majeur in France. He was a colonel in the army and received a doctor's degree from Princeton in international politics in 1953. Coming from the intelligence side he was invited to join the diplomatic service in 1965. Together with his assistant Keijo Korhonen he was considered to be one of ‘Kekkonen's men’. Hyvärinen's background as a military officer brought the leading group in the political department the nickname of the ‘colonel's junta’, derived from contemporary Greece. Max Jakobson and his second in line in New York, Ilkka Pastinen, were considered to be part of this group. [44] Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta, 206. [45] Telephone interview with Max Jakobson, 22 January 2007; Jakobson, År av fruktan och hopp, 482. [46] UKA, Box 22/11, Letter Hyvärinen to Kekkonen, Helsinki, 12 June 1968. [47] Interview with Risto Hyvärinen, Helsinki, 17 May 2006. [48] Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 76–9; Cf. Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta, 59–68. [49] Interview with Risto Hyvärinen, Helsinki, 17 May 2006. The memorandum is to be found in the Urho Kekkonen Archive: UKA, 22/11, P.M. Euroopan tilanne [European situation], enclosure to Hyvärinen's letter to Kekkonen of 12 June 1968. The cover letter mentions that a copy of the memorandum was given to consul Kustaa Loikkanen, the president's interpreter. As the trip was an unofficial visit to the Soviet Union, Kekkonen was only accompanied by Levo, Loikkanen and the head of security, captain Teuvo Hirvonen. [50] Telephone interview with Max Jakobson, 22 January 2007; see also Jakobson's memoirs, where he writes that he only learned after the Tamminiemi meeting of Hyvärinen's proposal, and that Kekkonen must have forgotten about it in the meantime. Jakobson, År av fruktan och hopp, 482. Jakobson, however, does not recall who came up with the idea first in the discussion he had with the president on that day of linking the CSCE initiative with the German question. Hyvärinen, on the other hand, is convinced that Kekkonen ‘surely knew then about the concept’ laid out in his proposal of June 1968 since he had spoken to the president on several occasions about the German issue. Interview with Risto Hyvärinen, Helsinki, 17 May 2006. [51] Suomi writes that Jakobson and Hyvärinen in 1968 had consulted on the GDR and the European security conference and decided to link the two issues with the aim of not having to recognize the East German state. Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta, 208. [52] Häikiö quotes the local Helsinki KGB officer Victor Vladimirov, who claims in his memoirs to have personally persuaded President Kekkonen over long-term contacts to promote the security conference initiative in his name. However, according to one of the anonymous reviewers of this article this allegation cannot be true since Vladimirov only arrived in Helsinki in October 1970 and was not connected with Kekkonen in his previous position in the KGB department responsible for sabotage etc.; cf. Häikiö, ‘Finland's Neutrality 1944–1994’, 212. [53] Quote from: Telephone interview with Max Jakobson, 22 January 2007; Interview with Risto Hyvärinen and Ilkka Pastinen, Helsinki, 11 May 2006; Interview with Paavo Keisalo, Helsinki, 12 May 2006; Interview with Risto Hyvärinen, Helsinki, 17 May 2006. [54] Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 124. [55] In May 1969 there were only three countries who had full diplomatic relations with both German states, the Soviet Union since 1955, Romania since 1967, and Yugoslavia since 1968. [56] Korhonen quoted in Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 124, from Korhonen, ‘Siihen aikaan kun Suomi Saksat tunnusti’, 564. [57] Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 121; The NORDEK plan failed since the Soviet Union was from the beginning very suspicious regarding Finland's participation in this initiative. Kansikas, ‘“Nordek is an Anti-Soviet Group”’; see also Rentola, ‘Der Vorschlag einer europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz’, 184f. [58] Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 129. The decisive passage in the Finnish-Soviet communiqué reads: ‘Both parties have again noted that Finland's peaceful policy of neutrality and her friendly relations with all countries are a valuable contribution to the development of international understanding and thus to the promotion of the cause of general peace.’ MAE, Europe, Finlande 1961–1970, vol. 79, Texte anglais du communiqué publié à Moscou le 20 juillet 1970, à l'issue de la visite officielle en U.R.S.S. de M. KEKKONEN, président de la République finlandaise (traduction établie par le min. finlandais des aff. étrangères) (emphasis added). However, it needs to be mentioned that the success of Hyvärinen's negotiations can only be judged a frail and temporary one, as a year later on the occasion of Prime Minister Ahti Karjalainen's visit to the Soviet Union another setback was suffered, when the Soviets were only ready to include a qualified statement on Finnish neutrality in the communiqué of the talks. [59] The Finnish memorandum of 5 May 1969 had been sent to 30 European states as well as to the USA and Canada. Cyprus and Liechtenstein originally had not been addressed by the circular and only got it after they had asked for it. UMA, 7 B, Kansio 1, P.M. muistiinpano ulkoasiainministeri Karjalaisen ja ulkoministeri Harmel'in keskustelusta Brysselissä 7.1.1970 [Notes of talks between Foreign Minister Karjalainen and Foreign Minister Harmel in Brussels, 7 January 1970], Martti Korhonen, 11 January 1970. [60] ÖStA/AdR, BMfaA, II-Pol/Finnland, [non-registered box no. 11], 1970: Zusammenfassendes Protokoll über die österreichisch-finnischen Arbeitsgespräche zwischen Botschafter Dr. HALUSA und dem politischen Direktor im finnischen Aussenministerium, Botschafter HYVÄRINEN, am 4. und 5. März 1970 in Helsinki. [61] UMA, 7 B, Kansio 9, Statement by Mr. Ahti Karjalainen, Foreign Minister of Finland, on European security conference 23.2.1970. A German version of the statement is reprinted in: CitationJacobsen et al., Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 201f. After two initial visits to Helsinki in January and February between March 1970 and November 1971 Enckell would make a total of 56 trips including six times Helsinki for reporting back and coordinating with the Foreign Ministry. The complete travel itinerary of Ralph Enckell is reprinted in Jacobsen et al., Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 371. [62] The exceptions are CitationLeatherman, Engaging East and West, 375–7; CitationZielinski, Die neutralen und blockfreien Staaten und ihre Rolle im KSZE-Prozess, 142f. [63] Interview with Paavo Keisalo, Helsinki, 12 May 2006. [64] UMA, 7 B, Kansio 9, P.M. Euroopan turvallisuuskonferenssi; kiertavävän suurtähettilään toiminaan suuntaviivat [Guidelines for the roving ambassador for the European Security Conference], Helsinki, 6 March 1970. [65] Swiss Federal Archive [Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, Bern, hereafter: BAr], E 2200.48 ( − ) 1992/148, 10, Stockholm: Besuch des Finnischen Sonderbotschafters, Ralph Enckell, in Bern vom 24. bis 25. März 1970, Protokoll der Besprechung vom 25. März. See also Ambassador Alhom's report on Enckells visit to Berne on March 24 and 25, 1970: UMA, 7 B, Kansio 9, Suurlähettiläs Enckellin käynti Bernissä, Alholm to Karjalainen, Berne, 28 March 1970. [66] Swiss Federal Archive [Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, Bern, hereafter: BAr], E 2200.48 ( − ) 1992/148, 10, Stockholm: Besuch des Finnischen Sonderbotschafters, Ralph Enckell, in Bern vom 24. bis 25. März 1970, Protokoll der Besprechung vom 25. März. See also Ambassador Alhom's report on Enckells visit to Berne on March 24 and 25, 1970: UMA, 7 B, Kansio 9, Suurlähettiläs Enckellin käynti Bernissä, Alholm to Karjalainen, Berne, 28 March 1970; cf. Leatherman, Engaging East and West, 375. [67] Ralph Enckell is described as ‘an extremely able diplomat’, who ‘was particularly suited for the task because of his vast experience, and much better than usual skills in that sort of sensitive game’. Leatherman, Engaging East and West, 375. [68] The National Archives, Kew/London [hereafter: TNA], Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO] 41/753, Attitude of Finland towards European Security: Report by André Potvin to J.P. Waterfield (FCO) on conversations between Finnish Roving Ambassador Enckell and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilichev in Moscow on 14–15 April, London, 28 April 1970; Telegram Warsaw to FCO, European Security, Ambassador Enckell's visit to London, Warsaw, 5 May 1970; Telegram Scott (Vienna) to FCO, Finnish Initiative on European Security, Enckell's visit, Vienna, 6 May 1970; Record of a conversation at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office between Ambassador Enckell and Mr. Luard at 3.45 p.m. on Thursday 14 May 1970; Record of conversation at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Friday, 15 May 1970, at 11.15 a.m. In his talks with the representatives of the British Foreign Office in London on May 15, Enckell openly stated ‘Finland's interest to show [with its security conference initiative] that Finnish neutrality was useful not only to Finland, but also to the international community. Finland's role in European security might make Finnish neutrality more visible’. [69] Memorandum der Konferenz der Aussenminister der Mitgliedstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Budapest zu Fragen, die mit der Einberufung einer gesamteuropäischen Konferenz zusammenhängen, vom 22. Juni 1970, in Jacobsen et al., Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 225–7. [70] UMA, 7 B, Kansio 9, P.M. Neuvottelu tasavallan presidentin linnassa, Helsinki, Risto Hyvärinen, 28.8.1970 [Notes on the discussions at the Palace of the President of the Republic, August 27, 1970 (participants: President of the Republic, Prime Minister Karjalainen, Foreign Minister Leskinen, Minister Mattila, Secretary of State Tötterman, Ambassador Enckell, Ambassador Jakobson, Heads of Department Uusivirta and Hyvärinen)]. [71] Kommuniqué des finnischen Aussenministeriums vom 29. Juli 1970, in Jacobsen et al., Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 236. [72] TNA, FCO 41/753, Attitude of Finland towards European Security: Report by André Potvin to J.P. Waterfield (FCO) on conversations between Finnish Roving Ambassador Enckell and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilichev in Moscow on 14–15 April, London, 28 April 1970. [73] Memorandum der österreichischen Bundesregierung vom 24. Juli 1970 an die Regierungen aller europäischen Staaten, der Vereinigten Staaten und Kanadas zur Frage einer Konferenz über die europäische Sicherheit, in Jacobsen et al., Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 234–6. [74] Rentola, ‘Der Vorschlag einer europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz’, 199, n. 93. [75] By that time NATO states had signalled to Enckell that ‘multilateral exploratory talks’ might eventually be organized on the security conference issue. TNA, FCO 41/753, Telegram FCO to Helsinki, European Security: Visit of Ambassador Enckell, London, 10 November 1970. [76] UMA, 7 B, Kansio 9, Letter Enckell to Hyvärinen, Paris, 26 October 1970. [77] TNA, FCO 41/753, Aide-Mémoire of the Finnish government to the governments of all European states as well as the United States and Canada, 24 November 1970. German version of this document reprinted in: Jacobsen et al., Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 244f. [78] TNA, FCO 41/753, Letter Sir Thomas Brimelow to J.E. Cable, London, 25 November 1970. [79] TNA, FCO 41/753, Telegram Ledwidge to FCO, European security, Helsinki, 3 December 1970. [80] Seppo Hentilä and Ilkka Pastinen both in talks with the author used this quote to illustrate Finland's attitude towards the conference project before 1972. Meeting with Seppo Hentilä, Helsinki, 15 May 2006; Interview with Risto Hyvärinen and Ilkka Pastinen, Helsinki, 11 May 2006. [81] According to the travel itinerary of Ambassador Enckell in Jacobsen et al., Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 371. [82] ‘Europa im Umbruch’, Rede Präsident Kekkonens in Hörfunk und Fernsehen am 11.9.1971, in CitationVilkuna, Finnlands Weg zur Neutralität, 163–9, quote 167. [83] Interview with Klaus Törnudd, Helsinki, 11 May 2006; Interview with Paavo Keisalo, Helsinki, 12 May 2006. [84] In spring 1971 the Finnish Foreign Ministry in the light of Brandt's Ostpolitik and the likelihood of an end to the Hallstein doctrine had decided to change its German policy and secretly began preparing an initiative that envisaged the official recognition of both German states. However, these plans were leaked prematurely and caused the Finns considerable distress. With regard to the CSCE initiative this leak seriously threatened to jeopardize the Finnish strategy since it came at an awkward point of the German–German negotiations. Hentilä, Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten, 130–40. [85] The re-launch of the initiative was made public in an official Foreign Ministry statement on May 25: Kommuniqué des finnischen Aussenministeriums über die Vorbereitung der KSZE vom 25. Mai 1972, in Jacobsen et al., Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 405. [86] Schlusskommuniqué der Ministerratstagung des Nordatlantikrats in Bonn vom 31. März 1972, in Jacobsen et al., Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 411–14. [87] The Finns had already indicated in May that they would be technically ready within four weeks to host the talks. The delay of the opening of the multilateral phase of preparations was tied up with the superpower issue of who was to participate in the parallel MBFR talks, and what the timing of the initiation of both the CSCE and MBFR should be. Eventually the matter was settled in a deal between Kissinger and Brezhnev in Moscow on 10–14 September, which opened the way for the formal Finnish invitation of 9 November 1972. See CitationYamamoto, Uncontrollable Multilateral European Détente, 5–10; van Oudenaren, Détente in Europe, 320f. [88] CitationHakovirta, East–West Conflict and European Neutrality, 230. [89] For an in-depth analysis of the Swiss position towards the idea of a European security conference in 1969 see Fischer, Die Grenzen der Neutralität, 81–90. [90] Fischer, ‘Die Sowjetunion, Österreich und die finnische KSZE-Initiative’, 326–30. Additional informationNotes on contributorsThomas Fischer Thomas Fischer, born 1971 in Switzerland, studied History, Public and International Law in Zurich and Bruxelles. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Sciences from the University of Zurich. Since 2004 he has been an affiliated researcher with the Austrian Institute for International Affairs in Vienna, and from 2005 a lecturer in International History at the University of Vienna. He is currently working on a manuscript on ‘The Neutral and Non-aligned States in the CSCE, 1969–1975’.