Chinese Suspicion and US Intentions
2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 53; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/00396338.2011.586211
ISSN1468-2699
Autores Tópico(s)International Relations and Foreign Policy
ResumoAbstract No matter what assurances Washington provides, many in China are concerned that the United States is becoming increasingly uneasy about China's emergence and will try to prevent it. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Phillip Saunders, Andrew Erickson and Jesse Karotkin for their comments on earlier versions of this article. Notes The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Press Conference with President Obama and President Hu of the People's Republic of China’, 19 January 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-president-obamaand-president-hu-peoples-republicchina; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by President Obama and President Hu of the People's Republic of China in an Exchange of Toasts at State Dinner’, 19 January 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/remarks-president-obama-andpresident-hu-peoples-republic-chinaexchange. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Press Conference with President Obama and President Hu of the People's Republic of China’. See for example US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 30, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. On the attitudes of China's America specialists and Chinese views of US strategic intentions during the 1990s, see Phillip C. Saunders, ‘China's America Watchers: Changing Attitudes towards the United States', China Quarterly, no. 161, March 2000, pp. 41–65. Recent concerns also derive at least in part from Beijing's concerns about the history of competition and confrontation between rising and declining powers. Additional sources of mistrust include China's strong sense of historical victimisation at the hands of the West and Japan and the view that in the 1950s and 1960s the United States sought to contain China by developing alliances and fortifying bases along the First and Second Island Chains. Shen Dingli, ‘A Chinese Assessment of China's External Security Environment’, China Brief, vol. 11, no. 5, 25 March 2011. Yang Yi, ‘Improving Military Ties’, China Daily, 7 January 2011. Wu Xinbo, ‘Understanding the Geopolitical Implications of the Global Financial Crisis’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 4, October 2010, pp. 155–63. Ibid., p. 155. ‘Wei jin yi bu tuijin jiji hezuo quanmian de zhong mei guanxi zhiming fangxiang queding jidiao (quanwei luntan)’ [Chart the Direction and Set the Tone for Further Pushing Forward A Positive, Cooperative and Comprehensive China-US Relationship (Authoritative Forum)], Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 18 January 2011, p. 23. For the official English translation of Dai's essay, see Dai Bingguo, ‘Stick to the Path of Peaceful Development’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 December 2010, http://www.news.xinhuanet/com/english2010/indepth/2010-12/13/c_13646586.htm; for the Chinese version, see ‘Zhongguo guowu weiyuan Dai Bingguo: jianchi zou heping fazhan daolu’, 6 December 2010, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2010-12/06/content_1760381.htm. Yuan Zheng, ‘Zhong Mei zengjin zhanlue huxin zai lu shang’ [On the Road to Promotion of Sino-US Strategic Mutual Trust], Liaowang xinwen zhoukan [Outlook Weekly], no. 5, 31 January–6 February 2011, pp. 60–61. Ibid. Ibid. Huang Haixia, ‘Cong Aobama fang Hua dao Hu Jintao fang Mei’ [From Obama's China Visit to Hu Jintao's US Visit], Liaowang xinwen zhoukan [Outlook Weekly], no. 3, 17–23 January 2011, pp. 19–21. Yuan, ‘Zhong Mei zengjin zhanlue huxin zai lu shang’. ‘Wo shaojiang jibian Mei gaoguan tuan, zhi yan Meiguo shi Zhongguo zui da weixie’ [Chinese Rear Admiral Debates with American Officials, States Bluntly that America is Greatest Threat to China], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], 23 April 2010, http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2010-04/790183.html. Ibid. Zhang Jie and Zhong Feiteng, ‘Debate: 2010 and Beyond’, China Daily, 27 December 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-12/27/content_11757575.htm. ‘How Should China Handle America's “Return to Asia”?’, People's Daily, 6 December 2010, http://www.english.peopledaily.com/cn/90001/90780/91343/7222156.html. Li Wei, ‘East Asia Calls for Peace’, China Daily, 20 December 2010, http://www.chinadaily/com/cn/opinion/2010-12/20/content_11724761.htm. Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2010, March 2011, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper.node_7114675.htm. Yuan, ‘Zhong Mei zengjin zhanlue huxin zai lu shang’. Han Xudong, ‘U.S. Forcing China to Boost its Military’, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-01/13/content_21731534.htm. According to Han, it ‘would also provide beneficial spin-offs to civilian technology’. Huang Ping, quoted in ‘How Should China Handle America's “Return to Asia”?’. On the divergent views of the United States and China with regard to such operations in the exclusive economic zone, see Peter Dutton (ed.), Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.–China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons, China Maritime Study no. 7 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2010). Jim Garamone, ‘Chinese Vessels Shadow, Harass Unarmed U.S. Survey Ship’, 9 March 2009, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53401. Li Xiaokun, ‘Protest Lodged Against U.S. Incursion’, China Daily, 11 March 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/11/content_7565717.htm. US Department of State, ‘Remarks at Press Availability’, 23 July 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm. Specifically, Clinton stated that ‘the United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion. We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant. While the United States does not take sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the South China Sea, we believe claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN convention on the law of the sea. Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.’ Li Wei, ‘East Asia Calls for Peace’. Keith Bradsher, ‘Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan’, New York Times, 22 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html. Martin Fackler and Ian Johnson, ‘Japan Retreats with Release of Chinese Boat Captain’, New York Times, 24 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/world/asia/25chinajapan.html. US Department of State, ‘Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara’, 27 October 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/150110.htm. Li Wei, ‘East Asia Calls for Peace’. Ibid. Li is quoted in Xi Zhigang, ‘Haijun zhuanjia cheng Zhongguo ke e'zhi hangmu’ [Naval Expert States China can Hold Back Aircraft Carriers], Fenghuang zhoukan [Phoenix Weekly] no. 389, 5 February 2011), pp. 66–7. Luo Yuan, ‘Why China Opposes US–South Korean Military Exercises in the Yellow Sea’, People's Daily, 16 July 2010, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7069743.html. Liu Jianhua and Yu Shuihuan, ‘‘Duobian shiya: Meiguo dui Hua waijiao celue xin dongxiang’ [Multilateral Pressure: A New Trend in America's Diplomatic Tactics Toward China], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], 20 October 2010, pp. 1–7. Michael Wines and Edward Wong, ‘China's Push to Modernize Military Bearing Fruit’, New York Times, 5 January 2011. ‘Some Chinese scholars worry that the U.S. will complete its encirclement of China this way’, said Xu Qinhua, a Russia and Central Asia expert at Renmin University. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, ‘The Japanese Archipelago through Chinese Eyes’, China Brief, vol. 10, no. 16, 5 August 2010. The First Island Chain extends from Japan to the Philippines, including the Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan. The Second Island Chain stretches from Japan to Guam and continues further south. Dai Xu, C-xing baowei: neiyou waihuan xia de Zhongguo tuwei [C-Shaped Encirclement: China's Breakthrough Under Internal and External Problems] (Shanghai: Wenhui Publishing, 2009). ‘Dai Xu: Zhongguo ying gei Meiguo weidu hangwei hua hongxian’ [Dai Xu: China Should Draw a Red Line Against American Containment], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], 2 August 2010, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/roll/2010-08/977633.html. ‘A Long Way Ahead to Build Sino-US Military Mutual Trust’, Ta Kung Pao, 18 January 2011. Wu Di, ‘Meiguo xi taipingyang zhanlue zhi wo jian: fang junshi zhuanjia, haijun shaojiang Yang Yi’ [The US Pacific Strategy in My View: An Interview with Military Expert and Navy Rear Admiral Yang Yi], Shijie Zhishi [World Knowledge], 16 August 2010, pp. 22–3. For example, see Xiao Feng, ‘Bie ba Zhong Mei guanxi de “fuza” went “jiandanhua”’ [Don't ‘Simplify’ the ‘Complicated’ Issues of U.S.–China Relations], Dangdai Shijie [Contemporary World], 5 October 2010, pp. 37–9. Some Chinese analysts do recognise that some of China's recent actions have had consequences. For an assessment that touches on the ways in which some of China's own foreignpolicy behaviour has contributed to what many Chinese security specialists see as a downturn in China's external security environment, see Shen, ‘A Chinese Assessment of China's External Security Environment.’ Additional informationNotes on contributorsMichael S. Chase Michael S. Chase is an Associate Research Professor and Director of the Mahan Scholars Program at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He holds a PhD in International Affairs and an MA in China Studies from the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
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