Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Reading Booth in Beirut: Is Hizbollah an Emancipatory Actor?

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 36; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1057610x.2013.755914

1521-0731

James Worrall,

Political Conflict and Governance

Abstract The concept of Emancipation has become increasingly important in security studies in recent years but how well does the idea travel outside of the Western context in which it was conceived and into the Middle East? This article examines Hizbollah's four main identities: religious, resistance, socioeconomic, and as allies/proxies of Iran and asks to what extent this key regional non-state actor sees itself as an emancipatory agent in its own terms and how this differs from the Emancipatory ideal of Critical Security Studies (CSS). Does Hizbollah's current makeup offer enough scope to pursue Emancipation in line with the CSS project? Since the precept of Jihad offers Muslims a theological justification to engage in a holy struggle for a moral, spiritual, or political goal, seemingly Hizbollah is uniquely positioned to offer the prospect of Emancipation for the traditionally downtrodden Shi’a citizens of Lebanon, but does their Islamic faith and their aim of adherence to the Islamic way of life which they interpret from the Qur’an and Sunnah proscribe their credentials as truly Emancipatory actors? The article uses this analysis to examine the extent to which the commitment to universal Emancipation, found in CSS, is reconcilable with its Western-orientated foundation when applied in a Middle Eastern context. Acknowledgments The author thanks Dr. Naomi Head, Prof. Clive Jones, and Prof. Michael Rainsborough for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article and Samuel Thomson for help with early research into CSS. Notes 1. See: Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011) for the argument for the latter option. 2. Except for those that remain in the original in quotations, Emancipatory is capitalized throughout this article where it refers to CSS ideas of Emancipation purely in order to differentiate it from broader understandings of emancipation. 3. Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 112. 4. CSS is capitalized here purely to make the distinction between the broad church of critical security studies, which also includes, for example, the Copenhagen and Paris Schools, with the Welsh School which, while a subfield of css, is also frequently labelled Critical Security Studies in the literature. 5. Ken Booth, “Conclusion,” in Ken Booth, ed., Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p. 274. 6. See Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), especially pp. 205–208. 7. Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies 17(4) (1991), pp. 313–326. 8. Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in Matthew J. O’Connell et al.,Trans., Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Continuum Press, 1972). 9. Arun Patnaik, “Gramsci's Concept of Common Sense: Towards A Concept of Subaltern Consciousness in Hegemony Processes,” Economic & Political Weekly 23(5) (1988); Richard Wyn-Jones, “‘Message in a Bottle’? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies,” Contemporary Security Policy 16(3) (1995), pp. 299–319. 10. Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millennium 10(2) (1981), pp. 126–155. 11. Karl Marx, Thesis on Feuerbach (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976). 12. Nick Vaughan-Williams and Columba Peoples, Critical Security Studies: An Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 28. 13. Ibid., p. 24. 14. Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 250. 15. Richard Wyn-Jones, Ed., Critical Theory and World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p. 88. 16. K. M. Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 167. 17. Richard Wyn-Jones, “On Emancipation: Necessity, Capacity, and Concrete Utopias,” in Ken Booth, ed., Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p. 230. 18. Ibid., p. 230. 19. Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies 17(4) (1991), p. 319. 20. See Rodger Shanahan, The Shi’a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties And Clerics (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011) and Max Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi`ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 21. A. N. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. 12. 22. Nazih N Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 190– 191. 23. V. Shields, “Political Reform in Lebanon: Has the Cedar Revolution Failed?” The Journal of Legislative Studies 14(4) (2008), p. 484. 24. Hassan Krayem, “The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement, AUB.” Available at http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html. See also the text of the Taif Accords at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm 25. See Mehran Kamrava and Frank O Mora, “Civil Society and Democratisation in Comparative Perspective: Latin America and the Middle East,” Third World Quarterly 19(5) (1998), pp. 893–915 and Rodney Wilson, Economic Development in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1995). 26. A. R. Norton, Hezbollah (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 18. 27. International Crisis Group, “Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis,” Middle East Report No. 69 (2007), p. 4. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/069-hizbollah-and-the-lebanese-crisis.aspx 28. Norton, Hezbollah, p. 20. 29. Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 30. Norton, Hezbollah, p. 21. 31. See, for example, Hizbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's interview with Al Watan al-Aribi, 11 September 1992, in Nicholas Roe, ed., Voice of Hezbollah (London: Verso, 2007), p. 93. 32. See, for example, Martin Kramer, “Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran: The Challenges for Israel and the West,” The Sydney Papers 18(3/4) (2006), pp. 18–27 and Jeremy Sharp, Christopher Blanchard, Kenneth Katzman, Carol Migdalovitz, Alfred Prados, Paul Gallis, Dianne Rennack et al., “Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict,” CRS Report for Congress (2006). Available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA488310&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf 33. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 18. 34. Norton, Hezbollah, p. 33. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., p. 83. 37. Nasrallah's Victory Speech, 26 May 2000, in Nicholas Roe, ed., Voice of Hezbollah (London: Verso, 2007), p. 233. 38. Nasrallah's Speech on Al Quds Day, 28 October 2005, in Nicholas Roe, ed., Voice of Hezbollah (London: Verso, 2007), p. 361. 39. Taif Accords, Article Two, Section C, Part 4. Available at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm 40. Nicholas Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon (London: IB Tauris, 2009), p. xvii. 41. Ibid., pp. vi–xvii. 42. Hizbollah of course would argue that the Israeli threat is ever present and they continue to fight an undercover war with the Zionists over the border. 43. Nasrallah's Speech on Al Quds Day, p. 369. 44. T. W. Karsaik and G. Schbley, “Hizbullah's Armoury Up for Debate,” RAND Corporation, p. 173. Available at http://www.rand.org/commentary/2008/06/12/UPI.html 45. Blandford, Killing Mr Lebanon, p. viii. See also Edward P. Djerejian, “From Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution,” Foreign Affairs December 2006. Available at http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/Djerejian_FA_web.pdf 46. For a detailed examination of the 2006 war see Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani, eds., Israel and Hizbollah: An Interstate and Asymmetric War in Perspective (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 47. See, for example, Norton, Hezbollah, p. 77 (hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the execution of Robert Stetham), p. 71 (suicide bombings), and pp. 78–79 (bombings of Jewish targets in Argentina). 48. Patrick Galey, “Lebanon Indictment: Rafiq Hariri Tracked for Three Months with Elaborate Phone Network,” The Daily Telegraph 17 August 2011. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/lebanon/8706873/Lebanon-indictment-Rafiq-Hariri-tracked-for-three-months-with-elaborate-phone-network.html and BBC News ‘Rafik Hariri Murder: Suspects To Be Tried In Absentia.” Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16849508 49. Haroon Siddique, “Thailand Arrests Hezbollah Suspect After Terror Tipoff,” The Guardian 13 January 2012. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/13/thailand-arrests-hezbollah-suspect-terror-tipoff 50. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion (London: Pluto, 2002), pp. 34–35. 51. N. Qassem, Hizbollah: The Story From Within (London: Saqi, 2005), p. 31. 52. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion, p. 36. 53. See Sanaz Alasti, “Comparative Study of Stoning Punishment in the Religions of Islam and Judaism,” Justice Policy Journal 4(1) (2007) and Amnesty International Campaign, “End Execution By Stoning in Iran.” Available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/appeals-for-action/end-execution-stoning-iran 54. See, for example, Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006). 55. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion, pp. 35–37. 56. Joseph Alagha, The Shifts In Hizbullah's Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p. 200. 57. Norton, Hezbollah, p. 103. 58. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 12. 59. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: IB Tauris, 2004), p. 83. 60. Cited in Ken Silverstein, “Augustus Norton On Hezbollah's Social Services,” Harper's 14 March 2007. Available at http://harpers.org/archive/2007/03/sb-augustus-no-1173896326 61. Shields, p. 482; Norton, Hezbollah, pp. 99–100. 62. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 51. 63. Harik, Hezbollah, p. 86. 64. Shawn Teresa Flanigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah's Social Jihad: Nonprofits As Resistance Organizations,” Middle East Policy XVI(2) (2009), p. 123. 65. Ibid., p. 132. 66. Ibid. 67. Hannin Ghaddar, “The Story of Hezbollah's Halal Hookups,” Foreign Policy, 25 November 2009. Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/25/the_militarization_of_sex?page =0,0; See also the Sunni reaction at http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?52722-The-Militarization-of-Sex-Hezbollah-s-halal-hookups 68. Ayla Hammond Schbley, “Torn between God, Family, and Money: The Changing Profile of Lebanon's Religious Terrorists,” Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 23(3) (2000), pp. 175–196. See also Chris Dishman, “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime And Terror Converge,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28(3) (2005), pp. 237–252; Peter Lowe, “Counterfeiting: Links to Organised Crime and Terrorist Funding,” Journal of Financial Crime 13(2) (2006), pp. 255–257; Louise Shelley and Sharon Melzer, “The Nexus of Organized Crime and Terrorism: Two Case Studies in Cigarette Smuggling,” International Journal of Comparative And Applied Criminal Justice 32(1) (2008), pp. 43–63. 69. See, for example, Nasr. 70. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 16. 71. Alagha, The Shifts In Hizbullah's Ideology, p. 98. 72. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 36. 73. Alagha, The Shifts In Hizbullah's Ideology, p. 13. For extensive discussion of Hizbollah's religious side see chapter two. 74. Norton, Hezbollah, pp. 30–31. 75. Magnus Ranstorp, “Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions,” Terrorism and Political Violence 6(3) (1994), pp. 303–339. 76. James Whittington, “Iran Sending Funds to Hezbollah,” BBC News, 2 November 2006. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6112036.stm 77. See “Hezbollah Hails Ties with Iran, Syria,” Press TV, 10 April 2011. Available at http://www.presstv.ir/detail/173970.html. See also: “Iran-Lebanese Hezbollah Relationship Tracker.” Available at http://www.irantracker.org/military-activities/iran-lebanese-hezbollah-relationship-tracker-2010 78. See, for example, “Iran gave Hezbollah UAVs, Attack Aircraft,” Haaretz, November 2010. Available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/report-iran-gave-hezbollah-uavs-attack-aircraft-1.323259 79. Iran is reported to have donated $1 billion toward the postwar reconstruction efforts when there are reports that up to 90 percent of the Iranian population is living below the pove- rty line. See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/lebanon/8064280/Mahmoud-Ahmadinejad-in-Lebanon-a-landlord-visiting-his-domain.html and http://www.iranfocus.com/en/?option=com_content&task=view&id=1304 and for a different view: DjavadSalehi-Isfahani, “Poverty, Inequality, and Populist Politics in Iran,” Journal of Economic Inequality 7(1) (2009), pp. 5–28. 80. See, for example, “Amnesty, Human Rights Violations Persist in Iran 30 Years after Islamic Revolution.” Available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/feature-stories/human-rights-violations-persist-iran-30-years-islamic-revolution-20090209 and UN News, “UN Human Rights Council to Appoint a Rapporteur to look into Iranian Record,” 24 March 2011. Available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37887&Cr=iran&Cr1 81. See Alam Saleh, Identity And Societal Security In Iran, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Leeds, 2011. 82. Alagha, The Shifts In Hizbullah's Ideology, p. 113. 83. Ibid., p. 113. 84. See: Alagha, The Shifts In Hizbullah's Ideology; Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion; Norton, Hezbollah; and Harik, Hezbollah. 85. Norton, Hezbollah, pp. 83–86. 86. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion, pp. 168–187. 87. Alagha, The Shifts In Hizbullah's Ideology, p. 128. 88. Booth, “Conclusion” p. 181. 89. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion, p. 36. 90. Judith Palmer Harik, “Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizballah,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(1) (1996), p. 56. 91. Alagha, The Shifts In Hizbullah's Ideology, pp. 207–220. 92. Simon Haddad, “The Origins of Popular Support For Lebanon's Hezbollah,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29(1) (2006), p. 23. 93. Alagha, The Shifts In Hizbullah's Ideology, p. 209. 94. Ibid., p. 208. 95. Saad-Gorayeb, Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion, pp. 22–26. Mirrored perhaps in the Habermasian concern for Communication, Critical Theory and Politics, Wyn-Jones, p. 9. 96. See, for example, Nikki Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots And Results of Revolution (London & New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 222–262 and Said Amir Arjomand, “Iran's Islamic Revolution In Comparative Perspective,” World Politics 38(3) (1986), pp. 383–414. 97. On the economic actions taken to protect the poor since the Revolution see Keddie, Modern Iran, p. 256 although there has always been something of a split between the Islamic left and right in Iran on economic issues. 98. See Ray Hinnebusch, “The Middle East in World Hierarchy: Imperialism and Resistance,” Journal of International Relations and Development 14 (2011), pp. 213–246. 99. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion, p. 89. Booth, “Conclusion,” p. 181. For a discussion of the particular example of apostasy, see Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 29(2) (2007), pp. 301–302. Unless perhaps it can accommodate different conceptions of Human Rights.