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Why Greek Terrorists Give Up: Analyzing Individual Exit from the Revolutionary Organization 17 November

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 34; Issue: 7 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1057610x.2011.578551

1521-0731

George Kassimeris,

Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

Abstract This article seeks to analyze the life histories of two former members, Patroklos Tselentis and Sotiris Kondylis, of the defunct terrorist group, the Greek Revolutionary Organization 17 November (1975–2002) in order to look for causes of disengagement, dissociation, and repentance. Analyzing the life histories of Patroklos Tselentis and Sotiris Kondylis offers valuable insights into the development of complex processes of involvement in and disengagement from 17 November terrorism. The detail stemming from their testimonies provides a more complete picture of the group's internal dynamics and challenges a range of simplistic stereotypes, not only about the individuals involved in terrorism but also about the ways in which they make decisions and reflect on their experiences of being part of a terrorist organization. Acknowledgments The author is grateful to the Nuffield Foundation, the Leverhulme Trust, and the British Academy for funding different stages of the research on which this article is based. Notes 1. See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Mark Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 2. See Alison Jamieson, “Entry, Discipline and Exit in the Italian Red Brigades,” Terrorism and Political Violence 2(1) (1990), pp. 1–20. 3. See John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2009). 4. See Joshua Geltzer, US Counter-Terrorism Strategy and al-Qaeda (London: Routledge, 2010); see also Daniel Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (London: Wiley, 2008). 5. The charges against Tselentis included participating in a criminal organization, construction, supply and possession of explosives, being an accomplice in grand weapons possession, repeated counts of intentional manslaughter, repeated counts of attempted manslaughter, robbery that resulted in death, and causing an explosion. These included the robbery of a National Bank branch in Petralona and the murder of police officer Christos Matis on 24 December 1984; the murder of Apogevmatini newspaper publisher Nikos Momferatos and his driver Panagiotis Rousetis on 21 February 1985 in Kolonaki; the murder of industrialist Dimitris Angelopoulos on 8 April 1986 in Kolonaki; the attempted murder of medical doctor Zaharias Kapsalakis on 4 February 1987; setting off a bomb in an air force bus carrying United States army officers in Rendi on 24 April 1987 in which 13 people were injured; the attempted murder of U.S. national George Carros on 21 January 1988 in Filothei, the murder through a booby-trapped car of U.S. military attaché William Nordeen on 28 June 1988 in Kefalari; and the raid on a police station in Vyrona in which weapons were stolen. 6. See David Moss, “The Gift of Repentance: A Maussian Perspective on Twenty Years of Pentimento in Italy,” European Journal of Sociology 42(2) (2001), pp. 298–301. 7. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 195. 8. Tselentis court testimony, August 2003. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. See Alison Jamieson, “Identity and Morality in the Italian Red Brigades,” Terrorism and Political Violence 2(4) (1990), p. 513. 14. Memorias del Calabozo was published in Spanish in December 2000. The Greek edition, translated by Koufodinas, came out in 2009 by Koukida editions. 15. According to Marighella, this “form of revolutionary armed struggle inevitably resembles certain forms of banditry, but the fundamental difference between the two is that revolutionaries do not expropriate from workers and ordinary people, do not violate their interests or harm them or their property. Revolutionaries do not attack the people, but combat dictatorship, the dominant classes and imperialism, and by doing so win the sympathy of the population. By making expropriations seem the work of bandits and by avoiding identifying themselves and their origins, the Brazilian revolutionaries managed to gain time by keeping the authorities in a state of uncertainty, preventing them from following specific trails.” Reproduced in Vicenzo Tessandori, BR Imputazione:banda armata; Cronaca e documenti delle Brigate Rosse (Milan: Garzanti, 1977), p. 24. It's worth mentioning that unlike the Red Brigades, which refrained from publicly claiming responsibility for bank “expropriation” until 1975, 17N's long list of self-financing operations came known only after the group's arrests. 16. Tselentis court testimony, August 2003. 17. Ibid. 18. The occupation of the Athens Polytechnic in November 1973 provoked a major crisis to the apparatus as it became the epicenter of student dissent and served as an effective focus of opposition to the regime. Lasting for a mere three days (14–17 November) the revolt not only challenged the military regime but catalyzed popular mobilization in many sectors of Greek society. What had a begun as a student protest against an authoritarian educational system escalated rapidly into a general political uprising against the military dictatorship. 19. Tselentis court testimony, August 2003. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. 17N communiqué taking credit for the attack on Momferatos and his driver, undated. 23. Tselentis court testimony, August 2003 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. See also Eamon Collins, Killing Rage (London: Granta, 1997), pp. 23–24. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Tselentis Korydallos court testimony, 5 July 2003. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Taken from an interview that was carried out by the anarcho-punk webzine Future Noir in 2002. Available at http://futurenoir.propagande.org 39. Tselentis court testimony, 5 July 2003. 40. Ibid. 41. Jamieson, “Identity and Morality in the Italian Red Brigades,” p. 197. 42. Tselentis court testimony 5 July 2003 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. See Robert Meade, Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 241. 46. Koufodinas court testimony, July 2003. 47. T. Papagiannis Interview, September 2006. 48. Kondylis court testimony, 28 August 2003. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid., 29 August 2003. 56. Ibid., 28 August 2003. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Interview, Athens, October 2010. 62. Alison Jamieson, The Heart Attacked (London: Marion Boyars, 1990), p. 234. 63. The words of a Front Linea pentito cited in Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 147. 64. Primo Moroni, ed., Le Parole la Lotta Armata (Milano: Shake Edizioni, 1999), p. 31. 65. Donatella della Porta, “Leaving Underground Organizations: A Sociological Analysis of the Italian Case,” in Tore Bjiorgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 72. 66. Kondylis court testimony, 29 August 2003. 67. Ibid.