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What is Behind the Headscarf Ruling of the Turkish Constitutional Court?

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 11; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14683849.2010.483844

1743-9663

Abdurrahman Saygili,

Public Administration and Governance

Abstract Modern constitutions foresee a constitutional judiciary body to serve as a limiting factor for the legislative body. The concrete users of this judiciary power have been the constitutional courts. The Turkish Constitutional Court takes Carl Schmitt as a reference, whether intentionally or not, while making the decisions in question. The Court did not use its factual review power, the power to review the content of constitutional amendments in general. In other words, during the 1982 Constitution's term the Constitutional Court remained within normative limits. However, when the issue at stake is related to the headscarf, the Court does not hesitate to use its factual review power in the court rulings. Perhaps paradoxically, the constitutional judiciary system is not seen only as a legal mechanism; apart from that, it has also been regarded as a possible intervener into politics through the courts. However, this intervention option is not designed in a way that will open the way for substitute‐opposition mission. The constitutional courts are increasingly assuming the co‐legislator position. Notes 1. The other scale of the balance holds freedom. 2. Classical analysis explains that after constitutional courts are set up, they interpret constitutions in their own way and thus produce an interpretation that can serve as a substitute to the interpretations to legislative and executive organs. In the French doctrine, Edouard Lambert argues that judges do not limit themselves to technical review and do an appropriateness review, which indicates their intention to direct the elected parliament's legislative policies in line with their own views. On this issue, see Bakır Çağlar, “Parlamentolar ve Anayasa Mahkemeleri, Teori ve Pratikte Anayasa Yargısının Sınırları (Sentetik Bir Deneme İçin Notlar)” [Parliaments and Constitutional Courts, Limits of Constitutional Jurisdiction in Theory and Practice (Notes for A Synthetic Essay)] Anayasa Yargısı, No. 3 (1986), p. 149. 3. The beginning of the review of laws for their constitutionality is not with a written rule but with a case. The case where the foundations for judiciary review of laws for their constitutionality were laid was the Dr. Bonham case in England in the seventeenth century. Judge Edward Coke stated that a law passed by parliament can be in violation of the common law, without citing a written clause. See Erdal Onar, “Türkiye'de Kanunların Anayasaya Uygunluğunun Yargısal Denetimi Alanında Öncüler,” [Pioneers in Field of Judicial Review in Turkey] Anayasa Yargısı İncelemeleri, No. 1 (2006) p. 4. 4. It should be noted that constraining does not mean replacing. Constraining the political pendulum and generating policies are two different things. The constitutional courts often generate policies today. 5. Bakır Çalğar, “Anayasa Yargısı ve Normatif Devreler Analizi,” [Constitutional Jurisdiction and Analysis of Normative Circuit] Anayasa Yargısı, Vol. 6 (1989), p. 148. 6. Bakır Çağlar, Bir Anayasacının Seyir Defteri [The Journal of A Constitution Lawyer] (Istanbul: Anahtar Yay., 2000), p. 108. 7. The original version of this question was formulated by Ozan Ergül. See Ozan Ergül, Yeni Kurumsalcı Yaklaşımla Türk Anayasa Mahkemesi ve Demokrasi [Turkish Constitutional Court and Democracy in New Institutionalist Approach] (Ankara: Adalet Yay., 2007), pp. 70–71. 8. For this comment, please see Dominique Rousseau, “The Constitutional Judge: Master Or Slave of The Constitution?,” Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 14, Nos 3–4 (1992–1993), p. 775. 9. It is useful to indicate at this point that Bakır Çağlar is talking about the hegemony of judges. 10. See Rousseau, “The Constitutional Judge,” p. 775. 11. Ibid. 12. Dieter Grimm, “Judicial Activism,” in Robert Badinter and Stephen Breyer (eds.), Judges In Contemporary Democracy: An International Conservation (New York: New York University Press, 2004), p. 18. 13. Ibid., pp. 24–25. 14. Rousseau, “The Constitutional judge,” p. 796. 15. Kemal Gözler, Kurucu İktidar [The Constituent Power] (Bursa: Ekin Yay., 1998), p. 10. 16. For detailed information about the issue, see Cem Eroğul, Anayasayı Değiştirme Sorunu (Bir Mukayeseli Hukuk Incelemesi) [Problem of Amendment to Constitution (A Comparative Law Study)] (Ankara: Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yay., 1974), pp. 26–32. 17. There is no consensus over the question of whether the constituent power is an extra‐legal power or not. For instance, Burdeau argues that the constituent power has a legal character. However, Carre de Malberg showed states founded following a revolution as examples, arguing that when violence is the founding element, we cannot talk about law. For detailed explanation on the issue, see Gözler, Kurucu İktidar, p. 28 et seq. 18. Constituent power is a sociological power creating legal authority. For this definition, see Osman Can, “Anayasayı Değiştirme İktidarı ve Denetim Sorunu,” [The Power to Amendment of Constitution and Problem of Control] Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2007), p. 106. 19. Aren Lijphart, Çağdaş Demokrasiler [Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration] (Ankara: Yetkin Yay., 1999), p. 166. 20. Abdullah Sezer, 1982 Anayasası Ekseninde Türev Kurucu İktidar Yetkisinin Sınırları Ve Yargısal Denetimi [Limits of Authorization of Amending Constituent Power in Context of the 1982 Turkish Constitution] dissertation (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2006), p. 439. 21. The third clause of Article 6 of the 1982 Constitution openly stipulates, “No person or agency shall exercise any authority which does not emanate from the Constitution.” 22. Can, “Anayasayı Değiştirme İktidarı ve Denetim Sorunu,” p. 111. 23. This phrase is borrowed from Aykut Çelebi. One of the main architects of this phrase is J. Habermas. See Aykut Çelebi, Devlet, Toprak Ve Egemenlik: Carl Schmitt'in Düşüncesinde Siyasal Kavramı Ve Kurucu İktidar Sorunu [State, Land and Sovereignty: Concept of Politics and Constituent Power in Carl Schmitt's Studies] (Ankara: İmaj Yay., 2008), p. 8. 24. Bertil Emrah Oder, Avrupa Birliğinde Anayasa Ve Anayasacılık [Constitution and Constitutionalism in the EU] (Istanbul: Anahtar Yay., 2004), p. 66. 25. See Ibid., pp. 66–67. 26. There is no consensus in the Turkish doctrine on the issue. For some, there is no obstacle before the amendment or annulment of Article 4 regarding positive law. For example, see Erdal Onar, 1982 Anayasasında Anayasa Değiştirme Sorunu [The Problem of Amendment to Constitution in the 1982 Turkish Constitution] (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yay., 1993), p. 20. Other authors argue that these four norms cannot be changed. See Yıldızhan Yayla, “Anayasa Mahkemesine Göre Cumhuriyetin Özü,” [The Core of the Republic from the Point of View of the Constitutional Court] Hıfzı Timur'un Anısına Armağan, (1979), p. 1005. This article agrees with the first view; there is no obstacle before the change of the banning article regarding the positive law. The sole obstacle before the amending constituent power is extra‐legal power. If the amending constituent power can take the risk of political consequences, it can change this article. It can also change the first three articles, which would mean its transformation into constituent power. If that happens in Turkey, there will be “more primary power/powers” that will replace constituent power. 27. Meltem Caniklioğlu, Anayasa Arayışları Ve Türkiye (Anayasal İktisat Arayışları) [In Search of Constitution and Turkey (In Search of Constitutional Economy)] (Istanbul: BDS Yay., 1998), pp. 302–304. 28. İbrahim Ö. Kaboğlu, Anayasa Yargısı: Avrupa Modeli Ve Türkiye [The Constitutional Jurisdiction: Europe Design and Turkey] (Ankara: İmge Yay., 2000), pp. 11–12. 29. Necmi Yüzbaşıoğlu, Türk Anayasa Yargısında Anayasallık Bloku [The Constitutionality Bloc in Turkish Constitutional Jurisdiction] (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yay., 1993), p. 109. 30. Ibid., p. 111. 31. Mehmet Turan, “Anayasaya Aykırı Anayasa Değişiklikleri,” [Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments], Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 33, Nos. 1–4 (1977), p. 63 et seq. 32. See Sezer, 1982 Anayasası Ekseninde Türev Kurucu İktidar Yetkisinin Sınırları Ve Yargısal Denetimi, p. 165. 33. Constitutional Court, E. 1990/32, K. 1990/25, K.t. 1.6.1990; Constitutional Court, E.1991/2, K.1992/1, K.t.10.07.1992. 34. Constitutional Court, E. 1970/41, K. 1971/37, K.t. 13.04.1971. 35. Ergun Özbudun, “Türk Anayasa Mahkemesinin Yargısal Aktivizmi ve Siyasal Elitlerin Tepkisi,” [Reaction of Politic Elites and Judicial Activism of Turkish Constitutional Court] Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2007), p. 259. 36. In his article on the issue, Osman Can indicated that the date for the Constitutional Court's ruling E. 1964/38, K. 1965/59 as November 16, 1965. However, the author could not find a phrase about constitutional amendment in this ruling. Therefore, this turning point is 1970. 37. Constitutional Court, E. 1970/1, K.1970/31, K.t. 16.06.1970, Official Gazette, Publication date/number: 7.6.1971/13858. 38. However, the court did not consider itself bound with this regulation. Following the amendment, it annulled four more constitutional amendments. The references for these rulings are as follows: Constitutional Court, E. 1973/19, K. 1975/87, K.t. 15.04.1975; Constitutional Court. 1976/38, K. 1976/46, K.t. 12.10.1976; Constitutional Court E. 1976/43, K. 1977/4, K.t. 27.01.1977; Constitutional Court, E. 1977/82, K.1977/117, K.t. 27.09.1977. 39. According to Özbudun, this ruling beatifies the spirit of Auguste Comte. See Özbudun, “Türk Anayasa Mahkemesinin Yargısal Aktivizmi ve Siyasal Elitlerin Tepkisi,” p. 265. 40. Constitutional Court, E. 1989/1, K. 1989/12, K.t. 07.03.1989. 41. Constitutional Court, E. 2008/16, K. 2008/116, K.t. 05.06.2008. 42. Özbudun, “Türk Anayasa Mahkemesinin Yargısal Aktivizmi ve Siyasal Elitlerin Tepkisi,” p. 264. 43. Ibid.