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In the Name of the Father? Christian Militantism in Tripura, Northern Uganda, and Ambon

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 30; Issue: 11 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10576100701611288

1521-0731

Jeroen Adam, Bruno De Cordier, Kristof Titeca, Koen Vlassenroot,

Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East

Abstract Although armed groups and political violence referring to Islam have attracted increasing attention since the start of the global war against terror, one particular religion can hardly be described as the main source of inspiration of what is commonly referred to as "terrorist acts of violence." Faith-based violence occurs in different parts of the world and its perpetrators adhere to all major world faiths including Christianity. As such, this article treats three cases of non-state armed actors that explain their actions as being motivated by Christian beliefs and aimed at the creation of a new local society that is guided by religion: the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the Lord's Resistance Army, and the Ambonese Christian militias. It analyzes the way by which they instrumentalized religion against respective backgrounds of conflict rooted in social change, the erosion of traditional identities, imbalances of power, and widening communautarian faultlines. Since you cannot speak in words about the essence of God, best is to speak about nobody at all. —Kitab Ilahi Notes Notes 1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civlizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 211. 2. Quoted in D. Tuastad, "Neo-Orientalism and the New Barbarism Thesis: Aspects of Symbolic Violence in the Middle East Conflict(s)." Third World Quarterly 24(4), p. 594. 3. M. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 4. O. McTernan, "From Violence to Conciliation." CCTS Newsletter, No. 20, available at (http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts20/mcternan.htm). 5. Both groups are physically easy to distinguish on the streets and countryside: the Bengali generally look "typically South Asian," whereas the tribal population generally has Burmese-Mongoloid features. 6. The National Liberation Front of Tripura chapter on the South Asian Terrorism Portal, available at (www.satp.org), A. Sahni, "Tripura: The Politics of Ethnic Terror." South Asia Intelligence Review 1(6) (26 August 2002), and CRG conversations with NGO leader and church cadre in Agartala, 10 and 11 May 2004. 7. The online South Asian Intelligence Review of the Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management keeps detailed accounts of the casualties with breakdown in civilians, rebels, and security forces on its website at (www.satp.org) and puts the number of casualties in Tripura at 2,762 for the 1992–2002 period. 8. S. Bhaumik, "72 Tripura Rebels Surrender." BBC News World Online, 6 May 2004, available at (www.bbc.co.uk/news). 9. Inter Press Service, 13 February 2003. 10. The NLFT's constitution can be found on the website of the South Asian Terrorism Portal at (www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/tripura/documents/papers/nlft_const.htm). In fact, the text stresses an ethnic-emancipatory social agenda much more than a religious one. 11. CRG telephone interview, 31 August 2004. 12. A. Sahni, op. cit. (see note 6). 13. BBC News World, "Separatist Group Bans Hindu Festivities," 2 October 2000, available at (news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/953200.stm); "Hindu Preacher Killed by Tripura Rebels," 28 August 2000, (news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/899422.stm); "Tripura Tribal Leader Killed," 27 December 2000, (news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1089578.stm). 14. P. Kumar, "Tripura: Beyond the Insurgency-Politics Nexus," Faultlines, vol. 14 (Institute for Conflict Management, Delhi, 2003), p. 32. The territory of the administrative entity of Tripura in 1901 and 1921 was substantially larger than that of the state of Tripura today. It also contained the Bengali-inhabited plains of what is now Comilla district in neighboring Bangladesh. But if one takes the 10,491 sq. km–large territory that is present Tripura (called "hill Tripura" on 1909 colonial maps) then the percentage of tribals in 1921 was well over 85 percent. 15. For example, according to a 1990 study on the land transfer pattern in seven scheduled and seven non-scheduled villages in southern and western Tripura by the Law Research Institute in Guwahati, Assam "in the seven non-scheduled villages, out of the total 240 plots transferred, 145 plots were transferred by tribals to non-tribals, 76 by tribals to tribals, and 19 by non-tribals to non-tribals. (…) In settled agricultural areas within one hundred kilometers of the state's capital Agartala, between 20 to 40 percent of the tribal lands had been alienated [transferred in one way or another to non-tribals-aut.] by 1979, when tribal insurgency gathered momentum. In some parts of southern Tripura, as much as 60 percent of tribal lands were alienated, sold in distress conditions as a sequel to an unequal economic competition with the Bengali settlers (quoted in S. Bhaumik, "The Dam and the Tribal," Himal South Asian [May 2004]). 16. In 1994, for instance, 51.14 percent of tribals lived below the poverty line compared ot the state average of 35.97 percent; likewise, 40.6 percent of the tribals had no access to safe drinking water and electricity compared to 28.65 percent among Bengali Hindus. 17. CRG telephone interview, 31 August 2004. The social-geographic effect of land encroachment itself is, of course, best visible in the countryside, where Bengali Hindu settlements are generally concentrated in the plains or close to the roads, and tribal villages are situated on top of the hills or more "inland," away from the main roads. The main places where the two quasi-segregated communities meet, but not necessarily interact, are the markets in Agartala, Udaipur, or other district centers on market days, and the state capital of Agartala, with its communities of tribal IDP and socially mobile tribals who are in town for education and business. 18. Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asian Intelligence Review online at (www.satp.org), Tripura State Police Department and A. Dasgupta: "Tripura's brutal cul de sac," Himal South Asian (December 2001). 19. The total number of tribal rebel groups in Tripura number well over a dozen, most of them parochial and more engaged in infighting that anything else. 20. S. K. Das, "Ethnicity and the Rise of Religious Radicalism: The Security Scenarion in Contemporary Northeastern India," in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, edited by S. P. Limaye, R. Wirsing and M. Malik (Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies (APCSS), 2004). 21. According to sources in the Tripura Baptist Christian Union—Tripura's Baptist umbrella organization—the number of Christians of all denominations in the state numbered 24,872 in 1981 (other sources indicate 16,000) and 46,472 in 1991. In 2003, the Christian population in Tripura was estimated at some 90,000, two-thirds Baptist and the rest Roman Catholic. Bhaumik, in a CRG telephone interview on 31 August 2004, said: "This was not the work of foreign missionaries from outside of the country. In fact, after the expulsion of the missionaries of the New Zealand Baptist Missionary Society in 1960, Baptist proselytizing largely became an indigenous affair tribal missionaries from Mizoram, an almost entirely Christian state. (…) The Baptist Church of Tripura got directly funded by the Southern Baptist Convention from the US. Also, in 1980 the Baptist World Alliance, the global Baptist umbrella organization, changes its funding style to direct funding of local Baptist churches who work in areas with room for expansion." 22. CRG telephone interview, 19 August 2004. 23. M. N. Karna, "Social-Economic Aspects of Ethnic Identity in North-Eastern India," in Liberalisation and India's North East, edited by G. Das and R.K. Purkayastah (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 1988), pp. 228–229. Along the same lines, European Christian missionaries were also among the first to codify tribal languages, as has been the case in the neighboring state of Meghalaya for instance. 24. R. K. Ranjit Singh, "Ethnicity Among the Small Tribal Groups of Manipur. An Anthropological Analysis," in Ethnic Groups, Cultural Continuities and Social Change in North East India, edited by I. Barua, S. Sengupta, and D. D. Das (New Dehli: Mittal Publications, 2002), pp. 80–81. 25. According to the 1991 census, 98.35 percent of the total tribal population of Tripura lived in hilly, rural areas compared to the state's average of 84.72 percent. The authors' own observations and conversations in and around Agartala and Udaipur in March 2004 suggest, however, that after almost 15 years of NLFT insurgency, this does no longer reflects reality, especially among younger tribals. 26. On the bases of the authors' observations, "urban" is a relative notion in Tripura. The only town of any size is the administrative center of Agartala, which was founded as a municipality in 1871. The 1991 census put the town's population at 157,636, whereas the figure for 2004 is estimated at 200,600, or a 21 percent increase. The number of tribals residing in Agartala in the 1991 census was 3,363 or 2.1 percent. 27. CRG conversation in Udaipur, 11 May 2004. 28. These numbers fluctuate over time, and are from the International Institute of Strategic Studies' Armed Conflict Database, quoted in: A. Vinci, "The Strategic Use of Fear by the Lord's Resistance Army." Small Wars and Insurgencies, 16(3)(2005), p. 361. See also International Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 23, Shock Therapy for Northern Uganda's Peace Process, Kampala/Brussels, 2005. 29. For an in-depth analysis of these factors, see R. Doom and K. Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message." African Affairs 98(390) (1999), pp. 5–36. 30. A.A. Mazrui, Soldiers and Kingsmen in Uganda. The Making of a Military Ethnocracy (London: Sage Publications, 1975). 31. CRG interview data, December 2005–October 2006. 32. CRG interview with former LRA commanders, Gulu, October 2006. 33. CRG interviews with former LRA rebels, Gulu, Uganda, 11 December 2005. Due to the precarious situation for the ex-rebels, and the nature of the information, total anonimity was guaranteed for all interviewees. 34. CRG interview data, December 2005–October 2006. 35. CRG interviews with former LRA rebels, Gulu, Uganda, 18 December 2005. 36. CRG interview with former LRA commanders, Gulu, October 2006. 37. Some priests report about LRA soldiers who came to pray at their churches before the intensification of the conflict. One priest comments on this: "(…) they pray sincerely, ardently, that God should save them from harm and let them succeed in their war. They seemed to draw their strength from their strong belief in God and in the military genius of the Acholi." Quoted in: Human Rights and Peace Centre, The Hidden War, the Forgotten People (Kampala, 2003), p. 83, available at (www.up.ligi.ubc.ca/reports.html). 38. After several high-placed commanders defected under the amnesty law, and with no more official safe haven in Southern Sudan, the LRA is breaking up into smaller units. Nevertheless, the LRA has never been active on a bigger territory. A group led by Kony's right-hand man Vincent Otti has entered the Democratic Republic of Congo in September 2005. Other groups are in Southern Sudan and yet others are active in Uganda, not only in the northern districts but as far as Kaboramaido-district, which is in the eastern part of the country. 39. For example, most units seem to pray, but far less frequently (e.g. once a week instead of three times a day). 40. Interview at People's Voice for Peace, Gulu, 14 December 2005. See also: F. Van Acker, Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: The New Order No-One Ordered (Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, IDPM Discussion Paper No. 6, 2003), p. 33. Apart from these basic regulations, the LRA also has many temporary ad hoc regulations, such as sudden orders to pray and refrain from eating and drinking. 41. Some 20,000 children are estimated to have been abducted by the LRA. See also Human Rights Watch's, Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda (March 2003). 42. Kony allegedly mistook a non-partisan mass-prayer for peace as a mass-prayer to stop the LRA. CRG interview at the Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative, Gulu, 14 December 2005. 43. B. Diken and B. Carsten, "Zones of Indistinction: Security, Terror and Bare Life," Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, 2002, quoted in: F. Van Acker, op. cit. (see note 40), pp. 33–34. 44. New Vision, 18 July 2003. 45. Another expression of this are the numerous prayer-rallies in order to engage "spiritual warfare" against the evil practices of the LRA. 46. These figures are based on a report of the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), which used the data of the official census figures of Survei Penduduk Antar Sensus for 1991, 1985, and 1990. This report states that the Moluccan province consists of 59 percent Muslims, 35.3 percent Protestants, and 5.2 percent Roman Catholics, S.R. Panggabean, "Maluku: The Challenge of Peace," in Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific. An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, edited by A. Heijmans et al. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2004). 47. For an detailed description of these events in April 2004 in Ambon city, see: ICG Asia Briefing No. 32, Indonesia: Violence Erupts Again in Ambon, Jakarta/Brussels, 17 May 2004. 48. International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 31, Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku, Jakarta/Brussels, 8 February 2002, p. 1. 49. For in-depth information on this history, see R. Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists. The Ambonese Islands from Colonialism to Revolt (1880–1950) (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990). Chapters 2 and 3 in particular are of interest. 50. J. Betrand, "Legacies of the Authoritarian Past: Religious Violence in Indonesia's Moluccan Islands," Pacific Affairs, 75 (1) (April 2002), p. 63. 51. G. Van Klinken, "The Maluku Wars: Bringing Society Back In." Indonesia, 71 (April 2001), p. 10. 52. J. Bertrand, op.cit. (see note 50), p. 75. 53. J. Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 118. 54. In most of the analysis on the conflict in Ambon, full attention is given to the Muslim side of the fighting while the Christian part in the violence is often underexposed. In the case of Ambon, attention was strongly reinforced by the fact that certain individuals of the Muslim militias in Ambon were related to international terrorist organizations. For more detailed information on this issue, see: International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 103, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso, Jakarta/Brussels, 13 October 2005. 55. K. E. Schulze, "Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon." The Brown Journal of World Affairs IX(1) (spring 2002), p. 63. 56. Ibid. 57. CRG interview conducted in Infodoc Maluku, Ambon, 23 February 2006. 58. Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon, Human Rights Watch, March 1999, p. 7, report available at (http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/ambon/). 59. M. N. Azca, Security Sector Reform, Democratic Transition, and Social Violence, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Management, Dialogue Series No. 2, August 2004, p. 8, available at (www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dialogue2_azca.pdf). 60. S. Mulyadi, "Violence under the Banner of Religion: The Case of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus." Studia Islamika10(2) (2003), p. 95. 61. CRG interview conducted in Infodoc Maluku, Ambon, 23 February 2006. 62. K. E. Schulze, op. cit., p. 64. 63. Noorhaidi, Laskar Jihad. Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Utrecht, 2005, p. 208. 64. Ibid., p. 206. 65. It is unclear what the specific meaning of the color red was for the Christians. According to some, this was a clear reference to the blood of Christ, yet to others it was rather coincidence that this particular color became affiliated to everything Christian during and after the conflict. 66. CRG interview conducted at hotel Manise, Ambon, 8 February 2006. 67. S. Mulyadi, op. Cit., p. 100. 68. Kathleen Turner, "Myths and Moral Authority in Maluku: The Case of Ambon," Asian Ethnicity, 4(2) (June 2003), pp. 225–239. 69. Fieldwork conducted in January–February 2006 among IDP's in the city of Ambon.