On Responsibility in Science and Law
1999; Cambridge University Press; Volume: 16; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1017/s0265052500002429
ISSN1471-6437
Autores Tópico(s)Political Philosophy and Ethics
ResumoRespon'sible , liable to be called to account or render satisfaction: answerable: capable of discharging duty: able to pay . The old Chambers's dictionary gives a behavioristic view of responsibility: in terms of action, not thought or belief. “Lust in the heart” is not equated to lust in flagrante . It is this view I shall explore in this essay, rather than the more subjective notion of moral responsibility, as in, “I feel moral responsibility (i.e., guilt ) for not doing anything to save the Tutsis [Hutus, ethnic Albanians, etc.].” My presumption is that responsibility implies capability: you cannot be held responsible for something over which you have no control (Hutus, ethnic Albanians, etc.). There is obviously uncertainty in some cases—where control is less than total, where the degree of potential control depends on our own efforts, where we cannot know if we have control until we try to exert it, etc. The relation between responsibility and degree of control is a separate topic which I shall not treat here.
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