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Terrorist Decision Making and the Deterrence Problem

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 36; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1057610x.2013.747075

1521-0731

Gregory D. Miller,

Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

Abstract An ongoing debate among policymakers and terrorism scholars concerns the effectiveness of deterrence as a counterterrorism tool. Absent from the debate is a discussion of the complex nature of terrorist decision making. Decisions are made at varying levels in a terrorist organization, often by actors having different motives, resulting in behavior that is not always fully rational. This article identifies several circumstances when terrorist behavior is not the product of an entirely unitary, rational decision-making process, and therefore highlights when deterrence policies will be least effective. It concludes with some policy implications for understanding when deterrence policies are most likely to succeed and how to address terrorism in other situations. Acknowledgments I thank Keith Gaddie and the editor and anonymous reviewers at Studies in Conflict & Terrorism for their helpful comments on previous drafts. An early version of this article was presented at the International Studies Association annual conference, 15–18 February 2009, New York, NY. Notes 1. Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13(4) (July 1981), pp. 379–399; Todd Sandler and Harvey Lapan, “The Calculus of Dissent: An Analysis of Terrorists’ Choice of Targets,” Synthese 76(2) (August 1988), pp. 245–261. 2. Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97(3) (August 2003), pp. 343–361; Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random House, 2005); Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric Dickson, “The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization,” American Journal of Political Science 51(2) (March 2007), pp. 364–381; Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31(1) (Summer 2006), pp. 49–80. 3. Henry Prunckun and Phil Mohr, “Military Deterrence of International Terrorism: An Evaluation of Operation El Dorado Canyon,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 20(3) (July–September 1997), pp. 267–280; Philip Heymann, “Dealing with Terrorism,” International Security 26(3) (Winter 2001/02), pp. 24–38; Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies: A VAR-Intervention Analysis,” American Political Science Review 87(4) (December 1993), pp. 829–844; Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can be Done,” International Security 30(3) (Winter 2005/06), pp. 87–123. 4. Pape, Dying to Win. 5. Richard Betts, “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror,” Political Science Quarterly 117(1) (Spring 2002), pp. 19–36. 6. Jeremy Ginges, “Deterring the Terrorist: A Psychological Evaluation of Different Strategies for Deterring Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9(1) (1997), 170–185; Bruno Frey and Simon Luechinger, “How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence,” Defence and Peace Economics 14(4) (2003), pp. 237–249; Ronald Wintrobe, “Extremism, Suicide Terror, and Authoritarianism,” Public Choice 128(1–2) (July 2006), pp. 169–195. 7. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), p. 15; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 2006), p. 12; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (May 2010), p. 17. 8. “Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat,” Jane's Intelligence Review (20 October 2000); Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy (September/October 2000), p. 72; Doron Almog, “Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism,” Parameters 34(4) (2004), pp. 4–19; Alan Dershowitz, Is There a Right to Remain Silent? Coercive Interrogation and the Fifth Amendment After 9/11 (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 137; James Smith and Brent Talbot, “Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial,” in Paul Viotti, Michael Opheim, and Nicholas Bowen, eds., Terrorism and Homeland Security: Thinking Strategically about Policy (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008), pp. 53–68. Most who discuss the possibility of deterring CBRN terrorism tend to focus on state sponsors, work that more closely parallels the use of rational deterrence theory in international politics. Few attempt to explain how to deter the group that decides to adopt mass-casualty tactics, or more importantly the individuals who would carry out such attacks: Wyn Bowen, “Deterring Mass-Casualty Terrorism,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 2002), pp. 25–29; Jasen Castillo, “Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters,” Current History 102(668) (2003), pp. 426–431; Daniel Whiteneck, “Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework,” The Washington Quarterly 28(3) (Summer 2005), pp. 187–199. 9. Trager and Zagorcheva, 2005/06. MILF even cooperated with authorities hunting for ASG and JI terrorists in 2007 and negotiated a peaceful settlement in 2008, which the Philippine Supreme Court rejected, declaring it unconstitutional. Blaine Harden, “In Philippines, Abandoned Deal Reignites Rebel War,” The Washington Post (14 September 2008), p. A20. 10. Attacks by ASG caused significantly more casualties than MILF attacks. According to the Global Terrorism Database, between 2002 and 2010, 62 ASG attacks caused 267 fatalities (4.31 fatalities per incident) and 728 injuries (11.74 injuries per incident), compared to 106 MILF attacks resulting in 320 fatalities (3.02 deaths per incident) and 608 injuries (5.74 per incident). National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd (accessed 10 July 2012). The MILF itself formed in 1981 as a splinter of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), when the MNLF reached a settlement with the Philippine government that some of its members would not accept. On MILF members switching groups, see “Rebels Behead Philippine Troops,” BBC News Online (11 July 2007) (accessed 2 October 2009); Human Rights Watch, “Lives Destroyed: Attacks on Civilians in the Philippines,” Human Rights Watch Report (July 2007); Zachary Abuza, “The Philippines Peace Process: Too Soon to Claim a Settlement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front?” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies Research Briefing Series 3(3) (February 2008). 11. According to the Global Terrorism Database, the MILF carried out 100 attacks between 2003 and 2010. Sixty-one of these occurred in 2003, with every year since seeing 8 or fewer attacks (with the exception of 21 attacks in 2008). In contrast, nationwide terrorism remains at a relatively high level. National attacks did decrease from 88 incidents in 2003 to 22 incidents in 2005, but then more than doubled from 2005 to 2006 and remains at comparable levels—53 incidents in 2006, 59 in 2007, 82 in 2008, 78 in 2009, and 67 in 2010. Available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd (accessed on 10 July 2012). 12. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 1. 13. Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960). 14. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). 15. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis,” American Political Science Review 87(4) (December 1993), pp. 829–844. 16. Camilla Mortensen, “Hard Time: Eco-Saboteurs May Face High Security Prisons,” Eugene Weekly (7 June 2007); Troy Graham, “Prosecutors to Seek Life Terms in Ft. Dix Plot,” The Philadelphia Inquirer (28 April 2009). 17. Ron Dudai, “Review of ‘Through No Fault of Their Own: Punitive House Demolitions During the al-Aqsa Intifada,’ by Ronen Shnayderman,” Human Rights Quarterly 28(3) (2006), pp. 783–795; David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), especially chapter 9. 18. Emma Daly, “Judge Bans Basque Part, Linking it to Terrorists,” The New York Times (27 August 2002). 19. Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 10. See also Michael Taylor, “Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action,” in Rationality and Revolution: Studies in Marxism and Social Theory, ed. Michael Taylor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 66. 20. Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” Public Opinion Quarterly 12(2) (Summer 1948), pp. 280–315; Leonard Wong, Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003). 21. Such behavior may be rational because it permits a parent's DNA to continue (I thank one of the anonymous reviewer's for pointing this out). Yet this explanation would expect that parents of an only child are more likely to sacrifice themselves than parents with several children. 22. Wintrobe, “Extremism, Suicide Terror, and Authoritarianism.” 23. Mark Harrison also suggests that suicide bombers are rational, in that they trade their life for an identity. Mark Harrison, “An Economist Looks at Suicide Terrorism,” World Economics 7(4) (2006), pp. 1–15. If correct, then governments could deter some suicide bombers by providing them with an identity through another mechanism. There are two problems with his argument. One is that Harrison simply assumes rational behavior, and then finds an economic theory to justify that assumption; that a transaction occurs in which a young person trades their life for an identity. Yet not all suicide bombers crave an identity. Second, he focuses exclusively on the Arab–Israeli conflict, ignoring significant suicide terror cases—Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and the Kurds—not to mention the more recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, where identity may not be as important as it is for Palestinians. 24. Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31(2) (January 1979), p. 299. 25. Bryan Caplan, “Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model,” Public Choice 128 (2006), pp. 91–107. 26. Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics”; Bruce Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The Atlantic Monthly 291(5) (June 2003), pp. 40–47. 27. Hassan Nasia, “An Arsenal of Believers,” New Yorker (19 November 2001), pp. 36–41; Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4) (Fall 2003), esp. 122–123. 28. Eyad Sarraj, “Why We Blow Ourselves Up,” Time Magazine (8 April 2002), pp. 35–42; David Lester, Bijou Yang, and Mark Lindsay, “Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27(4) (2004), pp. 283–295; Harrison, “An Economist Looks at Suicide Terrorism.” 29. Raphael Israeli, Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrology (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Nichole Argo, “Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs: The Palestinian Case and the Pursuit of a Martyrdom Complex,” Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Quebec (March 2004); James Dingley, Terrorism and the Politics of Social Change: A Durkheimian Analysis (England: Ashgate, 2010). 30. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1971); Frank Zagare and Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 41. 31. Allison, Essence of Decision; Allison and Morton Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics 24 (Spring 1972), pp. 40–79. A related issue that I do not address in this article is that even rational actors are susceptible to misunderstandings, misperception, and accidents, which are nearly impossible to deter because they are not the direct result of conscious choices. Jack Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,” World Politics 36(1) (October 1983), pp. 76–99; Robet Jervis, “War and Misperception,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18(4) (Spring 1988), pp. 675–700; Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 32. Assaf Moghadam, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach,” pp. 89–99 in Ami Pedahzur, Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006); Don Radlauer, “Rational Choice Deterrence and Israeli Counter-Terrorism,” in Intelligence and Security Informatics ed. Sharad Mehrotra, Daniel Zeng, Hsinchun Chen, Bhavani Thuraisingham, and Fei Yue Wang (Berlin: Springer, 2006), pp. 609–614, at p. 614. 33. Leonard Weinberg, “Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities,” Comparative Politics 23(4) (July 1991), pp. 423–438; Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (London: Routledge, 2003). 34. John Horgan, Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements (London: Routledge, 2009); Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qa’ida (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008); Audrey Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 35. Quan Li, “Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(2) (2004), pp. 230–258; Li, “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(2) (2005), pp. 278–297; Paul Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, “Some Roots of Terrorism,” Population and Environment 24(2) (November 2002), pp. 183– 192. 36. H. G. Tittmar, “Urban Terrorism: A Psychological Interpretation,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4(3) (1992), pp. 64–71; Jerrold Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 25–40. 37. Whiteneck, “Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework.” 38. Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in Reich, Origins of Terrorism, pp. 161–191. 39. Interviews with successful suicide bombers are clearly impossible, but are conducted with failed bombers or the family and friends of successful bombers. Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers,” New Yorker (19 November 2001); Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Emmaus, PA: Rodale, 2003). 40. Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). p. xii; Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”; Dying to Win. 41. Pape 2003, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”; Dying to Win.; Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Assaf Moghadam, “Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006), pp. 707–729; Pedahzur, Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism. 42. Mia Bloom and John Horgan, “Missing Their Mark: The IRA's Proxy Bomb Campaign,” Social Research: An International Quarterly 75(2) (Summer 2008), pp. 579–614; Neil Ferguson and Mark Burgess, “The Road to Insurgency: Drawing Ordinary Civilians into the Cycle of Military Intervention and Violent Resistance,” in M. Demet Ulusoy, ed., Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism and Youth (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), pp. 83–93. 43. Radlauer, “Rational Choice Deterrence and Israeli Counter-Terrorism.” 44. Alissa Rubin, “Inside the Mind of a Female Suicide Bomber,” The Observer (22 November 2009); STRATFOR, “The Tactical Advantage of Suicide Bombers” (13 November 2004). 45. Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” p. 72. 46. Gordon McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003), pp. 490–495; Clark McCauley and M. Segal, “Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups,” Review of Personality and Social Psychology 9 (1987), pp. 231–256. 47. Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” The Seditionist 12 (February 1992). 48. The literature on military culture illustrates this argument: Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jeffrey Legro, “Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II,” International Security 18(4) (Spring 1994), pp. 108–142. 49. For discussions of the Christian Identity movements, see Bruce Hoffman, “Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by Religious Imperative,” RAND Document P-7834 (1993), pp. 6–9; Jeffrey Kaplan, Radical Religion in America: Millenarian Movements from the Far Right to the Children of Noah (Syracuse University Press, 1997), pp. 47–68; Michael Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1997); Tanya Sharpe, “The Christian Identity Movement: Ideology of Domestic Terrorism,” Journal of Black Studies 30(4) (March 2000), pp. 604–623. 50. McVeigh modeled the bombing of the Murrah building after an attack that takes place in The Turner Diaries, a novel popular with the militia movement. Andrew MacDonald, The Turner Diaries (Hillsboro, WV: National Vanguard Books, 1999). 51. McVeigh wrote in a letter to a friend, which was later turned over to the media: “I chose to bomb a federal building because such an action served more purposes than other options. Foremost the bombing was a retaliatory strike; a counter attack for the cumulative raids (and subsequent violence and damage) that federal agents had participated in over the preceding years (including, but not limited to, Waco). From the formation of such units as the FBI's Hostage Rescue and other assault teams amongst federal agencies during the 80s, culminating in the Waco incident, federal actions grew increasingly militaristic and violent, to the point where at Waco, our government—like the Chinese—was deploying tanks against its own citizens.” Tracy McVeigh, “The McVeigh Letters: Why I Bombed Oklahoma,” The Observer (6 May 2001). Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/may/06/mcveigh.usa 52. Liz Michael, “Did Timothy McVeigh Have the Right Idea?” (May 29, 2001). Available at http://attackthesystem.com/did-timothy-mcveigh-have-the-right-idea/ (accessed 10 July 2012). Liz Michael was host of Lady Liberty, a nationally syndicated television show, and a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, 27th District in both 1994 and 1996. 53. Susan Saulny, “McVeigh Says He Considered Killing Reno,” The New York Times (27 April 2001), p. A10. 54. According to one prosecution witness, McVeigh did contemplate driving the truck into the Murrah building in a suicide attack, to ensure the greatest amount of death and destruction. Lois Romano, “Suicide Attack Considered by McVeigh, Accuser Says; Ex-Army Friend Tells Jurors about Casing Oklahoma City Site,” The Washington Post (13 May 1997). 55. Bloom, Dying to Kill‥ 56. Bruce Hoffman and Gordon McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004), p. 271. 57. Terry Atlas, “U.S. Backs Arafat, Works to Bolster Fragile Mideast Accord,” Chicago Tribune (17 September 1993); Graham Usher, “PFLP Threatens to Kill Arafat Aides if Leader is not Freed,” The Guardian (18 January 2002). 58. Keith Richburg, “Madrid Attacks May Have Targeted Election,” The Washington Post (17 October 2004), p. A16. 59. Craig Whitlock, “21 Convicted in Madrid Bombings,” The Washington Post (1 November 2007), p. A12. 60. Craig Whitlock, “Spanish Say Foiled Plot Targeted Anti-Terror Headquarters,” The Washington Post (20 October 2004), p. A19. 61. “Last Spanish Troops Leave Iraq,” BBC News Online (21 May 2004). Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3734751.stm (accessed 1 September 2009). 62. Hassan Fattah and Michael Slackman, “3 Hotels Bombed in Jordan; At Least 57 Die,” The New York Times (10 November 2005); Craig Whitlock, “Amman Bombings Reflect Zarqawi's Growing Reach,” The Washington Post (13 November 2005), p. A1. 63. Connections between Zarqawi's group and bin Laden formed as early as 2000, when Zarqawi received money to start up a training camp in Afghanistan. Walter Pincus, “Zarqawi is Said to Swear Alliance to Bin Laden,” The Washington Post (19 October 2004), p. A16; Craig Whitlock, “Death Could Shake Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Around the World,” The Washington Post (10 June 2006), p. A1. 64. According to the Pew Research Center, public opinion in Jordan turned dramatically against bin Laden and Al Qaeda because of the Amman bombings. In surveys conducted in May 2005, 60 percent of Jordanians had a lot or some confidence that bin Laden would do the right thing, and only 10 percent saw Islamic extremism as a threat to the country. By April 2006, only 24 percent had a lot or some confidence in bin Laden and 60 percent were concerned about Islamic extremism. PEW Global Attitudes Project, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics,” (14 July 2005), pp. 3, 29; PEW Global Attitudes Project, “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other” (22 June 2006), pp. 24–25. A different poll obtained similar results, with the number of Jordanians who saw Al Qaeda as a legitimate resistance movement falling from 66.8 percent in 2004 to 20 percent in December 2005. Only 6.2 percent saw Zarqawi's group as a legitimate resistance movement in December 2005, so while the Jordanian people distinguished between bin Laden and Zarqawi, bin Laden's approval rating still suffered after the attacks. In addition, those who saw the 9/11 attacks as terrorism increased from 34.6 percent in 2004 to 61.4 percent in December 2005. Fares Braizat, “Post-Amman Attacks: Jordanian Public Opinion and Terrorism” (Amman: Public Polling Unit, Center for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 3. Curiously, support for non–Al Qaeda terrorist groups also fell after the Amman attacks: those who saw Hamas as a legitimate resistance movement fell from 86.7 percent in 2004 to 73.5 percent in December 2005, and those who saw Hezbollah as a legitimate resistance movement fell from 84 percent to 63.9 percent. Braizat, “Post-Amman Attacks,” p. 4. 65. Zahid Hussein and Keith Johnson, “The Death of Osama bin Laden: Split Seen between bin Laden, Deputy,” Wall Street Journal (6 May 2011), p. A6. 66. Whitlock, “Amman Bombings.” 67. Whitlock, “Death Could Shake Al-Qaeda.” 68. One example is Colonel Karuna, who was once a Tamil regional commander, but broke away in March 2004, claiming it was partly for the LTTE's discrimination of Tamil in the east, and partly out of fear of assassination by the Tamil leader, Prabhakaran, who frequently assassinated potential rivals. Initially Karuna targeted the LTTE directly with the 6,000 fighters that followed him, but he later provided intelligence to the Sri Lankan military, and has since been appointed to the Sri Lankan parliament by the coalition government in Colombo. Emily Wax, “Without Me, They Couldn't Win the War,” The Washington Post (11 February 2009), p. A14. 69. Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22(2) (Fall 1997), pp. 5–53; Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence,” International Organization 56(2) (Spring 2002), pp. 263–296; Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence,” International Organization 59(1) (2005), pp. 145–176. 70. Kydd and Water, “Sabotaging the Peace,” p. 264. 71. An example of this is the 1996 election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel's prime minister, who was elected over Shimon Peres, at least partly because of Peres's seeming inability to deal with the threat of terrorism. 72. This is comparable to Byman's suggestion that ethno-nationalist communities should police themselves, but provides an even stronger theoretical basis for such recommendations. Daniel Byman, “The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21(2) (1998), pp. 149–169. 73. There is speculation that the first female Palestinian suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, did not intend to kill herself, and detonated the bomb by mistake. This was still praised as an act of martyrdom for the cause, and gained even more publicity because it was carried out by a woman. Mark Lavie, “Bomb Woman ‘Died in Error,’” The Advertiser (6 February 2002), p. 38; Cindy Ness, Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility and Organization (New York: Routledge, 2008).