Development of the Moldovan Parliament One Decade after Independence: Slow Going
2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 13; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13572330601165378
ISSN1743-9337
Autores Tópico(s)European and International Law Studies
ResumoAbstract The Republic of Moldova ranks high on the list of ‘failed transitions’ spawned by the break-up of the Soviet Union. Its parliament has played a key, if sporadic, role in determining the direction of the country's political life. It has been the primary venue for the factional conflict that has plagued reform efforts. The parliament has not, however, emerged as a stable institutional foundation upon which democratic politics could be built. This paper examines the forces that have shaped the post-communist Moldovan transition parliament and three post-communist legislatures. Notes 1. W. Crowther, ‘The Politics of Democratization in Post-communist Moldova’, in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds.), Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.294. 2. International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Republic of Moldova: Parliamentary Elections, February 1994 (Chişinău: TISH Ltd, 1994), pp.3–5. 3. Constituţia Republicii Moldova (Chişinău: Direcţia de Stat pentru Asigurarea Informaţională, MOLDPRES, 1994). 4. W. Crowther and Y. Josanu, ‘Moldova’, in S. Bergland, F. Aarebrot and J. Ekman (eds.), Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe (London: Edward Elgar Publisher, 2nd edn 2004), pp.549–92. 5. The World Bank, Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Prepared by the Moldovan authorities), 21 April (Washington, DC, The World Bank, 2002), p.4. 6. Sturza was only finally successful by inclusion in the vote count of a letter of support from Ilie Ilaşcu, a parliamentary deputy who was imprisoned in Transnistria. The support of the Snegur, Diacov and Matei factions provided the 52 votes necessary to give power to the government. In reaction the CDPP withdrew from the centre-right coalition. It was at this juncture that the far-left PCRM and far-right CDPP found common interest and entered into a de facto political alliance. 7. According to the commission's proposal, the government would be selected by the president and subsequently would be accountable to him alone. The president would have the right to name and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet. The presidential term was extended from four to five years. The number of deputies in parliament was to be reduced from 101 to 70 and a single-member district plurality electoral system would be introduced for legislative elections. 8. The 43 year old Dumitru Braghiş was a moderate former Communist. Braghiş was the last First Secretary of the Moldovan Komsomol, a position that he held from 1988 to 1991. 9. ‘Constitution Watch: Moldova’, East European Constitutional Review, 10/1 (2001) pp. 28–30. 10. The Braghiş Alliance was composed of members of the Braghiş government and 11 formerly independent MPs who supported Lucinschi. 11. Two parties, the Party of Rebirth and Reconciliation with 5.79 per cent and the Democratic Party of Moldova with 5.02 per cent would have been included in the legislature under the threshold rule that governed previous legislative elections but were now excluded. 12. W. Crowther, ‘Moldova: The Domestic Scene’, in A. Lewis (ed.), The EU and Moldova (London: The Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2004), p.43. 13. Based on the judet (the traditional Romanian Provincial administrative unit), which had existed during the Soviet period, 40 raions (districts) were established as the key unit of local administration, replacing the administrative system based on judet which had existed in the territory when Moldova was part of Romania. President Voronin's reversion to the Soviet system was widely perceived as a public repudiation of Romanian nationalism. 14. E. Tomiuc, ‘Moldova: Moscow and Chisinau Initial Bilateral Agreement’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Weekly Magazine, 6 Nov. 2001. 15. Financial Times Information, 22 Jan. 2002. 16. Invoking Article 52 of the European Convention, the Council of Europe Secretary General requested an explanation from Moldovan officials as to how their domestic laws ensured effective implementation of the European Convention. The fact that this procedure had only been employed once previously (in the case of Russia's activities in Chechnya) was a clear indication of the seriousness with which European diplomats viewed the situation (Council of Europe Press Division, 4 Feb. 2002). 17. ‘Council of Europe Meidates Political Armistice in Moldova’, The James Town Foundation Monitor, 8/77 (19 April 2002). . 18. The sessions meeting between November 1990 and March 1993 examined 33.3 per cent, 44.2 per cent, 57 per cent, 50 per cent and 40 per cent of the agenda items set out for them. 19. Parliamentary Staff Report, Informatie privind activitatea Parlamentullui si a comisiilor permannte, 28 Sept. 1993. 20. Parlamentul Republicii Moldova (Chişinău: Studioul de Creaţia, 1996). 21. S.D. Roper, ‘Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes’, Comparative Politics, 34/3 (2002), p.267. 22. Roper, ‘Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes’. 23. S.M. Fish, ‘The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World’, East European Politics and Societies, 12/1 (1998), pp.31–78. 24. Unpublished Parliamentary Staff Report, Bilanţul activitătii Paralamentului in anii 1994–1995: Date statistice. 25. Unpublished Parliamentary Staff Report, Informaţia privind activitatea legisliativă a Parlamentului Republicii Moldova anii 2001–2003 şi sesiunea de primavară 2004. Additional informationNotes on contributorsWilliam E. Crowther William Crowther is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro.
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