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A populist island in an ocean of clan politics: the Lukashenka regime as an exception among CIS countries

2004; Routledge; Volume: 56; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/0966813042000190515

1465-3427

Кимитака Мацузато,

European Politics and Security

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes This article is a product of ongoing research projects on 'Microscopic Investigation of Economic, Social, and Political Structures of Belarus and Ukraine under Transition' (2001–2004), 'Making of New Regions in Eastern Europe and Impact of EU Enlargement' (2002–2005), and the 21 Century COE Programme on 'Making a Discipline of Slavic Eurasian Studies: Meso‐areas and Globalisation' (2003–2008). These projects are financed by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Sciences and Technology. A significant part of this article relies upon the results of the joint research between the Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, and the Informational and Analytical Centre for NGOs affiliated with the World Association of Belarusians, Bats'kaushchyna, headed by Vladimir Rovdo, associate professor at Belarus State University. I refer to the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Recently, Slovakia might possibly be included in this group. See Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Elites and the Party System of Zakarpattia Oblast': Relations among Levels of Party Systems in Ukraine', Europe‐Asia Studies, 54, 8, 2002, pp. 1265–1299. See Robert Elgie (ed.), Semi‐presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). Wise & Pigenko repeat Shugart & Carey's emphasis on the aforementioned 'appointment game'; see Charles R. Wise & Volodymyr Pigenko, 'The Separation of Powers Puzzle in Ukraine: Sorting Out Responsibilities and Relationships between President, Parliament, and the Prime Minister', in Taras Kuzio et al. (eds), State and Institution Building in Ukraine (Houndmills and London, Macmillan, 1999), pp. 27–28; and Matthew Soberg Shugart & John M. Carey (eds), Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992). They thus try to argue that Kuchma is not the superpresident that he appears to be. However, if Wise & Pigenko had really paid attention to the 'appointment game' they should have noticed that, in contrast to the French Fifth Republic, post‐communist Polish and Lithuanian constitutions, the present Russian, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Central Asian countries' constitutions exclude the possibility of 'cohabitation' institutionally (the Ukrainian constitution does not describe it as clearly as the other CIS constitutions, but does not compel the president to appoint the leader of the parliamentary majority to the post of prime‐minister). In constitutional history, however, it was often 'cohabitation' that catalysed the shift from a strong to a weak presidential system. See Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'From Communist Boss Politics to Post‐Communist Caciquismo—the Meso‐Elite and Meso‐Governments in Post‐Communist Countries', Communist and Post‐Communist Studies, 34, 2001, pp. 175–201. Shefter argues that a party system develops when a mass electorate takes shape after civil service examinations and other formal rules to distribute public resources have been established. In this case, even ruling politicians are unable to gain access to public resources for party building and therefore have no alternative but to build parties by offering collective or programmatic benefits; see Martin Shefter, Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience (Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 5–6, 14–15, passim. From this perspective it was crucial that in Western post‐communist countries both conservative and leftist parties were created when they were in opposition. In contrast, in CIS countries the elite clans survived the political turmoil in 1989–91 without being cast from power, and created parties and blocs (such as Our Home Is Russia, Edinstvo, People's Democratic Party of Ukraine and For United Ukraine) 'internally', fueling traditional patronage networks with administrative resources. As Shefter remarks, the initial difference might possibly have enduring consequences and continue to determine the basic characteristics of these countries' politics even after sociological conditions change (p. 22). Shefter introduces the example of Bologna during the decades following World War II, in which the CPI controlled both the immigrant vote and local government and thus was in a position to raid the public treasury in a quest for patronage. 'Nonetheless the CPI did not degenerate into a patronage machine, and the city of Bologna was administered with less corruption and petty favouritism than comparable Italian cities that were governed by the CD' (p. 24). In a previous article I named this practice 'centralised caciquismo'; see Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'From Ethno‐Bonapartism to Centralized Caciquismo: Characteristics and Origins of the Tatarstan Political Regime, 1990–2000', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 17, 4, December 2001, pp. 43–77. Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Subregional'naya politika v Rossii—metodika analiza', in K. Matsuzato (ed.), Tret'e zveno gosudarstvennogo stroitel'stva Rossii: podgotovka i realizatsiya Federal'nogo Zakona ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnogo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Sapporo, SRC, 1998), pp. 12–35; K. Matsuzato, 'Local Reforms in Ukraine 1990–1998: Elite and Institutions', in Osamu Ieda (ed.), The Emerging Local Governments in Eastern Europe and Russia (Hiroshima, 2000), pp. 25–54; K. Matsuzato, 'An Island of Democracy? Local Reforms in Kyrgyzstan 1990–2000', Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2001, 4 (10), pp. 142–154. The salary figures mentioned here are very tentative (see note 14). To be more precise, Mouzelis classifies populism into urban (in Latin America) and peasant (in the Balkans) types; see Nicos P. Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi‐Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America (Houndmills and London, Macmillan, 1986), p. xvi, passim. Ibid., p. 45. Torcuato S. Di Tella, 'Populism and Reform in Latin America', in Claudio Veliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 47–74; Michael L. Conniff, 'Introduction: Toward a Comparative Definition of Populism', in Michael L. Conniff (ed.), Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque, The University of New Mexico Press, 1982), pp. 3–30; Michael L. Conniff (ed.), Populism in Latin America (Tuscaloosa and London, The University of Alabama Press, 1999), pp. 1–21; Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi‐Periphery, pp. 73–94. Tella, 'Populion and Reform in Latin America', p. 49. Larissa G. Titarenko, 'The Walls That Have Yet to Fall: Belarus as a Mirror of CIS Transition', Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post‐Soviet Democratization, 8, 2, 2000, p. 236. See also David G. Rotman & Aliaksandr N. Danilov, 'President and Opposition: Specific Features of the Belarusian Political Scene', in Elena A. Korosteleva, Colin W. Lawson & Rosalind J. Marsh (eds), Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy and Dictatorship (London and New York, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 109. All of these authors remark that the aged, less‐educated and female population (namely, the weak) tend to be more satisfied with the situation of Belarus than others. In my view this tendency reveals the populist characteristics of the Lukashenka regime. However, Titarenko's endeavour to attribute this high level of satisfaction solely to the social psychological legacy of socialism and the lack of wage/pension arrears in Belarus leads her to the strange claim that the real average monthly income was only 40 USD in Belarus, while it was 50 USD in Ukraine (apparently she implies that Belarusians are deceived by Lukashenka, but she does not show the source of these income data). However, even according to the CIS Statistical Committee data (which, in my view, obviously underestimate the average income in Belarus), the average monthly incomes (in USD) in Belarus in 1999, 2000 and 2001 were 70.8, 73.6 and 86.6 respectively, while those in Ukraine were 43.0, 42.3 and 57.9 (Mezhgosudarstvennyi statisticheskii komitet SNG, Sodruzhestvo nezavisimykh gosudarstv v 2001 godu: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow, 2002), p. 129). Having said this, however, I do not trust this source either. This source, for example, seems to overestimate the average monthly income in Kazakhstan (114.0 USD in 2001, namely higher than Russia's 111.1 USD). After futile efforts to compare the living standards in post‐Soviet countries by various data on average incomes, I began to think that the most reliable parameter in this regard was the UN human development indicators. The ranking of the former Soviet countries given by these indicators (Table 2) would hardly contradict our daily observations and experiences in these countries. Author's interview with N. Yamashita, interim Charge d' Affaires of Japan (11 September 2001, Minsk). Titarenko, 'The Walls That Have Yet to Fall', p. 249. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 20 October 2000, p. 1. Steven M. Eke & Taras Kuzio, 'Sultanism in Eastern Europe: the Socio‐Political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus', Europe‐Asia Studies, 52, 3, 2000, pp. 523–547. It seems that Eke & Kuzio premise a direct causal relationship between nationalism and democracy. (This is Kuzio's fundamental standpoint which motivates him to criticise Andrew Wilson's criticism of official nationalism in post‐communist Ukraine; see Taras Kuzio et al., State and Institution Building in Ukraine (Houndmills and London, Macmillan, 1999), p. 7.) It is true that national democratic ideas operated as a catalyst to reject communism and Soviet imperialism in Ukraine, the Baltic countries and a number of national republics in Russia, but it is already obvious that these victorious national democracies have not always produced democracies in the ordinary sense and respect for human rights. Moreover, it seems hardly convincing to explain authoritarian tendencies in CIS countries by ideological factors, with or without the presence of nationalism. The Ukrainian authorities refer to nationalism (or Europeanism) no less instrumentally than the Belarusian authorities do in regard to pan‐Slavism. I am afraid that Eke & Kuzio's argument appears as justification of Kuchma's regime, rather than criticism of Lukashenka's regime. Kathleen J. Mihalisko, 'Belarus: Retreat to Authoritarianism', in Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott (eds), Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 233. Actually, if it were in Russia or Ukraine, such leaders as Lukashenka, who constantly insult and jail the senior elites, would have been removed, jailed or assassinated by rivals long ago. There are many Belarusian anecdotes that describe Belarusians' mentality, according to which they are patient but do not forget any anger for a long time. I do not emphasise the Polish legacies in Belarusian mentality here to explain Lukashenka's victory in a fatalist manner. On the contrary, I am more sympathetic to 'process‐oriented' explanations as opposed to 'structure‐oriented' ones (Vital Silitski, 'Explaining Post‐Communist Authoritarianism in Belarus', Contemporary Belarus, pp. 36–37, contrasts these approaches). What I am implying is that Lukashenka's victory could possibly have been a by‐product of the Belarusians' positive characteristics—namely their diligence and serious mind, as opposed to those of a negative nature such as weak national identity. Moreover, researchers seem to overemphasise the presence or absence of Russian legacies when they explain failures or successes of post‐communist transition in the former Soviet countries. In my view, however, Polish or Baltic German legacies have played a no less important role in creating cultural preconditions for the transitions in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This opinion is apparently based on interrepublic and foreign trade balances of the union republics, calculated at the then prevailing domestic prices, which significantly underestimate fuel prices. If we adjust these data according to the world price, Soviet Belarus also slides down to the group of republics 'fed' by the RSFSR, which remains the only donor. Not surprisingly, among 'those who were fed', Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan enjoyed relatively favourable balances; see the data for 1987 and 1989 in Stuart S. Brown & Misha V. Belkindas, 'Who's Feeding Whom? An Analysis of Soviet Interrepublic Trade', in Richard F. Kaufman & John P. Hardt (eds), The Former Soviet Union in Transition (Armonk, New York and London, 1993), p. 165, Table 1. Valerii Karbalevich, 'Belorusskaya nomenklatura v period transformatsii: evolyutsiya sotsial'nogo statusa i politicheskoi roli', Belarus Monitor, 1998, 3, p. 3. L. V. Krivitsky, 'Belorusskaya demokratiya: uroki porazhenii', Belarus Monitor, 1997, 2, p. 12; Mihalisko, 'Belarus', p. 237. This perception of the republic's leader from the Brezhnev period differs grossly from that of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPU V. Shcherbitsky in post‐communist Ukraine. Shcherbitsky was a leader similar to Masherov; he repressed the nationalists but, at the same time, tirelessly lobbied for the republic's interests in Moscow. In Ukraine, however, there is no street named after Shcherbitsky and obviously Ukrainians will need a long time before they will be able to give a pluralist, 'objective' judgment of his contribution to Ukrainian national history. A similar phenomenon was observed in Ul'yanovsk oblast' in Russia; see A.L. Kruglikov, 'Khronika sobytii: protivostoyanie vlasti i oppozitsii (poligon reform v ekonomike i politike sovremennoi Rossii)', in Kimitaka Matsuzato (ed.), Regiony Rossii: khronika i rukovoditeli, vol. 6, Nizhegorodskaya oblast', Ul'yanovskaya oblast' (Sapporo, 1999), pp. 197–235. Vladimir Rovdo, 'Lukashenka Aleksandr Grigor' evich (Prezident Respubliki Belarus'): biograficheskie dannye', http://Rsrc‐h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/wpbp/Lukashenka.pdf. The only significant consequence was that Lukashenka, in tandem with the prime minister, V. Kebich, succeeded in toppling the Supreme Soviet chairman, Shushkevich; see Mihalisko, 'Belarus', p. 249; Pervye prezidentskie vybory v Respublike Belarus'—Osnovnye itogi (Minsk, 1994), p. 22. In contrast to the other candidates, namely V. Kebich (the prime minister of Belarus), A. Dubko (the chairman of the Council of Collective Farms of Belarus), V. Novikov (secretary of the central committee of the Party of Communists of Belarus), Z. Poznyak (leader of the Belarusian Popular Front) and S. Shushkevich (the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus), Lukashenka was only a parliamentary commission chairman, and still held the position of collective farm chairman (Pervye prezidentskie vybory, p. 20). Pervye prezidentskie vybory, pp. 33–34. Viktor Chernov, 'Priroda politicheskogo rezhima v Belarusi i perspektivy ego transformatsii', Belarus Monitor, 1997, 2, p. 73. Karbalevich, 'Belorusskaya nomenklatura v period transformatsii', p. 9; see also Silitski, 'Explaining Post‐Communist Authoritarianism in Belarus', pp. 44–46. He resigned because he did not agree with the referendum of November 1996. Karbalevich, 'Belorusskaya nomenklatura v period transformatsii', p. 10; see also V. Karbalevich, 'Belorusskii fenomenon politicheskogo populizma', Filamaty: Byuleten' Narodnaga Universiteta, 1999, 1, pp. 18–21. See K. Matsuzato, 'All Kuchma's Men: The Reshuffling of Ukrainian Governors and the Presidential Election of 1999', Post‐Soviet Geography and Economics, 42, 6, 2001, pp. 416–439. Colin W. Lawson, 'Path‐Dependence and the Economy of Belarus: The Consequences of Late Reforms', Contemporary Belarus, p. 129. On the clan‐isation of Tambov leftist forces see Dmitrii Sel'tser, 'Ot A.I. Ryabova do O.I. Betina: O traditsionnoi paradigme "kommunisty‐demokraty", klanovosti i fenomene Vladimira Putina (Tambovskaya oblast', 1995–2000 gg.)', in Kimitaka Matsuzato (ed.), Fenomen Vladimira Putina i rossiiskie regiony: pobeda neozhidannaya ili zakonomernaya? (Sapporo, 2004), pp. 84–140. Art. 85 of the Constitution; see also G.A. Vasilevich, Konstitutsiya Respubliki Belarus': nauchno‐prakticheskii kommentarii (Minsk, 2001), pp. 294–303. Besides this question, voters overwhelmingly confirmed the equal status of Russian with Belarusian, the introduction of the new national flag and emblem (which are similar to the Soviet ones) and the economic reintegration with the Russian Federation (Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 25 May, 1995, p. 1). Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 25 May 1995, p. 1 and 8 June 1995, p. 1. Krivitsky, 'Belorusskaya demokratiya', p. 14; Mihalisko, 'Belarus', pp. 265–268. Postanovlenie of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus, 6 September 1996, No. 491, 'O provedenii respublikanskogo referenduma v Respublike Belarus' i merakh po ego obespecheniyu', Vedamastsi Vyarkhounaga Saveta Respubliki Belarus', 1996, 26, pp. 72–74. 'Obrashchenie Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Belarus' k Prezidentu Respubliki Belarus' i deputatam Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Belarus', kotorye initsiirovali rassmotrenie na respublikanskom referendume izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitutsiyu Respubliki Belarus' 1994 goda', Vedamastsi Vyarkhounaga Saveta, 1996, 27, pp. 54–56. The parliament asked voters whether to support (1) the communist and agrarian proposal for constitutional amendments; (2) direct elections of local executive chiefs; (3) a ban on extra‐budget funds run by executive organs. In sharp contrast, Lukashenka gave voters quite concrete questions on whether they supported (1) moving Independence Day from 27 July (the day when the Belarusian Supreme Soviet adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty in 1990) to 3 July (the day of Belarus's emancipation from Hitler's occupation in 1944); (2) free purchases and sales of land; (3) abolition of the death penalty in Belarus. As Table 3 shows, Belarusian voters' reaction to these questions was almost predetermined. 'Zakon Respubliki Belarus' "O formirovanii Palaty predstavitelei Natsional'nogo sobraniya Respubliki Belarus" ', Vedamastsi Vyarkhounaga Saveta, 1996, 35, pp. 60–63. For example see Vitalii Medvedev, 'Problemy formirovaniya v Belarusi novoi modeli sotsial'no‐ekonomicheskoi sistemy', Upravlenie kapitalom, 1997, 10–12, pp. 8–14. A leading officer of the presidential administration remarks that in the mid‐1990s the euphoria prevalent among the post‐communist countries, which 'sought economic partners only in the West', ended in disappointment. The Belarusian leadership paid attention to different models demonstrated by 'China, India and Vietnam', which modified their economy 'without destruction' (V.V. Shinkarev, 'V interesakh naroda i gosudarstva: Belorusskaya model' razvitiya', Informatsionnyi byulleten' Administratsii Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus', 2001, 6(61), p. 59). For example see Aleksandr Lukashenka, 'Filosofiya nyneshnei vlasti prosta i ponyatna: ne pravit' narodom, a sluzhit' emu (The philosophy of the present authorities is simple and clear: Do not govern the people, but serve them)', Belaruskaya Dumka, 1997, 3, pp. 3–8. Interview with Z.K. Lomat', Chairman of the Slutsk County Executive Committee, Minsk oblast', 8 September 2001, Slutsk city. The lower chamber considered that President Lukashenka's term began not from his election in 1994 but from the constitutional amendment in 1996; see Yas' Pytsik, 'Narod mae prava!', Epokha: Chaspis belaruski, 1999, 2, pp. 5–8. Lukashenka gained 75.62% of the eligible vote; the turnout was 83.85% (Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 11 September 2002, p. 1). 'Zakon RB "Ob Operativno‐rozysknoi deyatel'nosti" ', Natsional'nyi reestr pravovykh aktov Respubliki Belarus' (henceforth NR), 1999, 57, 4 August, pp. 9–21, in particular, Article 2. Internet site 'Show Trials against the Belarusian Upper Elites under President Lukashenka', http://src‐h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/showtrials/index.html. Internet site 'Politicheskaya elita v regionakh Belarusi', http://src‐h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/belregions/index.html. BelaPAN, 17 August 1999, www.irex.minsk.by/promedia/who/main.asp. Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, 14 December 1999, pp. 4–5. Dekret of the president of Belarus', issued 23 November 1999, 'O nekotorykh merakh po vozmeshcheniyu ushcherba, prochinennogo gosudarstvu', NR, 1999, No. 91, 10 December, p. 8. Fortunately, this amazing decree lost its validity as early as 2000. Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, 27 March 2001, p. 1. See Vladimir Rovdo, 'Formirovanie, razvitie i sliyanie sudebnykh organov i prokurorskogo nadzora, struktur ekonomicheskogo kontrolya i organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti v Respublike Belarus', 1994–2002 gg.', http://src‐h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/wpbp/merging.pdf. In Russia the system of appointing territorial chief executives operated during 1991–96. In Ukraine this system operated during 1992–94, was abolished in 1994, but reintroduced in 1995. Reforma sistemy gosudarstvennogo upravleniya i rol' mestnykh organov vlasti v preodolenii krizisa. (Materialy soveshchaniya predsedatelei oblastnykh, gorodskikh (gorodov oblastnogo podchineniya) i raionnykh Sovetov deputatov) 16 sentyabrya 1994 g. (Minsk, 1994), pp. 9–10. According to Lukashenka, 'it is necessary to reintroduce the system to control the obligatory realisation of the decisions of the higher organs of power by the lower ones. Only in the time of feudalism was it possible to live without a centralised system of administration' (p. 10). V. Drits, A. Karamyshev & M. Kobasa, Mestnoe upravlenie i samoupravlenie v Belarus (Minsk, 2000), p. 21. Article 119 of the Belarusian and Clause 10, Article 106 of the Ukrainian Constitution. 'Zakon RB "O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Zakon RB 'O mestnom upravlenii i samoupravlenii v Respublike Belarus' " ', 10 January 2000, NR, 2000, 8, 26 January, pp. 12–35. Although the president signed this law in January 2000, Belarusian jurists usually call this the 1999 revision since the parliament adopted it in December 1999. Zakon of Ukraine, 4 April 1999, 'Pro mistsevi derzhavni administratsii', Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, 1999, 20–21, Item 190; in particular see Article 10. Titarenko, 'The Walls That Have Yet to Fall', p. 242. Remarkably, in Belarus as many as 40% of respondents 'trust the president to resolve economic problems'. Although this organisation was renamed several times during the 20 years after its foundation, we will rely on this original name to avoid confusion. Dainova (Dainava in Lithuanian) is the name of a medieval Baltic tribe. Belarusian nationalist historiography argues that this tribe was assimilated into Belarusians. Presidential decree, 7 October 1996, No. 401, Sobranie dekretov, ukazov Prezidenta i postanovlenii pravitel'stva Respubliki Belarus', 1996, 28, St. 736. Interview with L.M. Litskevich, director, and V.A. Korotkevich, Head of the Control Tower and Customs Office of BMC, 25 and 27 December 2002, Baranovich city. Interview with V.V. Petruchenya, law consultant of BMC, 27 December 2002, Baranovich city. Polozhenie issued by the Belarusian Ministry of Economy on 22 April 1999, No. 43, 'O poryadke formirovaniya i primeneniya tsen i tarifov', NR, 1999, 39, 28 May, pp. 61–71. Interview with Litskevich, 25 December 2002. Dekret of the President of the Republic of Belarus, 18 July 2002, No. 17, 'O nekotorykh voprosakh regulirovaniya oplaty truda rabotnikov'. This decree was made concrete by the postanovlenie of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, 23 August 2002, No. 1144. Valerii Karbalevich, 'Belarus': God v usloviyakh avtoritarnogo rezhima', Adkrytae hramadstva, 1998, 3 (105), p. 8. For example, Plitsko characterises the weak points of the opposition parties in Belarus as 'inability to analyse the political situation; incompetence to work out strategies and tactics, which might have outdone the authorities' actions; skirmishes amongst themselves to strengthen positions within the democratic camp, instead of unifying for important political purposes; lack of systematic collaboration with independent mass media and also of effective programmes to influence young people, women and pensioners; internal contradictions caused by violations of the norms of intra‐party democracy; insufficient attention to the creation of organisational structures in regions and lack of systematic work with them. The list of errors made by these parties can be lengthened endlessly. But perhaps the most significant elements lacking among these parties are professionalism, the will to victory, and the belief in their own might' (M.K. Plitsko, Politichekie partii: Belarus' i sovremennyi mir (Minsk, 2002), p. 135); see also Contemporary Belarus, pp. 7, 8, 12–13 and 38. Yurii Zagumennov, 'Izolyatsiya ili sotrudnichestvo?', Analiticheskii byulleten' belorusskikh fabrik mysli, 2001, 3 (14), pp. 28–29. S"ezd deputatov Sovetov deputatov Respubliki Belarus': Dokumenty i materialy. Minsk. 29 sentyabrya 2000 g. (Minsk, 2000), pp. 173–174. Interview with M.P. Sosonko, deputy of the lower chamber of parliament, chairman of the Commission for State Building, Local Self‐Government and Regulation, 6 September 2001, Minsk city. Four days before the voting day for the 2001 presidential election the pro‐presidential newspaper Sovetskaya Belorussiya published detailed examples of the financial, organisational and methodological reliance of the Belarusian opposition on foreign organisations, above all the Constitutional Observation Group of the OSCE (Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 5 September 2001, pp. 2–3). Even if most Belarusian citizens do not share Lukashenka's fanatical xenophobia and security mania, these reports spread the impression that the opposition is not rooted in Belarusian society. Anatolii Lysyuk, 'Regional'naya gosudarstvennaya vlast' kak sub"ekt politicheskoi zhizni Belarusi', Analiticheskii byulleten' belorusskikh fabrik mysli, 2001, 1 (12), p. 28.