New terrorist threat to India's internal security: the danger from Pakistan's “Karachi Project”
2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 30; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/14751798.2014.924738
ISSN1475-1801
Autores Tópico(s)Health and Conflict Studies
ResumoAbstractThe spectacular commando-style terrorist strike on Mumbai in November 2008 exposed India's lax internal security structure. As nearly all the security apparatus broke down during the long spell of attacks, massive public outrage flared up across the country calling for a firmer government response. Shockingly, India has done little to prevent a recurrence and a new security threat faces the country every single day not merely before but even after the Mumbai attacks. In contrast, Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence and the Lashkar-e-Taiba have successfully evaded pressures from both India and the international community and continue their terror campaign against India under the “Karachi Project” with the explicit intention to unsettle South Asia. Classified documents indicated that India is at the forefront of a cataclysmic “nuclear terrorism” threat from a “combination of Pakistan-based terrorists and homegrown radicals.” This article analyses the danger posed by the Indo-Pak radical groups targeting India and India's lack of preparedness to the new security threat from the “Karachi Project.”Keywords: Lashkar-e-TaibaInter Services Intelligence“Karachi Project”the Indian MujahideenIndia's Internal SecurityDifa-e-Pakistan Notes1. Ministry of Defence, Collated Data from War Casualty List (Delhi: Government of India, 2009).2. From 1990 to 2011, in Jammu and Kashmir alone 21, 323 militants were killed by security forces, 13,226 civilians were killed by militants, 3642 civilians were killed by the security forces and 5369 policemen were killed by the militants. The rest of the casualties occurred in other parts of India, Home Department, 2011, Internal Security, Crime, Law and Order, Government of Jammu and Kashmir; Annual Reports, Departments of Internal Security, States, Home, Jammu & Kashmir Affairs and Border Management (Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2013), 5, 6, 18.3. Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons (London: Walker and Co., 2007), 239–43.4. M.K. Dhar, ISI-CIA-Al Qaeda Nexus (New Delhi: Manas Publication, 2006), 65.5. The abatement of terror act continued; South Asian Terrorism Portal, 2014, India Fatalities: 1994–2004, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/indiafatalities.htm (accessed April 27, 2014).6. Saroj Kumar Rath, ‘Lurking Attacks on India: Finding and Fighting Terrorists’, Global Asia 5, no. 2 (2010): 109.7. Saroj Rath, Fragile Frontiers: The Secret History of Mumbai Terror Attacks (London: Routledge Publication, 2014).8. David H. Petraeus, ‘US Senate, Committee on Armed Services’, Washington, DC, June 29, 2010.9. Syed Saleem Shahzad, ‘Ceasefire Will not Hold, with Same Game, New Rules’, South Asia Tribune, no. 69 (November 30–December 6, 2003).10. Syed Saleem Shahzad, ‘Pakistan-India: Same Game, New Rules’, Asia Times, November 27, 2003.11. Ali K. Chisti, ‘Quetta Shura is now Karachi Shura’, Daily Times, January 20, 2011; Shahzad, ‘Ceasefire Will not Hold, with Same Game, New Rules’.12. Shashi Shekhar, ‘The Karachi Project’, The Pioneer, January 5, 2010.13. Denis Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf (accessed March 2, 2011).14. Saroj Kumar Rath, Fragile Frontiers: The Secret History of Mumbai Terror Attacks (London: Routledge Publication, 2014), 138.15. Bharti Jain, ‘IM suspect, Pune Could be Part of Karachi Project’, Economic Times, February 16, 2010.16. After 2003, Gen. Musharraf liberated the 2000 odd militants arrested after his 12 January 2002 speech. After the Lal Masjid operation of 2007, Musharraf was almost cornered by the terrorists; Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos (London: Penguin Publication, 2008), 225; Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism (New Delhi: Pentagon Press 2005).17. Ministry of Home, National Investigation Agency Report on David Coleman Headley, June 10, 2010, 25.18. Headley informed his interrogators during various sessions that Major Hashim has devised the “Karachi Project” when he was in the army. During his army career he was deputed to LeT as a trainer and after some time he developed differences with LeT and moved to Ilyas Kashmiri; Ministry of Home Affairs, National Investigation Agency Report on David Coleman Headley, June 10, 2010, 15, 24, 53, 96–97.19. Northern District Court of Illinois, USA Vs. Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed. CR 830, No 09, Eastern Division, October 7, 2009, 7.20. Ministry of Home, National Investigation Agency Report on David Coleman Headley, 53.21. Ali K. Chisti, ‘Quetta Shura is now Karachi Shura’, Daily Times, January 20, 2011.22. This understanding is testified by the profile of Major Hashim, his participation with ISI, LeT, HuJI, Al-Qaeda and Jund-ul Fida; Northern District Court of Illinois, USA Vs. Ilyas Kashmiri, Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed, David Coleman Headley, Tahawwur Hussain Rana. No. 09 CR 830, US District Court, Eastern Division, 2009; Northern District Court of Illinois, USA Vs. Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed; Syed Saleem Shahzad, Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond bin Laden and 9/11 (London: Pluto Press, 2011) 80–90; Ministry of Home, National Investigation Agency Report on David Coleman Headley.23. David Headley was explicit in his explanation to the NIA; Ministry of Home, National Investigation Agency Report on David Coleman Headley, 29–36.24. Denis Blair, ‘Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community’, for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington DC, February 3, 2010, 19.25. US Senate, US Select Committee on Intelligence, 111th Congress, Washington DC, February 2, 2010, 37; Sandeep Unnithan, ‘The Karachi Project’, India Today, February 18, 2010.26. Ministry of Home, National Investigation Agency Report on David Coleman Headley.27. Then Home Secretary of India, Mr G.K. Pillai quoted in Sandeep Unnithan, ‘The Karachi Project’, India Today, February 18, 2010.28. Interview of Syed Saleem Shahzad with Major Haroon, who was a SSG officer in the Pakistan Army before his deputation to the LeT. Major Haroon later joined hands with Al-Qaeda; as quoted in Shahzad, Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban, 101–102.29. My emphasis.30. Vishwa Mohan, ‘ISI even has a “Nepal set-up: Headley”’, Times of India, October 27, 2010.31. Author's interview with a senior police officer from Kashmir, Mr Vidhi Kumar Virdi, in Srinagar, April 20, 2010.32. National Investigation Agency, Chargesheet in Case No.RC-06/2012/NIA-DLI (New Delhi: Patialia House Special NIA Court, 2014).33. Confidential Memorandum, Undated, Briefing for Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (claimed to be sent to Mullen on May 10, 2011); Mansoor Ijaz, ‘Time to take on Pakistan's Jihadist Spies’, Financial Times, October 10, 2011.34. Ibid.35. National Investigation Agency, Interrogation Report of David Coleman Headley, June 10, 2010, 100; National Investigation Agency, Case No.RC-08/2010/NIA-DLI, Hyderabad, July 22, 2010.36. 90% of terrorist organizations have a life span of less than one year; and of those that make it to a year, more than half disappear within a decade; David Rapoport, ‘Terrorism’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, vol. 2., ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (London: Routledge Publication, 1992), 1067; Steven Hutchison and Pat O’ Malley, How Terrorist Groups Decline, Trends in Terrorism Series, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Carleton University, 2007).37. C. Christine Fair, Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Attack Upon Several Targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai, Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee. Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, March 11, 2009.38. For discussion on ISI's support to terrorist organization, see Rashid, Descent into Chaos.39. Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 154; C. Christine Fair, Lashkar-e-Taiba beyond Bin Laden: Enduring Challenges for the Region and the International Community, Testimony prepared for the US Senate, Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, May 24, 2011, 24.40. Delhi High Court, Union of India Vs Students Islamic Movement of India, March 26, 99 (2002) DLT 147, 2002 (63) DRJ 563, 2002, 1.41. V.S. Subrahmanian, et al., Indian Mujahideen: Computational Analysis and Public Policy (New Delhi: Springer, 2013), 29.42. Ministry of Home Affairs, Vide notification No.S.O.960 (E), under Section 4(1) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, September 27, 2001.43. Gilbert King, The Most Dangerous Man in the World: Dawood Ibrahim (New York: Chamberlain Brothers, 2004), 29.44. Praveen Swami, ‘Riyaz Bhatkal and the Origin of Indian Mujahideen’, CTC Sentinel 3 (2010): 2.45. Ministry of Home Affairs, Charge sheet in Case No.RC-06/2012/NIA-DLI, September 10, 2012.46. Ibid.47. National Investigation Agency, Interrogation Report of Yasin Bhatkal, Delhi, December 2013.48. Some of these attacks included the major bomb blast incidents in Hyderabad (2007), Jaipur (2008), Delhi (2008), Ahmedabad and Surat (2008), German Bakery (2010), Chinnaswami Stadium, Bangalore (2010), Jama Masjid (2010), Sheetlaghat (2010), Mumbai (2011) and Dilsukhnagar, Hyderabad (2013); National Investigation Agency (2013). Press Note, February 20, 2013.49. National Investigation Agency, Interrogation Report of Yasin Bhatkal.50. National Investigation Agency, Interrogation Report of David Coleman Headley, 82; National Investigation Agency, Case No.RC-08/2010/NIA-DLI.51. Saroj Kumar Rath, Fragile Frontiers: The Secret History of Mumbai Terror Attacks (London: Routledge Publication, 2014), XVI.52. Neeraj Chauhan, ‘ISI gave Rs 26 cr to Riyaz Bhatkal for anti-India operations: Agencies’, Times of India, March 31, 2014.53. Asif Ibrahim, Centre Admitted IM can Carry out Terror Acts at Short Notice, DNA, November 22, 2013.54. Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2012–13, Departments of Internal Security, States, Home Jammu & Kashmir Affairs and Border Management, 2013.55. Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010, Banned Organization, http://www.mha.nic.in/BO (accessed April 23, 2014).56. Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, Terror Strikes Mumbai: The World Reacts, December 4, 2008; Overseas Research Foundation, Delhi, undated, ‘Mumbai Attacks: Response & Lessons’; Summerjit Ghosh, Mumbai Terror Attacks: An Analysis (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2008).57. India Today, Frontline, Outlook, Times of India, DNA, the Pioneer, the Tribune, the Hindu, Indian Express and Hindustan Times to mention a few.
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