The political economy of economic reform in North Korea
2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 63; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/10357710903312587
ISSN1465-332X
Autores ResumoAbstract For over 10 years, North Korea has undergone a severe economic crisis, including food shortages, which has inflicted great suffering upon the North Korean people. Given such dire realities, it is beyond all doubt that the North Korean government should actively carry out comprehensive economic reforms as quickly as possible which aim to transform North Korea's present inefficient socialist planned economic system into a market economic system. Many argue that such reforms would give rise to successful economic growth in North Korea, which could enhance the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. Yet, the North Korean regime has consistently avoided implementing economic reforms, even though it has had a number of opportunities to do so. The July 1st reforms, which were introduced in 2002, have been half-hearted and inconsistently applied. This then raises an important question: Why has the North Korean government avoided adopting comprehensive economic reforms? In other words, what is the crucial barrier that has hindered North Korea's implementation of economic reforms? This article pinpoints North Korea's unique political system—i.e. its monolithic system of political control and policy making which exhibits the highest level of power concentration in one individual among all political systems—as the biggest barrier to economic reforms. No doubt North Korea desperately needs comprehensive economic reforms, in light of its economic crisis and food shortages. Nonetheless, the current North Korean regime has avoided adopting such reforms since they will undermine North Korea's monolithic system. In conclusion, North Korea's monolithic system has been the biggest obstacle to North Korea's economic reforms. Notes 1. In the present study, North Korea refers to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and South Korea the Republic of Korea (ROK). 2. In 2002, it was estimated that only 20 percent of all factories in North Korea were operative (Ha 2004 Ha , Sang Sik , 2004 . 'Bookhan kyeongjae-ui gaehyeok jeonmang' [The prospect of North Korean economic reforms] Hankook dongbooka nonchong [Journal of North-East Asian Studies] 32 : 131 57 . [Google Scholar]: 146). 3. At a UNICEF conference held in Beijing in May 2001, North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Choi Su Hon reported that between 1995 and 1998 about 220,000 people had died from starvation. The World Food Programme estimated that 1 million people died from hunger. Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) estimated that between 1995 and 1998 some 3.5 million people lost their lives due to starvation or disease (KINU 2004 KINU (Korea Institute for National Unification) , 2004 . White paper on human rights in North Korea 2004 , < www.kinu.or.kr/kinu/sc/skin/kinu/data/file/data04/data/2004e.PDF> (accessed 28 January 2008) . [Google Scholar]: 39). 4. 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Kim Il Sung indeed successfully transferred his power to his son, Kim Jong Il, far before his death. Likewise, Kim Jong Il is also reported to be preparing to hand over his power to one of his three sons—Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Chul and Kim Jong Un—at present (New York Times 2005 New York Times , 2005 . 'North Korea is said to plan for dynasty's next generation' , 1 February . [Google Scholar]; Times Online 2005). As of 2009, Kim Jong Nam, the oldest son, is 38 years old, while Kim Jong Chul and Kim Jong Un are 28 and 26, respectively. 14. The festival was held in an attempt to rival the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and the North Korean government spent approximately US$5 billion during the three years of preparation, which was roughly 23 percent of North Korea's gross national product at that time (Ha 1997: 169). 15. The official standpoint of the North Korean government, as far as opening is concerned, has always been to stop the inflow of the market as much as possible, though receiving capital and technologies from the West. Such a strategy is often called the 'mosquito-net-style opening'. Additional informationNotes on contributorsYong-Soo ParkYong-Soo Park is Associate Professor at the College of International Studies, Korea Maritime University, Busan, South Korea
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