THE PROSLOGION IN RELATION TO THE MONOLOGION
2008; Wiley; Volume: 50; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1468-2265.2008.00412.x
ISSN1468-2265
Autores Tópico(s)Classical Philosophy and Thought
ResumoThe Proslogion (1077/1078) by Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) is famous for the proof of God's existence presented in its Ch. 2, known as the earliest formulation of the ontological argument. Even though Anselm's proof continues to intrigue those with a philosophical bent, it is not the ontological argument alone that makes the Proslogion so fascinating – the most fascinating work within the history of philosophical theology, I would say. An important part of the charm of the Proslogion comes from the puzzles and interpretational problems that it poses to the reader. At the root of these puzzles is the peculiar combination of argumentation and devotion that the treatise exhibits. Unlike Anselm's first treatise, the Monologion (1076), which is based on an explicitly rational method, the Proslogion is a devotional exercise in which the person who speaks attempts to elevate his or her mind to the contemplation of God in prayer. Even though one need not agree with a recent author who calls this ‘the strangest and least well-fitting frame imaginable’1 1 Fendt, Gene, ‘ The Relation of Monologion and Proslogion’, The Heythrop Journal 46 (2005), pp. 149– 66 (here p. 158). Even though the present article has been inspired by Fendt's essay, it should not be seen as a reply to it but as an attempt to see the same issues from a different perspective. for a purely rational proof, it must be said that the combination is extraordinary and calls for explanation. It is no wonder that the nature of Anselm's endeavour in the Proslogion continues to be a controversial issue.2 2 Of the vast secondary literature related to Anselm's Proslogion, I would like to mention: M. J. Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion with a Reply on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo and the Author's Reply to Gaunilo. Translated with an Introduction and Philosophical Commentary by M. J. Charlesworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); J. Hick and A. C. McGill (eds.), The Many-Faced Argument: Recent Studies on the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Richard Campbell, From Belief to Understanding: A Study of Anselm's Proslogion Argument on the Existence of God (Canberra: Australian National University, 1976); Gregory Schufreider, Confessions of a Rational Mystic: Anselm's Early Writings (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1994). In B. Davies and B. Leftow (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), there are several articles which are relevant: G. R. Evans, ‘Anselm's Life, Works, and Immediate Influence’, pp. 5–31; Marilyn McCord Adams, ‘Anselm on Faith and Reason’, pp. 32–60; Gareth Matthews, ‘Anselm, Augustine, and Platonism’, pp. 61–83; Brian Leftow, ‘Anselm's Perfect-Being Theology’, pp. 132–56; Brian Davies, ‘Anselm and the Ontological Argument’, pp. 157–78. Here, I shall sketch a new interpretation of the Proslogion which aims at explicating the relation between argument and devotion in it.3 3 Cf. Adams, ‘Anselm on Faith’, pp. 34–8, 50–2. I shall maintain that the Proslogion should be read as a subtle attempt to justify the kind of rational approach that Anselm had used in the Monologion, and that the combination of argumentation and devotion is designed to serve this end. I shall first offer a brief discussion of the Monologion and of what Anselm says about the relation of his first two treatises. The second part will focus on the ‘single argument’ (unum argumentum) which, according to the Preface to the Proslogion, is at the core of the argumentation in this treatise. Thirdly, I shall highlight some aspects of the devotional exercise in the Proslogion and the role of the single argument in it. In the last part, a historical sketch will be offered which relates the Monologion and the Proslogion to conflicting views about theological method in Anselm's environment. When modern commentators refer to Anselm's first treatise as background for their discussion of the Proslogion, they usually treat two issues, viz. Anselm's method in the Monologion, and Ch. 1–4 of the treatise interpreted as a series of arguments for God's existence. The first issue is clear. Because the Preface and Ch. 1 of the Monologion contain some explicit and emphatic remarks about the rational method to be used in the treatise, there is not much room for error about that matter. Anselm's intention is to proceed ‘by reason alone’ (M 1, S I, 13; HR 7)4 4 In the short references included in the text, the abbreviations M, P and R refer to Anselm's Monologion, Proslogion and Responsio (=Quid ad haec respondeat editor ipsius libelli), respectively. For example, M 1 refers to Ch. 1 of the Monologion. For the Latin text of Anselm's writings, I have used the Opera omnia edition by F. S. Schmitt (6 vols., Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946–1961). For the English text, I have used the Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, tr. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Minneapolis: Banning Press, 2000), often silently or explicitly modifying it. The abbreviation S refers to Schmitt's edition and the abbreviation HR to the translation by Hopkins and Richardson. For example, ‘S I, 13; HR 7’ refers to p. 13 in vol. I of Schmitt's edition and p. 7 in the English translation. and ‘nothing at all in the meditation would be argued on Scriptural authority’ (M, Preface, HR 1). The second issue is more problematic. Because the ontological argument is what interests modern readers in the Proslogion, it is understandable that they also look for arguments for God's existence in Anselm's first treatise – assuming that these are the ‘chain of many arguments’ that Anselm will mention in the Preface to the Proslogion (HR 88). This is unfortunate because one thus gets a distorted idea of the content of the Monologion. It is true that Ch. 1–4 of the treatise aim at establishing an existence claim: their burden is to prove that there is a Supreme Being. However, Anselm did not see this as an argument for God's existence but as an initial phase in an extensive argument for the Christian understanding of God. It is only in the last chapter of the Monologion, i.e. Ch. 80, that Anselm considers God's existence as proven (M 80, HR 86). Before he arrives at this conclusion, he has established to his satisfaction that the Supreme Being whose existence is proved in Ch. 1–4 has created everything else from nothing (M 5–14), has the properties that the Divine Essence is believed to have (M 15–28), consists of a Father, a Son, and their Spirit (M 29–63), and is the proper object of human-or-angelic love, hope and faith (M 66–78). Anselm's Monologion is a bold attempt at reconstructing the basic tenets in the Christian idea of God (and of the creation in relation to God) on a purely rational basis – leaving out the Incarnation, though, as Anselm will later remark (see next paragraph). Fifteen years later, Anselm would refer to his first two treatises as follows: Still, if anyone will deign to read my two short works, viz., the Monologion and the Proslogion (which I wrote especially in order [to show] that what we hold by faith regarding the divine nature and its persons – excluding the topic of incarnation – can be proven by compelling reasons apart from [appeal to] the authority of Scripture) … (De incarnatione verbi 6, S II, 20; HR 279) This remark confirms the characterisation of the nature and scope of the Monologion that was just presented. The remark is also important for the reason that it reveals some important aspects of how Anselm saw the relation between the Monologion and the Proslogion. He lets us understand that the two treatises have a common objective: they aim at showing that what Christians believe about the Divine Essence and the three Trinitarian persons can be proved by compelling reasons without appealing to the authority of Scripture. From this it follows that the Monologion and the Proslogion share the same point of departure. In spite of some superficial differences, both works aim at presenting compelling reasons not based on authority. The Monologion and the Proslogion appear here as two parts of the same project with a one common objective and a common methodology.5 5 In regard to the theological subject matter that Anselm specifies in De incarnatione verbi 6, it is the Monologion that meets the description better. In the Proslogion there is only one chapter about the Trinity, viz. Ch. 23, and in it the Trinitarian nature of God is rather assumed than argued for. In the Monologion, Anselm uses more than a third of the work (M 29–63) to establish that there is a Trinitarian structure within the Supreme Being. In his joint characterisation of the two treatises, Anselm describes what they jointly establish on the basis of a common methodology. This is also the idea that one gets from the Preface to the Proslogion. As in the passage from the De incarnatione verbi, Anselm here treats the Monologion and the Proslogion as a pair of works, but in addition he makes some comparisons between them and, equally important, fails to make some other comparisons. The best known of the comparisons concerns the complexity of argumentation: the Monologion was ‘composed of a chain of many arguments’ whereas the Proslogion aims at introducing ‘a single argument’ (P, Preface, S I, 93; HR 88 modified).6 6 Hopkins and Richardson translate unum argumentum as ‘a single consideration’– for the reason that they find the rendering ‘single argument’ misleading, it would seem. As already anticipated, there is no reason to assume that the expression ‘a chain of many arguments’ refers to Monologion 1–4. It is best understood as referring to the complexity of the arguments in the Monologion as a whole. There are also many misunderstandings around about Anselm's single argument; I shall deal with that issue below (Part II). At this point, let us focus on a comparison Anselm fails to make. When Anselm points out a difference in the complexity of argumentation and fails to mention a difference in the point of departure in the argumentation, the reader will assume that there is no difference regarding this latter, more fundamental issue. In other words, the Preface to the Proslogion induces the reader to think that the single argument will be based ‘on reason alone’ in the same way as the many arguments in the first treatise. And this is the way Anselm wanted it to be. Anselm was very conscious of methodological issues, as the remarks in the Monologion already show, so there is no reason to doubt that he was aware of this presupposition in the comparison related to the complexity of argumentation. But what about the fact that the Proslogion is a devotional exercise? Does it not follow that the point of departure will be different? This takes us to the other important comparison between the Monologion and the Proslogion that Anselm makes in the Preface to the latter work. The Monologion was written ‘in the role of someone who by arguing silently with himself investigates what he does not yet know’ whereas the Proslogion was written ‘in the role of someone endeavouring to elevate his mind toward contemplating God and seeking to understand what he believes’ (P, Preface, HR 87–8). That is to say, the two treatises are different in the respect that the subject matter in them is treated from a different perspective. However, the Preface to the Proslogion makes one think of this difference as a difference in the mode of presentation. As far as the Preface to the Proslogion is concerned, one could freely switch the modes of presentation in the two works or instead use some other form (say, write a dialogue). The ‘point of departure’ in the Proslogion is different from that in the Monologion in the respect that the two works were composed from a different perspective, but this does not prevent there being a common point of departure on a deeper methodological level. In the Preface to the Proslogion, Anselm spends some time to describe his desperate quest for a single argument and how he finally discovered it to his great joy. By focussing on the unum argumentum, Anselm makes the reader curious and intent on learning what this argument is. If the reader pauses to reflect on what s/he has read, s/he will realise that the argument is meant to be a purely rational one and thus independent of the devotional mode of presentation that will be used in the Proslogion. When s/he continues reading, s/he may become bewildered, because there is not a word about ‘a single argument’ in the treatise. Anselm does not explicitly say what his single argument is, but the reader should gather it from what s/he reads. It is difficult to tell how much Anselm's contemporaries could usually gather of it. As for our contemporaries, there are many misunderstandings around, as already mentioned. Good discussions of Anselm's single argument are hard to find in the current literature, and the scholars who are on the right track have seldom pondered the consequences of the matter.7 7 For a short survey of the different views on the single argument, see Toivo J. Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 54 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), pp. 133–5. What is the single argument, then? It may be instructive to start from what it is not. First, the single argument is not an argument for God's existence. It is true that proving God's existence is part of what the single argument should be able to do, but its scope is essentially larger. In the Preface, Anselm says that the single argument would suffice by itself to demonstrate (1) that God truly [i.e., really] exists and (2) that He is the Supreme Good (needing no one else, yet needed by all [else] in order to exist and to fare well) and whatever [else] we believe about the Divine Substance. (P, Preface, S I, 93; HR 88) Because the single argument should prove not only God's existence but also ‘whatever we believe about the Divine Substance’, it would be a mistake to assume or claim that the ontological argument for God's existence – or the inference in Proslogion 2 (or 2–3) analysed in some other way – is Anselm's argument. Secondly, the single argument is not a piece of text that would actually be written down somewhere in the Proslogion, in the way the inference about God's existence is written down in Ch. 2 (or Ch. 2–3). There simply is no piece of text in the Proslogion that would do the job that the single argument is supposed to do. Instead of a piece of text on God's existence, then, we should look for something which is more general in scope and more basic in nature – some constant element that appears in various passages in the Proslogion and has the potential of achieving what the single argument should achieve. Several alternatives for this constant element can be suggested; I shall mention some that I find illuminating. First, the single argument could be an abstract argumentative idea, such as the ontological argument taken in the abstract. Secondly, the single argument could be an argumentative pattern which is used in a uniform manner in different passages in the Proslogion; the most plausible candidate for this kind of ‘argument’ would be the reductio ad absurdum in Ch. 2 and 3.8 8 P 2, S I, 101–2; HR 93–4: ‘But surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be only in the understanding. For if it were only in the understanding, it could be thought to exist also in reality – something which is greater [than existing only in the understanding]. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought were only in the understanding, then that than which a greater cannot be thought would be that than which a greater can be thought! But surely this [conclusion] is impossible. Hence, without doubt, something than which a greater cannot be thought exists both in the understanding and in reality.’P 3, S I, 102–3; HR 94. Thirdly, the single argument could be the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’, which plays a pivotal role in Anselm's reasoning. To begin with, a quick way to get the gist of Anselm's single argument is to think of a generalisation of the ontological argument for God's existence. Think of the notion of a perfect being. On pain of contradiction, a perfect being must have all the perfections, for if it lacks any one of them, then it will not be a perfect being. But the attributes of God are perfections. Therefore, a perfect being can be proved to have all the attributes of God. In this way, the ontological argument can be used to prove ‘whatever we believe about the Divine Substance’. To be sure, Anselm used neither the notion ‘perfect being’ nor the notion ‘perfection’. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the above generalisation of the ontological argument closely corresponds to how Anselm understood his single argument to function. Anselm's argumentation starts from the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’, and he believed that the attributes of God are of a kind that makes their bearer greater or more excellent. In the last section of his reply to Gaunilo, Responsio 10, Anselm offers what appears to be a short explication of his single argument (even though he does not mention the term ‘argument’ here): For the signification of this utterance [viz., ‘something than which a greater cannot be thought’] contains so much force that what is spoken of is, by the very fact that it is understood or thought, necessarily proved to exist in reality and to be whatever ought to be believed about the Divine Substance. For we believe about the Divine Substance whatever can in every respect be thought of as better [for something] to be than not to be. For example, it is better to be eternal than not to be eternal, better to be good than not to be good – or, rather, to be goodness itself than not to be goodness itself. But that than which something greater cannot be thought cannot fail to be anything of this kind. Therefore, it is necessarily the case that that than which a greater cannot be thought is whatever ought to be believed about the Divine Being. (R 10, S I, 138–9; HR 130–1) Gaunilo had directed his critique against Anselm's argument for God's existence in Proslogion 2–3, and Anselm had replied to that critique in Responsio 1–9. In the quoted passage, the focus is not on the argument for God's existence but on how it is possible to prove that God is ‘whatever ought to be believed about the Divine Substance’. Anselm explicitly says that ‘we believe about the Divine Substance whatever can in every respect be thought of as better [for something] to be than not to be’, and he explicitly says that ‘that than which something greater cannot be thought cannot fail to be anything of this kind.' It would be problematic to identify the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ with the notion of perfect being, and Anselm's list of attributes predicable of the Divine Essence would certainly be different from any given list of ‘perfections’. In spite of this, it is clear that the idea that Anselm describes in Responsio 10 has the same structure as the generalisation of the ontological argument sketched above. Even though Anselm does not refer to his reductio in the passage, it can obviously be used to establish the connection between the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ and the divine attributes. On pain of contradiction, that than which a greater cannot be thought must be ‘whatever can in every respect be thought of as better [for something] to be than not to be’, for if it lacks any such attribute, then it will not be that than which a greater cannot be thought. Anselm need not mention the reductio here because it was all too familiar to the readers by the time they had got as far as Responsio 10. In Responsio 10, Anselm points out a simple way of proving ‘whatever we believe about the Divine Substance’ in a uniform manner. The proof is based on the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ and an abstract argumentative idea related to it, and it is possible to use a reductio ad absurdum to spell out the proof. Where exactly does the single argument lie here? My answer would be twofold. On one hand, the single argument does not lie anywhere exactly but consists of a notion together with an argumentative idea and a pattern of argumentation. Strictly speaking, however, the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ should be identified as the single argument. First, Anselm says in Responsio 10 that his reasoning is based on the ‘force’ that the ‘signification’ of this notion contains. Secondly, in Responsio 5 Anselm uses the term argumentum to refer to the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ (R 5, S I, 135; cf. HR 126). Related to this, it can be shown that this way of using the term argumentum has a background in early medieval dialectic.9 9 See Holopainen, Toivo J., ‘ Anselm's Argumentum and the Early Medieval Theory of Argument’, Vivarium 45 (2007), 1– 29. Thirdly, it is not clear that Anselm's argument for God's existence in Proslogion 2 can be adequately analysed as an application of the argumentative strategy explained above. Namely, this proof consists of two stages, and only the second stage is a reductio. However, the first stage is also based on the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ and the force of its signification.10 10 P 2, S I, 101; HR 93: ‘But surely when this very same Fool hears my words ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’, he understands what he hears. And what he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand [i.e., judge] it to exist. For that a thing is in the understanding is distinct from understanding that [this] thing exists. … So even the Fool is convinced that something than which nothing greater can be thought is at least in his understanding; for when he hears of this [being], he understands [what he hears], and whatever is understood is in the understanding.' Further, the reductio ad absurdum pattern can hardly qualify as Anselm's single argument because he omits it in Responsio 10 and elsewhere, which shows that its use is optional. This analysis of the single argument is well suited to the reading of the Preface to the Proslogion that was presented above (Part I). First, it is clear that Anselm meant his argument as a purely rational one. The only suspicious part in the argument, from the point of view of (purported) rationality, is the set of presuppositions which the strategy assumes, saying that it is greater to be good than not good, eternal than not eternal, and so on. For Anselm, this was not a problem. In the Monologion, he claims that the ability to make correct value judgments belongs to the essence of rationality: Indeed, for a rational nature to be rational is nothing other than for it to be able to discriminate what is just from what is not just, what is true from what is not true, what is good from what is not good, what is more good from what is less good. (M 68, S I, 78; HR 78) Secondly, the analysis of the single argument is well suited to what was said about the different modes of presentation. One need not have much imagination to notice that the single argument can be used in a variety of ways for a variety of purposes. The reason why Anselm introduced his single argument within a devotional exercise is not that it would depend on the devotional exercise in respect of its validity or in some other way. However, the analysis also gives rise to a new problem. In the actual text of the Proslogion, the single argument is used five times. In addition to Ch. 2, it is used in Ch. 3, 5, 15 and 18 to argue that God, or that than which a greater cannot be thought, ‘cannot be thought not to exist’ (P 3, HR 94), is ‘that which – as highest of all things, alone existing through Himself – made all other things from nothing’ (P 5, HR 95), is ‘something greater than can be thought’ (P 15, HR 103) and is absolutely one and indivisible (P 18, HR 104–5).11 11 In Proslogion 18, the use of the single argument is less explicit than in the other cases. Anselm argues that some consequences are ‘foreign to You, than whom nothing better can be thought’ (HR 105). From these scattered instances of the single argument within a devotional exercise, it is very difficult indeed to get a clear view of the argument – particularly so if one does not have the Preface and the Responsio at one's disposal, which was the case for the very first readers of the Proslogion (see Part IV below). If Anselm's aim in the Proslogion was to introduce the single argument, and if there was a variety of ways available for doing it, why did Anselm choose to do it in such an opaque way? To get clarity to this issue, let us first study the devotional exercise in the Proslogion and then look at the historical context of this treatise. In the current literature, two different attitudes toward the devotional exercise in the Proslogion are common. First, there are those writers who give it a polite nod and then neglect it. In contrast, there are those who venerate it and speculate about its significance for the interpretation of Anselm's argument for God's existence. Few attempts have been made to actually analyse the devotional exercise in the Proslogion from the point of view of philosophical theology.12 12 See Schufreider, Confessions, esp. pp. 97–112, 174–5, 187–230; Adams, ‘Anselm on Faith’, pp. 34–8, 50–2. I shall next offer a brief sketch of some aspects of the exercise and comment on the role of the single argument in it.13 13 See also Toivo J. Holopainen, ‘Anselm's Proslogion as an Attempt at Contemplating God', in C. Viola and J. Kormos (eds.), Rationality from Saint Augustine to Saint Anselm (Piliscsaba, Hungary: Pázmány Péter Catholic University, 2005), pp. 185–95. In the Preface to the Proslogion, Anselm says that he wrote the treatise in the double role of ‘someone endeavouring to elevate his mind toward contemplating God and seeking to understand what he believes’ (HR 88). What does Anselm mean by contemplation of God, and what is the relation between contemplation and faith's search for understanding? ‘Contemplating’ refers to some kind of mental seeing or looking at – seeing or looking at with the ‘eye of the mind’ (cf. P 18, HR 105). An attempt at contemplating God is, hence, an attempt at seeing God. It turns out that two kinds of contemplating God are relevant for the exercise in the Proslogion. By ‘contemplation of God’, we can refer to a direct vision of God, on one hand, and to an intellectual contemplation of truths about God, on the other. The two types of contemplation play a constitutive role in the devotional exercise in the Proslogion, from the first chapter to the last, and their role is particularly prominent in Ch. 1, 14–18 and 24–26. The latter type of contemplation, i.e., intellectual vision of truths about God, is closely related to the understanding which faith seeks. The devotional exercise in the Proslogion begins with an ‘Arousal of the mind for contemplating God’ (P 1, chapter-title, HR 90). What kind of contemplation is it that the mind is aroused for? From the early parts of Ch. 1, one gains the impression that the contemplation that is sought is a vision of God Himself. The person who prays sets out to seek God, but s/he laments that s/he does not know how to look for Him. S/he knows that God dwells in ‘light inaccessible’ (lux inaccessibilis, HR 90; 1 Tim. 6:16), but s/he does not know how to approach this light so that s/he may behold God in it. As a matter of fact, the vision of God is man's end, but the person who prays has not achieved this end: ‘I was made for seeing You; but not yet have I done that for which I was made’ (ad te videndum factus sum - et nondum feci, propter quod factus sum) (P 1, S I, 98; HR 91). At this point, the reader will assume that the aim of the exercise is the vision of God which is man's end. Towards the end of Ch. 1, however, the aim is expressed much more moderately. The person who prays does not dare to strive ‘to penetrate [God's] heights’ (penetrare altitudinem tuam, S I, 100; cf. HR 93), for the reason that his or her intellect is in no way equal to it. Instead, s/he is satisfied to ‘look upward toward [God's] light’, even if it were ‘from afar or from the deep’ (HR 92), and s/he yearns ‘to understand [God's] truth to some extent’ (aliquatenus intelligere veritatem tuam; cf. HR 93). The chapter ends with the well-known lines on faith seeking understanding. Here, the aspiration of contemplating God appears to collapse into the aspiration of understanding that which is believed. The person who prays yearns to be able to contemplate God by contemplating truths about Him–truths that s/he now only believes but also wants to understand or ‘see’. In the chapters that follow, Anselm introduces and makes use of his single argument, ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’. Familiarity with this argument should give one a whole new outlook on the Divine Essence. The notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ can be used to prove God's existence and to establish the connection between God and His attributes (see Part II above), and the connection established is not only necessary but also evident. Therefore, the single argument allows on
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