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“(Mis)interpreting Threats: A Case Study of the Korean War”

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 16; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09636410701399457

1556-1852

Alexander Ovodenko,

Intelligence, Security, War Strategy

Abstract During the fall of 1950, many American national security officials concluded that the Chinese Communists would refrain from undertaking full-scale intervention in the Korean War. Contrary to most secondary accounts, however, officials who doubted that Communist China would intervene nonetheless drew increasingly worrisome signs from incoming verbal threats and intelligence signals. A small minority of officials in the State Department expressed considerable concern over the dangers of having United Nations forces cross into North Korea and approach the Yalu River. This growing concern and the minority of opposing voices, however, did not override the prevailing judgment—held by hawkish members of the State Department and the CIA as a whole—that China would more likely increase covert involvement in the Korean War, but would not undertake full-scale military intervention. Theories of biased assimilation and risk-taking practices have divergent success in predicting American reactions to the threat. Only further archival research can shed light on how this case of American strategic surprise comports with these theories. Alexander Ovodenko will become a graduate student in political science this fall. For invaluable feedback on earlier versions of this article, he thanks Walter LaFeber, Matthew Evangelista, Fredrik Logevall, Chen Jian, Deborah Larson, two anonymous reviewers for Security Studies, and the editors of Security Studies. He also thanks the Cornell University Department of History for providing research funding, as well as archivists at the Truman Library, MacArthur Memorial, and Marshall Foundation who helped him acquire copies of primary sources cited in the article. Notes 1. American officials commonly used this term to refer to the Chinese Communist leadership in the documents referenced in this study. The same meaning applies here. 2. Allen Whiting and Harvey de Weerd first presented this argument. See Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1960); and Harvey de Weerd, “Strategic Surprise and the Korean War,” Orbis 6, no. 4 (Fall 1962): 435–52. 3. See, in particular, Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 183–235. Walter Zelman provides a similar explanation in Walter Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War: A Bilateral Failure of Deterrence, Security Studies Paper No. 11, (Los Angeles: University of California-Los Angeles, 1967). 4. Richard Ned Lebow, “Conclusions,” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 203–32. 5. George Poteat, “Strategic Intelligence and National Security: A Case Study of the Korean Crisis (June 25-November 24, 1950)” (Ph.D. diss., Washington University, St. Louis, MO, 1973); George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy; Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Jan Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950's (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Also see Jennifer Milliken, The Social Construction of the Korean War (British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press, 2001). 6. George H. Poteat, “The Intelligence Gap: Hypotheses on the Process of Surprise,” International Studies Notes 3, no. 3 (Fall 1976), 14–18. 7. Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1983); Barton J. Bernstein, “The Policy of Risk: Crossing the 38th Parallel and Marching to the Yalu,” Foreign Service Journal 54, no. 3 (March 1977), 16–22, 29. 8. Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). 9. William Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947–1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981). 10. William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 11. Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 12. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 13. Kennan to Acheson, 26 June 1950, box 24, folder 10, Papers of George F. Kennan, Mudd Library, Princeton University. 14. Kennan to Acheson, 27 June 1950, box 24, folder 11, Papers of George F. Kennan, Mudd Library, Princeton University. 15. American officials commonly referred to the Korean War as a limited war during the first month of combat. 16. Minutes of Meetings of the National Security Council (Fredrick, MD: University Publications of America, 1982), reel 1, 321. Acheson reiterated this point about China to President Truman in a memo dated 11 September. See Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), vol. 7: Korea, 1950 (Washington: GPO, 1976), 721. 17. As early as late July, General Omar Bradley and Ambassador-at-Large Phillip Jessup believed that the possibility of Chinese intervention was unlikely, yet certainly was a dangerous contingency worth considering. See “Summary of U.S./U.K. Discussions on Present World Situation, 20–24 July 1950,” President Harry S. Truman's Office Files, pt. 2: Correspondence Files, (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989), reel 11, 929. 18. NSC 73 (dated 2 July), 73/1 (dated 29 July), 73/2 (dated 8 August), 73/3 (dated 22 August), and 73/4 (dated 25 August), Documents of the National Security Council, First Supplement (Fredrick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981), reel 2, 635–702. 19. FRUS, vol. 7, 600–603. 20. Johnson to Truman, 30 August 1950, general data, Korean War File, President's Secretaries Files, box 206, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library. 21. Intelligence Summary, September 1950, Daily Intelligence Summaries, August-November 1950, reel 665, MacArthur Memorial. 22. FRUS, vol. 7, 698. 23. “Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,” 8 September 1950, CIA Research Reports. Japan, Korea, and the Security of Asia, 1946–1976 (Fredrick, MD: University Publications of America, 1983), reel 3, 540. 24. An NSC draft memo, dated 31 August, summarizes this agreement. FRUS, vol. 7, 679–81. 25. Minutes of the 67th Meeting of the NSC, 7 September 1950, Minutes of Meetings of the National Security Council, reel 1, 467–86. 26. Memorandum of Conversation, 8 September 1950, “Policy Concerning UN Crossing of the 38th Parallel, Summer 1950,” Korean War File, box 6, Truman Papers. 27. FRUS, vol. 7, 724. 28. Korean War Message Forms, September 1950, RG-6 Records of Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM): 1947–1951, reel 628, MacArthur Memorial. 29. Ibid., a subsequent report. 30. FRUS, vol. 7, 724–25. 31. Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the Period 16 to 31 August 1950, 18 September 1950, Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, vol. 18, ed. Dennis K. Merrill, (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1995), 478. 32. “Situation Summary,” 15 September 1950, CIA Research Reports, reel 4, 7–14. 33. FRUS, vol. 7, 742. 34. See the situation summaries and daily intelligence reports found in CIA Research Reports, reel 4. Also see the “Korean War Message Forms,” in RG-6 Records of Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM): 1947–1951, reel 628; as well as the intelligence summaries found in Daily Intelligence Summaries, reels 665–66. 35. Henderson to Acheson, 16 September 1950, “Indian Efforts to Mediate and Prevent the Spread of Hostilities [2 of 2: August-November 1950],” Korean War File, box 5, Truman Papers. 36. Memo to MacArthur, 16 September 1950, RG-6, Korean War File, no. 2, box 9, Papers of General Douglas MacArthur, MacArthur Memorial. 37. Memo to MacArthur, 21 September 1950, RG-6, Korean War File, no. 2, box 9; FRUS, vol. 7, 731. 38. Notes on Cabinet Meeting, 29 September 1950, Papers of Matthew J. Connelly, box 2, Truman Library; Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, 26 September 1950, “JLCOM Aug 50–Apr 51; JCS Nov 45–Apr 51; KMA Jul–Sep 49,” RG-9 Radiograms, MacArthur Papers, reel 186. 39. FRUS, vol. 7, 727. 40. Intelligence Summary, September 1950, Daily Intelligence Summaries, reel 665. 41. Korean War Message Forms, September 1950, RG-6 Records of Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM): 1947–1951, reel 628. 42. FRUS, vol. 7, 796. 43. Both Panikkar and Prime Minister Nehru repeatedly warned U.S. diplomats of the danger from China, particularly after the Inchon invasion, and advised against crossing the 38th Parallel. Ibid., 791, 809, 822-23. 44. Homes to Acheson, 29 September 1950, “Indian Efforts.” 45. FRUS, vol. 7, 814–16; New York (United Nations Delegation of the United States) to Acheson, 28 September 1950, “Indian Efforts.” 46. See Dean Rusk's memo,FRUS, vol. 7, 709. The State Department asked General MacArthur on several occasions to tell South Korean President Syngman Rhee to desist from making public declarations about the 38th Parallel before the issue was officially decided in Washington. 47. This was a near-consensus view among senior military officials in Washington. See the comments by Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins in The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective, ed. Francis H. Heller (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 26–27; Dean Acheson's Congressional testimony, “Military Situation in the Far East,” Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1 June 1951 (Washington: GPO, 1951), 1716–17, 1729; the Papers of Dean Acheson: Princeton Seminars, 13 and 14 February 1954, (Independence, MO: Harry S. Truman Library, 1975), reel 4, 1235; and FRUS, vol. 7, 763. 48. Henderson to Acheson, 21 September, 27 September, 4 October, and 17 October 1950, “Indian Efforts.” 49. Joint Chiefs to MacArthur, 29 September 1950, “Pertinent Papers on Korean Situation” vol. 2, Korean War File, box 13, Truman Papers. 50. Documentary History, 490–92. 51. FRUS, vol. 7, 829. 52. Discussing an aerial attack by American planes near Vladivostok, Kennan reminded Acheson of Soviet sensitivity to American military activities so near its Far Eastern border. Clubb, by contrast, considered the same for the Chinese leadership. 53. FRUS, vol. 7, 765. 54. Wilkinson did not have first-hand knowledge of the preparations in Manchuria, possibly because he was stationed in British-controlled Hong Kong at the time. 55. “Situation Summary,” 22 September 1950, CIA Research Reports, reel 4, 26–33. 56. FRUS, vol. 7, 797–98. 57. Notes on Cabinet Meeting, 29 September 1950, Connelly Papers. 58. “Korean War Message Forms,” October 1950, RG-6 Records of Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM): 1947–1951, reel 628. 59. Ibid., a subsequent report; “Intelligence Summary,” October 1950, Daily Intelligence Summaries, Reel 666. 60. Ibid. 61. “Propaganda Possibilities in the Korean Situation,” 2 October 1950, CIA Research Reports, reel 4, 54–74; FRUS, vol. 7, 913. 62. William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 93–94. 63. FRUS, vol. 7, 850, 852. 64. Ibid., 849. 65. Ibid., 864. 66. Chapin to Acheson, 3 October 1950, “Information and Estimates Regarding Chinese Communist and Soviet Intentions in Korea,” Korean War File, box 7, Truman Papers. 67. “Propaganda Possibilities in the Korean Situation.” 68. “Situation Summary,” 6 October 1950, CIA Research Reports, reel 4, 82–88. 69. James Webb of the State Department to Far East Command, 5 October 1950, “State Depart May–Oct 50,” RG-9 Radiograms, MacArthur Papers, reel 237. 70. Documentary History, 528. 71. Initially, they focused Moscow's possible intervention in the war. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 2 July 1950, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Part 2, 1946–53, the Far East (Washington: University Publications of America, 1979), reel 9, 88. 72. FRUS, vol. 7, 915, 944. 73. Ibid., 913–14. 74. “Situation Summary,” 13 October 1950, CIA Research Reports, reel 4, 103–109. 75. FRUS, vol. 7, 912. 76. U. Alexis Johnson (of the State Department) to Far East Command, 10 October 1950, “State Depart May–Oct 50.” 77. FRUS, vol. 7, 916. 78. Ibid., 258. 79. Documentary History, 546. 80. “Critical Situations in the Far East,” 12 October 1950, ORE 58–50, Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China during the Era of Mao, 1948–1976 (Pittsburgh: GPO, 2004). 81. “Critical Situations in the Far East,” 3. 82. “Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea,” 12 October 1950, CIA Research Reports, reel 4, 98–101. 83. The “Intelligence Summaries” provided updated, detailed information about Chinese military movements, political interactions with the Soviet Union, and domestic economic conditions. These summaries were more detailed than the daily summaries which President Truman received from the CIA. 84. Poteat, “Strategic Intelligence and National Security,” 125. 85. Documentary History, 530. 86. Ibid., 558. 87. For analysis of the evolution of this decision, see Chen, China's Road to the Korean War. 88. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 94. 89. “The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation,” Documents of the National Security Council, 1947–1977 (Fredrick, MD: University Publications of America, 1980), reel 2, 635–702. 90. See Kennan's draft memorandum of 30 June 1950, folder no. 12, Kennan Papers, box 24. For Bohlen's thoughts, see FRUS, vol. 7, 174. 91. “Review of the World Situation,” CIA 8–50, 16 August 1950, Minutes of Meetings of the National Security Council, reel 1, 1. 92. “Review of the World Situation,” 1; “Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea”; “Military Supplies for North Korea,” 15 September 1950, Intelligence Memorandum no. 325, National Security Council Files, box 209, Truman Papers. 93. State Department to Far East Command, 22 September 1950, “State-In Dec 50–Apr 51; State Misc. in Jun–Sep 50,” RG-9 Radiograms, MacArthur Papers, reel 239. 94. “Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime,” ORE 18–50, 19 July 1950, CIA Research Reports, reel 5, 297-308. In a draft memo, John P. Davies of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff portrayed the Soviet government as controlling North Korean military operations in the war. FRUS, vol. 7, 754. 95. The CIA and most State Department officials subscribed to this general proposition, albeit to varying degrees. For an authoritative discussion, see Deborah Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 96. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,” International Security 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1979): 126. Some in the State Department were concerned that weak governments in Asia were vulnerable to communist subversion and thereby subject to potential Soviet suzerainty. See the draft paper Acheson cabled to Far East Command, 12 October 1950, “State Depart Nov 50–Apr 51 State–In Jul–Nov 50.” 97. Address before the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, 15 March 1950, American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955, Basic Documents, vol. II (Washington: GPO, 1957), 2567. 98. “The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation,” 8 August 1950, Documents of the National Security Council, First Supplement, reel 1, 12. 99. “United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea,” 9 September 1950, Documents of the National Security Council, 1947–1977, reel 2, 833–43. 100. David A. Mayers, Cracking the Monolith: U.S. Policy Against the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 52. 101. Henderson to Acheson, 21 September 1950, “Indian Efforts.” 102. David S. McLellan, “Dean Acheson and the Korean War,” Political Science Quarterly 83, no. 1 (March, 1968): 18. Dean Acheson was especially sensitive to the possibility of open Soviet military involvement. See FRUS, vol. 7, 706. The Defense Department immediately evaluated the likelihood of this. See “U.S. Courses of Action in the Event of Soviet Forces enter Korean Hostilities,” 2 July 1950, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reel 9, 88. 103. CIA and NSC reports both reflected this belief. Notable examples are “Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,” 6 November 1950, National Intelligence Estimate no. 2, Central Intelligence Agency; and “Review of the World Situation.” 104. Bohlen memorandum, 13 July 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States vol. 1: 1950 (Washington: GPO, 1977), 342–44. 105. James Irving Matray, Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 253. 106. “Summary of U.S./U.K. Discussions on Present World Situation, 20–24 July 1950,” 922. 107. Rosemary Foot, “The Sino-American Conflict in Korea: The U.S. Assessment of China's Ability to Intervene in the War,” Asian Affairs 14 (June 1983): 161. 108. This term is used in numerous State Department memos. The conclusion that the Soviet Union had adopted a seeming “hands off” policy only slowly evolved. Drafted in early September, the NSC report upon which MacArthur received authorization to conduct military operations above the 38th Parallel noted that probably had not adopted a hands off policy. By late September and early October, opinion on this question had changed. 109. Ambassador Alan Kirk in Moscow found Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's response—and the overall response he witnessed—to the attacks mild in tone. State Department to Far East Command, 10 and 11 October 1950, “State Depart May–Oct 50.” 110. See NSCs 73 through 73/4 and Situation Summary, 13 October 1950, CIA Research Reports, reel 4, 103–9. 111. “Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea,” 101. George Kennan agreed with this assessment, and judged the likelihood of a Soviet military attack in either Europe or Asia lower than in the immediate aftermath of the North Korean invasion. See “Memorandum on Soviet Intentions,” 2 October 1950, folder no. 14, box 24, Kennan Papers. 112. “Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea.” 113. FRUS, vol. 7, 673 114. Dean Acheson, congressional testimony, “Military Situation in the Far East,” 1 June 1951. 115. FRUS, vol. 7, 913. 116. “Review of the World Situation,” 4. 117. Wilkinson to Acheson, 8 October 1950, “Policy Concerning U.N. Crossing of the 38th Parallel, Summer 1950.” 118. David M. Lampton, “The U.S. Image of Peking in Three International Crises,” The Western Political Quarterly 26, no. 1 (March 1973): 33. 119. “Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,” National Intelligence Estimate no. 2, 6 November 1950, “Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,” National Intelligence Estimate no. 2/1, 24 November 1950, Tracking the Dragon. 120. FRUS, vol. 7, 1309. Another estimate upheld this supposition by indicating that the Soviets might become directly engaged in an air defense of Manchuria—more than the initial assessment holding the Soviets would remain disengaged would have allowed. See “Soviet Participation in the Air Defense of Manchuria,” National Intelligence Estimate 2/2, 27 November 1950, CIA website. http://www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp. 121. Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (December, 1980): 579. 122. As late as 14 This material advantage gave General MacArthur confidence in responding to President Truman that the Chinese would be repulsed if they intervened—an assessment the president was particularly inclined to value after the resounding victory following Inchon. U.N. forces were rapidly driving northward while routing the North Korean Army and had become better supplied by the late summer of 1950.Footnote 124 By contrast, Chinese Communist forces had just fought a long, brutal civil war against the Nationalists and were dealing with attacks from isolated locations, particularly from Nationalist-occupied islands in the Pacific.Footnote 125 The conscripts they were amassing were not trained or battle-hardened forces like those fighting under MacArthur's command. Moreover, Chinese territory and industry were readily open to American air attack. An NSC note issued on 2 July asserted that the United States would have many targets in China in case it intervened in Korea.Footnote 126 On numerous occasions thereafter, American aircraft attacked small towns in Manchuria allegedly as accidents, thereby demonstrating Manchuria's vulnerability.Footnote 127 October, a day prior to the Wake Island Conference, General MacArthur believed that Peking would declare war only if it had the assurance of Soviet support. Documentary History, 544. 123. Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002). 124. Foot, “The Sino-American Conflict in Korea,” 161. 125. Military intelligence reports and CIA reports frequently mentioned Chinese intentions toward the remaining islands. 126. “The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible further Soviet Moves in Light of the Korean Situation,” NSC 73, 1 July 1950, 6. In late September, Dean Rusk also acknowledged that Northeast China was open to easy American aerial assaults. See FRUS, vol. 7, 760. 127. On 27 August, U.S. aircraft attacked a rail terminal and adjoining facilities in Antung, north of the Yalu. Two days later, another border violation was charged against U.S. military aircraft. Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou eventually filed a grievance over these events at the United Nations. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, 97. 128. “Draft memorandum on possible further danger points in light of Korean situation,” 30 June 1950, folder no. 12, box 24, Kennan Papers. 129. A telegram sent by the British Foreign Office to the State Department on 28 September stated that China's “military capacity to face major hostilities is doubtful although she may consider on the analogy of the war with Japan that her vast territory and population would ensure ultimate success.” FRUS, vol. 7, 815. 130. “U.S. Course of Action in the Event Soviet Forces Enter Korean Hostilities,” 2 July 1950, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reel 9, 87–90. 131. “Operational Immediate,” R6-16a, folder 15, box 6: “Personal for Joint Chiefs of Staff,” MacArthur Papers. 132. Documentary History, 490–91, 529. 133. “Critical Situations in the Far East,” 3. 134. FRUS, vol. 7, 822. 135. “Propaganda Possibilities in the Korean Situation,” 72. 136. “Critical Situations in the Far East,” 3. 137. FRUS, vol. 7, 953. 138. This was notably different from the CIA's perspective on a possible Chinese intervention in French Indochina. A CIA analysis issued to major elements of the American national security bureaucracy, including President Truman, concluded that Chinese forces would experience a near-total victory against the French, even if the United States provided military supplies in defense against the invasion. Apparently, the CIA underestimated the impact of Chinese military intervention in Korea, but did not entirely discount Peking's overall armed strength, particularly its ground capabilities. This may reveal either American estimates of French forces stationed in Indochina or a specific inclination of the CIA to emphasize and overestimate the prowess of U.S. forces relative to that of Chinese forces. See “Prospects for the Defense of Indochina Against a Chinese Communist Invasion,” ORE 50-50, “Prospects for Chinese Communist Action in Indochina during 1950,” ORE 50-50 Supplement, 7 September 1950, Korean War File, President's Secretary's Files, box 216, Truman Papers. Assessments of Soviet military capabilities and Chinese Communist capabilities also posited that Chinese intervention alone would not carry the same dangers for American military objectives in Korea. See NSC 81/1. 139. Foot, “The Sino-American Conflict in Korea,” 162. 140. McLellan, “Dean Acheson and the Korean War,” 21. 141. Wilkinson to Acheson, 8 October 1950, “Policy Concerning U.N. Crossing of the 38th Parallel, Summer 1950.” 142. On 6 October, the State Department notified Far East Command that 20,000-30,000 Chinese soldiers of Korean descent fought with North Korean forces against the UN forces. State Department to Far East Command, 6 October 1950, “State Depart May–Oct 50.” 143. For Kennan's assessment, see Kennan to Acheson, 26 June 1950, Kennan Papers. This opinion is also expressed in an unsigned memo: State Department to Far East Command, 29 September 1950, “State-In Dec 50–Apr 51; State Misc In Jun–Sep 50.” 144. FRUS, vol. 7, 784. 145. Ibid., 798. Acheson had repeatedly asked Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson not to have American planes bomb locations close to the Soviet Far East or Manchuria, for fear of provoking Moscow or Peking. On 12 October, he reiterated his position on bombing near the Soviet and Chinese borders to Air Force Secretary Finletter. Documentary History, 541. 146. Even after the Chinese intervention, a CIA report grimly indicated that this development could mean general war in the Far East. See “Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,” 6 November 1950, National Intelligence Estimate no. 2. 147. “Immediate United States Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa,” NSC 37/10, 3 August 1950, Documents of the National Security Council, 1947–1977, reel 1, 950–61. 148. “Minutes and Documents,” Minutes of Meetings of the National Security Council, First Supplement (Fredrick, MD: University Publications of America, 1988), reel 1, 321–22. Acheson advocated maintaining American policy toward Taiwan as President Truman had described it when he ordered the Seventh Fleet to protect against an invasion. Acheson feared antagonizing Peking further by accelerating assistance to Chiang. 149. “Review of the World Situation,” 4; Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 28 July 1950, Minutes of Meetings of the National Security Council, First Supplement, reel 1, 361–78. 150. “Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,” 542. 151. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, 106. 152. From the President to the Secretary of State,” 18 July 1950, President Harry S. Truman's Office Files, Part 3: Subject Files, reel 25, 978. Also see Truman to MacArthur, 30 August 1950, RG-1a, folder 19: “Personal for President Truman,” box 5, MacArthur Papers. 153. Henderson to Acheson, 1 September 1950, “Indian Efforts.” 154. Documentary History, 468; Memorandum for Record, 13 September 1950, Papers of Eben A. Ayers, box 9, Truman Library. 155. Truman to MacArthur, 30 August 1950, “Personal for President Truman.” 156. Chen,China's Road to the Korean War. 157. “Propaganda Possibilities in the Korean Situation.” 158. Holmes to Acheson, 29 September 1950, “Indian Efforts.” 159. FRUS, vol. 7, 747. 160. Dean Acheson, Congressional testimony, “Military Situation in the Far East,” 1 June 1951. 161. See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper, “Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, no. 11 (November, 1979): 2098–2109. Also see Cheryl Koopman et al., “Beliefs about International Security and Change in 1992 among Russian and American National Security Elites,” Journal of Peace Psychology 4, no. 1 (1998): 35–57. 162. A fine application of prospect theory to international relations appears in Rose McDermott, Risk-taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in Post-War American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). Yaacov Vertzberger develops a sociocognitive approach to risky decision-making in Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998). 163. The Joint Chiefs agreed that the defeat of the North Korean armed forces would mark a significant blow to the Soviet Union. See “Military Measures in Support of U.S. Policy with Respect to Korea,” 3 September 1950, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reel 9, 413.