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Cognitive operations in Buddhist meditation: interface with Western psychology

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 13; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14639947.2012.669281

1476-7953

Tse-fu Kuan,

Anxiety, Depression, Psychometrics, Treatment, Cognitive Processes

Abstract This paper interprets Buddhist meditation from perspectives of Western psychology and explores the common grounds shared by the two disciplines. Cognitive operations in Buddhist meditation are mainly characterized by mindfulness and concentration in relation to attention. Mindfulness in particular plays a pivotal role in regulating attention. My study based on Buddhist literature corroborates significant correspondence between mindfulness and metacognition as propounded by some psychologists. In vipassanā meditation, mindfulness regulates attention in such a way that attention is directed to monitor the ever-changing experiences from moment to moment so that the practitioner attains the 'metacognitive insight' into the nature of things. In samatha meditation, mindfulness picks an object as the focus of 'selective attention' and monitors whether attention is concentrated on the chosen object so as to attain the state of 'concentration'. Nimitta that appears in a deep state of concentration resembles 'imagery' in psychology. Mindfulness consists in the wholesome functioning of saññā. A finding by psychologists supports my view that saññā can act as perception on the one hand and, on the other hand, it can produce nimitta 'imagery' in deep meditation where perception is suspended. Acknowledgements A preliminary version of this paper entitled 'Mindfulness and concentration: Cognitive operations in Buddhist meditation' was presented at the Conference on 'Cultural histories of meditation: Practice and interpretation in a global perspective' in Jevnaker, Norway in May 2010. I would like to thank Professor Halvor Eifring for inviting me to present this paper at the conference that he organized, where I benefited by the participants' questions and comments. I am greatly indebted to Professor Maurits G.T. Kwee, Professor Øyvind Ellingsen and the referee for reading earlier drafts of this article and offering valuable advice and suggestions. Notes 1. See e.g. Vism 4. Cf. DN I 206–208, DN III 219, AN I 229ff., MN I 301. 2. This argument could agree with the Dhammasa ga i (§§1–364), an Abhidhamma text, which shows that sati exists in various skilful states of mind (kusala-citta). In the Abhidhammattha-sa gaha, sati is one of the 19 mental factors (cetasika) common to beauty (sobhanasādhāra a). Bodhi (Citation1993, 85) explains that these 19 mental factors are invariably present in all beautiful consciousness. 3. For example Dhs §§1–364 shows that saññā exists in various wholesome states of mind. Dhs §§365–427 shows that saññā exists in various unwholesome states of mind. Dhs §§ 431ff. shows that saññā exists in various indeterminate states of mind. In the Abhidhammattha-sa gaha, saññā is among the seven metal factors (cetasika) common to every consciousness (sabbacittasādhāra a) (Bodhi, Citation1993, 77). 4. Dreyfus (Citation2011) and Gethin (Citation2011) also address the issue of psychologists' description of mindfulness as nonjudgmental in Contemporary Buddhism, 12 (1), May 2011. My paper was submitted to the journal in February 2011. 5. Horner (Citation1964, 50f.) translates apilāpana as 'not wobbling', and its verbal form apilāpeti 'does not wobble', but this could be a misunderstanding. I render it as 'reminding' with reference to Norman (Citation1988, 50–1) and Gethin (Citation2001, 38–9). 6. For details, see Kuan (Citation2008, 128). 7. While the Buddha accepted the conventional usage of the term 'attā' (in Pali, ātman in Sanskrit) to refer to 'oneself', 'myself' or 'himself' according to context, he did not accept anything to be an attā in the sense of a permanent Self as a separate entity. Here I use the form 'Self' to refer to this kind of (supposed) self, as distinct from the conventional or empirical 'self' of 'oneself' etc. 8. Vetter refers to Webster's new dictionary of synonyms (Springfield 1984), p. 721a. 9. Lutz et al. (Citation2008, 164) already point out the role of selective attention in meditation, but they associate selective attention with their proposed category of meditation called 'focused attention (FA)', as opposed to 'open monitoring (OM)'. 10. According to the Cū agosi ga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, this long term refers to any of the nine meditative attainments, including the four jhānas (MN I 207–209). In our passage, however, this long term must refer only to the jhānas because it is associated with the radiance and the vision of forms, whereas the five meditative attainments higher than the jhānas surmount conceptions of forms (rūpasaññā) according to the Nikāyas. 11. The text literally means that sound may 'prick' (destroy) the delicate state of the first jhāna, let alone the even more delicate states of the second, third and fourth jhāna. In other words, no sound should be heard in the jhānas.