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‘The Chinese and the Thais are Brothers': the evolution of the Sino–Thai friendship

2005; Routledge; Volume: 14; Issue: 45 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10670560500205100

1469-9400

Michael Chambers,

Asian Geopolitics and Ethnography

Abstract During the late 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese and Thais forged a close, friendly relationship based on their security cooperation in an informal alliance against Vietnamese regional hegemonism. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cambodian conflict and the Vietnamese threat, the Sino-Thai cooperative friendship became deeper and broader, rather than dissipating. How are we to explain the closeness of Sino-Thai relations today? While the dynamics of the international political structure in East Asia have played a critical role in shaping the relationship between these two countries since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the emerging regional international structure—particularly the rise of China—provides indeterminate incentives. Thailand could balance against or bandwagon with rising China, or try to hedge its bets; nor does the emerging structure direct how the Chinese will wield their growing influence and power over their neighbors. This article argues that the best explanation rests in a combination of the structural argument (the rise of China) with the desire of both countries to maintain the mutually beneficial partnership they constructed during the 1980s, in particular Thailand's role as a link or facilitator between the PRC and ASEAN. Notes 1. Amy Kazmin, ‘Beijing leader backs Thai drugs battle’, Financial Times, (21 May 2001, USA edn), p. 4; ‘China–Thailand friendship to be passed on from generation to generation: Chinese premier’, Xinhua, (20 May 2001). 2. See for example Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, ‘Adjusting to the new Asia’, Foreign Affairs 82(4), (July/August 2003); Catharin Dalpino and Juo-yu Lin, ‘China and Southeast Asia: the difference of a decade’, in Richard C. Bush and Catharin Dalpino, eds, Brookings Northeast Asia Survey, 2002–2003 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003); Satu P. Limaye, ‘Weighting for China, counting on the United States: Asia's China debate and US interests’, in Satu P. Limaye, ed., Asia's China Debate (Honolulu: Asia–Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, Special Assessment Series, December 2003); Denny Roy, ‘Rising China and US interests: inevitable vs. contingent hazards’, Orbis 47(1), (Winter 2003); Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, ‘The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 57(2), (July 2003); and Brantly Womack, ‘China and Southeast Asia: asymmetry, leadership and normalcy’, Pacific Affairs 76(4), (Winter 2003–2004). 3. Bandwagoning refers to siding with a rising power to gain benefits for oneself; balancing refers to taking steps to counter the potential or actual threat from another country (often involving alliance with a third country against the threatening country). For assertions of Southeast Asian bandwagoning with China, see David Kang, ‘Getting Asia wrong: the need for new analytical frameworks’, International Security 27(4), (Spring 2003); and Robert S. Ross, ‘The US-China peace: great power politics, spheres of influence, and the peace of East Asia’, Journal of East Asian Studies 3(3), (September–December 2003). It should be noted that Ross sees mainland Southeast Asia bandwagoning with China, but maritime Southeast Asia is more likely to maintain close relations with the US. 4. In his excellent discussion of bandwagoning behavior, Randall Schweller analyzes the reasons why a country would engage in such behavior. However, he does not address why the country that is the ‘bandwagon’ would accept other countries seeking to profit from its rise. See Randall L. Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for profit: bringing the revisionist state back in’, International Security 19(1), (Summer 1994). 5. Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, ‘Catching the dragon's tail: China and Southeast Asia in the 21st century’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 25(1), (April 2003); and Bradley Mathews, ‘Bangkok's fine balance: Thailand's China debate’, in Limaye, ed., Asia's China Debate. 6. Mathews, ‘Bangkok's fine balance’; Vatikiotis, ‘Catching the dragon's tail’. 7. Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics: a response to my critics’, in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 329. 8. For a discussion of ententes as informal alliances and how they differ from formal security alliances, see Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 346–349; and Robert A. Kann, ‘Ententes versus alliances’, World Politics 28(4), (July 1976). 9. For examples of references to the Sino–Thai relationship as one of traditional friendship, see the comments of General Liu Huaqing, Vice Chair of the PRC's Central Military Commission, to General Wimol Wongwanich, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, reported in ‘Liu Huaqing meets Thai army general’, Xinhua, (22 March 1995); the comments of Vice Premier Li Lanqing to Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, reported in ‘Vice premier Li Lanqing meets Thai Princess Sirindhorn’, Beijing Xinhua, (2 April 1999), (via FBIS); and the joint communiqué issued during Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's August 2001 visit, reported in ‘“Full text” of Sino–Thai joint communique on Thaksin's PRC visit’, Xinhua Domestic Service, (29 August 2001), (via FBIS). 10. On these Sino-Siamese interactions, see D. G. E. Hall, A History of South–East Asia, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan & Co., 1964), ch. 7; Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652–1853 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1977), p. 1; and David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, 1984), chs 3, 4. 11. Among these were Siamese efforts to counter Burmese expansionism in the late 1500s and their contributions to defeating the Tayson Rebellion in Vietnam, which was causing problems for China in the late 1700s as well as Siam. On these events, see Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World, Harvard East Asian Monograph no. 11 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984), pp. 126–140; and Wyatt, Thailand, p. 104. 12. Viraphol, Tribute and Profit, pp. 236–237. 13. For a more detailed discussion of these events, see Anuson Chinvanno, Thailand's Policies towards China, 1949–54 (Houndsmill and London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 27–37; Boonchai Kosolthanakul, ‘Changing patterns of Sino–Thai relations: a case study in contemporary application of the balance of power’, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1993, pp. 202–204; and Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 98–99. 14. Phibun is sometimes romanized as ‘Pibul’. 15. Chinvanno, Thailand's Policies towards China, chs 2, 6; Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, pp. 101–109; and R. K. Jain, China and Thailand, 1949–1983 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1984), pp. xlii–xliv. 16. David A. Wilson, ‘China, Thailand and the spirit of Bandung, part I’, China Quarterly no. 30, (April–June 1967), p. 152. 17. For China's efforts to create this ‘zone of peace’ along its southern borders, see Kuo-kang Shao, ‘Chou En-lai's diplomatic approach to the non-aligned states in Asia, 1953–60', China Quarterly no. 78, (June 1979). 18. Anuson Chinvanno, ‘Brief encounter: Sino–Thai rapprochement after Bandung, 1955–1957', ISC Study Paper, International Studies Center, Institute of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 1991; Evelyn Colbert, Southeast Asia in International Politics, 1941–1956 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 305–306; George McT. Kahin, The Asian–African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), especially pp. 13–15 and Zhou's supplementary speech of 19 April 1955, at pp. 52–56; and David A. Wilson, ‘China, Thailand, and the spirit of Bandung, part II’, China Quarterly no. 31, (July–September 1967), p. 98. 19. On these two secret missions, see Sirin Phathanothai, with James Peck, The Dragon's Pearl (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 45–53; and Chinvanno, ‘Brief encounter’, pp. 23–28. Phathanothai's father led the secret delegation in the Rangoon discussions. For a summary of the secret Joint Declaration signed in Rangoon, see Zhu Zhenming, ‘Bashi Ganzhanayue yu Zhong-Tai guanxi’ [‘Prasit Kanchanawat and Sino–Thai relations’], Dongnan Ya [Southeast Asia] no. 2, (1999), p. 52. 20. ‘Women de yuanwang shi shi Zhong-Tai liangguo youhao’ [‘Our desire is for China and Thailand to become friends, part II’], in PRC Foreign Ministry and Central Committee Documents Research Office, comps., Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe and Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1994), p. 230. 21. According to Sirin Phathanothai, Zhou told the group: ‘China is ready to sign a non-aggression treaty with Thailand. But the absence of such a treaty in no way detracts from the sincerity of our friendship’. However, David Wilson, quoting the published account of the trip by Klaew Norapat (one of the delegation members), has Zhou saying: ‘It is our opinion that the Asian nations ought to have a treaty of peace and live together in peace without any aggression’. Phathanothai, Dragon's Pearl, p. 54; Wilson, ‘China, Thailand, and the spirit of Bandung, part II’, p. 120. 22. On this trade deal, see Phathanothai, Dragon's Pearl, pp. 56–57; and Chinvanno, ‘Brief encounter’, pp. 29–30. 23. Phathanothai, Dragon's Pearl, pp. 107–109. 24. The Thai government was concerned about China promoting subversion in northeast Thailand, and Beijing's diplomatic presence in Cambodia and support for communist activities in Laos (and South Vietnam) would provide opportunities to carry out such subversion. See Wilson, ‘China, Thailand, and the spirit of Bandung, part II’, pp. 101, 125–127; Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements, expanded and updated edn (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 275–276, 285–288; and Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, pp. 135–137. 25. For discussions of these events, see Daniel D. Lovelace, China and ‘People's War’ in Thailand, 1964–1969, Chinese Research Monograph no. 8 (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1971); Chak Wing David Tsui, China and the Communist Armed Struggle in Thailand (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1995), chs 2–3; Melvin Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia—The Politics of Survival (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 26–36; General Saiyud Kerdphol, The Struggle for Thailand: Counter-Insurgency, 1965–1985 (Bangkok: S. Research Center Co., 1986); Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London & Portland: Frank Cass, 1996), ch. 1; and Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, pp. 288–293. 26. On China's lack of material support for the insurgency, see Lovelace, China and ‘People's War’, pp. 65–74; and Gurtov, Politics of Survival, pp. 37–38. 27. On the Chinese calls for protracted struggle, see Gurtov, Politics of Survival, pp. 35–36. 28. See Kosolthanakul, ‘Changing patterns of Sino–Thai relations’, pp. 286–287; Gurtov, Politics of Survival, pp. 44–47; and Sarasin Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976), pp. 12–14. To some extent, Thanat's moves to improve Thailand's relations with the PRC could be viewed as bandwagoning, albeit with a country that he felt might eventually dominate the region (it was far from able to do so at the time). 29. Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, pp. 334–337. 30. Wang Taiping, comp., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiao Shi [Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China], vol. 3, 1970–1978 (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1999), p. 17. 31. Kosolthanakul, ‘Changing patterns of Sino–Thai relations’, pp. 290–292; Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy, p. 13. 32. Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, pp. 350–353. 33. Wang, Waijiao Shi, pp. 96–97; Kosolthanakul, ‘Changing patterns of Sino–Thai relations’, pp. 301–302; Phathanothai, Dragon's Pearl, pp. 302–305; Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, pp. 354–355; interview with a Thai scholar with access to Thai Foreign Ministry archives, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, August 1995. Sirin Phathanothai served as a translator for many of Prasit's meetings with the Chinese leadership. 34. Zhu Zhenming, ‘Bashi Ganzhanayue yu Zhong-Tai guanxi’, pp. 53–54. For these developments, see also Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy, p. 20; Kosolthanakul, ‘Changing patterns of Sino–Thai relations’, p. 304; and Gurtov, Patterns of Survival, p. 184. 35. Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy, p. 21; Kosolthanakul, ‘Changing patterns of Sino–Thai relations’, pp. 306–307. 36. ‘Thai aide reports China's assurance on red insurgents’, New York Times, (17 February 1974), p. 9; Gurtov, Patterns of Survival, p. 186. 37. Jain, China and Thailand, doc. 210, pp. 196–197; Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 135–138. 38. Interviews with Thai scholars, Chulalongkorn University and Thammasat University, Bangkok, August 1995; Morrison and Suhrke, Strategies of Survival, pp. 136–137; Sukhumbhand Paribatra, ‘Dictates of security: Thailand's relations with the PRC since the Vietnam War’, in Joyce K. Kalgren, Noordin Sopiee and Soedjati Djiwandono, eds, ASEAN and China: An Evolving Relationship, Research Papers and Policy Studies no. 24 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1988), pp. 297–298; Robert S. Ross, The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 50–51; and Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy, p. 4. 39. Interview with Thai scholars, Chulalongkorn University and Thammasat University, Bangkok, August 1995; Wang, Waijiao Shi, pp. 97–98; Huang Chao Han (Singaporean) et al., Zhongguo yu Yatai Diqu Bianhua zhong de Zhengzhi Jingji Guanxi [Changing Political and Economic Relations of China and the Asia-Pacific Region] (Guangzhou: Jinan University Press, 1990), p. 161; and Norman Peagam, ‘Thailand joins the Peking ensemble’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (11 July 1975), pp. 20–21. The Chinese assurances are in article 4 of the joint communiqué; see Jain, China and Thailand, doc. 217, pp. 203–205. 40. Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy, pp. 4, 23. 41. Joseph Alsop, ‘Showdown over Southeast Asia?’, Reader's Digest, (December 1975), pp. 137–138. See also Ross, Indochina Tangle, p. 50. 42. Quoted in Anne Gilks, The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970–1979, China Research Monograph no. 39 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1992), p. 146. 43. ‘Tong Taiguo Zongli Kuli Bamo de tanhua’ [‘Conversation with Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj’], in PRC Foreign Ministry and Central Committee Documents Research office, comps., Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1990), pp. 504–505. 44. Ross, Indochina Tangle, p. 52. 45. Economic data is from Paribatra, ‘Dictates of security’, Table 2, p. 316; the rice deal is from Kosolthanakul, ‘Changing patterns of Sino–Thai relations’, p. 325. 46. Michael Morrow, ‘Two neighbors on the same wavelength’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (15 August 1975), pp. 12–13; Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 143; Ross, Indochina Tangle, p. 78. 47. For a fuller discussion of these events, see Michael R. Chambers, ‘Explaining China's alliances: balancing against regional and superpower threats’, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2000, pp. 173–186. 48. Interviews with Thai scholars, including one with access to Thai Foreign Ministry archives, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, August 1995. 49. Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy, p. 64; Richard Nations, ‘Progress by negatives’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (1 October 1976), pp. 81–82. 50. Ross, Indochina Tangle, p. 139; Kosolthanakul, ‘Changing patterns of Sino–Thai relations’, p. 334. 51. Over the previous year, Kriangsak had become good friends with the PRC ambassador in Bangkok, Chai Zemin, and held many ‘cordial’ talks with the ambassador, including many on ‘the Vietnam problem’. Wei Manlun, ‘Fang dashi furen Li Youduo’ [‘A visit with ambassador's wife Li Youduo’], in Cheng Hujun, ed., Nu Waijiaoguan [Women Diplomats] (Beijing: Renmin Tiyu Chubanshe, 1995), p. 258. Li Youduo was Chai Zemin's wife. 52. Richard Nations, ‘The military muscle in’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (4 November 1977), pp. 12–14. 53. Nayan Chanda, ‘The two-year solution’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (4 November 1977), pp. 10–12; Nations, ‘The military muscle in’; ‘The week’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (11 November 1977), p. 5; Richard Nations, ‘Kriangsak hints at change’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (25 November 1977), p. 11. 54. For a detailed discussion of this visit, see Chambers, ‘Explaining China's alliances’, pp. 368–372. 55. ‘Kriangsak hosts banquet’, Xinhua, (31 March 1978), [in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: PRC (FBIS: PRC), 3 April 1978], p. A11; ‘Kwangtung holds banquet for Thai prime minister’, Xinhua, (3 April 1978), (FBIS: PRC, 4 April 1978), p. A7. 56. Interviews with Thai scholars, Beijing, August 1993, and Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, August 1995; David Bonavia, ‘The marxist and the monarchy’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (17 November 1978), pp. 10–12. 57. Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War: A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon (New York: Collier Books, pbk edn, 1988), p. 325. 58. Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War: A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon (New York: Collier Books, pbk edn, 1988), p. 325., pp. 325–326. 59. Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War: A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon (New York: Collier Books, pbk edn, 1988), p. 325., p. 326. 60. Rodney Tasker, ‘Condemnation but no confrontation’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (26 January 1979), pp. 24–25. 61. ‘Meets with Deng Xiaoping’, Xinhua, (13 January 1979), (FBIS: PRC, 15 January 1979), p. A29; Geng Biao, ‘Report on the situation of the Indochinese peninsula’, Issues and Studies 17(1), (January 1981), pp. 88–89. 62. Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 348–349. 63. Paribatra, ‘Dictates of security’, p. 303. 64. Paribatra, ‘Dictates of security’., p. 303 and fn. 30. 65. Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 381. 66. For a more detailed discussion, see Chambers, ‘Explaining China's alliances’, pp. 398–400; see also Paribatra, ‘Dictates of security’, p. 308. For examples of subsequent Chinese warnings in 1980, 1983, and 1984–1985, see Chambers, ‘Explaining China's alliances’, pp. 410–411, 418–424. 67. Interview with former Supreme Commander, Bangkok, August 1995. One scholar with ties to the security establishment suggested that China probably never specified what it would do. Interview with Thai scholar, Thammasat University, Bangkok, August 1995. 68. Chang Pao-Min, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985), p. 110; Paribatra, ‘Dictates of security’, p. 308. 69. ‘Intelligence’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (2 January 1986), p. 9. 70. R. Bates Gill, Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns, and Prospects in the New World Order (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), pp. 168–169; Paribatra, ‘Dictates of security’, p. 309. 71. The rumor of the transfer of a few 130–mm artillery taking place circa 1980–1981 (i.e. soon after the Non Mark Moon incident) was relayed in interviews with Thai scholars, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, August 1995. 72. For additional details on these arms transfers, see Gill, Chinese Arms Transfers, pp. 168–171, as well as Appendices 1–4, pp. 213–220. 73. For additional details on these arms transfers, see Gill, Chinese Arms Transfers., pp. 173–174. 74. Paribatra, ‘Dictates of security’, p. 309; Chang, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam, p. 119; interview with Thai scholar, Thammasat University, Bangkok, August 1995. For a list of official exchange visits between China and Thailand during 1979–1983, see Jain, China and Thailand, Appendix 1, pp. 386–391. General Serm Nanakorn was the first Supreme Commander to visit China, making the trip in May 1981, but there was no Chinese reciprocation until 1983. 75. ‘Intelligence’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (4 January 1980), p. 5; John McBeth, ‘Seeking a cleaner image’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (4 January 1980), pp. 11–12; ‘Intelligence’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (11 April 1980), p. 11. 76. John McBeth, ‘The search for an alternative’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (31 October 1980), pp. 21–23; Nayan Chanda, ‘Do you like my facelift?’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (7 November 1980), pp. 13–14. 77. John McBeth, ‘Peking prepares to dump Pol Pot and co.’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (6 February 1981), pp. 8–10. 78. Nayan Chanda, ‘Agreement to disagree’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (24 July 1981), pp. 13–15. 79. Lezcek Buszynski, ‘Thailand: the erosion of a balanced foreign policy’, Asian Survey 22(11), (November 1982), pp. 1050–1051. 80. Lezcek Buszynski, ‘Thailand: the erosion of a balanced foreign policy’, Asian Survey 22(11), (November 1982)., pp. 1051–1052; Paisal Sricharatchanya, ‘Hearts, but not minds’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (28 August 1981), pp. 15–16. 81. Leszek Buszynski, ‘New aspirations and old constraints in Thailand's foreign policy’, Asian Survey 29(11), (November 1989), pp. 1058–1061; Paisal Sricharatchanya, ‘The golden land’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (23 February 1989), pp. 11–12. 82. On these developments, see Chambers, ‘Explaining China's alliances’, pp. 425–430. 83. Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2003: Education for Global Participation (Manila: ADB, 2003), p. 322; ‘Figs.: trade of China's mainland with major partners in Asia in 2004’, Xinhua, (9 February 2005). 84. ‘Get on China's economic train: ASEAN–China cooperation on fast-track’, People's Daily Online (English version), (26 May 2004), (FBIS). 85. ‘Xinhua “roundup” examines economic, cultural cooperation between PRC, Thailand’, Beijing Xinhua, (22 January 2003), (FBIS). See also the discussion of investments for 1990–1999 in Zhu Zhenming, ‘Zhong Tai jian jiao yilai Zhong Tai guanxi de huigu yu zhanwang’ [‘Retrospect and prospect of Sino–Thai relations since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two sides’], Dongnan Ya no. 2, (2000), p. 26. 86. ‘Li Peng meets Thai crown prince’, Beijing Xinhua, (22 May 1998), (FBIS). 87. ‘Thailand to give $10,000 in flood aid’, Bangkok Post, (26 August 1998); Bhanravee Tansubhapol, ‘China threatens to put its money elsewhere’, Bangkok Post, (30 August 2001). 88. See ‘China donates 1b yuan to tsunami-hit countries’, PRC Embassy in the US, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t181224.htm. 89. For example, see ‘Chinese tourists set to return to Phuket’, fnWeb.com, (29 March 2005). 90. ‘Narcotics: four-nation summit gets China boost; Surakiart buoyed by Beijing's response’, Bangkok Post, (21 July 2001); Marisa Chimprabha, ‘China eager to host ACD's 2004 meeting’, The Nation, (21 June 2003); interview with Chinese scholars, Beijing, April 2004. 91. See Reuters, ‘Thai Falun Gong meeting shelved after pressure from China’, carried in South China Morning Post on-line updates, (20 February 2001); and John Martinkus, ‘Thailand's quiet crackdown’, South China Morning Post, (8 March 2001). 92. Songpol Kaopatumtip and Tunya Sukpanich, ‘Caught between a rock and an awakening giant’, Bangkok Post, (8 September 2002); ‘Visa office denies bending to pressure’, Bangkok Post, (20 January 2003). 93. See, for example, Sermsuk Kasitipradit, ‘China thanks Thailand for firm support’, Bangkok Post, (22 June 2001); and ‘“Full text” of Sino–Thai joint communique on Thaksin's PRC visit’, Xinhua Domestic Service, (29 August 2001), (FBIS). 94. Kenneth W. Allen, ‘China's foreign military relations with Asia-Pacific’, Journal of Contemporary China 10(29), (November 2001), p. 661. 95. Sermsuk Kasitipradit, ‘China assures Chavalit of its friendship’, Bangkok Post, (3 July 2001). 96. Anuraj Manibhandu et al., ‘China ties might need a rethink’, Bangkok Post, (21 July 1997). 97. In October 2002, the Bangkok Post reported that General Thammarak Isarangkura na Ayudhaya, the newly appointed Thai defense minister, was alerted to his promotion when he was prematurely congratulated on it by General Zhang Wannian, Deputy Chairman of the PRC's Central Military Commission. Zhang is a good friend of Chavalit's, and Thammarak was Chavalit's choice to replace himself as defense minister. See ‘Close ties are no defence’, Bangkok Post, (10 October 2002). 98. One of the other officials was Deputy Prime Minister Wanmuhamatno Matha, who spearheaded security measures in the south as Minister of the Interior until March 2004, and who is himself a Muslim from southern Thailand. See Makoto Suzuki, ‘High-ranking Chinese official in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region visiting Thailand’, Sankei Shimbun, (13 May 2004), (FBIS). 99. ‘China visit: Chinese president accepts invitation’, Bangkok Post, (6 December 1998); ‘In brief: royal barge rehearsals start’, Bangkok Post, (2 September 1999); ‘Buddha relic loaned to Thailand’, South China Morning Post, (16 December 2002). 100. ‘Ministry of Education awards Thai princess’, Beijing Xinhua, (17 March 2000), (FBIS); ‘Chinese top legislator meets Thai princess’, Xinhua, (27 February 2004), (FBIS). 101. On this point, see for example Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 125–127; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for profit’. 102. ‘Protestations of friendship as Thai foreign minister meets Chinese leaders’, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts FE/1627/A1, (3 March 1993); Kasitipradit, ‘China assures Chavalit of its friendship’. 103. ‘Chinese vice premier issues statement on Thai visit’, Xinhua, (20 July 1994); ‘“Full text” of Jiang's speech in Thailand’, Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, (3 September 1999), (FBIS); Achara Ashayagachut et al., ‘Bridge-building on anniversary occasion’, Bangkok Post, (30 June 2000). 104. ‘Sino–Thai relations are very good’, Xinhua, (28 September 1992); Kosol Satithamajit, ‘Thaksin insists on Burma visit’, Bangkok Post, (5 June 2001); ‘China, India to be focuses of Thailand's diplomacy: PM’, Xinhua, (10 January 2004); Editorial, ‘Thaksin's visit to China’, Matichon, (28 August 2001), p. 2 (FBIS). 105. Ashayagachut et al., ‘Bridge-building on anniversary occasion’; Saritdet Marukatat and Nussara Sawatsawang, ‘Sino–Thai relations move into 21st century’, Bangkok Post, (5 February 1999). 106. ‘China visit: Chinese president accepts invitation’, Bangkok Post, (6 December 1998). 107. Yuwadee Tunyasiri, ‘Thailand won't back down from road map’, Bangkok Post, (29 July 2003); Wassana Nanuam, ‘Chavalit to brief China on Burma’, Bangkok Post, (2 September 2003). 108. For elaboration on these points see, Wen Jiabao, ‘Turn your eyes to China’, speech delivered at Harvard University, (10 December 2004), available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/12.11/10-wenspeech.html; Luo Qinwen, ‘On his first official visit to Thailand, Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchun stresses need to maintain close ties of exchange and cooperation between the two countries and the two armed forces’, Zhongguo Xinwen She, (31 March 2004), (FBIS); Luo Qinwen, ‘Chinese national defense minister expounds on the “peaceful rise” road’, Zhongguo Xinwen She, (31 March 2004), (FBIS). 109. ‘“Text” of Sino–Thai joint statement’, Xinhua, (5 February 1999). 110. ‘Chinese, Thai FMs hold talks on bilateral, regional issues’, Xinhua, (20 June 2003); and ‘China, Thailand to scrap tariffs on fruits, vegetables’, Xinhua, (20 June 2003). 111. See ‘“Text” of Sino–Thai joint statement’. 112. ‘Thailand to act as link between ASEAN, China; push for FTAs’, Beijing Xinhua, (14 June 2003), (FBIS). 113. ‘China, Thailand to strengthen economic ties’, Agence France Press, (26 August 1993). 114. Quoted in Allen S. Whiting, ‘ASEAN eyes China’, Asian Survey 37(4), (April 1997), p. 315. 115. Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘US view of China has lessons for Thailand’, The Korea Herald, (7 July 2002); Chet Chaovisidha, ‘China: economic threat or a blessing to relish?’, Bangkok Post, (30 September 2002). 116. On the FTA, see Thanyaporn Kunakornpaiboonsiri and Tulsathit Taptim, ‘Trade with China: are we being swamped?’, The Nation, (8 March 2004), (FBIS); Woranuj Maneerungsee and Anuraj Manibhandu, ‘Good for whom?’, Bangkok Post, (20 March 2004); Editorial, ‘Public discussion of FTAs needed’, The Nation, (16 April 2004). On the Mekong River, see Kultida Samabuddhi, ‘Chinese dams upstream blamed for drastic decline in fish stock’, Bangkok Post, (10 March 2004). 117. On these Chinese discussions see ‘China urged to speed up talks on Thai canal’, The Straits Times, (14 July 2003); and Franz Schurmann, ‘China's grand plan to clear a traffic jam on the sea’, South China Morning Post, (5 August 2003). 118. Francesco Guerrera, ‘Thailand to press ahead with dollars 600m oil pipeline to China’, Financial Times (Japan edn), (3 February 2004); and Loh Hui Yin, ‘S'pore expected to halve tax on oil traders to 5%; move is to counter Thailand's 10% rate: analysts’, Business Times (Singapore), (26 February 2004). Additional informationNotes on contributorsMichael R. Chambers * Michael R. Chambers (Ph.D. Columbia University) is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Indiana State University, and was a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research during 2003–2004. He would like to thank Andrew Scobell and Allen Whiting for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article, as well as the comments of two anonymous reviewers.