Managing Competition: Politics and the Building of Independent Regulatory Institutions
2004; Routledge; Volume: 3; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/14736480490895561
ISSN1557-3036
Autores Tópico(s)Social and Economic Development in India
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes The author thanks Sunil Khilnani, Rob Jenkins, Montek Ahluwalia, and Partha N. Mukherji. Interaction with S. L. Rao, Rajat Kathuria, and M. B. Athreya helped. Ajoy Lywait provided excellent research assistance and Anjali Mukherji chipped in with timely editorial advice. The shortcomings nevertheless rest with the author. 1 On the political economy of reforms beyond 1991, see Rob Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Rahul Mukherji, “A Path to Trade and Investment Liberalization” (New York: Columbia University PhD Dissertation, 1999). See also Rahul Mukherji, “Economic Transition in a Plural Polity,” in Rahul Mukherji, ed., Economic Reforms: Political Economy of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2004. 2 For Indira Gandhi's policy orientation in the 1980s, see Mukherji, Trade and Investment Liberalization, Chapter 4; also see Indira Gandhi, Selected Speeches and Writings – Vol. 4 (New Delhi: Government of India – Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1985), p. 236. For Indira Gandhi's policy orientation in the 1960s, see Rahul Mukherji, “India's Aborted Liberalization – 1966,” Pacific Affairs Vol. 73, No. 3 (Fall 2000), p. 381. 3 On developments in telecom policy favoring competition during Indira Gandhi's tenure, see Stephen D. McDowell, Globalization, Liberalization and Policy Change (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 127–35; and J. P. Singh, Leapfrogging Development: The Political Economy of Telecommunications Restructuring (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 141–43. 4 For a description of Rajiv Gandhi's orientation and partial success with economic reforms, see Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Chapter 11. 5 For other sources of telecom policy before the balance of payments crisis of 1991, see Ben A. Petrazzini, “Telecommunications Policy in India: The Political Underpinnings of Reform,” Telecommunications Policy Vol. 20, No. 1 (January–February 1996), pp. 40– 41; M. B. Athreya, “India's Telecommunications Policy,” Telecommunications Policy Vol. 20, No. 1 (January–February 1996), pp. 11–17; and Singh, Leapfrogging Development, pp. 141–63. 6 On the US problems with Indian policy see McDowell, Globalization, pp. 142–44. 7 Athreya, “India's Telecommunications Policy,” pp. 16–17. Interview with M. B. Athreya, New Delhi, May 8, 2004. 8 Petrazzini, “Telecommunications Policy in India,” pp. 43–4. 9 Petrazzini, “Telecommunications Policy in India,” p. 48; Athreya, “India's Telecommunications,” p. 19; and Nikhil Sinha, “The Political Economy of India's Telecommunications Reform,” Telecommunications Policy Vol. 20, No. 1 (January–February 1996), p. 31. 10 Petrazzini, “Telecommunications Policy in India,” p. 44. 11 On the licensing process and its implications see Anupama Dokeniya, “Reforming the State: Telecom Liberalization in India,” Telecommunications Policy Vol. 23, No. 2 (March–April 1999), pp. 111–22; Sinha, “Political Economy,” pp. 32–35; Athreya, “India's Telecommunications,” pp. 20–21; Petrazinni, “Telecommunications Policy in India,” pp. 49–50; and Rajni Gupta, “Telecommunications Liberalization: Critical Role of Legal and Regulatory Regime,” Economic and Political Weekly,April 27, 2002, pp. 1679–80. 12 Dokeniya, “Reforming,” pp.122–23. See also Gupta “Telecoms Liberalization” pp. 1669–70; and Singh, Leapfrogging, pp. 180–81. 13 On TRAI's mandate see Dokeniya, “Reforming,” pp. 123–25; T. H. Chowdary, “Telecom Demonopolisation: Policy or Farce?” Economic and Political Weekly, February 5, 2000, pp. 438–39. On the first interconnection controversy between the DOT and TRAI see Gupta, “Telecoms Liberalization,” p. 1670. 14 Gupta, “Telecoms Liberalization,” p. 1670. 15 On the TRAI–DOT conflict over TRAI's licensing powers see Gupta, “Telecoms Liberalization,” p. 1670. See also EIU ViewsWire, “MTNL Plans Cellular Service in Delhi, Bombay,” The Economist Intelligence Unit (London: January 7, 1998); EIU ViewsWire, “More Telecoms Trouble,” The Economist Intelligence Unit (London: March 4, 1998); and EIU ViewsWire, “Telecoms Authority's Wings Clipped,” The Economist Intelligence Unit(London: August 5, 1998), all via www.viewswire.com. 16 On the composition of the Group on Telecommunications see EIU ViewsWire, “New Telecoms Policy in Pipeline,” The Economist Intelligence Unit (London: January 13, 1999), via www.viewswire.com. 17 On the politics and economics of the shift to revenue sharing, see EIU ViewsWire, “A Telecom Truce is Called,” The Economist Intelligence Unit (London: June 30, 1999); and EIU ViewsWire, “Government Intent on Telecoms Bailout Package,” The Economist Intelligence Unit (London: July 23, 1999), via www.viewswire.com. 18 On the gains to TRAI and DOT from the New Telecom Policy 1999, see Gupta, “Telecoms Liberalization,” p. 1671. 19 See www.trai.gov.in. 20 Urjit R. Patel, “Plug Power Financials – Now!” Business Standard (New Delhi), March 10, 2004. 21 Madhav Godbole, “Electricity Act: 2003: Questionable Wisdom,” Economic and Political Weekly, September 27, 2003, p. 4104. 22 Gajendra Haldea, “Whither Electricity Reforms?” Economic and Political Weekly, April 28, 2001, pp. 1389–91. 23 Government of India, Ministry of Power [B], Blueprint for Power Sector Development (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2003), pp. 49–52. 24 Government of India, Blueprint, pp. 20–22. 25 For the rise of the rural sector see Ashutosh Varshney, Democracy, Development and the Countryside (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 169–72; Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), Chapters 12–13; and Subrata K. Mitra, “Room to Maneuver in the Middle: Local Elites, Political Action, and the State in India,” World Politics Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 390–413. 26 Navroz Dubash and Sudhir C. Rajan, “Power Politics: Process of Power Sector Reform in India,” Economic and Political Weekly, September 1, 2001, pp. 3369–70. 27 Dubash and Rajan, “Power Politics,” pp. 3383–84; and S. L. Rao, “Economic Reforms and the Political Economy,” in Rahul Mukherji, ed., Economic Reforms: Political Economy of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2005). I am grateful to Amit Ahuja of the University of Michigan for bringing to my notice the pre-election behavior of the Tamil Nadu chief minister. 28 Government of India, Blueprint, pp. 62–64. 29 On the policy of introducing independent power producers see Dubash and Rajan, “Power Politics,” pp. 3372–75; and K. P. Kannan and N. Vijaymohan Pillai, Plight of the Power Sector in India: Inefficiency, Reform and Political Economy (Thiruvanthapuram, Kerala: Centre for Development Studies, 2002), pp. 393–98, 410–24. 30 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank's Role in the Electric Power Sector (Washington, DC: 1993), pp. 11–18. 31 On the Orissa experience see Dubash and Rajan “Power Politics,” pp. 3375–79; Haldea, “Whither Reforms?” pp. 40–46; Ministry of Power, Distribution Policy Committee Report – 2001 (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2003), pp. 129–33; T. L. Shankar and Usha Ramachandran, “Electricity Tariff Regulators: The Orissa Experience,” Economic and Political Weekly, May 27, 2000; and K. Ramanathan and Shahid Hussain, Privatization of Electricity Distribution: The Orissa Experience (New Delhi: Tata Energy Resource Institute, 2003). 32 Ministry of Power, Distribution Policy – 2001, pp. 185–97. 33 On regulatory issues, see Rao, “Economic Reforms”; S. L. Rao, “Political Economy of Power,” Economic and Political Weekly, August 17, 2002, pp. 3441–43; Madhav Godbole, “Power Sector Woes: No Easy Answers,” Economic and Political Weekly, September 6, 2003, pp. 3782–83. 34 Tonci Bakovic, Bernard Tenenbaum, and Fiona Wolf,“Regulation By Contract: A New Way to Privatize Electricity Distribution,” World Bank Working Paper No. 14 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), pp. 1–6. 35 Godbole, “Power Sector Woes,” pp. 4106–07. 36 For a comparison of levels of state autonomy in the developing world, see Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 37 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 251–67. 38 On the design of IMF programs emphasizing country ownership of programs, see Mohsin S. Khan, “IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs,” IMF Working Paper 01/142 (Washington, DC: IMF, 2001).
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