Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

An Absence of Malice

2015; SAGE Publishing; Volume: 43; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1177/1532673x15570470

1552-3373

Michael D. Cobb, Andrew Taylor,

Corruption and Economic Development

We examine whether repeated scandals within one party generate collective sanctions for fellow partisans. Do voters punish a party’s candidates because of multiple corruption scandals? Our data come from a unique survey conducted prior to the 2010 legislative elections in North Carolina, a state that had recently seen a number of high-profile corruption scandals involving Democrats exclusively. Although Republicans campaigned energetically against “the party of corruption,” we find the impact of that campaign was muted. Respondents who accurately identified at least one scandal rated the Democratic Party less favorably and thought Republicans would do better at responding to corruption. Nevertheless, vote choice was unrelated to knowledge of corruption scandals, and Republicans did not benefit from any effects on voter turnout. Importantly, respondents’ partisanship only sometimes mediated attitudes and did not affect behavior. We conclude that voters might in theory prefer “clean” parties, but their political actions are uninfluenced by that preference, a finding that has unfortunate implications for democracy.