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Inscriptions of Violence in Northern Yemen: Haunting Histories, Unstable Moral Spaces

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 45; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00263200802697084

1743-7881

Ayman Hamidi,

Global Maritime and Colonial Histories

Abstract The article investigates the so-called ‘Huthi crisis’ in northern Yemen, centering on the recent confrontation between Zaydi Shi‘is and the government. The crisis is analysed in the context of local contestations over moral authority and regional developments since the late 1970s. The article shows how regional and global dynamics, notably Cold War strategic alliances, Saudi Arabia's aspirations to contain Shi‘ism on the Arabian Peninsula and American security concerns since 2001, have impacted local politics and configurations of power. The article argues that anxieties over the past remain, against the backdrop of the politicisation and repression of the Zaydi revivalist movement, depicted by the government as aiming to restore the imamate. The government was open to accusations of ambivalence towards Sunni militants, by using them alongside the army and giving them positions of power while at the same time claiming to counter their influence. Action against the Zaydis established its credentials in the ‘war on terror.’ Notes 1. P. Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 2. Al-Thawra, 29 March 2005. 3. The article is based on sources most of whom wish to remain anonymous. 4. M. Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.231–9. 5. In the words of a member of the Mu'assasat Imam Zayd. 6. Among the Zaydis modesty and self-restraint are attributes valued above all in those entrusted with authority. See, for example, P. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p.159. 7. Commonly the hijra is a protected enclave reserved for those affiliated with the Islamic sciences. In Marran, however, the Huthi family lives among the qaba’il. 8. The government donated YR400,000 monthly to those schools. Those teaching there, among them Salih Habra, Muhammad ‘Izzan, and Muhammad b. Badr al-Din al-Huthi, spent the money on basic support of the students. 9. In 2007 the party was dissolved by its chairman, Ahmad al-Shami, though some of its leading figures, among them the general secretary, Hasan Zayd, maintained that it should continue. Thus du Bouchet's assertion that Yemen has achieved ‘thorough political, social, economic integration of Islamism by, and within, the state’ requires qualification (L. du Bouchet, ‘The State, Political Islam and Violence: The Reconfiguration of Yemeni Politics since 9/11’, in A. Blom, L. Bucaille and L. Martinez (eds.), The Enigma of Islamist Violence (London: Hurst, 2007), pp.137–191). The dynamic and inclusive policy the republican government has pursued towards the Islamists refers merely to groups displaying an anti-Shi‘i agenda. Its relationship with parties such as the Hizb al-Haqq has been for most part confrontational. 10. Until he and others fled to Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Egyptian bombardment of Sa‘da, Muqbil al-Wada‘i was a student of the renowned Zaydi scholar Majd al-Din al-Mu'ayyidi (d. 2007). Muqbil was later attributed Wahhabi tendencies by reason of having studied ‘ilm al-hadith at Medina under the guidance of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Baz and Nasr al-Din al-Albani, and of his subsequent teachings. Muqbil argued that Yemen required ‘reislamization’ (F. Burgat and M. Sbitli, ‘Les Salafis au Yémen ou … la modernisation malgré tout’, Chroniques Yéménites, Vol.10 (2002), pp.1–65). However, Muqbil should not be mistaken as a client of the Saudi state. He established his own Salafi movement in Yemen and his relationship with Saudi Arabia was ambivalent. 11. In addition to generous funding from abroad, Muqbil al-Wadi‘i enjoyed government support. Prior to 2001, some of those institutes accommodated students from over 30 countries (Yemen Times (YT), 30 March 2007). Among Zaydis in Sa‘da province the term ‘Salafi’ is synonymous with ‘Wahhabi’. Wahhabi attempts to proselytize in Yemen in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries were never as successful as those of the contemporary era. On the Wahhabi–Zaydi conflict in north-west Yemen, see S. Weir, ‘A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen’, Middle East Report, No.204 (1997), pp.22–6. 12. After 1962 other kinds of endowment that belonged to the awlad al-Hadi (descendants of Imam al-Hadi, the first Zaydi imam in Yemen) in Sa‘da were given to tribal leaders and others loyal to the regime. One of the demands made by the Huthi family in advance of peace negotiations following armed conflict with the government was the return of such endowments (Yahya al-Huthi, ‘A Letter to the ‘ulama’, 16 May 2007). There are still unresolved cases of land confiscation since 1962, and attempts by men of tribal background to appropriate land owned by Hashimites in various parts of the country have increased since the government's military campaign against al-Huthi's followers in 2004. Since that time, the government also gave ‘jihadists’ fighting them control over land belonging to the Huthi family (M. Knights, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org (accessed 24 Sept. 2008). 13. Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, p.250. 14. Al-Shura, 7 July 2004. 15. Soon after taking up his post, the governor passed a school in Sa‘da that was named after Imam Hasan b. ‘Izz al-Din (d. 1128, Fallala). Picking up some soil and throwing it at the plaque, he shouted that the age of the imams was over. Locals likened al-‘Amri to Al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf (d. 714), governor of Iraq during the reign of the Umayyad caliph ‘Abd al-Malik. 16. Yahya al-Huthi, Husayn's younger full brother, was a member of the Consultative Council from 1988 to 1993. In February 2007 the government lifted his immunity from prosecution, and in June 2008 revoked his membership of the parliament. 17. According to du Bouchet, in addition to receiving sponsorship for educational projects, Husayn al-Huthi was given permission by the government to collect zakat (du Bouchet, ‘The State, Political Islam and Violence’, p.149). This may be so; however, people in the area, often mistrusting the government, have customarily given the zakat to ‘ulama families such as Bayt al-Huthi both before and after the revolution. 18. In a letter of 28 April 2004 to President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih, Husayn al-Huthi confirmed that he was not seeking to overthrow the regime. For similar statements by ‘Abd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Huthi, see al-Akhbar, 4 July 2008. 19. Al-Shura, 30 June/7 July 2004. Among those asked by the president to join the mediation committee were ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Anisi (secretary general of al-Islah), Hamud ‘Ubad (minister of youth), Hamud al-Hitar (minister of endowments), Muhammad al-Mutawakkil (political science professor and deputy secretary general of the Union of Popular Forces), Shaykh ‘Ali Ghadir, ‘Abd al-Malik al-Makhlafi (general secretary of Nasirite party until 2007), Muhammad al-Mansur (Zaydi mujtahid), and Ibrahim b. Muhammad al-Wazir (owner of al-Balagh). In a letter to the president (5 Aug. 2004) a member of the team, al-Mansur, explained the reasons for the failure of talks. On arrival in Sa‘da, the governor and General ‘Ali Muhsin informed the delegation that they could not contact Husayn al-Huthi due to combat activities in the area and to lack of communication with al-Huthi. Fighter planes had taken off for Marran just as the delegation was about to go there. ‘We could neither mediate nor meet Husayn and talk to him.’ 20. YT, 8 Feb. 2007; New York Times, 28 June 2008. In 2007, Yemen's foreign secretary Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, asked in an interview about Iranian–Yemeni relations, repeated that ‘Yemen rejects interference in its internal affairs’ (Al-Sharq al-awsat, 4 Aug.). However, Mark Katz notes that ‘Iran does not appear interested in the Huthis … It makes far more sense for Tehran to maintain good relations with Sanaa (which is a potential ally against Riyadh) than to support a movement that probably has little prospect for actually overthrowing and replacing the Saleh regime, and would probably not be subservient to Tehran even if it did’ (Middle East Times, 11 June 2008). Libya was also accused of supporting al-Huthi's followers in order to weaken Saudi Arabia's influence in the region (YT, 28 May 2007; Reuters, 2 March 2007). When the Yemeni ambassador was recalled from Libya, a member of ruling party explained that ‘Yemen will not accept that poverty and neediness be exploited by some countries to settle their agendas on its territories’ (Al-Mawtamar.net, 11 May 2007). 21. Badr al-Din al-Huthi denied those allegations (al-Wasat, 16 March 2005). Note that after his expulsion from Saudi Arabia (where he had fled during the crisis between the Yemeni government and some Zaydi ‘ulama in the 1990s), he took up temporary residence in Qum, where he was not granted stipends by the Iranian authorities by reason of his adherence to Zaydi doctrine. 22. New York Times, 28 June 2008. 23. Al-Balagh, 22 Feb. 2005. 24. Anonymous personal communication. As the ideological battle intensified, the government became anxious that its propaganda concerning the Huthis' Imami-Shi‘i identity might defeat its purpose and lead wealthy Gulf Shi‘is to sponsor their cause. Thus, in a speech foreign secretary al-Qirbi said that in spite of their claim to embrace Imami Shi‘ism, the Huthis were actually Zaydis (‘The Road from Failure to Success’, lecture at Chatham House, 15 June 2007). 25. In the early 1990s unidentified persons tried to blow up the houses of ‘ulama (al-Ra'i, 86, 1992). Several attempts were made on Yahya al-Huthi's life, and his house was damaged by a rocket (al-Umma, 48, 1992). The Huthi family has had problems with the government since ‘Ali ‘Abdullah became president. 26. Al-Shura, 30 June 2004. 27. du Bouchet, ‘The State, Political Islam and Violence’, p.149. 28. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History, p.166. 29. Al-Thawra, 29 March 2005; France24, 30 Jan. 2007; al-Mawtamar.net, 18 June 2008. 30. The poem was recited by Naji ‘Ali at a summer school in Razih (north-west Yemen) in 2004. 31. Amnesty International, Report (2005). Available at http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/yem-summary-eng (accessed 28 May 2006). 32. The army was said to have deployed about 3,000 soldiers for this operation. 33. Nine members of the Huthi family were killed in the fighting between June 2004 and June 2008. In a letter of 10 May 2005 to the president, Badr al-Din al-Huthi wrote: ‘Nothing from our side has occurred that would justify shedding our blood, killing our sons, destroying our homes … since neither in the past nor in the present have we rejected the republican system nor the president … we as citizens call upon you to remove this injustice that has been put upon us’. 34. Likewise in the war between republicans and royalists in the 1960s, many qaba’il living in the northern parts of the country joined royalist forces only after their villages were bombarded by Egyptian planes. 35. Al-Wasat, 16 March 2005; Al-Akhbar, 4 July 2008). This view was echoed by the Hizb al-Haqq affiliated al-Umma (15 July 2004). 36. Al-Umma (15 July 2004) claimed that some of the attacks on Marran by planes and rockets came from the Saudi region. According to the Yemen Times (8 Feb. 2007), after renewed fighting had broken out following the collapse of a ceasefire, Saudi forces helped the Yemeni army besieging the fighters from the east and south by blockading the northern border. Allegations that Saudi planes had bombed targets in Sa‘da province were made again in 2008 (http://shabwahpress.net, 4 June 2008), soon after meetings of the joint Saudi–Yemeni military committee had begun in San‘a (Al-Hayat, 27 May 2008). In April 2005 allegations were also made that American forces bombarded the area from their ships in the Red Sea, and that they had provided the Yemeni army with satellite photos that enabled it to take out positions on mountaintops. Al-Shura (30 June 2004) linked the conflict in Sa‘da to American strategic interests, saying that government-affiliated newspapers analysed the Huthi crisis in the context of issues relevant to the United States: Iran and the threat it posed; the Shi‘i doctrine it represents; and related events in Saudi Arabia's eastern province, Bahrain, and Iraq. 37. ‘A. Al-Ba‘si, Al-yaman ‘ala-’l-tariq al-khallas (London: publ. unknown, 2005), p.60. 38. http://www.sanaapress.net (accessed 2 June 2008). 39. Al-Akhbar, 4 July 2008. Similar points were made by Mark Katz (Middle East Times, 11 June 2008) and MP Yahya al-Huthi who argued that ‘accusing us of having relations with Iran aims at diverting the attention of the West away from the human rights violations in Sa‘da. The Yemeni government is exploiting Western and Saudi fears to get their support.’ Accusing Saudi Arabia of instigating the Yemeni president to wage war against his adversaries in Sa‘da, he claimed that the president had received $25 billion from the Saudis in order to fight the Zaydis. ‘The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which used to occupy our country, is paying a lot of money to the state in order to eradicate our doctrine from schools, institutes and mosques’ (Al-Quds Press, 10 July 2008). The Huthi family is also concerned about attempts made by Imami-Shi‘is to ‘convert’ Zaydis in some parts of the country. 40. 7 June 2008. Compare http://www.yemenhurr.com (accessed 9 June 2008). 41. http://www.alweeam.com. 42. The Ashraf ruled Mecca and its dependencies from the tenth century until the early twentieth century, adhering to Zaydi Islam until nearly the end of the fifteenth century. See R. Mortel, ‘Zaydi Shiism and the Hasanid Sharifs of Mecca’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.19, No.4 (1987), pp.455–72. At the height of the fighting in Sa‘da province in April 2007 the Najdi scholar Ibn Jibrin issued a fatwa denying that the Ashraf were Hashimites. 43. I. Al-Mutawakkil, Harb sa‘da wa athuraha ‘ala’l-sa‘udiyya’[The Sa‘da War and its Effect on Saudi Arabia], unpubl. ms, 7 Nov. 2006. 44. Notably the Hadramawt was conquered by the Zaydi imam al-Mutawakkil ‘ala Allah Isma‘il in the seventeenth century. 45. Compare YT, 9 March 2007. By April there were an estimated 5,000 ‘irregulars’ from different ideological and regional backgrounds fighting with the army (available at http://jid.janes.com). Al-‘Amrani's fatwa coincided with the government's call on ‘volunteers’ to join the battle. Such calls were reiterated at a meeting between President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih and shaykhs from Sa‘da during a deadlock in the fighting (YT, 12 July 2008). In an attempt to prevent further support for al-Huthi in the rural areas of Sa‘da and elsewhere, the president suggested the formation of a ‘popular army’, made up of 20,000 tribesmen from Sa‘da province and 9,000 from the Hashid and Bakil tribes. It was to be commanded by al-Ahmar's son Husayn, an MP and chairman of the National Solidarity Council (Al-Jazeera.net, 14 July 2008). At a religious forum held in San‘a on 15 July 2008, al-Zindani and others promised to ‘gather thousands of well-trained jihadists’ who would join that army (YT, 17 July 2008). However, by arming a substantial number of men the government would have taken risks, and the plan contradicted its policy to disarm citizens. In any case, it was impossible to predict the outcome of a war between tribal factions with diverse regional and doctrinal allegiances. The president's realization that the war might be won only at the price of establishing another army not commanded by his own lieutenants and giving Saudi Arabia a powerful lever is likely to have influenced his decision to arrange a ceasefire in the summer of 2008. 46. YT, 17 May 2007. 47. Al-Ayyam, 11 April 2005. 48. YT, 12 July 2008. 49. ‘A Survey of Pakistan’, Economist, 8 July 2006. 50. M. Hafez, ‘Radicalization in the Persian Gulf: Assessing the Potential of Islamist Militancy in Saudi Arabia and Yemen’, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, Vol.1 (2008), p.6–24. In the 1990s, many of the Arab fighters who returned from Afghanistan but were unable to go back to their own countries, were welcomed by the Yemeni government (New York Times, 21 June 2008). 51. Presumably those who fought in Sa‘da did not belong to al-Islah, a member of the Joint Meeting parties that opposed the war. In 2007 the Yemen Times (22 Feb.) claimed that the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA), which emerged from the Islamic Jihad Movement that was held responsible for the kidnapping of tourists in 1998, also joined the army. However, political observers noted that there was no evidence for such allegations. In a recent interview, the leader of the AAIA, Khalid ‘Abd al-Nabi, declared that he personally did not know anyone of his group who ‘went to fight in Sa‘da’. He also confirmed that his group had fought against southern forces in the war of 1994 (Al-Quds al-‘arabi, 8 July 2008). In 1994 the president had also requested that Husayn al-Huthi send his followers to fight alongside the northern army against southern forces. However, he refused, suggesting dialogue instead. 52. New York Times, 21/29 June 2008. 53. YT, 22 Feb. 2007. A year after the start of the war, in a communiqué a number of Zaydi ‘ulama, most notably Muhammad al-Mansur and Hamud al-Mu'ayyid, distanced themselves from the military campaign ‘against the citizens and the weak’, and implicitly placed blame on the Salafis. ‘We assure the president (may God protect him) that the situation would not have reached this point had it not been for the intriguers and individuals out for their own ends who are trying to turn people away from [their loyalty to] the president and [thus] prejudice him against them. What these individuals want is to spread dissension and hate. One hopes that the president (may God protect him) will not support them or be pleased by them’ (al-Balagh, 23 June 2005). 54. YT, 22 June 2006; 10 March 2008. 55. In Rayda near the town of ‘Amran the grave of Imam al-Qasim al-‘Iyani (d. 1003) was razed to the ground in the same fashion as the shrines of members of the House of the Prophet such as the Prophet's grandson al-Hasan and great-grandson ‘Ali Zayn al-Abidin in Medina in 1925. See M. Rodenbeck, ‘The Time of the Shia’, New York Review of Books, 10 Aug. 2006, p.44. 56. Y. Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi‘a in the Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p.46. 57. Akhbar al-Yawm, 8 July 2004; 10/11 Feb. 2005; see also New York Times, 28 June 2008. 58. Al-Thawra, 29 March 2005. 59. YT, 29 April 2005. However, a few years later President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih denied that the issue was sectarian, citing his own Zaydi background (New York Times, 28 June 2008). 60. M. Brandt, ‘Hamoud al-Hitar und die Praxis des Kommunikativen Handelns’, Jemen-Report, Vol.37 (2006), p.6. In an interview with Gulfnews (20 April 2007), al-Hitar defended fatwas of the kind issued by al-‘Amrani. 61. C. Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.11. 62. Al-Balagh, 3 May 2006. Before the war, officials refrained from using anti-Hashimi rhetoric publicly. During the war period, the rhetoric was reminiscent of the 1960s and particularly vocal among the army. The atmosphere of repression was such that even in the capital San‘a, over 200 miles away from Sa‘da, companies refused to deliver goods to anyone belonging to the Huthi family, however remotely related they were to those living in the northern province. 63. YT, 28 June 2004. 64. Al-Wasat, 16 March 2005. Husayn al-Huthi denied those charges on al-Jazeera (al-Balagh, 29 June 2004). 65. During the mid-twentieth century, imamate dissidents were accused of abbreviating the Qu'ran. 66. A. Feldman, ‘Ethnographic States of Emergency’, in C. Nordstrom and A. Robben (eds.), Fieldwork Under Fire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp.224–52. 67. For example, there is discussion about the level of erudition required of a ruler and whether the institution of ‘a mujtahid without an imamate’, who does not aspire to political office, is compatible with Zaydi doctrine. 68. Al-Wasat, 16 March 2005. 69. In 2008, flags inscribed with the slogans were displayed on tanks captured from the army. 70. A. Feldman, ‘On Cultural Anesthesia: From Desert Storm to Rodney King’, American Ethnologist, Vol.21, No.2 (1994), pp.404–18. 71. Ibid., p.407. 72. I borrow a term from ibid., p.408. 73. D. Eickelman and J. Anderson, ‘Redefining Muslim Publics’, in D. Eickelman and J. Anderson (eds.), New Media in the Muslim World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), p.1–18. 74. In this context writers have drawn attention to the ‘Medina agreement’ (Wathiqat Madina) that was signed by members of different faiths, committing themselves to respecting the dignity of each (G. Jawad, Al-Haqq qadim (Cairo: Markaz al-Qahira li-dirasat huquq al-insan, 2000), p.23). 75. Al-Balagh, 29 June 2005. 76. That same year, their leaders started to run an ‘information office’, publishing news and updates on the war on the internet (http://www.almenpar.com). When on 24 May 2008 media outlets reported that ‘Abd al-Malik al-Huthi had been killed or injured in an air raid, he denied the claims in an audiotape recorded in his hideout and placed on the internet. 77. Eickelman and Anderson, ‘Redefining Muslim Publics’, p.3. 78. New York Times, 28 June 2008. 79. http://www.washingtonpost.com (accessed 16 June 2007). By 2007 the army used heavy artillery, anti-personnel mines and MiG-29 fighter aircraft that killed mainly civilians. No combatant was reported to have died in an air raid. An estimated 30,000 troops and Central Security units were mobilized. Over 1,000 were estimated to have died between late January and April 2007, and there were about 56,000 internally displaced civilians (http://www.middle-east-online.com, 28 April 2007; YT, 23 April 2007; irinnews, 11 Nov. 2007). Before the renewed outbreak of hostilities in May 2008, the ICRC was looking after over 100,000 persons (http://www.al-tagheer.com/news/ye, 11 May 2008). As the war progressed, the government ignored its obligation under the Geneva Convention and refused it access to areas suspected of supporting al-Huthi's cause. By mid-July, an unnamed Yemeni NGO declared that 20,000 children had lost their fathers due to the war (YT, 21 July 2008). 80. Available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2007/850/re11.htm. After earlier reluctance to accept outsiders' efforts to bring peace to the region, the government welcomed the Qatari diplomatic initiative not least because it might serve to weaken and to counterbalance Saudi influence in Sa‘da province. It was noted that during the civil war in the 1960s, Saudi support for the enemies of the newly installed republican regime was channelled through that province. 81. The demonstrators were readily denounced by religious figures. In a speech in an Adeni mosque in the presence of the president, Nasir al-Shaybani, a former minister of endowment and Sufi, referred to them as non-believers. The speech was reminiscent of the fatwa against al-Huthi and his supporters (YT, 8 Nov. 2007). 82. Members of the committee included ‘Abd al-Karim al-Iryani and ‘Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar acting on behalf of the government on the one hand, and on the other Yahya al-Huthi and Shaykh Salih Sabra (representing ‘Abd al-Malik al-Huthi), and ‘Ali b. Nasir Qirsha, a local shaykh. The talks were chaired by Shaykh Hamad b. Jasim b. Jabr Âl Thani, the Qatari prime minister and foreign secretary. By ordering ‘Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar to participate in the Doha talks, the president skilfully neutralized the most important member of the military, who might have opposed an end to hostilities. Some commanders, notably those with anti-Shi‘i leanings, disapproved of the agreement (compare al-Quds al-‘arabi, 4 Feb. 2008). For example, a few days after the conclusion of the agreement, the 17th armoured military division led by General ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Shahari continued to attack villages deemed loyal to al-Huthi (YT, 11 Feb. 2008). 83. Since Qatar agreed to pay for the reconstruction of villages destroyed in the 2004–08 war, finance new projects, and compensate victims on all sides, Saudi Arabia committed $225 million for similar purposes (al-Thawra, 2 April 2008). 84. YT, 11 Feb.; 3 March; 28 April 2008. 85. Al-Wasat, 6 March 2008. 86. ‘Izzan was imprisoned on 13 July 2004 after returning from a conference in Beirut. On his release he wrote articles denouncing al-Huthi and casting doubts about the validity of hadith which exalt the Quraysh above others. See, e.g., M. ‘Izzan, ‘Hadith ‘al-a'imma min quraysh' taht al-mijhar', Al-Masar, Vol.2, No.1 (2001), pp.5–29; al-Umma, 15 July 2004; al-‘Arabiyya, 17 April 2007. 87. In light of the catastrophic aftermath of Yemen's refusal to approve of military action against Iraq after it had invaded Kuwait, the government has been cautious to avoid alienating the United States. 88. Some Salafis downplay the Zaydis' role in Yemeni history. By claiming that they are Iranian agents, they seek to capitalize on anti-Iranian sentiment in a country that was used to Saddam Husayn's conciliatory treatment in the government-affiliated press, and to find favour with the government which has portrayed the Huthi leadership in similar fashion. 89. Al-Shura, 30 June 2004.