David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol and the Struggle over Dimona: A Prologue to the Six-Day War and its (Un)Anticipated Results
2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 15; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13537120902734418
ISSN1743-9086
Autores Tópico(s)Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The most important study of the Israeli–French collaboration that led to the acquisition of the Dimona reactor by Israel is in Benjamin Pinkus, From Ambivalence to an Unofficial Alliance, Israel, France, and the French Jews 1947–1957, Beer Sheba, 2005; cf. Pierre Pean, Les Deaux Bombes, Paris, 1982 and ensuing editions. See further Zaki Shalom, Between Dimona and Washington, the Struggle over the Development of Israel's Nuclear Option 1960–1968, Tel Aviv, 2004; cf. Michael Bar-Zohar, Like a Phoenix – Shimon Peres, the Biography, Tel Aviv, 2005, and the volume of records published by the Israeli State Archive, Jerusalem, 2005, Yemima Rosenthal (ed.), entitled Yitzhak Rabin – the Prime Minister of Israel 1974–1977/1992–1995. See further for primary sources, Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XI: Arms Control and Disarmament, Washington, DC, 1997. See also Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, New York, 1998 and my, with the assistance of Oded Brosh, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, Opacity, Theory and Reality 1960–1991, Albany, NY, 1992, and its Hebrew translations quoted below, and my Israel's Nuclear Programme, the Six Day War and its Ramifications, London, 1999. 2. See Yigal Allon, A Curtain of Sand, Tel-Aviv, 1959 and 1968 editions. In the second edition, Allon argued that the Six Day War was a conventional pre-emptive war as envisioned by him in the first edition. 3. See Yitzhak Greenberg, 'The Creation of the Foundations for the R&D and the Defence Production: Aspects of Policy and Budgeting', Iyunim beTkumat Israel, Studies in Zionism, the Yishuv and the State of Israel, A Research Annual, Vol. 9, The Ben-Gurion Research Center, Sede Boker Campus, 1999, pp. 167–187. 4. Greenberg, 'The Creation', p. 170. 5. See Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace, London, 1995; cf. Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, Vol. III, Tel Aviv, 1977; Matti Golan, Peres, Tel Aviv, 1982. 6. See Pean, Les Deux Bombes. 7. See Bar-Zohar, Like a Phoenix, pp. 1522–26. 8. See Mordechai Gazit, President Kennedy's Policy toward the Arab States and Israel, the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel-Aviv University, 1983, p. 40. 9. See Bar-Zohar, Like a Phoneix, p. 1373. 10. In an interview granted to the present writer by the late Professor Yuval Ne'eman, a major nuclear scientist and former military figure held on 20 February 2006, the actual completion of the reactor under Mr. Peres' leadership proved to be impossible until Peres' departure from the Ministry of Defence early in 1965 to the opposition party Rafi. The reactor became finally operational later, under Professor Israel Dostrovsky of the Weizman Institute. Israel could have obtained, for the time being, an amount of feasible material from other sources. This issue was investigated in secret by a Senate Subcommittee at the time, and may become more plausible thanks to the recent opening of the Nixon–Kissinger records at the US National Archives; cf. 'Israel's Nuclear Arsenal Vexed Nixon', New York Times, 29 November 2007. 11. For details see Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme. 12. Peres, Battling for Peace, pp. 138–139. 13. See Gazit, President Kennedy's Policy, p. 52. 14. This refers to the so-called McCloy visit in Egypt and Israel in summer 1963, aimed at a package linking Israel's nuclear programme with Nasser's missiles. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Library, Boston, NSF (National Security Files), box 119. 15. Greenberg, 'The Creation', p. 173. 16. See my Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East, Baltimore and London, 1978, pp. 52–53. 17. New York Times, 16 November 1963, quoting Ben-Gurion, hinting of possible experiments at Dimona in view of Egyptian threats, and Ben-Gurion's denial in the New York Times, 20 November 1963. 18. Greenberg, 'The Creation', p. 173, note 20. 19. Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions Concerning Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons', Lyndon B. Johnson Memorial Library, Austin, Texas, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, containers 1–2, problem 2, item 1. 20. Paris, Arthem Fayard, 1982 and ensuing versions. 21. Deptel circular 2447 to Vienna for IAEA, 26 June 1964, confidential, repeated to all Arab capitals; archival source: UPA microfilm, 'Israel: National Security Files 1963–1969', K4-128b [Kathy], Library of Congress Microfilm Reading Room, frames 86-892624 (85/4561 MICRR). I am indebted to my assistant Oded Brosh for this and the other records from the Kennedy and the Johnson Presidential archives quoted here. 22. See UPA microfilm, note 28, below. 23. Archival source: LBJ Library, NSF, UAR, containers 159–161, cables, vol. 2, item 99a. 24. Archival source: LBJ Library, NSF, UAR, containers 159–161, cables, vol. 2, item 99a (emphasis added). 25. See Shlomo Aronson, Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, Vol. I, Jerusalem, 1994, p. 316. 26. On 19 March 1966, the American Embassy in Cairo informed Washington that the 'conference uncovered concern and deep Arab suspicion Israel developing nuclear armaments (We have already reported in Embtel 2363 statement by Iraqi premier Bazzaz that report Israel on way to producing atomic weapons most serious item confronting conf.)'. After a censored half-line, the cable continues:'…very confidentially told me … [censored] had reported to him conversation between [censored] Pres Nasser [during which later] expressed his concern Israel threat and included remarks Israelis now have "eight kilos plutonium" … [censored] expressed the view, which he identified as general in Cairo, that situation would be very dangerous if Egypt failed to accept US assurances re Israeli nuclear activity' (emphasis added). 27. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XVIII, Arab–Israeli Dispute 1964–1967, Washington, 2000, p. 597. 28. See Yitzhak Rabin, A Service Record, Vol. I, Tel Aviv, 1979, pp. 129–130. Cf. Report on Ambassador Harriman's meeting with PM Eshkol, UPA/Library of Congress, 25 February 1965, in which Harriman told Eshkol that 'for one thing, the late President Kennedy had cured Khrushchev and Company of using the threat of nuclear war', as the USSR had done during the Suez crisis of 1956. Finally cf. Report to amembassy Cairo on the results of the Harriman/Komer visit: 'Harriman/Komer talks have eased situation, but basic problems remain and are still a potential cause of war … USG will keep up pressure on Israel not to go nuclear. As Nasser undoubtedly aware fact of recent American visit to Dimona has been revealed by US press' (emphasis added). 29. See Moshe Dayan, 'Germany, Dimona and the Jordan', Ha'aretz, 26 March 1965; cf. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 'Memorandum of Conversation on Prospects of Non-Proliferation Agreement and Related Matters', 13 July 1965 (limited official use) between Mr. Arieh Dissentchik, Editor in Chief, Ma'ariv, and Mr. William C. Foster, Director, ACDA, copies to the White House, to the American embassies in Moscow, Cairo, Paris, US UN Mission, Mr. Harriman, archival source, Library of Congress/UPA. 30. Commentary by W. Morris, Eastern Department, for internal use of British Foreign Office, dated 5 April 1966, on reports from Washington and Tel Aviv to be quoted below, PRO, FO 371/186864 (emphases added). 31. On the Ben-Barka affair see Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme, pp. 41–42. 32. See Filastin (Beirut), 17 November 1966: 'preparations must be made to destroy the nuclear reactors in Israel'; cf. Al-Muharar (Beirut), 11 November 1966, 'A preventive war against Israel must be undertaken by launching missiles and [by mounting] an aerial surprise attack against the reactor in Dimona'. 33. Interviews conducted in 1991–1992. 34. Ambassador Michael Hadow to Mr. W. Morris, Foreign Office, received 30 March 1966, FO 371/86851, original # 1199/66. 35. 'An Independent Israeli Deterrent', Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, 28 December 1962. 36. FRUS 2000, Doc. 273, pp. 556–557. Memorandum from the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson, 22 February 1966. 37. FRUS 2000, Doc. 273, p. 559, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject US–UAR Relations; Yemen (emphasis added). 38. Israeli Army translation, 1 May 1966. 39. FRUS 2000, pp. 562–563, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic, dated 28 February 1966, signed by Rusk. 40. FRUS 2000, Doc. 289, pp. 582–583, Memorandum from the Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency (Caroll) to Secretary of Defence McNamara, 4 May 1966, signed by Joseph F. Carroll, Lieutenant General, USAF. 41. See Sunday Times, 5 October, 1986. 42. FRUS 2000, p. 588, Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, signed by Barbour. 43. See Uzi Narkiss, A Soldier of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, 1991, pp. 130–246. 44. Doc. 366, pp. 715–718. 45. Rostow to President Johnson, 16 January 1967, doc. 380, pp. 742–743. 46. Doc. 391, p. 766 (emphasis added). 47. FRUS 2000, doc. 391. 48. Doc. 392, note 2. 49. Doc. 393, pp. 768–771. 50. For a short summary of the 1957 arrangements pertaining to the UN troops see Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme. 51. For a short summary of the 1957 arrangements pertaining to the UN troops see Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme 52. See For a short summary of the 1957 arrangements pertaining to the UN troops see Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme regarding this matter. 53. For a short summary of the 1957 arrangements pertaining to the UN troops see Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme 54. Doc. 404, pp. 791–792. 55. Footnote in the source text defined 'strategic' missiles as those capable of striking the major population centres or military installations of the enemy, i.e. missiles with a range roughly between 100 and 500 miles. 56. The President's Special Assistant to President Johnson, subject: Israel Aid Package, Doc. 406, pp. 794–796. 57. See Dan Margalit, I Have Seen Them All, Tel Aviv, 1997, p. 60. 58. See Arie Baron, Moshe Dayan and the Six Day War, Tel Aviv, 1997. General Baron was Dayan's aide after the Six Day War, and had access to IDF's studies on the war and its origins. 59. See, in this regard, Rabin's A Service Record, p. 150. Accordingly David Ben-Gurion criticized Rabin's moves from Samu' all the way to the mobilization of May 1967: Bar-Zohar, Like a Phoenix, pp. 1588–89. Cf. General Dayan's criticism of the same actions in the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee.
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