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Al‐Hajj Amin and the British in world war II

1984; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 20; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00263208408700568

1743-7881

Joseph Nevo,

Middle East Politics and Society

The attitude of the British authorities towards al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni was characterized, from the beginning of their rule in Palestine, by an ambivalent mixture of respect and mistrust. On the one hand, many a British official regarded him with suspicion, surmising that his activities were inimical to the interests of their government. They were nonetheless aware, as of the late 1920s, of his influence with the Arab population in Palestine and of the fact that that population or part of it at any rate viewed al-Hajj Amin as its representative, and later as its leader. The reasoning therefore which came to prevail was that if they could contrive, by investing the man with power and some influential positions, to harness him to their chariot, they would be able to restrain and moderate his activities, could purchase political calm, and through him would be able to do an efficient job of running the Palestinian Arab community. There was no lack of occasion for this ambiguous approach to find expression. At the beginning of the 1920s High Commissioner Herbert Samuel and his aides were at pains to have al-Hajj Amin elected Mufti of Jerusalem and for his appointment as President of the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC). Yet even after his election his name occupied a place of pride at the top of the secret 'political black list' of the Public Security Department.' The basis of his power and influence with the Arabs of Palestine broadened, producing a progressively more acute polarization between the British distrust for him as opposed to their esteem. While theoretically a government official, a public servant receiving his salary from the Treasury, al-Hajj Amin controlled tremendous monetary reserves. The powers he wielded and the things he did could directly affect the way of life and the welfare of close on a million Muslims in Palestine. The authorities therefore handled him with kid gloves and the High Commissioner refrained from taking any steps whatever against him, even when complaints became rife as regards the Supreme Muslim Council and the man heading it.2 Throughout the 1930s, and even after the outbreak of the Arab rebellion, the authorities continued to be torn between the desire to 'clip the Mufti's wings' because of the way he was accumulating power and putting it to use, and the fear of 'raising of the religious cry'.3 As the British dithered, the Mufti moved on to take his place at the head of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) and to initiate anti-government activity ranging from civil disobedience to violent revolt. It was not before the end of September 1937, after the murder of Lewis Andrews (Acting District Commissioner, Galilee), that the British abandoned forbearance and declared martial law. The SMC was dispersed, the AHC was outlawed and those of its members who were in the country were arrested.4 But even at this critical juncture, the Palestine government avoided an out-and-out confrontation with the Mufti. The authorities had tried to arrest him in July 1937, but he managed to evade