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Did the United States Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 8; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14702430701812043

1743-9698

Carter Malkasian,

Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Michael Gordon and Mark Mazzetti, ‘General Warns of Risks in Iraq if GIs are Cut’, New York Times, 16 Nov. 2006; Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2004) p.32; Lawrence Freedman, ‘Rumsfeld’s Legacy: The Iraq Syndrome?’, Washington Post, 9 Jan. 2005; Joseph Collins, ‘Planning Lessons from the US Experience in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Carnegie‐Triangle Workshop, Washington DC, Feb. 2005; and Peter Boyer, ‘Downfall: How Donald Rumsfeld reformed the Army and lost Iraq’, New Yorker, 20 Nov. 2006. 2 Jeffrey Record, The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency, Policy Analysis (Washington DC: Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 577, 1 Sept. 2006), 6. 3 Michael Gordon, ‘Military Hones a New Strategy on Insurgency’, New York Times, 5 Oct. 2006. 4 ‘Pentagon’s Plan: More US Troops in Iraq’, Los Angeles Times, 13 Dec. 2006. 5 James Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006) pp.v, 1; Record (note 2) p.6. 6 On traditional counterinsurgency see: John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Univ. of Chicago Press 2005); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace‐keeping (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books 1971); Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger 1966); Andrew Krepinevich, ‘How to Win in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs 84/5 (Sept./Oct. 2005). 7 Record (note 2) p.6. 8 Field Manual 3‐24, Counterinsurgency, Dec. 2006, 5‐18. 9 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, ‘Bush Must Call for Reinforcements in Iraq’, Financial Times, 12 Nov. 2006. Max Boot, ‘Many Dead Ends in Iraq’, Los Angeles Times, 8 Nov. 2006. 10 Gordon and Mazzetti (note 1); Thomas Ricks, ‘Situation Called Dire in West Iraq’, Washington Post, 11 Sept. 2006. 11 Michael O’Hanlon, Policy Q&A on Iraq, Policy Council, 8 Sept. 2006. 12 Paul Krugman, ‘The Arithmetic of Failure’, New York Times, 27 Oct. 2006; Kalev Sepp, ‘Best Practices in Counterinsurgency’, Military Review (May–June 2005) p.9; James Quinlivan, ‘Force Requirements in Stability Operations’, Parameters 25/4 (Winter 1995). 13 US Representative John Murtha, News Conference, 17 Nov. 2005; Melvin Laird, ‘Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam’, Foreign Affairs 84/6 (Nov./Dec. 2005) pp.28–9; Charles Dunlap, ‘The Asymmetric Advantage’, Armed Forces Journal (Sept. 2006). For related arguments see: Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books 2006) pp.401–2. 14 Representative John Murtha, Press Release, 17 Nov. 2005, 〈www.house.gov/list/press/pa12_murtha/pr051117iraq.html〉. 15 Ibid. 16 Laird (note 13); and Dunlap (note 13). For related arguments see: Max Boot, ‘Radical Ideas for Iraq’, Los Angeles Times, 9 Aug. 2006; Austin Long, On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA RAND Corp. 2006) p.64; and Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984) pp.194, 239. 17 Krepinevich (note 6) pp.97–8. 18 Thomas Mockaitis, Counterinsurgency in the Post‐Imperial Era (Manchester UP 1995). 19 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Civil War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, UK: CUP 2005) pp.339–47, 395. 20 Boot (note 16). 21 Richard Andres, ‘The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/3 (June 2006) p. 418. Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2003) pp.212–13. 22 Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2002) pp.1–2. Biddle specifically argues against the Afghan model. Stephen Cimbala, “Transformation in Concept and Policy, Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 38 (Summer 2005) pp.29–32. 23 Andres (note 21) p.396. 24 Richard Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas Griffith, ‘Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model’, International Security 30/3 (Winter 2005/2006) pp.124–5. 25 I MEF Commanders’ Discussion, Camp Fallujah, 8 April 2004. 26 The Iraqi National Guard (ING) originally was named the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). The name changed at the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004. This paper uses ING for the sake of simplicity. 27 Krepinevich (note 6) p.94. 28 Discussions with Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (3/7), Camp Husaybah, 30 March 2004. Discussions with 3/7, Camp Al Qa’im, 30 March 2004. Most other battalions conducted 8–12 patrols per day. 29 Discussions with Lima Company 3/7, Camp Husaybah, 17 June 2004. 30 Discussions with Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT‐7), Camp Al Asad, 20 Oct. 2004. 31 Discussions with 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (1/7), Camp Al Qa’im, 20 Oct. 2004. 32 Discussions with Al Qa’im Police, Al Qa’im Police Academy, 17 June 2004. 33 Discussions with 1/7, Camp Al Qa’im, 20 Oct. 2004. 34 Hannah Allam and Mohammed al Dulaimy, ‘Iraqis Lament Call for Help’,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 17 May 2005. 35 Christopher Allbritton, ‘Making Tribal War Work for the US in Iraq’, Time, 8 Nov. 2005. ‘Iraq’s Desert Protection Force at War’, StrategyPage, 1 Jan. 2006. 36 Ellen Knickmeyer and Omar Fekeiki, ‘US Warplanes Target Alleged Rebel Havens Along Iraq‐Syrian Border’, Washington Post, 31 Aug. 2005. 37 Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, ‘Insurgents Assert Control over Town near Syrian Border’, Washington Post, 6 Sept. 2005. 38 Ibid. 39 Discussion with RCT‐7, Camp Al Asad, 28 March 2004. 40 Discussion with 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (2/7), Camp Al Asad, 28 March 2004. Discussion with 2/7, Camp Hit, 28 March 2004. 41 Discussion with 2/7, Camp Hit, 15 June 2006; Philip Skuta, ‘Introduction to 2/7 CAP Platoon Activities in Iraq’, Marine Corps Gazette (April 2005) p.35; Philip Skuta, ‘Partnering with Iraqi Security Forces’, ibid. pp.36–39. Jason Goodale and Jon Webre, “The Combined Action Platoon in Iraq’, ibid. pp.40–2. 42 These percentages were calculated by examining each engagement of the 503rd ING Battalion. 43 Discussions with 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (2/7), Camp Hit, 28 March 2004. Discussions with 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment (1/23), Camp Al Asad, 31 Oct. 2004. 44 Discussions with 1/23, Camp Al Asad, 30 Oct. 2004. 45 Discussions with 1/23, Camp Hit, 1 Nov. 2004. 46 Discussions with 1/23, Camp Al Asad, 31 Oct. 2004. 47 Discussions with 1/23, Haditha Dam, 31 Oct. 2004. 48 The First Battle of Fallujah might be considered an example of the clear‐hold‐build approach if not for the fact that the Marine offensive was prematurely halted. Consequently, traditional counterinsurgency techniques, which are at the heart of the clear‐hold‐build approach, could not be implemented. 49 I MEF Brief to Gen. John Abizaid, Camp Fallujah, 9 April 2004. 50 Comments by Lt. Gen. James Conway, Camp Fallujah, 9 May 2004. 51 Fallujah Brigade Meeting, Fallujah Liaison Team Center, Fallujah, 6 May 2004. Observations at I MEF headquarters, Camp Fallujah, 30 April to 10 June 2004. Daniel Williams, ‘Despite Agreement, Insurgents Rule Fallujah’, Washington Post, 7 June 2004. 52 I MEF Commanders’ Discussion, Camp Fallujah, 25 May 2004. Conversation with CPA representative to Fallujah, Camp Fallujah, 4 May 2004. Brief to Ambassador Robert Blackwill, Camp Fallujah, 23 May 2004. 53 The Marine commanders had all these goals in mind. I MEF Commanders’ Discussion, Camp Fallujah, 14 April 2004. Lt. Gen. James Conway, Address to I MEF Command Element, Camp Fallujah, 29 April 2004. Discussion with CPA Representative to Fallujah, Camp Fallujah, 30 April 2004. 54 Observation of train station assault, Fallujah, 8 Nov. 2004. Discussions with 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment CAP Platoon, 9 and 10 Nov. 2004. 55 Discussions with 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment CAP Platoon, Fallujah, 9 Nov. 2004. 56 Discussions with 4th Iraqi Intervention Force Battalion, Fallujah, 24 Nov. 2004. Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT‐1) Iraqi Intervention Force Brief, Camp Fallujah, 7 Nov. 2004. RCT‐1 Commanders’ Planning Meeting, RCT‐1 Forward Headquarters, 10 Nov. 2004. 57 Discussions with 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (3/6), Camp Al Qa’im, 21 Feb. 2006. 58 Ibid. 59 Discussions with RCT‐7, Camp Al Asad, 20 and 21 Feb. 2006. 60 Discussions with 3/6, Camp Al Qa’im, 21 Feb. 2006. 61 Discussions with RCT‐7, Camp Al Asad, 15 July 2006. 62 Discussion with 3rd Brigade, 7th Iraqi Brigade military transition team, Camp Al Asad, 15 July 2006. 63 Ann Scott Tyson, ‘In a Volatile Region of Iraq, US Military Takes Two Paths’, Washington Post, 15 Sept. 2006. Discussions with Marine forces, Hit, 6 July 2006. 64 Discussion with 24th MEU, Camp Kalsu, 18 Dec. 2004. 65 Ibid. 19 Dec. 2004. 66 Discussions with 2nd Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment (2/24), Camp Mahmudiyah, 26 Oct. 2004. 67 Discussions with 2/24, Camp Mahmudiyah, 19 Dec. 2004. 68 Discussions with 24th MEU, Camp Kalsu, 20 Dec. 2004. 69 Discussions with 24th MEU Force Recon, Camp Kalsu, 19 Dec. 2004. Discussions with 24th MEU, Camp Kalsu, 18 Nov. 2004. 70 Observations of the Second Battle of Fallujah, Fallujah, 7 Nov. to 31 Dec. 2004. Discussion with 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (3/1), Camp Fallujah, 21 Jan. 2005. Lt. Gen. John Sattler and Lt. Col. Daniel Wilson, ‘Operation Al Fajr: The Battle of Fallujah – Part II’, Marine Corps Gazette (July 2005). 71 Discussions with Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT‐1), Camp Fallujah, 14 Jan. 2005. I MEF Brief to Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, Camp Fallujah, 19 Jan. 2005. 72 Briefing to I MEF on Iraqi police, Camp Fallujah, 18 March 2006. 73 Discussions with 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, Camp Fallujah, 13 Jan. 2005. Discussions with RCT‐1, Camp Fallujah, 14 Jan. 2005. 74 Discussion with Kael Weston, State Dept. Representative to Fallujah, Fallujah Civil Military Operations Center, 26 April 2006. 75 Discussion with 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, Hurricane Point, Ramadi, 13 June 2004. I MEF Commanders’ Discussion, Camp Fallujah, 13 May 2004. Discussions with Lt. Col. Paul Kennedy, 1st Marine Division headquarters, Camp Pendleton, 20 March 2005. 76 Discussion with 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Division headquarters, Combat Outpost, Ramadi, 10 July 2006. Discussion with 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (3/8), Government Center, Ramadi, 9 July 2006. Discussion with Lima Company 3/8, Snake Pit, Ramadi, 5 June 2006. Discussion with 1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, OP Eagle’s Nest, Ramadi, 11 Aug. 2006. 77 Brief to Gen. Abizaid, Camp Fallujah, 26 March 2006. I MEF operational planning team, Camp Fallujah, 1 April 2006. 78 Karl Vick and Anthony Shadid, ‘Fallujah Gains Mythic Air: Siege Redefines Conflict for Iraqis in Capital’, Washington Post, 13 April 2004. International Republican Institute Poll, April 2004. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ‘Anti‐US Uprising Widens in Iraq’, Washington Post, 8 April 2004. I MEF Brief to Gen. Abizaid, Camp Fallujah, 9 April 2004. Incidentally, at the outset of offensive, none of the Marine commanders believed that the conditions were right for success. They preferred a more gradual and cautious operation. Subsequent history suggests that such an operation might have been successful. The second battle enjoyed laborious and methodical preparations, which helped prevent significant Sunni outrage. Local relationships improved greatly following the establishment of permanent presence, which had not occur after the first battle. 79 I MEF operational planning team, Camp Fallujah, 13 July 2006. Brief by 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry Regiment, Camp Habbaniyah, 4 April 2006. 80 I MEF Staff Meeting, Camp Fallujah, 28 March 2006. Discussion with 1st Iraqi Division military transition team, Camp Fallujah, 31 March 2006. 81 Debrief of I MEF staff visit to 3rd Brigade, 1st Iraqi Division (3‐1 Iraqi Brigade), Camp Fallujah, 21 April 2006. I MEF Staff Meeting, Camp Fallujah, 27 April 2006. Brief by 3‐1 Iraqi Brigade military transition team, 5 July 2006. 82 Brief by 3‐1 Iraqi Brigade military transition team, 5 July 2006. 83 Discussion with police transition team, Camp Fallujah, 25 March 2006. Discussions with Fallujah Police, Fallujah Police Station, Fallujah, 25 April 2006. 84 I MEF Commanders’ Conference, Camp Fallujah, 13 June 2006. 85 Fallujah City Council Meeting, Fallujah, 28 Feb. 2006. Fallujah City Council Meeting, Fallujah, 28 April 2006. Fallujah City Council Meeting, Fallujah, 1 Aug. 2006. 86 Regimental Combat Team 5 (RCT‐5) Combined Commanders’ Meeting, Camp Fallujah, 1 March 2006. RCT‐5 Combined Commanders’ Meeting, Camp Fallujah, 20 March 2006. RCT‐5 Combined Commanders’ Meeting, Camp Fallujah, 3 May 2006. 87 Field Manual 3‐24, Counterinsurgency, pp.5‐21. 5‐22. Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: The Penguin Press 2006) pp.228–232. Peter Maas, ‘The Way of the Commandos’, New York Times Magazine, 1 May 2005. Thomas Ricks, ‘In the Battle for Baghdad, US Turns War on Insurgents’, Washington Post, 26 Feb. 2006.