Syria, the Ba'th Regime and the Islamic Movement: Stepping on a New Path?
2005; Wiley; Volume: 95; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1478-1913.2005.00078.x
ISSN1478-1913
Autores Tópico(s)Middle East Politics and Society
ResumoFollowing the death of Ḣāfiz al-Asad and the rise of his son Bashshār to power in June 2000, a long chapter in the history of the complex relations between religion (Islam) and the Syrian state came to an end. Bashshār al-Asad refrained from opening his inaugural address at the People's Assembly with the traditional Bismiallah (Bism Allah al-Raḣmān al-Raḣ?m) (In the Name of the all merciful Allah) which is sine qua non in the speeches of any leader in the present day Arab world, continuing his father's practice of excluding this phrase or any other Islamic symbolism from his addresses.1 Nevertheless, one of his earliest steps after assuming power was to repeal his father's decree prohibiting the wearing of headscarves by girls in any part of the educational system in Syria. The decree had been issued by Ḣāfiz al-Asad in 1982 after he succeeded in crushing and ending the Islamic rebellion against his regime.2 Does this move on the part of Bashshār signal the turning over of a new leaf in the relationship between the Syrian Ba'th Regime and Islamic forces, not to say the Muslim Brethren movement, in Syria? It is still too soon to say. Nevertheless, Bashshār al-Asad's step is significant, even if only symbolic, since it bore witness to the regime's readiness to heal the fissures and bind the wounds left behind by the events of the Islamic rebellion of 1976–1982, to the point of relinquishing the regime's adherence and commitment to a secular and even atheistic worldview that had been a cornerstone of its past policies, replacing this view with the robes of Islam in order to gain public legitimacy. Following the final victory of the regime over its Islamic rivals, Rif'at al-Asad, the president's brother and the number two man in his regime at the time took the occasion to send the Daughters of the Revolution (members of the Ba'th party's youth movement) into the streets of Damascus to strip veils off the faces of women. For a long time, it was also reported from Damascus that men refrained from growing beards for fear of being accused of sympathy for the Muslim Brethren, or even a membership, a crime which according to Syrian law no. 49 from the year 1980 is punishable by death.3 From this perspective, the reports from the streets of Damascus in the spring of 1982 reminded one of the peaks of the past confrontation between the Ba'th regime and Islamic circles in Syria. On April 25, 1967 a junior Ba'thist officer of 'Alawi origin named Ibrahim al-Khallas published an article in the Syrian army organ Jaysh al-Sha'b entitled "The Means of Creating a New Arab Socialist Person," in which he stated that "the way to fashion Arab culture and Arab society is by creating an Arab socialist who believes that God, imperialism and all other values that had controlled society in the past are no more than mummies in the Museum of History.4" The article aroused angry protest among the urban Sunni population. Strikes and anti-Ba'th demonstrations broke out in Syria's large cities, forcing the regime to denounce the article and imprison its author and editor. These two, the Syrian public was told, were agents of the Central Intelligence Agency. Damascus Radio even stated that "the article has been planted in the army organ as part of reactionary Israeli-American plot, in collusion with anti-revolutionary elements and merchants of religion to drive a wedge between the masses and their leadership."5 Though the Ba'th regime had to distance itself from the article there is no doubt that the young 'Alawi officer expressed the views of many Ba'th party activists and especially those of its radical neo-Ba'th faction, which seized power in Syria in February 1966 to minimize the role of religion in society and state and replace it with Arab nationalist and secular ideology. In 1967, the Neo-Ba'th regime had to give up, but in 1982 it seemed that the Asad regime had the upper hand. However, twenty years after the Regime's decisive victory over its rivals in the Muslim Brotherhood, it is becoming increasingly clear that the last word regarding the fabric of relations between religion and state, or even between the Ba'th Regime and Islamic circles in Syria has yet to be said. In effect, it transpires that the two sides, each for its own reasons, wishes to mount a new path of co-existence, a path toward compromise between religion and state and between Islam and the Ba'th Regime. Throughout the forty years since the Ba'th Party seized power in Syria on March 8, 1963, Syria has been a bastion of secularism headed by an Arab-secular regime wishing to push Islam out of the central place it had occupied in the life of the individual, the society and the state. This was the case under Michel 'Aflaq and his colleagues, and even more so under his successors, members of the radical Neo-Ba'th faction who seized power on February 23, 1966. While 'Aflaq did view Islam as an important and even central element in the history and cultural tradition of the Arab nation, he did not recognize it as an expression of divine revelation, and thus as a religion of laws. He apparently wished to see in the Arab nationalism of the Ba'th Party school a new concept or even "religion," destined to replace Islam in the life of the individual, the society and the state.6 This trend grew stronger after the Neo-Ba'th coup in Syria in February 1966. The Neo-Ba'th challenge to Islamic forces in Syria was unprecedented and even exceptional in its daring. The Regime forbade preaching and religious education outside the mosques, increased its involvement in the appointment of clerics to religious institutions in the country, took over the management of the Waqf institutions, and did not hesitate to arrest or even execute clerics who demonstrated against it. The leaders of the Neo-Ba'th stood at the head of a social coalition whose members had nothing at all to do with Islam, at least in its Sunni-Orthodox form. This coalition was comprised of members of the minority sects and even Sunnis from the rural areas and the periphery in where there was practically no presence of the religious establishment. Worth mentioning is the fact that the main political and economic loser from the rising of this coalition was the urban strata in which the Muslim Brotherhood had its roots; thus, it is no wonder that the Brotherhood became the vanguard of these strata in their struggle against the Ba'th Regime.7 Ḣāfiz al-Asad's rise to power in November 1970 led to the regime's attempt under his leadership to open a new page in relations with Islamic forces in the country. He wanted to widen the basis of coalition in Syria and join this coalition with the urban Sunnis. Asad worked to mitigate the anti-Islamic line that had characterized his predecessors. He began to participate in prayers at Sunni mosques in Damascus, made a pilgrimage to Mecca, raised the salaries of clerics and actively tried to gain religious sanction for his community — the 'Alawi community. In this, he achieved some success in the form of a religious ruling (fatwa) handed down by the leader of the Lebanese Sh?'? community, Mūsa Ṡadr. It stated that the 'Alawis were Sh?'?s, and as such were Muslims in all respects.8 However, Asad's attempts to mollify religious circles in Syria and gain their support were in vain and had perhaps come too late. In 1976, militant Muslims, some of them former activists in the Muslim Brotherhood who had resigned from the movement and maintained only a weak affinity with it, mounted a violent struggle against his regime designed to bring it down and replace it with an Islamic state. Soon after the Muslim Brotherhood joined this struggle. The violent campaign against the Ba'th regime was in many respects a deviation from the Muslim Brotherhood's traditional course. During the first years after its establishment in 1944, this movement adopted a middle path that sought to bridge the gap between religion and state. In this framework, the Brothers were willing to accept the existing political and socio-economic arrangement in Syria in those years, and worked to blend into it. Thus, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood movement took part in elections to the Parliament in the 1940s and 50s, and its representatives served as ministers in several Syrian governments of that period. The Brothers thus concentrated their efforts on influencing the existing political system from within in favor of preserving and strengthening the Muslim character of the Syrian state.9 The path that the Muslim Brotherhood adopted for itself in Syria was the inevitable result of social, economic and political circumstances. These circumstances distinguished it from other Arab states, chiefly Egypt, of course. Support for the movement came only from members of the Sunni community, which constituted only 60 percent of the overall population. Members of minority communities in the state — Christians, 'Alawis and Druze — who constituted some 40 percent of the overall population, were, for obvious reasons, among the most obdurate opponents of the movement. However, even the Sunni community was not monolithic in its support for the movement. Many in the Sunni street had reservations, particularly the educated, but they were not alone. They were enchanted by the modernist-secular notions of "Arab nationalism" from the school of the Ba'th party, "Syrian nationalism" from the school of An⃛ūn Sa'āda, a founder and leader of the Syrian Nationalist Party (PPS), and, finally, communism. Even among the Sunni community in the rural areas and the periphery — constituting half of the Syrian Sunni community — there was no recognizable enthusiasm for the messages of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. In those areas the Islamic presence — mosques and other religious institutions or even the presence of clerics ('Ulama) — was very small if it existed at all. The main strongholds of support for the movement were thus to be found among the Sunni middle class in the big cities, especially in the northern region of the country. However, as previously mentioned, even this support was not full and sweeping.10 The challenge that the Ba'th regime, which had ruled Syria since March 1963, presented to the Islamic movement and the public it represented was ideological, political and socio-economic. Indeed, from 1963 there were repeated confrontations between activists of the movement, which had in the meantime been outlawed, and the authorities. These confrontations were mostly of a limited nature — strikes and demonstrations — and usually broke out as a local reaction to measures taken by the regime. Yet, these confrontations had a cumulative influence. Further contributing to the extremism that overcame the movement were generational shifts — the emergence of a young and militant generation distinct in social background and education — generally secular — from the movement's founders. It was also given to the influence of Sayyid Qu⃛b, with whom several of these activists met while studying in Egypt. These young activists began preaching in the spirit of Qu⃛b's ideas. They advocated open confrontation with the regime that was, in their view, heretical, i.e., secular and even non-Muslim (Ba'thist with shades of 'Alawism). They were willing to take the initiative and act independently once it became clear to them that the veteran leadership of the Brotherhood movement was in no hurry to adopt their notions and had reservations about a frontal campaign against the Ba'thist regime. In the mid-1970s, one of these activists, Marwan Hadid, established in the city of Hama the "Battalions of Muḣammad" (Katā'ib Muḣammad). This was an underground, fanatic organization that began violent activity against the regime. In retrospect, it was the vanguard for the Islamic camp on the road to a putsch in the Islamic revolt. There was nothing left for the veteran leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had lost its power and influence over rank and file activists, except to accept the inevitable and join the revolt when it broke out.11 From 1976 to 1982, the Muslim Brotherhood waged a violent campaign against the Ba'th regime, known as the Islamic revolt. The "Brothers" sought to establish an Islamic state in Syria. They succeeded in mobilizing to their cause significant backing from among the Sunni community that constituted a majority in the state, and took partial control — when the revolt reached its peak in early 1980 — of several cities in northern Syria. However, this was the extent of the Brothers' achievements, and from that point on, the heavy hand of the Regime bore down upon them. The revolt began to languish, ending in February 1982 after the suppression of the uprising in Hama, during which Syrian military and security forces killed thousands of residents of the city. After the failure of the revolt, the Muslim Brotherhood ceased to exist as an organized and active movement. Hundreds of its activists met their deaths during its course, thousands were sent to prison, and most of its leaders escaped over the border.12 In retrospect, it would appear that the rebellion was not a planned and organized move. It should more accurately be viewed as a long series of interconnecting acts of popular protest, such as trade strikes and street demonstrations, alongside violent acts of terrorism by Islamic activists all over Syria against the Regime, its leaders and its institutions. These acts lacked a guiding hand, were not accompanied by any kind of political or propaganda activity designed to recruit Syrian public opinion to the side of the rebels, and bore witness more than anything else to the fact that the Islamic activists, and especially their leaders, had no overall strategy in their struggle against the regime. It is quite possible that this is what ultimately led to the rebellion's failure. In the end, the Syrian Regime defeated its enemies and the Islamic rebellion ended in total disaster for the rebels. The regime's successful putting down of the rebellion was not only the result of brutal methods of repression it employed against the rebels, but mainly because it enjoyed the support of substantial portions of the Syrian population. They preferred the continuation of the existing regime over the alternative offered them by Islamic circles in the country. The Islamic revolt against the regime failed utterly, leading to the liquidation of the Muslim Brotherhood movement as an organized political organization in Syria. After the downfall, the Brotherhood's leaders (those that remained alive) began looking for ways to placate the regime. At the very least they hoped to establish a dialogue that would enable the Brotherhood's continued activity as an organized movement or as individuals in the state. Against this background one can understand the readiness of the Movement's leaders to enter into a dialogue with the Ba'th Regime. It bore witness to the leaders' acceptance of the existence of the Ba'th Regime in Syria since March 1963 as a fait accompli. This acceptance also marked a return of the Movement to the path it had pursued in the 1940s and 50s: mainly the acceptance of the political and socioeconomic order in the country and even efforts to become integrated into it as a means or promoting minimal and specific aims and the strengthening of the Syria's Muslim tinge, the preservation of the slowing burning embers of Islam through education and religious activities of those sectors of the population in which the Movement had been active in the past. From the mid-1990s, there was a recognizable improvement in the regime's attitude toward Islamic circles in Syria and beyond even to those previously involved in the Muslim Brotherhood's activities: first, the regime began demonstrating more openness to manifestations of religious faith among its citizens, such as traditional garb, including veils for women, maintaining a Muslim way of life, increased participation in festival and Friday prayer services in the mosques, and religious preaching. Visitors to Syria returned to say that religious schools had begun sprouting in the streets of the state — some with governmental encouragement, some of them even named after the president, (Madāris al-Asad li-T'al?m al-Qur'ān) and that textbooks and religious propaganda were offered for sale or distribution in the streets to all seekers. It was also reported that the works of Sayyid Qu⃛b were available in the country.13 By the beginning of 2004, the number of religious schools all around the country was, according to Syrian sources, 120, apart from 20 religious institutions or study centers, 7 of them granted academic degrees. Almost 25,000 students, 2,000 out of them were foreigners, studied in these institutions.14 In these renewed manifestations of religious faith there was of course evidence of the existence of deep Islamic sentiment among various sectors of the population, especially among residents of the big cities. The Regime had not succeeded in rooting out these sentiments. It also seems that, faced with severe social and economic problems, chiefly the population's natural rate of increase, the rise in unemployment and the increasing adversity of society's weakest classes, these sentiments were likely to take root, as had happened in neighboring Arab states. Foreign visitors in Syria in recent years left with the impression that Sunni concentrations in the big cities were slowly taking on a Muslim character, at least relative to the norm in Syrian society since the Ba'th party took control, and in the period preceding it.15 Second, the Regime released most of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been in prisons in Syria since the suppression of the Islamic Revolt at the start of the 1980s. They were released in several presidential amnesties in December 1991 (2,864 prisoners), March 1992 (600 prisoners), November 1993 (554 prisoners), November 1995 (1,200 prisoners), 1998 (250 prisoners), and November 2000 (600 prisoners).16 Third, the Regime continued its efforts to "Islamize" the Alawite community, efforts that, as will be recalled, had already begun in 1973 when Ḣāfiz al-Asad obtained a fatwa from the Leader of the Lebanese Shi'ite community Mūsa Ṡadr, declaring that the Alawites were Shi'ites. Over the years hundreds of the Alawite students were sent to Iran to engage in religious studies at Iranian religious institutions, and at the same time the regime encouraged the activities of Iranian clerics among the members of the Alawite community. In 1992, Asad even initiated the construction of a mosque in the city of Qarḋāḣa where he was born, near the grave of his mother Nā'isa, who had died in July of that year.17 Fourth, since the early 1990's, the regime permitted and even encouraged moderate clerics, including those outside the official religious establishment that was identified with it, to stand for elections as independents to the People's Assembly. It should be recalled that since the early 1990s the regime has been using the People's Assembly as a tool to ease public pressures for change and reforms and to promote his economic policy. On the eve of the election to the Assembly in 1990, the Regime made an unsuccessful effort to establish a pro-Regime moderate Islamic party under the leadership of Muḣammad Sa'?d al-Bū⃛? (see below).18 Nevertheless, quite a few clerics, among them Marwān Shaykhū, were elected to the People's Assembly to those places set aside for independent candidates. Their election as members to the People's Assembly, as well as the considerable increase in the educational activity of Islamic clerics in the large cities, is an apparent indication that a new generation of Muslim activists has grown up under the Regime's watchful eye and to a certain extent with its encouragement and support. With the help of these clerics, the Syrian regime is working to promote and preserve its notion of the place of religion in the life of the state. This notion is a softened version of the concept of Michel 'Aflaq that sought, as will be recalled, to dwarf the status of Islam in the life of society and the state. The Regime today thus recognizes the power and status of Islam. However, like neighboring Arab regimes such as in Egypt or Jordan, it seeks to preserve separation of religion and state and rejects the notion of "political Islam" that stood at the basis of the Muslim Brotherhood revolt from 1976 to 1982. One example is al-Bū⃛?, born in 1927, a cleric of Kurdish extraction known for his close relations with the late President Asad. In the sermon he held on the eve of the referendum that was to approve Asad's election to a fifth presidential term, B? said, for example: "Under the leadership of President Asad, Syria became the focal point of support for the entire Muslim world. The mosques of Damascus are flourishing, the number of worshippers present in them is on the increase". Bū⃛? is a graduate of the Shar?'ah Faculty of the University of Damascus where he now teaches. His doctoral thesis was on "The Sources of Islamic Religious Law" (U⋅ūl al-Shar?'ah al-Islāmiyya). Bū⃛? also has a popular religious program on Syrian television, "Dirāsāt Qura'niyya." He is also well known because of the dozens of articles and books he has written, some of which, at least those published in the past decade, were clearly designed to grant Islamic legitimacy to the regime of Ḣāfiz al-Asad.19 For example, Bū⃛? wrote a book on the subject of jihād. In it he sharply attacked the Muslim Brotherhood as having acted in contravention of the principles of Islam and of bringing about a civil war (fitna) in Syria. He added that he opposed the establishment of a religious party. He said, "there is always the fear that extreme elements will infiltrate such a party and turn it into a tool for sowing dissension and violence in society."20 The Muslim Brotherhood was quick to respond that it had not been the Muslim Brotherhood that removed itself from the nation, rather it was the Regime to which Bū⃛? granted religious legitimacy.21 The late Mufti of Syria, Aḣmad Kaftārū, b. 1910–d. 2004 and of Kurdish origin, is another clear example of a cleric who had bound his fate with the Ba'th Regime as early as 1964, when he was appointed to this high-ranking position. In 1974 Kaftārū founded the Ab?-Nūr religious center, which became the largest center in Syria. Ṡalāḣ al-D?n Kaftārū, the mufti's son who runs the center, stated that around 5,000 students from 60 countries study there. Some years later, Aḣmad Kaftārū founded a Nakshaband? order called after him, the Kaftāriyya.22 Aḣmad Kaftārū was known for his statement: "Islam and the Regime's power to enforce the law are twin brothers. It is impossible to think of one without the other. Islam is the base, and the Regime's power of rule is the protector; after all a thing without a base is destined to collapse and fall, and a thing without a protector will end in extinction."23 In a newspaper interview Kaftārū explained: "I have known President [Ḣāfiz] Asad for 35 years. I admire his personality and characteristics, his dedication and his steadfastness on the principle of faith. I know him as a determined fighter who never relinquished national rights and did not hesitate to assist in Arab and Islamic activities. Asad's actions in the religious spheres assisted in enhancing religious and spiritual life all over our country. During his rule, mosques were built, prayer houses were renovated, religious colleges were opened, and ancient sites were reconstructed in order to preserve the Arab and Islamic nature of this soil. Asad told me that he wants the flag of Islam to fly on high since to him it is a matter of faith and a path. Asad is proud of [being] an Arab and of the Islamic faith. He said that Islam is the revolution in the name of progress, and therefore no one has the right to be proud of being an Arab while ignoring Islam."24 Kaftārū, however, did not conceal during the interview that he and the Islamists had no argument regarding their "vision of the last days," that is, the ultimate goal; they only differed on how to achieve this goal. With this, Kaftārū exposed the limits of cooperation between establishment clerics like himself and the Arab regimes. Scrutiny of Kaftārū's remarks thus shows that it is in fact he, the authorities' designated religious leader, who deserves the title of keeper of the path of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. There is a clear connection between him and the Brotherhood in its early days in the 1940s and 50s. They share a path of adherence to goals combined with a willingness to show moderation, flexibility, and patience along the way to realizing them. Kaftārū said that "manifestations of extremism are neither wise nor logical, as anyone who hastens the arrival of something takes the risk of losing it altogether . . . Extremism is not for the good of the homeland or for the good of peace . . . The Arab rulers and those that are not Arab accept Islam gradually, that is, not all at once but in stages. The radical movements preach extremism, that is their way. I evaluate their desire to be [the victory of] Islam, but the question is not what they desire, but what can be achieved. I personally regard cooperation with the Muslim ruler as the only way to achieve the goal, as we should understand that these things will not be accomplished in an hour or even in a day."25 Finally, many of the leaders of the Islamic Brethren who left Syria in the early 1980s started to come back. Among those are 'Adnān 'Uqla, who was one of the leaders of the Islamic Revolt in between 1976–1982, and 'Abd al-Fattāḣ Abū Ghudda. Those among the movement's leaders who were left in exile started negotiations with representatives of the Syrian regime in order to allow them to come back to their houses. Indeed, in late in February 1997, the Damascus press gave extensive coverage to a letter of thanks sent to President Asad from the Abū Ghudda family of Aleppo. In the letter, the family thanked the Syrian president for his condolences following the death of 'Abd al-Fattāḣ Abū Ghudda. President Asad's condolences, like the note the bereaved family sent, were exceptional. 'Abd al-Fattāḣ Abū Ghudda had been a leader of the "Muslim Brotherhood" movement in Syria, and between the years 1976 and 1982 and served as its "Inspector-General" (al-Murāqib al-'Amm). Following the 1963 Ba'th revolution, Abū Ghudda left Syria for prolonged exile in Saudi Arabia. He continued to fight the Syrian regime from abroad, and in his role as "Inspector-General" also led the Islamic revolt against it. After the revolt failed, Abū Ghudda abandoned his political activity and immersed himself in teaching and writing. He taught at King 'Abd al-'Az?z University in Jedda and was known for the dozens of theological works he published.26 In December 1995, Abū Ghudda returned to Syria. He apparently arrived at an arrangement with the Damascus authorities in whose framework he was permitted to return to the city of his birth, Aleppo. The condition was that he busy himself with matters of education and religion and avoid all political activity. In mid-1996 he returned to Saudi Arabia — perhaps because of a decline in his health, or perhaps out of disappointment and frustration with political circumstances in Syria that did not allow him and his associates to act freely to promote their worldview. On February 16, 1997, Abū Ghudda passed away.27 Upon learning of Abū Ghudda's passing, President Asad was quick to send his condolences to the bereaved family. An official delegation that included the minister of the Awqaf, the governor of Aleppo, and the city's police chief visited the family and delivered the following message in Asad's name: "Abū Ghudda was a man who inspired respect during his lifetime, and therefore it is fitting that we preserve and honor his memory in death as well." President Asad went so far as to offer the family the use of his personal aircraft to fly the deceased to Syria for burial. Abū Ghudda was ultimately buried in Madina, near the grave of the Prophet Muḣammad, and Asad gained the gratitude of the bereaved family.28 It became clear, however, that the regime's conditions for reconciliation with the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were too difficult for them to accept. The regime demanded, for example, that the Brotherhood's leaders repent, confess guilt and express contrition over the Islamic revolt of 1976–1982, and commit not to renew their political activity as an organized movement in Syria. Former Minister of Information Muḣammad Salmān declared in this context that "anyone who renounces his past conduct is authorized to return and live a normal life in Syria and to conduct religious rites. Abū Ghudda visited me in my office and I told him that we in Syria do not relate to the Muslim Brotherhood as to a political party but as to individuals."29 The leadership of the Brotherhood rejected these demands, and the Inspector-General of the movement, 'Al? Sa'd al-D?n al-Bayānūn?, explained that the atmosphere was not yet suitable for deepening the dialogue. The Brotherhood was ready to bear some of the responsibility for events of the past, but would not consent to return to Syria as individuals.30 Nonetheless, the Brotherhood began laying the ideological foundation for a possible decision to return to Syria and come to terms with the Ba'th regime. They explained that, "first, Syria did not belong solely to the Muslim Brotherhood; it was ideologically, politically, religiously and ethnically heterogeneous. Second, cultural and economic developments in Syria in the last two decades created new circumstances that cannot be ignored. Third, normalization with Israel and the new world order were to be fought, not accepted as natural developments and, additionally, this struggle should top the Arab list of priori
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