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BIBTEX RIS

Strategic Private Experimentation

2014; American Economic Association; Volume: 6; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1257/mic.6.4.74

ISSN

1945-7685

Autores

Mike Felgenhauer, Elisabeth Schulte,

Tópico(s)

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Resumo

We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is impossible if the agent's stakes are too high. (JEL D82, D83)

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