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How many truths? Are there two truths or one in the Tibetan Prāsa[ndot]gika Madhyamaka?

2004; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 5; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1463994042000291547

1476-7953

Sonam Thakchöe,

Indian History and Philosophy

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 'Ontologically, nirvāna is a world beyond sasāra'. 'Phenomena are appearances, and appearances point to their reality. The veil gives a hint of that which is veiled'. Also (ibid., 53), 'the absolute comprehended through the categories of thought is phenomena and phenomena stripped of these categories are the Absolute'; and (ibid., 57) 'tathatā or reality is also called nirvāa or dharmatā or dharmadhātu. The word dhātu in this context means the inmost nature, the ultimate essence. The tathatā or dharmadhātu is both transcendent and immanent. It is transcendent as ultimate reality, but it is present in very one as his inmost ground and essence'. Also Singh writes (ibid., 70), 'In Mahāyāna we have, on the other hand, a denial of real elements (dharma‐nairātmya), and an assertion of the absolute Whole (dharma‐kāya). In Hinayāna, we have a radical pluralism; in Mahāyāna, we have a radical monism'; furthermore (ibid., 72) 'just as Mahāyāna moved towards radical Monism, even so Brāhmanism moved towards radical Monism. It is most probable that Mahāyāna is indebted to some Upaniadic influence'. For further details see Singh (, 51–9). 'The system of pluralism which is taught to Hinayāna and to the monist view which is the central conception of Mahāyāna'. 'In fact, there is only one truth—the Absolute. The other—sa v tisatya, is truth so‐called in common parlance, it is totally false from the Absolute standpoint'. He goes on to say (ibid., 20) 'In early Buddhism they correspond to a pluralistic universe, in Mahāyāna to a monistic'. Also (ibid., 47) he states: 'The Mādhyamika system started with an entirely different conception of reality. Real was that possessed as reality of its own (sva‐bhāva), what was not produced by causes (ak taka=asa sk ta, what was not dependent upon anything else (paratra nirpek?a)'. 'Artha as well as paramārtha are truths (satya). The former [conventional truth] is not presented as an un‐truth (a‐satya) in relation to the latter [ultimate truth], as it would be in an absolutistic tradition. Neither is the former sublated by the latter, there is no indication whatsoever that these are two truths with different standing as higher and lower'. 'This dual thesis of the conventional reality of phenomena together with their lack of inherent existence depends upon the complex doctrine of the Two Truths or Two Realities—a conventional or nominal truth and an ultimate truth—and upon a subtle and surprising doctrine regarding their relation. It is, in fact, this sophisticated development of the doctrine of the Two Truths as a vehicle for understanding Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology that is Nāgārjuna's greatest philosophical contribution'. 'The division of the two truths is not an ontological division. But exist only conventionally … both truths exist for valid dualistic cognizers amd not in ultimate analysis. The division of the two truths emphasizes two types of objects of consciousness, truths and falsities. Both, however, are falsely existent or falsely established because neither is independent; each depends on its imputing consciousness and on the other. The division into two truths on epistemological grounds is a call to eradicate ignorance and to attain the highest wisdom'. 'Conventional and ultimate are not two distinct realities, two realms opposed to each other. It should be clear that the ultimate, emptiness, is what is ultimately the case concerning the object under investigation. It is what makes the object a conventional entity and not an ultimate one, as we think it is. Emptiness makes the conventional conventional. Conventional and ultimate are thus not separate'. 'That the two truths are "different isolates" means, for example, that a table and its emptiness can be distinguished in terms of how they are understood by a conceptual consciousness. To say that two things are different isolates is to make only the most minimal distinction between them'. bDen pa gnyis kyi dbye gzhi la 'dud tshul me 'dra ba mang mod kyang/ 'dir shes bya la bya ste// Tsong khapa's followers unanimously accept 'objects of knowledge' as the basis of the division of the two truths. For example, mKhas grub rJe (see Cabezón , 357–60), wherein he not only proposes 'objects of knowledge' as the basis of the division of the two truths, but also refutes the position of rNgog who discounts ultimate truth from the objects of knowledge. See also lCang skya Rol pa'i rDo rje (, 317–8) and 'Jam dbyangs bZhad ba'i rDo rje (, 849–52). 'De ltar de bzhin gshigs pas kun rdzob dang don dam pa gnyis thugs su chud de/ shes bar bya ba yang kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i bden pa 'der zad de…// (cited in Tsong khapa , 176; mKhas grub rJe, n.d. [see Cabezón , 357]). 'Jig rten mkhen pa'i gzhan la ma gsan par/ bden pa de gnyis nyid kyis stong par mrzad/ gang gi kun rdzob de bzhin don dam tse/ bden pa gsum pa gang yang ma mchis so// (cited in Tsong khapa , 178). Shes bya/ blo'i yul du bya rung ba ste/ ka ba dang bum pa la sogs pa'i chos gang dang gang yin rung kyang/ sems can nas sangs rgyas kyi bar gyi blo spi'i yul du bya rung ba'o//. 'Dis ni myu gu lta bu gcig gi ngo bo la yang phye na kun rdzob yin pa dang/ don dam yin pa'i ngo bo gnyis yod par ston gyi …// Tsong khapa further explains, 'the ultimate reality of the sprout is its [ultimate] characteristic (rang bzhin), thus it is called sprout's nature. The sprout's colour, shape etc., are also its features, therefore they too are constitutive of its nature' (1992, 406): myu gu'i chos nyid ni de'i rang bzhin yin pas de'i ngo bo zhes bya la myu gu'i kha dog dang dbyibs la sogs pa yang myu gu'i bdag nyid yin pas de'i ngo bo'o//). 'Des ni myu gu lta bu gcig gi ngo bo la yang phye na kun rdzob yin pa dang/ don dam yin pa'i ngo bo gnis yod par ston gyi myu gu'i ngo bo gcig nyid so skye dang 'phags pa la ltos nas bden pa gnyis su bstan pa gtan min no//. Yul gyi gnas tshul gyi ngos nas bden pa gyis su med kyang blos gnas tshul mthong ba dang ma mthong ba'i sgo nas bden pa gnyis su dbye zhes pa'i don du snang bas shin tu legs so// des na gnas tshul rang ngos nas mtshan mtshon dang/ dbye gzhi dang dbye ba sogs byar med kyang tha snyad bden par sgro brtag nas gdul bya la bstan pa'i dbye ba'i ya gyal yod pa ltar bdye gzhi'ang yod par bya dgos//. gSung rub kyi brjod bya tsam dbyer gzhir byas na shin tu'ang 'thad te… dbu ma'i zhung lugs 'dir sgras bstan du med kyang tha snyad du sgras bstan pa dang/ bden pa gnyis po dbyir med kyang gdul bya la dbye ste bstan pa sogs gzhung 'grel gye dgongs pa gong 'og sgrigs na 'de nyid 'thad par sems so//. gNas tshul rang ngos nas mtshan mtshon dang/ dbye gzhi dang dbye ba sogs byar med kyang tha snyad bden par sgro btags nas gdul bya la bstan pa'i tshe bye ba'i ya gyal yod pa ltar dbye bzhi yod par bya dgos…//. bDen pa gnyis ste/ yul can gyi blo sgo nas kun rdzob gyi bden pa dang don dam bden pa gnyis yin la//. dBu ma'i gzhun lugs 'dir ni yul rang ngos nas bden pa gnyis su dbyer med…//. De yang gzhi gcig nyid snang tshul gyi sgo nas so sor phye ba yin gyi yul gyi ngos nas so sor yod pa zhig ma yin no// Also see f. 603: de ltar blo'i sgo nas ngo bo gnyis 'dzin pa'i mthong ba yang dag pa'i yul ni don dam bden pa yin la/ thong ba rdzun pa'i yul ni kun rdzob bden pa'i//. brDzun pa mthong ba dang/ yang dag mthong ba gnyis sam/ 'khrul ma khrul gnyis/ rmongs ma rmongs gnyis/ phyin ci log ma log gnyis sam/ tshad ma yin min gnyis kyis mthong tshul gyi sgo nas kun rdzob den pa dang/ don dam bden pa gyis su phye ba ste// Also see Go rampa (, 375b–d) for his detailed authentication of each of these assertions through citing various textual sources. bDen pa gnyis yul can gyi blo rmongs ma rmongs sam brdzun pa mthong ba dang/ yang dag mthong ba'am/ 'khrul ma 'khrul gyi sgo nas 'jog dgos pas yul can gyi blo'i sgo nas 'jog pa ni rgya gar gyi thal rang thams cad mthun par snang la//. The division of the two truths is made depending on 'mistaken cognition' (blo 'khrul ba) and 'unmistaken cognition' (blo makhrul ba). Yul can gyi blo 'khrul pa dang/ ma khrul pa gnyis la ltos nas bden pa gnyis su nges pa yin no//. Mipham's view regarding the relationship between the two truths is not consistent. Sometimes he appears to argue along the lines taken by Tsong khapa. See particularly in the Nges shes sgros me (Mi pham 1976, 95–7ff) and his commentary to the Madhyamakāvatāra, i.e., Zla ba'i zhal lung (1977, 81f, 169f). In the Shes 'grel ke ta ka (1993a, 3–4ff, 90–2ff), however, Mipham explicitly endorses the perspective based division of the two truths. bDen pa gnyis po yang yul la chos gnyis yod pa'i dbang gyis bzhag pa min gyi/ shes ngo gynis la ltos nas gzhag pa ste// See also ., 11f). Although he claims 'mere objects of knowledge' (shes bya tsam) as the basis of the division of the two truths, it is obvious that he is more committed to a distinction based on two different perspectives. See , 27f; n.d.a, 206), where he argues that the Prāsangikas accept all conventionalities based on the perspectives of ordinary beings. Despite the fact that he claims 'mere truth' (bden pa tsam) as the basis of the division, his argument seems to be more rooted in the notion that the two truths are distinguished on the basis of the correct perception and the incorrect perception. See Sākya mChog Idan (, 3–4ff) for his objections to Tsong khapa's claim that the objects of knowledge (shes bya) is the basis of the divisions of the two truths. 'Jig rten pa gang dag de kno na nyid rtogs ched du 'jig rten gyi bden brdzun gyi tha snyad sogs dang sgo bstun nas de ngor gcom ldan 'das kyis bden gnyis kyi rnam gzhag mdzad kyi/ bdu ma pa rang lugs kyis grub pa ni ma yin no// He claims that there is no such thing as the two truths in the Madhyamaka system. The two truths are, according to him, purely posited from the perspective of ordinary beings. 'Paramārthasatya, or Absolute Truth is the knowledge of the real as it is without any distortion … Sa v tisatya is Truth so‐called; Truth as conventionally believed in common parlance … There are not two different spheres or sets of objects … the difference is in our manner of looking at things'. 'Dharmas are', he argues, 'like the hairs that a monk with diseased eyes thinks he sees in his alms bowl; … This is proved by the fact that a man with the undiseased eyes has no though about these hairs at all'. 'The Absolute and the Empirical … are', according to him, 'not two sets of separate realities set over against each other …The Absolute or Nirvāa viewed through the thought‐constructions (vikalpa) is sasāra, the world or sasāra viewed sub specie aeternitatis is the Absolute or Nirvāa itself'. Also he argues (1989, 71) that 'the universe viewed as a whole is the Absolute, viewed as a process, it is the phenomena'. 'The two truths cannot be claimed to express different levels of objective reality since all things always equally lack svabhāva. They are merely two ways of looking (darsana) at things, a provisional and a definite'. 'All phenomena possess only one nature and that the second nature is obtained on the strength of false perceptions of common people. It is thus said 'that all things bear a dual intrinsic nature'. Also see Huntington (, 39, 40, 231). mThar thog bden pa gnyis su dbyer med pas grangs nges byar med de/ mdo las bden pa dam pa ni gcig kho na ste/ 'de lta ste/ mi slu ba'i chos can gyi myang ngan las 'das pa'o//. Mya ngan 'das pa bden gcig bu/ rgyal ba rnams kyis nam gsungs pa/ de tshe lhag ma log min zhes/ mkhas pa su zhig rtog par byed/35/ I borrowed the translation of this verse straight from Chr. Lindtner (, 35). 'on na kun rdzob bden pa zhes pa'i tha snyad kyang mi 'thad par 'gyur te/ kun rdzob yin na bden pa yin pa 'gal ba'i phir/ de ni blo kun rdzob pa'i ngo bor bden ba la 'jog pas skyon med do/ yang dag kun rdzob ces pa yang/ blo kun rdzob pa la ltos nas yang dag tu 'jog pas skyon med do//. Med bzhin du snang ba sgyu ma dang tshungs//. Kun rdzob tu chos thams cad chu'i zlaba ltar med bzhin du snang par rtog pa yin la//. Kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i mtshan nyid ni yod pa ma yin pa'i don snang ba'o//. Thabs dang thabs byung gi dbang du byas na tha snyad mthong pa'i blos dngos por gzung ba de nyid la gnas lugs dpyod pa'i blos ngos po ma rnyed pa nyid la don dam du 'jog dgos pa'i phir/. 'o na gdul byas don dam pa rtogs pa'i thabs med par 'ghur ro snam na gdul byas de rtogs pa'i don du tshig gyi brtod bya dang/ sems kyi spyod yul du tha snyad kyi bden par sgro btags nas bstan pa ste//. He offers an explicit and a lengthy discussion on the superimposition of conventional truth and how it serves the purpose to reach the ultimate truth. gDul bya ngor bstan pa'i tshe/ yul can dang/ yul dang/ byed pa dang/ nus pa'i sgo nas grangs nges pa dang bzhi las dang po ni… yul can gyi blo la rmongs marmongs sogs gnyis su grangs nges pa'o/ gnyis pa ni gzhugs sogs kyi snang ba gcig nyid la'ang ma dpyad pa'i blo ngor de dang der bden pa dang/ dpyad na mi rnyed pa gnyis su nges pa'o/ gsum pa ni 'ching bar byed pa dang/ grol bar byed pa gnyis su nges pa'o/ bzhi pa ni bsod nams kyi tshogs bsag pa dang/ yeshes kyi tshogs bsag pa'i gzhir gyur pas skyu gnyis thob pa gnyis su zhugs pa'o// When the truth is explained from the standpoint of the ordinary disciples ('dul bya'i ngor), Go rampa says that there are the four types of truths, namely, apprehending subjects (yul can), apprehended objects (yul), actions (byed pa) and potentials (nus pa). bDen pa bzhi dang bcu drug la sogs pa gsungs bzhin du gnyis su grangs nges pa'i rgyu mtshan ci yin zhe na/…'dir ngos 'gal gyi mtha' rnam par dpyod pa las gnyis su nges te/ 'de ltar blo 'khrul ma 'khrul gnyis dngos 'gal yin la/ de'i sar na gnyis ka yin bsgrub phyogs dang/ gnyis ka ma yin pa dgag phyogs kyi phung po gsum pa mi srid pas bden ba gnyis su grangs nges so//; see also Sa pa (1968a, 72d): yul can gyi blo 'khrul pa dang/ ma khrul pa gnyis la ltso nas bden pa gnyis su nges pa yin no// He stresses the notion that the enumeration of truth represents the two conflicting perspectives, and thus they are contradictory. 'A mistaken cognition and an unmistaken cognition', as he argues, 'are directly contradictory'. For there is neither a thing that 'belongs to both categories that can be positively affirmed nor a thing that does not belong to either one of the two categories that can be repudiated. Hence the existence of the third alternative is not possible'. Therefore, twofold truth is, he argues, a precise enumeration. sPros ba las grol ma grol dngos 'gal du nges pas bsgrub phyogs dang dgag phyogs kyi phung po gsum ba khegs pas gnyis su grangs nges so// rnam pa gcig tu na yul rnam ni yul can las ltos nas 'jog pa na yul can ni mthar mthog pa 'khrul pa'i blo dang/ mthar thog pa ma 'khrul pa'i blo gnyis las mi 'da'/ de la 'khor ba'i chos rnams ni 'khrul pa dang chos nyid ni ma 'khrul pa'i yul yin pas blo'i dbang gis gnyis su bzhag ste//. bDen pa la ltos nas brdzun par rnam par 'jog la/ brdzun pa la ltos nas bden par rnam par 'jog pa'i phir ro//. Yul can mthong ba brdzun pa dang/ mthong ba yang dag pa gnyis su nges pas/ gnyis su grangs nges par bzhad ste// Also see (n.d., 22f): yul can gyi blo la gnas tshul la zhugs ma zhugs gnyis su nges pa'i dbang gis yul gnyis su nges par bzhag ste/ phung po gsum pa gzhan med pa'i phir blo la ltos nas bden pa gnyis su nges so//. 'Di'i dbye bar bya ba'i ngo bo'am ris ni gnyis kho na ste/ slu chos kun rdzob kyi bden pa dang/ bslu med don dam gyi bden pa'o…rig pa yang/ thabs phyogs gtso bor byas pa'i blang dor la kun rdzob ming du mi rung zhing/ blang dor gtso bo rnam dag gi dmigs pa la don dam med du mi rung bas nyung na mi 'du zhing de tsam gyis skyes bu'i don thams cad tshogs par 'gyur bas mang mi dgos pa'i phir ro//. Sākya mChog ldan is a monist as far as his claim about the truth. He explicitly criticises the concept of the enumeration of truth while proving logical plausibility of a single truth. See Sākya mChog Idan (, 7–8ff), where he attacks mKhas grub rJe's position division of the two truths. He does this by vigorously defending his view that ultimate truth is the only truth, therefore, truth itself cannot be divided. Yet he does accepts the enumeration of the truth based on contradictions between the deceptive and the non‐deceptive standpoints. Also see kya mChog Idan (1975b, 222f): grangs nges pa yin te/ bslu mi slu phan tshun spangs te gnas pa'i 'gal ba yin pas so//. Bod snga ma rnams kyi bden pa gnyis kyi rnam gzhag 'chad pa de ni yul can gi blo 'khrul ma 'khrul gnyis su grangs nges pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis de gnyis la phung sum sel ba'i rnam gzhag mdzad pa yin gyi/ phi rabs pa rnams 'chad pa ltar yul bden pa gnyis kyis grangs nges tshad mas grub par 'chad pa ni gcig kyang mi snang no//. Kun rdzob bden pa'i mtshan nyid ni chos can gang zhig rig pas dpyad mi bsod pa/ don dam bden pa'i mtshan nyid gang zhig rig pas dpyad bzod pa// Also see kLong Chen (, 200f): de ltar rigs shes rjes dpag gyi rang bzhin skye med spros pa la dpyad bzod don dam bden pa'i mtshan nyid yin no shes dbu ma rang rgyud par rnams 'dod pa yin no//. mDor na dbu ma'i rang lugs la kun rdzob bden pa yod par khas len pa 'de ni zla ba'i zhabs kyi phyogs snga sma ba kho na yin te/ sems tsam pas gzhan dbang kun rdzob tu bden grub yin par rang lugs su bshad pa dang khyad par mi snang pa'i phir dang/ rang lugs la bden pa gcig kho nar nges gsung pa dang 'gal ba'i phir//; also Sākya mChog Idan (, 7f): shes bya thams cad bden pa gnyis su grangs nges pa zhes bya ba 'de dbum ma'i rang lugs ma yin te/ dbu ma'i rang lugs la gnas skabs su bden pa ni gcig khno na yin par..//; (ibid., 8): mdor na/ dbu ma'i rang lugs la gnas skabs kyi bden ba don dam pa'i bden pa gcig pu yin la//. Legs par dpyad na myang'das dang de las lhag pa'i chos kyang grub pa med mod rig shes kyis cung zad dpyad ngor bslu med ni/ mya ngan 'das pa bden gcig pur// gang tshe sangs rgyas rnams gsung ba// zhes pa ltar/ myang 'das kno na yin par bzhed pa'i phir//. De lta bu'i de bzhin nyid dam de ni bden par grub pa yin te/ kun rdzob rnams mi bden pa rdzun pa blu ba'i chos su grub la/ de dang dral ba don dam ni bden pa rdzun med pa mi slu ba'i chos su grub ste/ de ma grub na 'phags pa'i bden pa mthong ba'ang mi srid de rdzun pa bslu ba'i don mthong bas tha mal pa ltar su yang grol bar mi 'gyur ro/ mgon po klus/ bcom ldan 'das kyis chos gang zhig/ rdzun pa de ni bgrub par gsungs shes dang/ /mya ngan 'das pa bden gcig pur/ /rgyal ba rnams kyis gang gsungs pa/ /de tshe lhag ma log pa zhes/ /mkhas pa su zhig rtog mi byed//ces gsung pa bzhin no// In this passage, Mipham not only attempts to show that ultimate truth is the only truth, but also takes one step further and argues that ultimate truth is 'absolute', or 'truly existent' (bden par grub pa). Des na grub mtha gong 'od thams cad kyi lugs gang la rigs pas gnod pa med cing dpyad bzod ni don dam dang des las ldog pa kun rdzob…//. See note 1 . See note 2. See note 3. See note 4. 'Phags pa'i mnyam gzhag la ltos nas ni bden pa gcig kyang ma gzhag ste/ des ni bden pa phar zhog gang du yang ma gzhigs pa'i phir ro/ /mthar spros pa thams cad dang dral ba'i rjes kyi shes pa la ltos nas ni bden ba gcig kyang ma gzhag ste/ de'i tshe ni shes bya'i mtshan ma ji snyed pa thams cad brdzun par bzhag dgos pa'i phir ro//…de ltar na mthar thug la ltos nas bden pa mi srid la/ gnas skabs su bden pa mtshan nyid pa don dam pa'i bden pa dang btags pa kun rdzob kyi bden pa'o/ /de'i shes byed kyang bden 'dzin gyi ngor bden na bden par 'gal pa la thug pa yin no// Here, Sākya mChog ldan reinforces that the ultimate truth is the only real truth in the Mādhyamika standpoint. However, it is not treated as an absolute truth. Ultimately, he says 'it is to be proven false, because every object of knowledge is posited as false'. Although, he talks about the conventional truth in a detail, it is not taken as truth from the Mādhyamika standpoint. Hence, his monistic position still stands. Another crucial point to be noted here is his categorical rejection of the dual objective basis of the two truths. He writes (ibid., 17): chos can gcig gi steng du kun rdzob kyi rang bzhin dang don dam pa'i kyi rang bzhin gnyis ka bden pa mi srid pa'i phir// For further clarification see Sākya mChog Idan (, 17–8, 21–2). De lta bu'i de bzhin nyid dam de ni bden par grub pa yin te/ kun rdzob rnams mi bden pa rdzun pa bslu ba'i cho su grub la/ de dang dral ba don dam ni bden pa rdzun med pa mi bslu ba'i chos su grub ste/ de ma grub na phags pa'i bden pa mthong ba'am mi srid de rdzun pa bslu ba'i don mthong bas tha mal ba ltar su yang grol bar mi 'gyur ro/; f. 603: yang dag kun rdzob lta bu tha snyad du bden pa yin kyang gnyis snang dang bcas pa'i blo yi yul kun rdzob ba de dag rigs pas dpyad mi bzod pa yin pa'i phir bden grub min la/ chos nyid don dam par gang yin pa ni bden grub yin te/ gnyis snang med pa'i blo yeshes kyis yul du grub pa gang zhig//de la rigs pa gang gis kyang gzhig cing gzhom pa'i rgyu ba mi 'jug pa'i dpyad bzod pa yin pa'i phir//de na rigs pa'i dpyad mi bzod pa ji srid du ni don dam ma yin de/ kun rdzob tu thal ba'i phir//.