‘Unity of Effort’: The Missing Link in the Afghan Counter-insurgency Campaign
2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 32; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09700160802309225
ISSN1754-0054
Autores Tópico(s)Military History and Strategy
ResumoAbstract More than six years after the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom the Taliban and its affiliates are back, wreaking havoc on the fragile security situation and impeding development activity in Afghanistan. The Taliban-led insurgency is spreading its tentacles to new areas, with the relatively stable north swinging towards instability. This paper takes stock of the deteriorating security situation and singles out the lack of ‘unity of effort’ as a missing link in the international community's counter-insurgency campaign, contributing to its ineffectiveness in establishing security. There is an urgent need to first establish security, only after which can long-term sustainable progress in the political and economic spheres be achieved. Notes 1 The Taliban-led insurgency includes: a loose alliance of Taliban guerrillas, followers of Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's radical group Hizb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, Al Qaeda and its affiliates, narcotic traffickers, bandits, and tribal fighters in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This inference was derived from interviews, briefings, and discussions with the locals in various Afghan provinces in May–June 2007. For further details on the insurgency, see Seth Jones, ‘Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan’, RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Vol. 4, RAND Corporation Arlington, 2008; Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, Columbia University Press, New York, 2008. 2 Dr. David Kilcullen is a leading contemporary practitioner and theorist of counter-insurgency and counterterrorism. He served as chief strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department in 2005–2006 and as a senior policy adviser on the personal staff of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. In 2007, he served in Iraq as senior counter-insurgency adviser to the Multi-National Force, a civilian position on the personal staff of US General David Howell Petraeus, responsible for planning and executing the 2007–2008 Joint Campaign Plan, which called for the troop surge of 2007. According to Kilcullen, the ‘three pillars’ model is a possible framework and not a template, an aid for collaboration rather than an operational plan, for inter-agency counter-insurgency operations as a means of creating such a shared diagnosis. This approach builds on ‘classical’ COIN theory and incorporates best practices that have emerged through experience in peacekeeping, development, fragile states, and complex emergencies in the past several decades. For details on the model see David J. Kilcullen, ‘Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency’, remarks delivered at the US Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, DC, September 28, 2006 at http://www.usgcoin.org/docs1/3pillarsofcounterinsurgency.pdf (Accessed June 23, 2008). 3 The field study helped gather first-hand information and insights into the complexities of the reconstruction and long-term stabilisation process, through interviews, discussions, and ‘person on the street’ narratives in different parts of Afghanistan in May–June 2007. 4 Kilcullen, taking into account the transnational nature of several contemporary insurgencies, replaced McCormick's notion of a single-state entity facing an internal challenger with the broader concept of a state or group of states confronting one or more (internal or external) non-state challengers. Kilcullen's definition, thus, follows Gordon H. McCormick's, who suggests that ‘an insurgency is a struggle for power (over a political space) between a state (or occupying power) and one or more organised, popularly based internal challengers’. See Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison, ‘Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars’, Third World Quarterly, 28(2), 2007, p. 322. For further details, see David Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency Redux’, Survival, 48(4), 2006–2007, p. 112. 5 Field Manual 3–24/Marine Corps War Fighting Publication 3–33.5: Counterinsurgency, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, December 2006. 6 Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, ‘Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counter-insurgency’, Military Review, March–April 2006, at http://www.smallwars.mcwl.usmc.mil/search/articles/Cohen2.pdf (Accessed January 17, 2007). 7 David J. Kilcullen, n. 2. 8 There exist more than 17 US agencies in the foreign policy arena alone. Others include the Department of State, Agency for International Development, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Treasury, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Commerce (International Trade Administration), Department of Defense, Department of Energy (National Nuclear Security Administration), Department of Labor (Bureau of International Labor Affairs), International Trade Commission, National Security Agency, National Security Council, and United States Trade Representative. For further details, see David J. Kilcullen, n. 2, p. 1. 9 Incidentally, the designation of International Security Assistance Force represents a political compromise that was necessary to secure consensus from all NATO states in its first out-of-Europe engagement. NATO involvement began in Afghanistan under a UN mandate in August 2003. Some non-NATO states, such as Australia and New Zealand, contribute resources to the allied effort. NATO is operating in Afghanistan along with 13,000 soldiers from the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. As of December 2007, the ISAF had an estimated 41,700 troops from 39 countries, with NATO members providing the core of the force. The United States has approximately 15,000 troops in the ISAF. For further details see Paul Gallis, ‘NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance’, Congressional Research Service Report, RL33627, updated July 16, 2007, p. 3. 10 David J. Kilcullen, n. 2, p. 4. 11 Ibid., p. 5; ‘N.G.Os Question New Government Directive on Armed Escorts’, What's On in Kabul, August 5, 2007, at http://www.aisk.org/misc/woik2007issue65.pdf (Accessed August 6, 2007). 12 David J. Kilcullen, n. 2, p. 5. Greg Mills, Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan, Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 2007, at http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200704.mills.afghanistancounterinsurgency.html (Accessed June 28, 2007). 13 Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Mind Manoeuvres: The Psychological Element of Counterinsurgency Warfare Can Be the Most Persuasive’, Armed Forces Journal, April 2007, at http://www.afji.com/2007/04/2550166 (Accessed May 18, 2007). 14 Ralph Peters, ‘Getting Counterinsurgency Right’, New York Post, December 20, 2006, at http://www.nypost.com/seven/12202006/postopinion/opedcolumnists/getting_counterinsurgency_right_opedcolumnists_ralph_peters.htm?page=3 (Accessed April 21, 2007). 15 Todd A. Megill, ‘The Dark Fruit Of Globalization: Hostile Use of the Internet’, USAWC Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2005, at http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432655&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (Accessed August 2, 2007). 16 On modern terrorist organizations’ exploitation of the Internet and modern media, see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, pp. 197–228. 17 Rohan Gunaratna, as quoted in the SITE Institute, at http://www.siteinstitute.org (Accessed May 25, 2007). 18 ReliefWeb's Afghanistan page includes many components of the ‘three pillars’ model. See http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc104?OpenForm&rc=3&cc=afg (Accessed July 20, 2007). 19 Interview with Afghan government official, Office of National Security Council, Kabul, June 11, 2007; Ralph Peters, ‘Progress and Peril: New Counterinsurgency Manual Cheats on the History Exam’, Armed Forces Journal International, 144, February 2007, p. 35, at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/02/2456854 (Accessed August 30, 2008). 20 David J. Kilcullen, n. 2, p. 5. 21 According to a 2004 estimate, Afghanistan has the lowest international troop-to-population ratio of 1:1,115. For the Kosovo and Bosnia interventions, the ratios were 1:50 and 1:66. See Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan, and Philip Wilkinson, ‘MinimalInvestments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan’, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Briefing Paper, Kabul, June 2004; Barnett Rubin, A. Stoddard, H. Hamidzada, and A. Farhadi, Building a New Afghanistan: The Value of Success, the Cost of Failure, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, March 2004, p. 15. 22 Interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, Washington, DC, September 9, 2005. During the early years of COIN operations in Afghanistan (2001–2003), the US Government depicted an aversion to nation-building and maintained a ‘low profile, small footprint’ with low levels of economic assistance. In 2001, the United States committed some $500 million in reconstruction aid to Afghanistan in direct comparison of $18 billion in economic assistance the Bush administration requested in 2003 for Iraq, a country of comparable size, much greater wealth, and much less damaged. See James Dobbins, ‘Preparing for Nation-Building’, Survival, 48(3), 2006, pp. 27–40. 23 See Mark Sedra, ‘Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide Towards Expediency’, International Peacekeeping, 13(1), 2006, pp. 94–110; Richard Rupp, ‘High Hopes and Limited Prospects: Washington's Security and Nation-Building Aims in Afghanistan’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19(2), 2006, p. 291. 24 Interview with Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, Washington, DC, February 16, 2006. Also see Karl F. Inderfurth, ‘A Last Chance’, The Boston Globe, August 8, 2007, at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/08/opinion/edinder.php (Accessed August 10, 2007). 25 Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Issue Brief, Washington, DC, January 2008. 26 While Britain and Germany wished to preserve ISAF as stabilization, as opposed to combat mission, Britain – leading the ISAF counter-narcotics effort – intended to retain the initiative in the political sphere of ‘winning hearts and minds’. Germany opposed a merger of the commands because German forces in ISAF were trained only for stabilization and not for counter-insurgency operations. The French view was somewhat different and they were concerned that the administration, after having a US commander in place to guide all military activity in Afghanistan, might use NATO as a ‘toolbox’ to accomplish Washington's broader objectives. See Paul Gallis, n. 9. Also see Judy Dempsey and David S. Cloud, ‘Europeans Balking at New Afghan Role’, International Herald Tribune, September 14, 2005, at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/09/13/news/nato.php (Accessed July 1, 2007). 27 Reportedly, there are 102 restrictions that have been placed on forces by their nations and 50 of these restrictions are considered to be ‘operationally significant’. Examples of these restrictions include limiting Turkish troops to the vicinity of Kabul and German troops only being permitted to operate in northern Afghanistan. See Leo Shane III, ‘NATO Commander Asks Member Nations to Drop Troop Limits’, Stars and Stripes, mideast edition, October 25, 2006, at http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=40041&archive=true (Accessed June 27, 2007). 28 These include ‘geographical restrictions on locations of units deployments as well as nature of missions units are allowed to participate and are intended to restrict the affected units from participating in offensive combat operations or other operations that carry a high risk of casualties’. Andrew Feickert, ‘U.S. and Coalition Military Operations in Afghanistan: Issues for Congress’, CRS Report RL33503, updated December 11, 2006. Discussions with US army personnel at International Seminar ‘Asia-Pacific Security: Addressing the Challenges of a Changing World’, March 2–5, 2008, Chonburi, Thailand. 29 Robert Gates, the US defense secretary, on February 6, 2008, warned that NATO risks becoming a ‘two-tier’ alliance unless some members were willing to send more troops for the campaign to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. Demetri Sevastopulo, Gates Warns of Two-tier NATO, February 7, 2008, at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e505e66-d54b-11dc-8b56-0000779fd2ac.html (Accessed May 4, 2008). 30 While the United States is not averse to using forceful means like aerial spraying, NATO allies were reluctant to do so mainly for reasons of losing the heart and minds campaign. Forceful eradication like the spraying of herbicides, especially in Helmand, could further undermine support for the government of President Hamid Karzai, alienate the local populace, and provide a support base for the Taliban. In an interview with this author in Kabul, June 2007, former minister of counter narcotics, Eng. Habibullah Qaderi, emphasized the need for a unified and well-coordinated strategy with help from the international community. 31 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, August 2007. 32 They are integrated civilian–military organizations designed to meet three objectives: improve security, extend the reach of the Afghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in priority provinces. The PRTs were established in Afghanistan at the end of 2002. As of September 5, 2007, ISAF had 25 PRTs which were operational, 12 of which were US teams. Briefing on the role of PRT at ISAF HQ, Kabul, June 17, 2007. Also see ISAF PRT Handbook, 3rd edition, February 3, 2007, Kabul, ISAF. For further details see Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, USAID, June 2006, at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf (Accessed June 24, 2007); Andrew Feickert, n. 28; Kenneth Katzman, ‘Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy’, CRS Report RL30588. 33 It is a counter-insurgency strategy the British employed with great success during the 1950s, and US Special Forces are taking the same approach in similar bases along the Pakistani border and in central Afghanistan. PRTs are a useful concept of COIN – an ‘ink blot’ strategy wherein stability created by counter-insurgents in one area can gradually spread to other areas. See Andrea M. Lopez, ‘Engaging or Withdrawing, Winning or Losing? The Contradictions of Counterinsurgency Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Third World Quarterly, 28(2), 2007, p. 247. 34 This inference has been drawn from discussions with Afghan government officials and Afghan people in Kabul, Heart, and Jalalabad. Also see Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, Implementation: A New Approach to Multinational Coordination in Afghanistan, Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, Muscatine, IO, April 2008. 35 This was stated by an Afghan NGO security official in Mazar-e-Sharif, on June 6, 2007. 36 This inference was derived after visits to PRT-funded projects and discussions with NGO personnel and locals in different parts of Afghanistan in June 2007. 37 Greg Mills, n. 12. 38 John MacKinlay, Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, RUSI Whitehall Paper 64, London, 2005, pp. 57–58. 39 Discussions with Greg Mills and Terence McNamee at the International Workshop on ‘Building Peace: Applying the Tswalu Protocol to Africa’, hosted jointly by the Brenthurst Foundation, Johannesburg, The Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue, Addis Ababa, and the Commission of the African Union, Addis Ababa, March 15–16, 2008. Also see Greg Mills, Terence McNamee, and Denny Lane, ‘Security Vortex, Warlords and Nation Building’, The National Interest, January 9, 2006, at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=11952 (Accessed May 15, 2007). 40 In Afghanistan, during the tenure of the Ninth International Security Assistance Force (ISAF IX) deployed between May 2006 and February 2007, this evolved into ADZs, providing a focus of development spending and security effort. Discussions at the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy, Camp Phoenix, Kabul-Jalalabad Road, June 15, 2007. See ‘UK Military Operations in Afghanistan’, speech by Adam Ingram, minister of state, to the All-Party Parliamentary Army Group, October 24, 2006, at http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/MinAF/20061024UkMilitaryOperationsInAfghanistan.htm (Accessed August 30, 2008); ‘Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes’, Asia Report, n. 123, International Crisis Group, Kabul/Brussels, November 2, 2006, pp. 1–16, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4485 (Accessed November 10, 2006). 41 This approach was described in 2006 by one senior US officer in the Combined Joint Task Force 76, based at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul. See Greg Mills, n. 12; Carlotta Gall, ‘British Make Initial Gains against Taliban’, The New York Times, August 5, 2007, at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/world/asia/05afghan.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print (Accessed August 7, 2007). 42 David J. Kilcullen, n. 2, p. 5. 43 A former top US military commander in Afghanistan, Lietenant General Karl Eikenberry, has said that the greatest long-term threat to success in Afghanistan is not the resurgence of the Taliban but ‘the potential irretrievable loss of legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan’. In this regard, he specifically cited several critical areas – corruption, justice, and law enforcement – and said: ‘We need more urgency to build Afghan government capacity and help connect it with the Afghan people’. General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.), and Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Revitalizing Our Efforts: Rethinking Our Strategies, 2nd edition, Center for the Study of the Presidency, Afghanistan Study Group Report, Washington, DC, January 30, 2008, p. 28. 44 Interview with an Afghan member of parliament, Shukria Barakzai, June 1, 2007. Also see Beth DeGrasse and Emily Hsu, Afghanistan: Old Problems, New Parliament, New Expectations, United States Institute of Peace Briefing, October 2005, at http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2005/1025_afghanwomen.html (Accessed March 7, 2007). 45 For details on the failure of DDR, see Mark Sedra, n. 23. 46 David J. Kilcullen, n. 2, p. 6. 47 With a per capita gross domestic product of only US$377 in 2007, most Afghans live on less than a dollar a day, the World Bank measure of absolute poverty. Afghanistan was ranked the second-lowest country in the world on the UNDP 2007–2008 Human Development Index, and is in the bottom five countries of the world for life expectancy (42.9 years), under-five infant mortality (257 per 1,000 live births), maternal mortality, and adult literacy (28 per cent). 48 For more details on ‘rentier state’ see Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2002, pp. 81–105. 49 Afghanistan is ranked 172 out of 180 in Transparency International's corruption perception index. Unsurprisingly, in the context of highly publicized corruption of the Afghan state, the government as an aid administrator was considered by two-thirds of the respondents as the most affected by corruption. NGOs and international organizations came second, with only 13 per cent, while private companies and PRTs fall far behind with 8 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. A mere 10 per cent of respondents trusted the aid community to rectify its corrupt practices. According to Lorenzo Delesgues, co-author of the report, ‘Sometimes it's better to channel aid through an Afghan government that has a higher risk of corruption than aid that has a high risk of inefficiency. It's better to channel it through the government because even if it is being taken it will stay in the country’. See Yama Torabi and Lorenzo Delesgues, Afghanistan: Bringing Accountability Back In: From Subjects of Aid to Citizens of the State, Integrity Watch Afghanistan Report, Kabul, June 2008. 50 Ronald E. Neumann, n. 34. 51 The United States has delivered only half of the $10.4 billion it pledged in 2008, while the European Commission and Germany have sent less than two-thirds of their commitments. Matt Waldman, Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan, ACBAR Advocacy Series, March 2008, at http://www.oxfam.org/files/ACBAR_aid_effectiveness_paper_0803.pdf (Accessed June 23, 2008). 52 Discussions with Action Aid International staff in Afghanistan in May 2007. For details on the ‘phantom aid’ see Ann Jones, ‘How U.S. Dollars Disappear in Afghanistan: Quickly and Thoroughly’, September 3, 2006, at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/09/03/INGR0KRGMF1.DTL (Accessed July 29, 2007). 53 These include insurgent attacks, ambushes, small or heavy arms fire, rocket or mortar fire, improvised explosive device blasts, mine strikes, and surface-to-air attacks. The tactic of suicide attacks has been employed with lethal effectiveness and regularity by the Taliban. Compared to 109 such attacks in 2006, Afghanistan witnessed 270 suicide attacks in 2007. See Graeme Smith, ‘Afghan Tribes Plan Manifesto of Dissent’, Globe and Mail, February 19, 2008, at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080219.wafghan19/BNStory/Afghanistan/home (Accessed March 21, 2007); ‘A Suicidal Epidemic’, Los Angeles Times, February 10, 2008, at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-ed-suicide10feb10,0,7334339.story (Accessed April 2, 2007). 54 James L. Jones and Thomas R. Pickering, n. 43, p. 23. 55 ACBAR, Statement on the Protection of Civilans in Afghanistan, Kabul, August 1, 2008. 56 Yama Torabi and Lorenzo Delesgues, n. 49. 57 James L. Jones and Thomas R. Pickering, n. 43. 58 Statement of the top UN envoy in Afghanistan, Ambassador Kai Eide of Norway. See Louis Charbonneau, Afghan Insurgency Ruthless, Changes Needed – UN, March 12, 2008, at http://www.reuters.com/article/asiaCrisis/idUSN12214258 (Accessed March 14, 2008). 59 Ronald E. Neumann, n. 34.
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